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THE
SELF-REVELATION OF GOD.

WITH
THE PUBLISHERS'
COMPLIMENTS.

BY


SAMUEL HARRIS, D.D., LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN YALE UNIVERSITY.

EDINBURGH:
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1887.

To
THE STUDENTS
WHO IN SUCCESSIVE CLASSES HAVE BEEN
UNDER MY INSTRUCTION IN
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN BOWDOIN COLLEGE
AND IN
BANGOR AND YALE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS,
This Book
IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED.



CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

	PAGE
Design and plan	1-11

PART I.

GOD REVEALED IN EXPERIENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE OBJECT OF RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SERVICE	13-149
--	--------

CHAPTER I.

RELIGION.

DEFINITION. 1. Christianity and the ethnic religions. 2. Religion the response of man's spirit to the presence of the true God. 3. The idea of God at first obscure and defective. 4. Two essential elements of the idea of a divinity. 5. Progressive development of the idea. 6. No religion without a divinity. Proposed substitutes. 7. Religion manifested in all man's spiritual powers. 8. Ethnic religions degenerated	15-29
--	-------

CHAPTER II.

GOD KNOWN IN EXPERIENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS.

I. Explanations. Definition of experience. In what sense consciousness is used	30-36
II. The elements of the idea of God given in intuition and so brought within the consciousness. Objections answered	36-38
III. Consciousness of God in its deeper meaning. 1. Reasonable and antecedently probable. 2. Implied in the idea of religion and essential to its reality. 3. In fact assumed in all religions. 4. Involved in man's moral consciousness. 5. And in his scientific consciousness. The idea and belief presupposed in the proofs of God's existence	38-47

CHAPTER III.

GOD KNOWN BY REVELATION.

What revelation is. Essential to man's knowledge of any being. Revelation of man's physical environment. Revelation of man in his personality. Revelation of God. What God reveals is himself	48-58
---	-------

CHAPTER IV.

GOD KNOWN THROUGH REVELATION BY THE ACTION OF
MAN'S MIND RECEIVING AND UNDERSTANDING IT.

1. Necessary to the impartation of knowledge by any revelation. Three factors in the knowledge of God. 2. Action of thought defining the idea, verifying the belief, purifying and enlarging the knowledge of God. Mistakes. Objection. 3. Knowledge of God through revelation progressive. 4. Inferences as to the Biblical revelation. 5. The consciousness of God in the background of self-consciousness. Pantheistic error 59-73

CHAPTER V.

MAN'S CAPACITY TO RECEIVE GOD'S REVELATION AND TO
KNOW HIM THROUGH IT.

1. The capacity assumed in all religions. 2. Implied in the reality of human knowledge and the true conception of man's powers of knowing. Rational realism, the true theory of knowledge. God not known by unaided reason. The reason sense. 3. Possible on account of man's likeness to God. True line of demarkation between the supernatural and the natural. 4. Knowledge of God rooted in every part of man's constitution as personal. 5. Not a special faith-faculty. 6. Objection that the absolute cannot present itself in the consciousness of a finite being. 7. Belief and knowledge. 8. Theology concrete, not abstract 74-102

CHAPTER VI.

MAN'S SPIRITUAL CAPACITIES NEED TO BE AWAKENED.

1. Either because not yet developed, or because neglected or perverted. 2. The capacity to know God exists in the deepest spiritual insensibility. 3. God gives the influence of his Spirit to awaken men from spiritual insensibility. 4. Growth of knowledge after the awakening. Acquisition, assimilation, organization of knowledge into life. 5. The Christian doctrine of the witness of the Spirit 103-120

CHAPTER VII.

SYNTHESIS OF THE EXPERIENTIAL, HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL
IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

- Necessity of the synthesis seen in the errors resulting from isolation. 1. Isolation of the experiential issues in mysticism. Quietism; fanaticism. 2. Isolation of the rational issues in dogmatism and rationalism. Exemplified in the history of Protestantism. 3. Isolation of historical revelation issues in mere archæology and criticism. Or, in an opposite direction, the Bible isolated from thought. 4. Necessity of the synthesis of the three. 5. Historical revelation the medium of it. Christ the centre of religious life and theological thought. 6. To attain this synthesis the problem of all theological thinking. Objections to theology. 7. Historical fact that religious

experience and theological thought have been the working out of this synthesis. Three stages in the progress of theological thought.
 8. Key to the current movement of theological thought 121-149

PART II.

GOD REVEALED IN THE UNIVERSE AS THE ABSOLUTE BEING 151-229

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ABSOLUTE BEING.

Unity of the so-called arguments. Defects in their common treatment. Definition of absolute Being. That it exists a necessary principle of reason. Objections answered. Denial of the absolute Being involves universal skepticism. Its existence an implicit postulate of physical science. Historical persistence of the idea and belief. Concurrence of agnostics, pantheists, materialists and deists. The true significance of the *a priori* or ontological argument. The absolute Being revealed in the universe 153-165

CHAPTER IX.

THE ABSOLUTE BEING AND NON-THEISTIC THEORIES.

Definition of atheism. Classification of non-theistic theories 166-170

I. Denial of all knowledge of the existence of absolute Being. Represented by Comte's positivism. Rejects attempts to construct a theory of the universe as unnecessary and illegitimate. Implies the impossibility of knowledge. Rejected by physical science. Rational necessity of finding a theory of the universe 170-171

II. Spencerial agnosticism. Is partial, not complete agnosticism. Arises from attempting to define what the absolute Being is from the *a priori* idea; this gives only negatives; the absolute Being known as revealed in the universe. Assumes a false *a priori* idea. Rests on a false application of the maxim that definition limits. Issues logically in complete agnosticism. Agnostics inconsistent with themselves. Cosmic theism. Mr. Spencer might more consistently be a theist. The theistic position 172-182

III. Pantheism. 1. Definition. 2. Rests on no reasonable grounds. 3. Involves contradictions. Inadequate to solve the necessary problems of reason. 4. Incompatible with free will, moral responsibility and religion. 5. Various forms, its essential principles the same in all. 6. Calls attention to neglected aspects of truth 182-201

IV. Materialism. Definition. Not monism. Does not give the real absolute Being. Rests on subjective materialism. Cannot account for the facts of personality. Nor for physical phenomena. Its contradictions 201-206

CHAPTER X.

THE ABSOLUTE BEING AND THEISM.

- Four forms of belief in a divinity. Two objections. The question stated. Alleged impossibility of identifying the absolute Being of philosophy with the personal God whom we worship. 1. The alleged impossibility arises from the falsity of the philosophy. 2. From false ideas of theism. 3. From false ideas of personality. 4. Knowledge of the absolute Being positive but incomplete. 5. The absolute Being is the All-conditioning. 6. Atheism not in agreement with itself; in each form has some agreement with theism. 7. Truths misconceived in pantheism and set forth in theism 207-229

PART III.

- GOD REVEALED IN THE UNIVERSE AS PERSONAL SPIRIT THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE AND THE CONSTITUTION AND HISTORY OF MAN 231-440

CHAPTER XI.

GOD REVEALED IN THE UNIVERSE AS THE POWER FROM WHICH IT ORIGINATES AND ON WHICH IT DEPENDS.

- The cosmological argument. The absolute Being is the First Cause, transcending the universe. Shown from the essential finiteness and conditionedness of the universe. Objections. Intimations of the personality of the absolute 233-250

CHAPTER XII.

GOD REVEALED AS PERSONAL SPIRIT IN THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

- The Physico-theological argument. Nature and scope of the evidence. Preliminary objections. Principle on which the argument rests . . 251-256
- I. Nature is symbolic. Physical objects known in intellectual equivalents. Their objective ideality. Theism the only explanation. Nature comprehended in science. No science if nature did not reveal universal reason like man's. Physical science in harmony with theism. Symbolism of nature recognized in human language and action. All physical objects in the unity of a system 256-266
- II. Nature orderly under law 267-272
- III. Nature realizes ideals. Internal and external ends. 1. Evidence in particular objects and arrangements. In structures. In processes. In selection. In the coöperation of many agencies. 2. Evidence in the progressive realization of a plan in the cosmos as a whole. Teleology of evolution. 3. Evidence in the beautiful and sublime in nature 272-281

IV. Nature subserves uses. 1. Subserviencce of particular agents and processes to the uses of sentient and rational beings. 2. Nature as a whole subservient to the spiritual system	281-287
V. Unity of nature and the supernatural in one all-comprehending system	287-292
VI. The Inference	292-294
VII. Objections against the evidence. Arising from isolating a single fact. Alleging imperfection in the object adduced as evidence. From the existence of physical evil	294-316
VIII. Objections against the validity of the inference. That order and law prove the absence of will. That the inference from final causes is not scientific. That it presupposes a knowledge of the divine purposes. That the evidence is annulled by discovering the efficient cause. That we have had no experience in world-building. Fortuitous concurrence of atoms. Supposition that the universe is grounded in reason or spirit, but unconscious and impersonal	316-340

CHAPTER XIII.

GOD REVEALED AS PERSONAL SPIRIT IN THE CONSTITUTION AND HISTORY OF MAN.

I. In the existence of personal beings	341-345
II. In the constitutional religiousness of man. 1. Religion with belief in a divinity generic, spontaneous, powerful, persistent. 2. Therefore constitutional in man. Objections. 3. Inference that God exists	345-365
III. In the constitution of man as shown by its analysis. 1. In man's intellectual constitution. 2. In man's moral constitution as having free will. 3. In his susceptibility to rational or spiritual motives and emotions. 4. Belief in God rooted in every part of man's constitution as personal. 5. Religion and belief in a divinity antecedent to and independent of science	365-402
IV. God revealed in the practical power of faith in him. 1. Necessary to religion. 2. Practical influence in every sphere. 3. Objection that these blessings may be realized without a God. Hellenistic culture	402-423
V. God revealed in the course of human history. 1. In the history of man's religions. 2. Atheism disastrous. 3. Influence of religion in the progress of civilization. 4. The only true philosophy of history	423-433
VI. Anthropomorphism. The objection stated and answered	433-440

PART IV.

GOD REVEALED IN CHRIST AS THE REDEEMER OF MAN FROM SIN . . . 441-552

CHAPTER XIV.

ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GOD'S REVELATION OF HIMSELF IN REDEMPTION THROUGH CHRIST.

- I. It is historical. II. Involves the miraculous. III. The redemptive action constitutes the revelation. IV. The Christian revelation is historical and prophetic. V. Through a human medium in its reception and communication and is progressive. VI. The Bible. VII. The redemptive action continued in the Holy Spirit. VIII. Christianity ideal as well as historical 443-473

CHAPTER XV.

MIRACLES.

- I. Definition. II. Possibility. III. Epochal in the spiritual system and in the physical. IV. Miracles and law. V. What the impossibility of miracles implies 474-504

CHAPTER XVI.

UNITY AND CONTINUITY OF THE REVELATION OF GOD IN NATURE, MAN AND CHRIST.

- I. In nature and man 505-515
- II. In nature, man and Christ. 1. Christ's coming an epoch in the revelation, central in human history. 2. Brings the divine into the human as an abiding power of illumination, renovation and reconciliation. 3. Takes up and vitalizes all truth in the religion of Israel; in the ethnic religions; in modern substitutes for a divinity; in philosophy. 4. Reveals the worth of man and the significance of human life. 5. Christianity the absolute and universal religion . . . 515-532
- III. Unity of law in the spiritual and the physical systems 532-546
- IV. Objections. 1. Christianity cannot take up the varied knowledge and activities of the present time. 2. Christianity unreasonable in view of the vastness of the universe 546-552

“The one true and deepest theme of the world’s and man’s history, to which all others are subordinate, is the conflict of faith and unbelief. All epochs in which faith, under whatever form, prevails, are brilliant, heart-elevating, and fruitful for contemporaries and for after times. On the contrary all epochs in which unbelief, under whatever forms, maintains its sorry triumph, even though for a moment they should shine with a sham splendor, vanish from the view of posterity, because no one chooses to trouble himself to know that which is unfruitful.”

GOETHE: Israel in the Wilderness, in Notes to the West-Östlicher Divan.

THE SELF-REVELATION OF GOD.

INTRODUCTION.

IT may seem needless to add another to the many treatises on what we have been accustomed to call Natural Theology and the Evidences of Christianity. Certainly there is no need of a mere repetition of the familiar arguments. But God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself presents himself anew to the people of every generation to be received or rejected as their redeemer from sin, and his kingdom of righteousness and good-will to be sought or refused as the progressive and only realization of the true wellbeing of man. And while the reasons for believing in God and seeking first his kingdom are always in essence the same, the apprehension of them by men of successive generations must vary in accordance with the progress of knowledge and civilization and the changing condition, opinions and development of man. Hence in every generation the claims of God in Christ to the faith and service of men must be examined anew. The old truths, more precious than rubies, will never change, but they must have a new setting in the knowledge and life of the time.

In our day scientific discoveries and industrial inventions have enlarged our knowledge of the universe and of the application of its material and forces to the service of man. And since the universe itself is the manifestation or revelation of the ever present God, this enlargement of knowledge presents new evidence of his existence and new revelations of what he is. Also the progress of knowledge as to the physical, political and social wellbeing of man presents new tests and confirmations of the reality of God's revelation of himself in human affairs and pre-eminently in Christ, and of the necessity of his redemption of men from sin and of the progressive realization of his kingdom

of righteousness and good-will on earth to the renovation and the true progress and wellbeing of man. Philosophical thought, also, is finding a broader and firmer basis for theistic belief.

On the other hand, the intense energy and wide range of human thought, its great discoveries, the great increase of knowledge and its wide diffusion, bring us to new points of view, open new ranges of investigation, and so necessarily raise new questions, difficulties and objections as to the existence of God and the reality of his revelation of himself in the universe and especially in Christ. These are forced on us from the spheres of physical science, of social and political economy, and of philosophy. For example, while the Kantian philosophy in one line of its development has been helpful to theism, in another line it has issued in a diversified progeny of phenomenalism, agnosticism and pantheism.

Thus the thinking of the present day on God and his revelation of himself to man, on the part both of skeptics and believers, has an earnestness, vigor and depth, a breadth of range and a general prevalence never before surpassed. Butler's Analogy, Paley's Natural Theology and Evidences of Christianity, the Bridgewater Treatises, and similar defenses of Christian Theism in the last and the earlier parts of the present century are not now sufficient. The evidence which they present is as valid as ever; but they fail to present the new evidence and to meet the new questions and objections now urged on our attention; their method is open to criticism; and some of the principles which they assume are now the very points in question.

Hence there is imperative need of a reëxamination and restatement of the evidence of the reality of God's revelation of himself as the one personal God, and of his preëminent revelation of himself in Christ as the Redeemer of men, reconciling the world unto himself as recorded in the Bible.

Such reëxamination is also necessary in order to discriminate between false and true ways of meeting the difficulties and objections of the time, and to prevent fleeing, as if in desperation, to defenses of Christianity which only betray it. For example, some theologians are looking to a modified Hegelianism with an inevitable trend toward pantheistic thought, to stay the progress of skepticism. But in thus defending Christianity they are in danger of sacrificing not only Christianity, but with it the personality of man and the personality of God.

In Part I. I consider the origin of the knowledge of God. It

begins as a spontaneous belief in the religious experience or consciousness.

Any statement of the evidence of Christian theism which is to meet the thinking of this age must take and hold the position that man's knowledge of God begins in experience. It exists in his implicit consciousness as a spontaneous feeling and belief before he has defined it in thought or asked for evidence of its truth. All knowledge originates in experience. Thought discovers no new element of reality. It can only apprehend, define and integrate the realities already presented, from within or without, in intuition. Until the presentation of some reality in experience thought is impossible, because there is nothing to think about. We know, indeed, in rational intuition the self-evident principles of reason which are regulative of all thought and action. But the mind acts in these rational intuitions presenting these principles in consciousness only on some occasion in experience which calls forth thought. "Pure thought," developing knowledge *a priori* without the presentation of any reality in experience, is impossible. In this there is now a general concurrence of all schools of thought. At the present day any satisfactory statement of the evidence of Christian theism must conform to this principle. Man cannot find God by mere dint of thinking without knowing him in experience, any more than he can find the outward world in that way. "Pure thought" cannot attain even the idea of God in this way, any more than a man who has never seen can acquire the idea of color. By thus thinking he will find nothing but his own thoughts.

The next position to be taken is that man's knowledge of God in experience presupposes God's revelation of himself to man. All objects known in experience reveal themselves by some action on the man in which they present themselves in his consciousness. Man has knowledge even of himself only when he is in some way active and therein reveals himself to himself in his own consciousness. In like manner man's knowledge of God in experience presupposes God's revelation of himself to man. By some action or influence, mediate or immediate, on the man, God has presented himself in his consciousness and thus revealed himself to him. The initiative in man's knowledge of God must be taken by God. Man can never come to the knowledge of God and to communion with him unless God has already made advances to the man. Man can know God only in some revelation which God makes of himself to man. The great truth of Chris-

tianity is that it is not man who must first seek God, but it is God who first seeks man. And this accords with a philosophical truth underlying the possibility of man's knowledge of God.

Next, as to what God reveals, the position to be taken is that God primarily reveals himself rather than doctrines concerning himself. The doctrines are the product of man's intellectual apprehension of God in the true significance of his revelation of himself. But what man is to know is God himself. So the heavenly bodies do not reveal astronomy, they reveal themselves and their movements. It is man's study of them as thus revealed which produces the astronomy. What man knows in the astronomy is the heavenly bodies themselves and the laws of their action. The current of modern thought is setting powerfully away from the abstract to the concrete, from words and abstract notions to facts and things, from the formulas of thought to the realities which they signify. Our thought of God must set in the same direction. The question is not, Do we know truth, doctrines, moral precepts? but, Do we know God and what do we know of him? It is not, Can we prove the truth of Christianity as a system of thought? but, Do we know God in Christ redeeming the world from sin and establishing his kingdom of righteousness and good-will to be sought first as the realization of man's true wellbeing?

As to the method of revelation, the right defense of Christian theism must show, further, that God reveals himself primarily in historical action by what he does. By his action and influence on the individual he reveals himself in the consciousness. He acts in the courses of nature and of human history in providential action, in moral government, in redemption, in the advancement of his kingdom of righteousness and good-will, and thus reveals himself to men. God's revelation of himself recorded in the Bible is mainly through historical action. His prophetic revelations of truth and precept, of warning, promise and prediction, are occasioned by events occurring or impending, and are incidental and subordinate to the course of his historical action.

Hence we recognize in man a spiritual capacity through which he is receptive of the revelation of God, and can know him when revealed; a spiritual eye by which he can see the divine light if it shines on him; spiritual susceptibilities through which he is sensitive to the divine influence when it touches him.

Another position to be held is that if God reveals himself to man, man must receive the revelation and apprehend, interpret

and verify it in his own thought. So the outward world reveals itself to man through his sensorium, but he must apprehend, interpret and verify his spontaneous beliefs in thought. This is what man has been doing in all ages ; it is what science has been doing, with slow and laborious progress, ever since scientific thought began. This is equally essential in attaining the knowledge of God. It is especially imperative in a scientific and skeptical age. To try to screen our religious belief from the tests of reason and the scrutiny of rational thought would be to admit the impossibility of defending it to intelligence as reasonable, and to abandon religion to mysticism and fanaticism.

The three factors in the knowledge of God are divine revelation, religious experience and rational thought.

The next step, therefore, must be to ascertain whether God has made other revelations of himself by which we may verify the spontaneous belief arising in religious experience or consciousness, and correct and enlarge the idea of God obtained from that belief by thought. This is done in the three remaining Parts. God has made revelation of himself in the universe, both in nature and in man ; he reveals himself also in Christ. By these the reality of God's revelation of himself in the consciousness of the individual is tested and verified, and his knowledge of God is enlarged. The same God whom he has found revealed in his own religious experience, he now finds revealed in the universe as the absolute Being ; revealed in the constitution and course of nature, and in the constitution and history of man, as the personal God, the universal and absolute reason energizing in them ; and revealed in Christ as the Redeemer of men from sin.

In pursuing this investigation, in Part II. it is shown that an absolute or unconditioned Being exists, and is manifested in the universe. This proposition is a first principle of reason and a necessary law of thought. English and American theologians have commonly passed this by, sometimes as merely fruitless metaphysics. But it is necessary to the true idea of God, who is not God if he is not the absolute Being ; and it is necessary to show the true basis of the evidences following, and to hold them to their true significance and point. In recognizing the absolute the theist has thus far in agreement with him the Spencerian agnostics, and the monists, pantheistic and materialistic. Only the few, whose theory of knowledge involves universal skepticism, deny it. In fact, this postulation of the existence of the

absolute Being as a primitive principle of reason is the truth sought in vain in the *a priori* or ontological argument in its various forms.

In Part III. the inquiry will be, first, what the absolute Being is revealed to be in the constitution and course of nature. In the so-called cosmological argument we find that the absolute Being is the first Cause or Power on which the universe depends and which manifests itself in it. Mr. Spencer agrees with us up to this point. Then, looking at the constitution and course of nature, we find evidence of a directing mind. This is commonly called the teleological argument or the argument from final causes. But it is much broader. We find in nature manifestations of each of the four fundamental ideas of reason, the True, the Right, the Perfect and the Good. Nature is symbolic of rational thought, ordered under law, progressive towards ideals, and subservient to uses and productive of good. Thus in God we find the unity of nature and the supernatural without any break in the law of continuity. It has been claimed that evolution, if proved true, would annul this whole line of evidence. But it will be shown that the evolution of the Cosmos as a whole reveals truth or thought, is ordered under law, is progressive through successive epochs toward the realization of higher and higher orders of being, and is subservient to their uses; and indicates the unity and continuity of the progressive development of the universe. If it impairs any supposed evidence of the direction of mind in details (though I do not see that it does so), it restores more in showing the evidence of intelligent direction in the progressive development of the Cosmos as a whole, through all ages and by the concerted action of innumerable molecules and forces, from the primitive homogeneous stuff. Then, secondly, from the constitution and history of man, it will be shown that the belief in God has its roots in man's reason, his will, his susceptibility to motives and emotions, in every part of his constitution as a rational personal being; that its truth is essential to the right understanding of his history, and to the discovery of any worthy end for which he exists.

In Part IV. the revelation of God in Christ will be considered, but not with the design of examining the evidences of Christianity in detail. I shall attempt only to ascertain and define the essential idea of Christianity, of the revelation of God in Christ and of the miraculous, and to find a reasonable basis for the possibility of miracles without interrupting the continuity of na-

ture in its true sense. And, in conclusion, I shall show the unity and continuity of God's revelation of himself in nature and in the supernatural from the beginning of motion in the homogeneous stuff through the successive epochs of the physical evolution till rational man appears; and then in the progressive education and development of man in the moral system until the great epoch in the progress of the moral system when God in Christ appears reconciling the world to himself, elevating men in a new birth by the Spirit into a higher and spiritual humanity, which is Christ's kingdom of righteousness and peace on earth.

In prosecuting our investigations along these lines, if we would take up all the thought of this age pertaining to the subject, we must take up not only its doubts and difficulties, but also its highest attainments in the conception of God. If we would go anywhere we must start from where we are. So in every science investigation must start from the highest attainments already made. It will hardly be denied that this highest is the Christian conception of God, the absolute Spirit, perfect in all power, wisdom and love, and ever acting among men to reconcile the world to himself. He is the absolute Power; not, as the Epicureans taught, apart from the universe, but immanent and active in it; "my father worketh hitherto;" "he is not far from each one of us; for in him we live and move and have our being." He is the absolute Reason; not, as the Stoics believed, an impersonal, unconscious reason,¹ but reason alive and energizing; in God as the absolute Reason, all truth and law, all ideals of perfection and good, are eternal and archetypal, and he is ever revealing himself by the progressive realization of them in the universe. He is immanent in the universe; not the same with it, as the pantheists teach, but transcending it, while ever active in it, realizing in it the thoughts of perfect wisdom in the action of perfect love. He is in the universe; not merely in the physical system evolving in necessity under blind force, but also in the spiritual system of personal free agents under moral law, redeeming them from sin, educating

¹ I commonly use the word reason not to denote merely the power of reasoning by which the finite mind by virtue of its rationality passes by inference from the known to the knowledge of what had been unknown, but to denote the mind or spirit itself considered as capable of the rational intuition of primitive and universal principles. This implies in a finite mind the power, as its finiteness involves the necessity, of reasoning. In God, the absolute Reason, all knowledge is archetypal and eternal.

them to righteousness and good-will, and in the midst of the world progressively establishing the kingdom of heaven. The physical system is the form or medium in and through which the spiritual manifests itself. The question to be answered in this volume is, "Do we find in our own consciousness, do we find in the universe, in the constitution and course of nature, or in the constitution and history of man, do we find in Jesus Christ and the growth of the kingdom of God on earth, evidence that such a God is revealing himself therein to man?"

While we begin with the highest conception of God, we know that his revelation of himself to man must be progressive and can never be completed, because it is the revelation of the absolute and infinite God in the finite and to finite beings. It is a common assumption in the objections of skepticism that the absolute Reason can reveal itself only in a perfected and completed universe; that any imperfection in the medium through which the revelation is made proves imperfection in the God revealed. This overlooks the fact that the distinction of the absolute or unconditioned and the finite, like that of the true and the absurd or of the right and the wrong, is fundamental in the reason, and no power, not even the almighty, can annul it. If God reveals himself it must be through the medium of the finite and to finite beings. The revelation must be commensurate with the medium through which it is made and with the development of the minds to whom it is made. Hence both the revelation itself and man's apprehension of the God revealed must be progressive and, at any point of time, incomplete. Hence, while it is the true God who reveals himself, man's apprehension of God at different stages of his own development may be not only incomplete, but marred by gross misconceptions.

Such is the question before us in this volume and the general course of thought in answering it. I have not attempted to follow out all these lines of evidence in their details. To do this would be impossible in a single volume; for there is nothing in the universe but what has some significance in its bearing on the knowledge of God. I have aimed rather to indicate the positions to be taken, the lines in which the evidence is found, and the way in which it is to be presented in its relations to the thought and life of the present age.

The wide-spread skepticism of the day, so far as it has an intellectual basis, rests on errors of principle or fact, or on erroneous applications of truth and fact, in empirical or philosophical

science. Hence it involves the profoundest questions both of philosophical and of physical, anthropological and sociological science. But while its roots are deep in questions and researches necessarily confined to the few, its ramifications of misapprehension, doubt and disbelief penetrate the thinking of the many. Few study the philosophy of Kant. Yet the pantheism which has paralyzed evangelical life and thought in Germany sprang from it. Buddhism, arising from analogous philosophical errors, has sway over hundreds of millions. Few study the philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton. Yet to it Spencer appeals in support of the agnosticism which now confronts the Christian church in its work in India and Japan, and is discussed in the workshops as really as in the schools of Christian countries. Few have opportunity to master the investigations of physical science. Yet its laws of evolution, of the correlation and conservation of force, of the uniformity and continuity of nature, are misapplied in popular lectures and literature to disprove the existence of any divine and even of any supernatural being. This skepticism must be killed in its deep roots if it is to die in its branches and leaves. In defending theism it must never be forgotten that belief in a divinity wells up spontaneously, like the belief in the outward world, and is as well-founded; and that in bringing men to faith in God, we must depend first of all on the power of God's Spirit awakening their spiritual susceptibilities to the consciousness of their need of God and to the experience of his presence and sufficient grace. Belief in God without scientific investigation and proof is reasonable, as is also belief in the sun, moon and stars, in fire, air, earth and water, without scientific knowledge of them. But when theism encounters the assaults of skepticism it cannot defend itself merely by appealing to the spontaneous religious belief. It cannot shrink from fairly meeting the profound questions and difficulties which skepticism thrusts on it. When intellectually apprehended theism must meet these questions, because it is itself the true theory of the universe, and sets it forth in the unity of a thoroughly rational system grounded in the absolute and perfect Reason and expressing or manifesting its eternal and archetypal intelligence. It must be able to convince the intellect not less than to touch the heart. To cease to maintain this is to abandon the whole ground to agnosticism and skepticism. It is suicidal in the defense of theism to sneer at all investigation of its fundamental bases and of the errors of skepticism respecting them, as metaphysics confined to the

closets of philosophers and theologians, and of no concern to ordinary thinkers or to the interests of religion.

These deeper principles and facts in philosophy and in physical, anthropological, and sociological science, a right understanding and application of which underlie an intelligent and reasonable knowledge of God, I have considered in *The Philosophical Basis of Theism*. In the present volume we are concerned with the application of the principles there established, in examining the reality of God's revelation of himself in the experience or consciousness of men, and the verification of the same by his further revelation of himself in the constitution and ongoing of the universe, and in Christ. To avoid repetition reference will be made, as occasion may require, to the former volume.

The conclusion reached is not merely that Christian theism may find a tolerated, but inferior and precarious standing in the presence of empirical and philosophical science and advancing civilization. It is that the existence of God, the Absolute Reason, the ultimate ground of the universe and revealing himself in it, is the necessary presupposition of all scientific knowledge; that it is the necessary basis of all ethical philosophy which recognizes an immutable and universal moral law, of all æsthetical philosophy which recognizes any rational and universal standard of perfection and beauty, and of all teleological philosophy which discriminates among the ends of human action, the objects of pursuit and the sources of enjoyment, and determines in the light of reason and by its unchangeable standard what is worthy of man as a rational being, what is the true good which has worth in itself and under all changing conditions is unchanged and everlasting; that the revelation of God in Christ redeeming man from sin and establishing and advancing his kingdom of righteousness and good-will gives the only complete and satisfactory philosophy of human history; that in it alone is given the knowledge of the true goal of human progress and the true realization of the well-being of mankind in God's kingdom of righteousness and good-will on earth, and the motive, light and quickening energy effective for its progressive realization; and that the progress of Christ's kingdom takes into harmony with and subservience to itself the advancing knowledge of every age, meets its questions, its difficulties and objections, and finds in the ever enlarging knowledge of the universe an ever enlarging revelation of God. And thus we find a true significance in the words of Clement of

Alexandria : " Philosophers are children, unless they have been made men by Christ." ¹

This volume is the result of the investigation and discussion of this subject in my instruction of successive classes of theological students for many years. In these studies we have endeavored to avail ourselves of all the new light from the investigations and discoveries of our time, and to meet fairly its questions and difficulties. We have endeavored to find the harmony of its empirical and philosophical science with Christian theism, to comprehend its discoveries not only in the unity of scientific systems, but in the broader unity of the conception of the universe as the progressive revelation of God. I do not offer the book to the public with any thought that it is a complete presentation of the reasons for believing the existence of God, the reality of his revelation of himself, and the harmony of Christian theism with empirical and philosophical science, but only in the hope that it may contribute something to this result; that it may help to expose the fallacy of the objections of skepticism, to confirm the faith and enlarge the knowledge of believers, and to help candid inquirers who in perplexity and doubt are seeking God if haply they may feel after him and find him; though he is not far from every one of us. If it is little that it contributes, yet our Lord pronounces his blessing on the servant who is faithful in that which is little, and rebukes the servant who hid the talent intrusted to him by his Lord because it was but one.

¹ Stromata, bk. i. chap. xi.

PART I.

GOD REVEALED IN EXPERIENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE OBJECT OF RELIGIOUS FAITH AND SERVICE.

“Here have we in brief the ground-thought of all philosophy of religion. It sets forth the religion in its absolute truth, while it recognizes in it the progressive steps and changing forms through which the spirit elevates itself to the true freedom in God which in its essence it demands.” — Pfleiderer, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 137.

“It is after all not our human conception of God nor the manner in which we worship him, but the consciousness that there is a God and that we depend on his guidance and providence, that constitutes the essence of religion; and herein every worshiper of Divinity is alike, no matter as to the form of worship. Have we not all one Father? Has not one God created us?” — *Hebrew Journal*.

“The religious man does not desire communion with his own thoughts, but real communion with God. . . . The religious impulse longs for contact with God, and not simply with doctrines or past history.” — Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. i. pp. 122, 109, translation.

“God is essentially spirit. Religion is a relation of spirit to spirit. This relation of spirit to spirit lies at the ground of religion.” “He who has not broadened his heart beyond the impulses of the finite, who has not attained the exaltation of himself in the aspiration for the eternal in the presentiment or feeling of it, and has not seen into the pure atmosphere of the spirit, let him not touch the matter here to be handled.” — Hegel, *Philosophie der Religion*, vol. i. pp. 98 and 6.

“Where shall we find the principle which includes the whole spirit of a society? In the arts, the literature, the philosophical systems, the civil institutions? Without doubt, if in every people there were not an element more profound than all that, more intimate, more inseparable from the very idea of the social life. And this genius eternally present, of which the very substance of the peoples forms itself, what can it be if it is not religion, since from it issue, as so many necessary consequences, political institutions, the arts, poetry, philosophy, and, up to a certain point, even the course of events. Do not imagine that you understand a people if you have not pushed your inquiry up to their gods. . . . If you know the religious doctrine of a society, you know truly for what and how it lives; you possess its secret; it cannot put you off with any illusion either by its laughter or its tears; you read not only the thoughts on its face, but those which are formed and inscribed by God himself in the depths of its spirit.” — Quinet, *Le Génie des Religions*, p. 12.

“Religion is for our consciousness that region in which all riddles of the world are solved, all conflicts of thought are explained and harmonized, all pains and sorrows are stilled, the region of eternal truth, eternal rest, eternal peace. That by which man is man, is thought; more exactly in the concrete it is spirit. From him as spirit issue all the manifold creations of science, art, political institutions. But all these manifold creations

and all farther complications of human relations, activities, enjoyments, all which has worth for man, in which he seeks his happiness and glory, find their ultimate centre in religion, in the thought, the consciousness, the feeling of God. God is the beginning of all and the end of all; as all issues from him so all goes back to him; thus he is the centre that quickens, animates and inspires all. In religion man sets himself in relation with this centre, in which all his other relations come together; and therewith he exalts himself to the highest grade of consciousness and into the region which, free from all other attraction, is the purely satisfying, the unrestricted, free, and an end for itself . . . As feeling this relation to God is the free enjoyment which we call blessedness; as activity it is nothing else but to manifest the glory of God and to reveal his lordship; and for the man, it is no more to live for himself, his own interest and vain-glory, but for the absolute end. All peoples know that the religious consciousness is that in which they possess truth, and they have regarded religion always as their dignity and as the Sunday of their lives. Whatever awakens doubt and anguish, all cumber and care, all limited interests of the finite we leave behind on the sandbank of the temporal; as from the highest peak of a mountain, far removed from all definite view of the earth, we look restfully over all boundaries, so with the spiritual eye the man, lifted from the hard reality of life, looks on it only as a view, whose lights and shadows and divisions, softened to eternal repose, are in this region mirrored in the beams of the spiritual sun." — Hegel, *Philosophie der Religion*, vol. i. Einleitung, pp. 3-5.

CHAPTER I.

RELIGION.

RELIGION is man's consciousness of relation to a superhuman and supernatural power, which we may call a divinity; and manifests itself in spontaneous belief and feeling, and in voluntary action designed to be a service acceptable to the divinity. It is man's inward life and outward action responsive to his relation to a divinity. It is in reality the conscious response of the human spirit to the presence and action of God, who is ever present and ever active.¹

1. Christianity is the absolute or universal religion, but it is not the only religion.

It is a common opinion among Christian people that religion is properly ascribed only to those who are devoutly living lives of Christian faith and love. But this is not accordant with the accepted usage of the word, which applies this name to all the religions of the world, whether polytheistic or monotheistic, whether pagan or Christian. The life of faith and love is doubtless essential to acceptance with God, but not to the definition of religion.

Christianity, as the absolute religion, does not deny that there are other religions. On the contrary, it takes up into itself all which is true and right in the ethnic religions. It is in antagonism to them only so far as they are erroneous in belief, practice or spirit. It is the goal toward which they are blindly groping, the redemption of which they obscurely feel the need and for which they dimly hope. It would bring them to an end, as the sun brings the light of the stars to an end, not by quenching it, but by absorbing it in the light which fills the firmament.

If this is not so, then outside of Christianity and antecedent to

¹ "A religion is the belief in a superhuman being or beings, whose actions are seen in the works of creation, and in such relations toward this being or beings as prompt the believer to acts of propitiation and worship, and to the regulation of conduct." — Professor Wm. D. Whitney, *Princeton Review*, May, 1881, p. 438.

it there is and has been no religion in the world. Then there would be no evidence that religion is constitutional in man and characteristic of humanity always and everywhere. Then religion begins on earth suddenly, after mankind had existed ages without it; and in a magical way without any vital organic connection with human history and growth. Then it is something which comes down on man from without, but has no root in humanity and no living growth in human history.

2. The religiousness of man is the response of his spirit to the presence of the true God, ever active and revealing himself in the constitution and ongoing of nature, and in the constitution and history of man. Man is religious because he lives in the presence and amid the activities of God, and is constituted so as to receive the divine influence, and to become aware of his presence through it. The lowest savage lives in the presence and amid the activities of the everywhere energizing God. He becomes aware of his presence through his spiritual sensibility, as he becomes aware of the trees and the sun through his physical sensibility. In the religions of the world we see man's universal consciousness that he lives in the presence of this mysterious reality and is dependent on it. In every stage of human progress, in every type of human life, man comes in sight of the superhuman and the supernatural.

3. The idea which in thought the man forms of the divinity of whose presence he becomes conscious is at first obscure, defective, and usually erroneous. It is long before the true idea is attained. His knowledge of God in this respect is analogous to his knowledge of the external world. Man has always lived in the presence of the sun, moon and stars, and of the earth, and has been acted on by their never ceasing energies. He is aware of their presence and has some right ideas of them. But he thinks of the sky as a blue dome dotted with shining spots, of the earth as flat and motionless, and of the sun and stars as moving over it. His ideas of nature are as erroneous as his ideas of God, and his progress towards right ideas as slow. But whatever his errors of thought, it was the real sun and stars and earth which were always acting on him and revealing themselves. So it was the true God who was always revealing himself by his presence and action, and of whom man has always shown himself conscious, however erroneous his early ideas of him and however slow his progress to the knowledge of him as the one true God.

4. In all religions the object of religious belief, feeling and service is a supernatural¹ and superhuman being. God is the Absolute Spirit. These two words denote the two essential ideas of the Deity. In God's universal presence and action he reveals himself as the Infinite or Absolute Spirit. In the spontaneous religiousness of man, which is the response of the soul to the presence of God, we should expect to find traces at least of impressions made in his consciousness by each of these aspects of the Deity. These words would not exist in the language of a rude people, and the ideas which they express would not be defined and formulated in thought. But there would be some dim and undefined feeling of the infinite, thought of probably, if at all, as the superhuman; and some feeling or sense of divinity as spirit or supernatural. In their religion would be spontaneous feelings and beliefs responsive to both the infinite and the spiritual in God. And this we find to be the fact.

The sense of the infinite appears in wonder and awe and fear before the transcendent powers of nature. The world confronts the man at every turn with beings and energies beyond and above his comprehension, and beyond and above his power. He lives in the presence of the infinite, which reveals itself on every side in the inaccessible sky, in the great and silent forests, in the ocean, in the impassable rivers, in the dawning light morning by morning, in thunder, lightning and storm, in the springing of plants from the seed, the coming forth of grass, leaves and flowers in the spring, and in all the mystery of birth and life. Thus everywhere and always confronted and awed by what transcends both his comprehension and his strength, he feels himself hemmed in, limited, dependent, in the grasp of these resistless and incomprehensible powers. His divinity is always superhuman.

On the other hand, he knows in himself thought, feeling and will; from his own voluntary action he gets his first knowledge of power or causal efficiency. He naturally ascribes the effects which he witnesses around him to a thinking, voluntary power like himself. This tendency is discovered now among the lower tribes of savages. One who saw a watch for the first time supposed it to be alive, and when it had run down and stopped, he said it was asleep. A missionary to a savage people sent a boy with fruits to another missionary's family in the neighborhood,

¹ Every spirit, every personal being endowed with intuitive reason and free will, is supernatural, that is, above nature.

with a letter specifying the number. The boy had learned that a letter communicated information. Therefore in a retired spot on the way he hid the letter under a stone and ate some of the fruits. He then took out the letter and delivered it with the remainder. When asked for what was missing, he was astonished, and wondered how the letter hidden under a stone could have known what he was doing. So the savage regards the transcendent and incomprehensible powers, before which he is awed, as intelligent like himself. In the sense of his dependence he cries to them for help, and considers by what offerings or service he can avert their displeasure and gain their favor.¹

Some consciousness of the divinity as a personal being or spirit is inseparable from religion, because religion implies in its essence communion with the divinity in service rendered with the expectation of favors returned. Rothe says: "The religious self-consciousness is immediate consciousness of relation to God as a reciprocal fellowship, a communion with God; but this is possible only with a personal God. Only if God is an I, can he be to us a Thou, as he always is to the religious, — even at the lowest grade of religion; for at this grade it is essentially praying."²

Thus the spontaneous religiousness of man is not the sense of the infinite alone nor the sense of the spiritual alone. The divinity is not solely a transcendent and incomprehensible power manifesting itself everywhere; nor is it solely a spirit-like man (a ghost, a dead ancestor reappearing). It combines both. The primitive and spontaneous religion is the response in human consciousness, however dim and incomplete, to the presence and action of God, the absolute Reason, the eternal Spirit, of whose archetypal thought the universe is the expression, and who is immanent in the universe and ever revealing himself through it.

5. In the progress of man, the form in which he conceives the divinity in thought changes, being gradually cleared, corrected and filled out; but, because he is always confronted with the infinite and the spiritual or supernatural, these essential elements always appear.

At first the horizon which separates the finite from the infinite or absolute, what man comprehends and controls from what transcends his knowledge and his power, is close at hand. In a primitive animism he believes that everything unfamiliar, that acts, is alive, and that any object may be the abode or shrine of a

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp. 555-557.

² Zur Dogmatik, i. p. 25.

divinity. As he advances in knowledge and culture the horizon recedes; the area of the intelligible and familiar enlarges. Still in the greater powers of nature he is awed in the presence of the infinite and sees the action of a mind. He worships greater gods, who are the ruling energies respectively in the sun, the moon, the air, the sea and other greater powers of nature. Also he deifies the man who has exerted powers greater than he knows in his own experience for the deliverance of men from evils or the bestowment of signal good.

In his ruder condition what becomes familiar and explicable ceases to awaken religious sentiments; and in what is extraordinary and anomalous he continues to see the divine. But as he advances further and comes to recognize the uniformity of nature, the fixedness of its laws and the beauty of the cosmos, he begins to see the infinite and the presence of reason in these, and thus attains a nobler idea of the infinite Spirit revealing himself in the universe. Nor does any progress in science remove the religious consciousness of God, or the intellectual necessity of recognizing the absolute Spirit. In explaining the solar system and all the interaction of masses of matter science recognizes gravitation. But whether it is regarded as a force inherent in matter or as communicated through an intervening medium, the explanations issue in the unexplainable. Science announces the law of the correlation and conservation of force, and begins to think it has unveiled the secret of the universe; it identifies molar motion with molecular, it explains light by the vibrations of an all-pervading ether; but as it unfolds the explanation it finds itself inextricably involved in difficulties, and even confronted with seeming contradictions and impossibilities. It resorts to atoms and molecules only to find that they cannot be ultimate, but as "manufactured articles" carry the thought to a power behind themselves.¹ The universe, seen in the clearest light of science, continues to reveal through and behind itself the absolute Spirit that transcends our comprehension and that continually reveals itself in the universe as the power, energizing in it, that sustains and directs it. Man has always found the supernatural as the necessary background of the natural. Hartmann says: "Very little thought is required to satisfy one's self that the natural, all and everywhere, rests on the supernatural and terminates in it. Every atom of nature still preaches its supernatural origin and being, and every force of the mechanical process terminates in

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp. 416-425.

interior emotion, which appoints to the will its ends.”¹ The progress of science does not set the supernatural aside, but reveals more clearly its reality and grandeur; reveals it as the absolute Reason, encompassing not nature only, but the whole contents of human knowledge, and giving it unity, consistency and reality. Not only has science failed to remove this all-encompassing supernatural, but it has shown it to be the most certain and fundamental of realities; so that if we cease to know the absolute Reason, we cease to know anything.

Religion existed before empirical science, before philosophy and theology. The feelings and services in which it has manifested itself have been various; but they all disclose the essential characteristics of religion. The terrors of Shamanism prompting its votaries to avert the malign influence of evil spirits, the rapture of Edwards contemplating the mystery of the Trinity, the self-sacrificing love of Paul suffering the loss of all things and rejoicing in the sacrifice that he may bring to men the glad tidings of God’s grace revealed in Christ, all the multiform motives and emotions of the religions of men, agree in revealing a consciousness of relation to a superhuman and supernatural being.

This conception of religion, necessary from the theistic point of view, is also sustained by the facts ascertained by anthropologists in their investigations of the religions of the world.²

6. Conversely, no state of consciousness, in whatever beliefs, feelings or services manifested, is religion, if void of all indications of impressions received from the Infinite and the Supernatural.

Man’s constitutional religiousness cannot of itself give him a religion. There must be a divinity as the object of the constitutional religiousness or there can be no religion. Man’s constitutional susceptibility to impressions of sense could give him no knowledge of sensible objects nor of himself as sensitive, if there were no outward world to act on his sensorium and thus reveal itself to him and reveal his own sensitive capacity to himself. So man’s susceptibility to religious impressions could give him no knowledge of a divinity nor of his own religious susceptibility,

¹ *Die Religion des Geistes*, part B, p. 118, Hitchcock’s Trans.

² “Certain it is that the oldest religions must have contained the germs of all the later growth and, though perhaps more thoroughly naturalistic than the most naturalistic we now know, must have shown some faint traces at least of awakening moral feeling. . . . The gods are no mere names. They are not the natural phenomena themselves, but spirits, lords, ruling them.” — Prof. C. P. Tiele, *Religions*, in *Encyc. Brit.*, vol. xx. 367, 366.

if there were no divinity to act on his religious susceptibility, and reveal himself through it and therein reveal to the man his own constitutional susceptibility to religion. God is the infinite Spirit. If, by the presence and action of God everywhere, man's religious susceptibility is awakened at once to the consciousness of a divinity and of his own religiousness, this consciousness must disclose more or less clear impressions both of the infinitude and the spirituality of the divinity. Without these there can be no religion.

Man's constitutional religiousness and the necessity of finding an object for it are now very generally admitted; and various objects other than a personal divinity have been proposed to satisfy it. For it is now contended that there may be religion in its full and proper significance without any consciousness of a divinity as its object.

Agnosticism tells us of "worship mostly of the silent sort at the altar of the Unknowable."¹ Mr. Spencer recognizes the existence of absolute Power as a necessary postulate in all scientific knowledge, and also as the object of religion. This belief in the existence of the Absolute, as constitutional in man, must persist through all human evolution. Accordingly he says: "No one need expect that the religious consciousness will die away or will change the lines of its evolution. Its specialities of form, once strongly marked and becoming less distinct during past mental progress, will continue to fade; but the substance of the consciousness will persist."² He recognizes, however, the absolute only. This is but one of the elements essential in the idea of God, and therefore cannot satisfy either the religious consciousness or the demands of reason. Religion supposes communication of some sort between the worshiper and the divinity. Mr. Spencer argues with much insistence that because science can never remove mystery from the universe, therefore religion will always persist. But religion cannot subsist on the mere mystery of an unknowable Absolute.³

¹ Huxley, *Lay Sermons*, pp. 19, 20.

² *The Study of Sociology*, chap. xii. p. 311.

³ Mr. Spencer, in the *Principles of Sociology* (part i. chaps. xiii.-xxv. pp. 185-440), maintains that religion and the idea of a divinity have their origin in the worship of ancestors, this having been preceded by a belief in ghosts. This seems to contradict his doctrine that the object of worship is the unknowable absolute. It is untenable also because the idea of a divinity cannot have originated in a belief in ghosts; man must have had an idea of the spirit in the body before he could believe in its survival after death. Thus Mr.

On the other hand, the followers of Comte, who worship humanity, isolate the personal or spiritual element in the idea of God, and make it the object of the religious consciousness to the exclusion of the absolute or superhuman. This cannot satisfy either the needs of religion or the demands of reason. It does not carry the thought or the heart beyond finite nature and man to an absolute Spirit as the object of trust and service. In fact, it presents no being whatever as the object of worship, not any one man nor the human race itself. Its object of worship is a mere abstraction in the worshiper's own mind of the nobler qualities of humanity disclosed in the whole course of human history. It can satisfy the heart of the worshiper only as he unawares hypostasizes this abstraction of all which is true, right, perfect and good in man, in the conception of an all-transcending Spirit perfect in power, wisdom and love, and thus ignorantly worships the true God.

Since man is constituted with religious needs and susceptibilities there is no reason to fear that religion will cease to be a power in human history ; nor that its object will fade out either into the formless unknowable or into an abstraction of qualities without a being. The object of the religion which is to survive through all changes will be, in some more or less adequate form of conception, the absolute Reason or Spirit revealing himself in the consciousness of men.

Matthew Arnold would identify religion with morality : " Re-

Spencer's own theory with logical necessity carries us back to the fact that man's idea of a spirit originated in his knowledge of himself as a power of invisible thought, volition and energy. This is a simple and natural explanation, accordant with common sense, sustained by the observation of facts, completely satisfactory as an explanation of the idea. To account for its origin it is needless to resort to man's shadow or his dreams. Hence the movements in nature which he sees about him he attributes to a mind or spirit like his own. Mr. Spencer himself seems to imply as much, when, in defending his theory, he says : " The necessity we are under to think of the external energy in terms of internal energy, gives rather a spiritualistic than a materialistic aspect to the universe." (Nineteenth Cent., Jan. 1885, p. 10.) There are insuperable difficulties in carrying out this ghost-theory of the origin of religion in its details. For example, in explaining on this theory the worship of the sun and moon, of mountains, trees and animals, Mr. Spencer says that the names of these objects were sometimes given to men, or that a great chief might be figuratively called a mountain ; and that after death the person might be confounded with the object whose name he had borne. The whole argument is a striking example of special pleading under the powerful bias of a preconceived and favorite theory.

ligion is ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling ; the passage from morality to religion is made when to morality is applied emotion.”¹

But morality without religious faith, however heightened and enkindled, is not religion and cannot meet the religious needs of the soul. It is not every feeling which lifts morality into religion, but only those which spring from the consciousness of a divinity. This is implied in Kant's definition : “ Religion is the recognition of all our duties as divine commands.”² Man's consciousness of his relation to God penetrates with its influence every sphere of life and action. As he comes to know the divinity clearly as the eternal Spirit, the absolute Reason, he sees that all truth and law are eternal in him, that all men are in a moral system in their common relation to him, and that the law itself is the law of universal love. In the consciousness of his dependence on God as a creature he sees that the only life which can accord with the reality of his own condition, the only life which can accord with truth and law and be an acceptable service to God, must be the life of faith or trust in the God on whom he absolutely depends, putting forth its energies in acts of universal love. Thus by religion morality is lifted into the service of God ; it is made of absolute and universal obligation ; it is brought into unity under the all-comprehending law of love ; it is lifted above “ the catoric imperative,” vitalized and made spontaneous by love ; it is inspired and made strong in service by God's graciousness to man and man's faith in God. Thus man rises above the life of morality into the spiritual life of fellowship with God, transfiguring the morality by faith and love into a divine service, and transfiguring the man into the moral likeness of God, who is love.

When morality lacks the consciousness of a divinity, not only is it not religion, it is not even morality in its true development ; it is not obedience to the command of conscience in its true significance ; it is but the dry, hard rock awaiting the divine touch which shall make it flow with the water of life. Morality without religion ignores man's real condition as a creature dependent on God, and the life of faith in him which it requires. It leaves man with nothing above himself on which he can lay hold to lift himself from the fleshly and natural to the spiritual and divine. It implies no need of such divine power, but leads man directly

¹ Literature and Dogma, chap. i. pp. 20, 21.

² Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, iv. 1.

to a life of self-sufficiency. Man recognizes his own autonomy and finds the law which he obeys to be no higher than himself; thus it takes from duty all absolute obligation and all universal application. Knowing no moral system under the law and government of God, morality has no philosophical basis for the law of love, nor for the worth of man, the sacredness of his rights and the equality of men in their relations to God, the common Father and Lord of all, nor for the unity of the spiritual life as in all its aspects and actions the manifestation of faith and love. It is not lifted above the sense of duty and the imperative command of the law to the unity, the spontaneity, the enthusiasm of the life of love; it is rather a piecemeal and perfunctory doing of many duties, a living by rules. As such it is but a defective apprehension of the significance of the moral law, and a partial and incomplete obedience to its requirements. With some similar conception of morality as grounded in self-sufficiency, and as not competent to realize the inspiration, depth and fulness of the spiritual life, Wordsworth wrote in *A Poet's Epitaph*: —

“ A moralist perchance appears,
Led, Heaven knows how, to this poor sod;
And he has neither eyes nor ears,
Himself his world and his own God;

“ One to whose smooth-rubbed soul can cling
Nor form nor feeling, great nor small;
A reasoning, self-sufficient thing,
An intellectual All in All.”

Considering, therefore, both the distinctness of religion and morality, and their necessary union and coöperation in realizing the spiritual life, it is evident that morality cannot be identified with religion nor substituted for it; and that they who do not believe in God cannot find in morality an object for religion which may be a substitute for God, or which can satisfy man's religious consciousness and realize his right spiritual development.

A religion which has not yet recognized the Divinity as a moral law-giver and judge, and therefore has not yet penetrated morality and vitalized it into spiritual life, remains itself a germ not yet developed in its normal growth; a staminate plant which has not yet found the pistillate blossom on which to drop its fertilizing pollen, although it is growing on the same tree. And morality, if not quickened by religion into spiritual life, is but a pistillate plant susceptible of fertilization and awaiting it from above.

D. F. Strauss suggests, in *The Old Faith and the New*, that we may still have a religion in revering the Cosmos itself, a suggestion in which he pathetically utters the yearning of his soul, bereaved of its God by false philosophy, for a divine object of trust and worship. But the Cosmos cannot satisfy the needs of religion. The object of religious faith and service is not humanity; it is the mysterious reality behind humanity, on which humanity itself depends. It is not the Cosmos, but the unconditioned reality behind the Cosmos on which the Cosmos itself depends. The universe does not pass beyond nor rise above the finite. Man feels his dependence on it, ground under material masses and blind and aimless forces. The very design and necessity of religion is to free man from dependence merely and helplessly on unintelligent necessity, on physical and resistless forces, or on fate, by leading him to see his dependence on absolute and perfect Reason, on absolute power guided by wisdom and love. Schleiermacher's conception of religion as primarily the sense of dependence is inadequate. Religion is distinguished not by the sense of dependence, but by the object on which we consciously depend; by the sense of dependence on a being superhuman and supernatural, a being whose power transcends and controls all power, on the absolute Spirit whose intelligence pierces and illuminates all reality and all possibility, and in whom wisdom and love guide and regulate almighty power. We find the ultimate ground of the universe in the absolute Reason, directing all power in wisdom and love; and the right religious life is the life of conscious dependence on this God, and of willing trust and service. Nothing is rightly called religion which shows no trace of the soul's response to the presence of the absolute Spirit.

Mr. J. R. Seeley, in *Natural Religion*, advances the opinion that enthusiastic devotion to the study of a science is a religion, and may satisfy the constitutional religiousness of man. The same may be said of enthusiastic devotion to art or literature, or to the abolition of slavery, to temperance, or any other philanthropic movement. But evidently in none of these do we find any distinctive peculiarity of religion. The subordination of life to a ruling idea, thus bringing it into unity and quickening enthusiastic self-devotion to an object, is not distinctive of religion; for a man may be thus controlled by the greed of gain; he may thus devote himself enthusiastically to any object, good or bad. There is probably no propensity natural to man which may not become his master-passion, flaming up and enveloping his whole

being. It is not enthusiastic self-devotion which is the distinctive peculiarity of religion, but it is the fact that the object of the devotion is a divinity, a being at once superhuman and supernatural. With him, though beyond the finite, man comes into communication because he himself in his own rational and free personality participates in the supernatural; and to him man's thought and heart go out as the supreme object of trust and service. If there is no divinity there is no religion. Then man's constitutional susceptibility to religion is without a real object; his religiousness is a miserable illusion, a falsity in the very constitution of his being.

When agnostics, positivists and materialists affirm the reality of religion, they are using the word excluding its distinctive meaning; they are sheltering their systems under the shadow of a great and venerable name after stripping the name of all that makes it great and venerable. Herein they give their testimony that religion has its roots in the constitution of man and is indispensable to his wellbeing; at the same time they reveal the insufficiency of their systems either to take up and express the fundamental facts or to realize the highest ends of humanity.

In ancient times, in the childhood and ignorance of the race, man was reaching out to the supernatural, "stretching out his hands unto God;" religions were growing and myths forming. He worshiped the great powers of nature, the great heroes who had once lived on earth, as seeing in and through them the supernatural and superhuman that he sought — transitory representations of the divinity, to give place, with advancing culture, to the God more clearly and truly known. But here in these modern times come artificers of religions who call on us to go back from the light and maturity of our civilization, and worship these abandoned divinities of ancient times, this rubbish of decayed religions. They call on us to worship them, not as supposed divinities, but in the full knowledge that they are no gods; not yearning for clearer knowledge of the supernatural, with hands stretched out unto God, but in the full conviction that there is no divinity, and for the express purpose of proving that man's religiousness may be satisfied without a God, and so of giving consistency to speculative unbelief. And for this, man in his highest enlightenment is expected to be satisfied to worship humanity, or the material universe, or even his own science and art. In the burning midsummer brightness of modern civilization, these seeds from the mummies of ancient religions will not take

root and grow. And if they should, they could not satisfy the needs of religion now. But in fact these religions are manufactured to order, and are not, like the ancient religions, spontaneous and luxuriant growths. Theism is now the living religion into which, among us, the religions of the past have grown. Nothing in our civilization can satisfy the religious needs of men but the consciousness of relation to the absolute Spirit, the supreme and universal Reason, in whom wisdom and love are perfect and eternal, from whom all power issues, and by whom it is directed, in accordance with rational principles and laws, to the progressive realization of rational ideals and ends.

7. Religion is manifested in the action of all man's spiritual powers. The much debated question whether religion belongs to the intellect, the feelings or the will, is set aside by the fact that it manifests itself in them all.¹ Religion manifests itself in the intellect in spontaneous beliefs; in the feelings in religious motives and emotions; and in the will in voluntary acts designed to be acceptable to the divinity.

If a person believes in the existence of a divinity, but hates him, and refuses all homage, worship and obedience, he cannot be said to be religious; he reveals the capacity for religion, but certainly not religion. If a person believes in God while the belief is inoperative and he remains indifferent to him and renders him no service, he cannot be properly said to have a religion. Religion includes belief, feeling and voluntary service.

The services, however widely different, agree as service to a divinity, supposed to be acceptable to him and designed to secure his favor. This characterizes the rudest offering of food, drink and sweet odors, which the divinity is supposed in some invisible way to partake of and enjoy; it characterizes propitiatory sacrifices, penance and self-torment, and all religious services up to the Christian's secret communion with God in prayer, and his life of fidelity to duty and of self-sacrificing love. "An old Samoyede woman, who was asked by Castren whether she ever said her prayers, replied: Every morning I step out of my tent and bow before the sun and say, When thou risest, I too rise from my bed. And every evening I say, When thou

¹ For an account and criticism of this discussion in Germany, see Voigt's *Fundamental Dogmatik*, pp. 55-76. In connection with it is a very full discussion of the different proposed etymologies of the Latin word *religio*. But if the true etymology were ascertained, it would be of little account in explaining what religion is.

sinkest down, I too sink down to rest. That was her prayer, perhaps the whole of her religious service. A poor prayer it may seem to us, but not to her; for it made that old woman look twice, at least, each day away from earth and up to heaven; it implied that her life was bound up in a larger and a higher life; it encircled the daily routine of her earthly existence with something of a divine halo. She herself was evidently proud of it, for she added, with a touch of self-righteousness, "There are wild people who do not say their morning and evening prayers."¹ Tertullian alludes in a most touching manner to the offering of children to Saturn: "When, indeed, their own parents offered of themselves, and willingly paid their vow, and fondled the infants lest they should be slain weeping."² Yet if the parents had been asked why they did this they might have answered, "We ought to give our most precious things to the gods;" a principle which the religion of universal love recognizes, while inspiring horror at the misapprehension and misapplication of it.

The voluntary rendering of service implies religious belief and feeling. In these also, under all differences, a real agreement may be traced. Fetichism, which is animism, finds mind or the supernatural in everything. Polytheism recognizes the divine in everything by multiplying its gods, till every subdivision and ramification of physical processes, of organic growth, of the personal, domestic, social and political life of man, and of moral feeling, action and character is supposed to be superintended by its peculiar divinity. In monotheism, in which all limitations of time and space drop off from the Deity, God is again found pervading the universe by his energy and revealing himself in all the forms and processes of nature and in the life and history of man. Dr. Dorner remarks that the oriental religions set out from the divine, and attempt to bring God down to the human, issuing often in Pantheism; but the western religions set out from the finite and attempt to lift man up to God, issuing in the deification of heroes. "But both seek the same end, the unity of the divine and the human." "In the broader sense, the whole history of ancient religion in general may be called a prophecy of the consummation of religion, that is, of the unity of God and the man."³

¹ F. Max Müller, *Science of Religion*, Lecture III.

² *Apology*, § 9; *Oxford Trans.*, vol. i. p. 21.

³ *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, vol. i. Introduction. *Christl. Glaubensl.*, vol. i. pp. 697, 698, 705.

8. The ethnic religions, as historically known to us, are often in a state of degeneracy in which their original spiritual elements are partially obscured. The earlier Vedas disclose a religion superior in its ideas of God and his service to the later religions of India. The same is true of the earlier Zoroastrian religion of Persia. In China are ceremonies which seem to be survivals of ancient beliefs and services more distinctively religious than Confucius inculcates; these indicate an ancient religion superior to any now prevalent among that people. Even in savage tribes it is not uncommon to find traditions of a divinity and religious services that have passed away; the divinity is sometimes said to be dead.¹ And these traditions disclose a religion superior to that of recent times. In the time of the Roman emperors the purer and healthier religion, which was so powerful in the Republic, had degenerated. Of the results of this degeneracy Paul presents an appalling picture in the beginning of his Epistle to the Romans. The people, in the never-dying consciousness of religious needs, were already seeking other religions, especially the religions of the East, which offered a mediating priesthood and propitiation for sin.² Christianity, with Paul, accounts for this degeneracy as a consequence of man's sin, wilfully turning away from the purer knowledge and service of God: "Even as they refused to have God in their knowledge." But, however explained, it is a fact which must be taken into account in estimating the historical evidence of man's constitutional religiousness, and of its essential unity as the response of the human spirit to the presence of the superhuman and the supernatural, in its progressive development to the knowledge and service of the true God. And analogous appearances of degeneration are facts which must be taken into account in any theory of the evolution of organic life.

¹ F. Max Müller, *Origin and Growth of Religion*, pp. 15, 16.

² See Uhlhorn's *Conflict of Heathenism and Christianity*, Dr. Smyth's Trans., bk. i. chap. ii.

CHAPTER II.

GOD KNOWN IN EXPERIENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS.

GOD is known in experience or consciousness.

I. Some preliminary explanations are necessary to clear the meaning of this proposition.

We are said to know in experience whatever is known in presentative intuition ; it may be either the mind itself in its several acts and states or some reality which is not self. Whatever reality has come under our immediate observation is said to be known in experience. In other words, we know in experience whatever is or has been presented in consciousness. What is known in experience may be also said to be known in consciousness.

Consciousness as thus used includes the primitive or intuitive knowledge both of the subject and the object.

Consciousness as used in the earlier Scotch philosophy, and commonly in Great Britain and America, means the mind's immediate knowledge of its own mental states and acts, or at most, the mind's knowledge of itself in those states and acts. In this narrower meaning of the word it is not correct to say that we are conscious of God, or that he is present to our consciousness.

In German philosophy consciousness is used in a broader sense to denote the intuitive, undiscriminated knowledge of both object and subject, the immediate knowledge in one and the same act of the object known and the subject knowing. Hamilton introduced this usage into Great Britain, maintaining, to use his own example, that a man may be conscious of his ink-stand. In popular language consciousness is used with this broader meaning. We speak of a person absorbed in thought as being unconscious of all which is going on around him ; of a person fainting or rescued from drowning as having lost all consciousness. The literary usage is the same. So Tennyson uses it : —

“Slowly and conscious of the raging eye
That watched him . . . went Leolin :”

and so Dryden : —

“Æneas only, conscious to the sign,
Presaged the event.”

This commends itself to the reason as the usage which gives exactly the true rendering of the facts. Every act of knowledge is knowledge of an object known, a subject knowing, and the knowledge. There are not here three acts of knowing, but only one. In knowing any object, as in perceiving a tree, the mind with its knowledge is revealed to itself as really as the object is revealed to the mind. The mind's knowledge of the object known and of itself knowing are equally real and certain as knowledge; they are indissolubly united in one and the same mental act; if the knowledge of the object is unreal the mind's knowledge of itself is annulled, and if the mind's knowledge of itself and of its knowledge is unreal the knowledge of the object is annulled. We give the correct rendering of this fact when we give to this complex act one name which designates it in both aspects. And consciousness is the appropriate name, because whether applied to the knowledge of the object or of the subject, the name itself, consciousness, denotes that it is knowledge of one *with* the other. Hence we describe the fact correctly when we say that the object is presented or revealed to the mind in consciousness, and that the mind is conscious of the object; or, that in the perception of the object the mind becomes conscious of itself and its knowledge. Of late, philosophy both in Great Britain and America is coming to the use of the word in its wider meaning, as “the light of all our seeing.”

It must be noticed, however, that consciousness as thus defined is the implicit, undiscriminated consciousness. The matter given in it is nebulous and undefined. Intelligence, choice and feeling are present but as yet undistinguished. Knowledge is not yet out of the swaddling-clothes of feeling and able to stand alone on its own feet. In the reaction of the thinking mind on the nebulous contents of consciousness, knowledge, feeling and determination are distinguished; and knowledge itself is discriminated as consciousness of an object and self-consciousness. A reason for using the word in this broader sense is that it denotes primitive knowledge in this undiscriminated state, which no other word so appropriately denotes.

In the proposition that man is conscious of God or that God presents himself in man's consciousness, the word is used in

its broader meaning. This explanation removes all objections founded on its more restricted meaning. God does not present himself to the distinctive self-consciousness as a being identical with the human spirit; but he presents himself, as a being distinct from the man, to the primitive consciousness in its broader meaning. Yet the fact that God thus presents himself shows that, though not identical with man, he is like him, in affinity with him and capable of communication with him. As material things, to which man in his body is like, can act on him through the sensorium by which he is in communication with nature, and present themselves in his primitive consciousness, as these things being expressions of the divine thought can be translated into thought again, so God, to whom man as spirit is like, may act on him as spirit, and so present himself in man's consciousness and be apprehended in thought.

The proposition as thus explained implies that God acts in some way on the human spirit, so that it may be conscious of his presence and action. It implies that as man, being as to his body included in nature, is surrounded by a physical environment which is constantly acting on him and presenting itself in his consciousness, so man as spirit is surrounded by a spiritual environment which is constantly acting on him and presenting itself in his consciousness. That environment is God, in whom we live and move and have our being, and the moral system of spiritual beings, who depend on his power and are subjects of his law and of his love. Hence our proposition implies the truth of the saying of Kant, which has sometimes been thought extravagant, that "we are conscious of forming a part of the intelligible world."

It is not pretended, however, that God presents himself in consciousness in the fully rounded and complete idea of him. No object is so presented. Consciousness may be distinguished as implicit, as it lies unapprehended and undefined in thought; and explicit, after its contents have been thus apprehended and defined. In the primitive or implicit consciousness, the objects presented incite and actuate the man while he has not clearly apprehended them nor his own mental state as affected by them; in the explicit, the contents are the same, but they now lie clear and definite before the mind. In the primitive consciousness is presented all the reality which at any moment is matter or contents of immediate knowledge; the mind reacting on it apprehends, distinguishes and defines the several objects included in

this presented reality and notes the relations by which they are in unity with one another. This is true even of man's knowledge of himself. It is only as the mind reacts on the contents of the consciousness that the man comes to know himself in his individuality and identity, to bring himself fully into the light of his intelligence, and to know himself in his rationality and freedom, in his personality, in all the attributes of his many-sided being.

The same is true of man's consciousness of God. Man's spiritual environment presents itself in his primitive consciousness as nebulous and undiscriminated matter. It is only by the reaction of the mind upon it in perception and thought that the reality thus presented is traced out and united in the full idea. If God is known in consciousness, it is only in this way that the idea of him is traced out and brought into the full light of intelligence. This consciousness of God, or, as we otherwise call it, this knowledge of God in experience, is what is meant by the religious consciousness.

If the word consciousness is used in this larger sense we shall have the consciousness of self and of reality which is not self; subject-consciousness and object-consciousness. And the object must be man's environment, physical and spiritual, as it acts on him and so presents itself in consciousness. Man in his connection with the physical world is endowed with a sensorium through which it can act on him and present itself in his consciousness. So in his connection with the spiritual system he is endowed with rational and spiritual susceptibilities through which his fellow-men may act on him, and reveal themselves in his consciousness in their rational, free personality; and God may act on him and reveal himself in his consciousness.

Whether we use the phrase "religious consciousness" or "God-consciousness" or not, is a question as to the use of words. The real and momentous question at issue is, whether or not we know God in experience; whether or not we have any immediate consciousness of God.

A recent writer has said that the phrase "Christian consciousness" "has served for more than seventy-five years as the rallying cry of a definite method of theological inquiry, whose claims of superior merit cannot be conceded, and many of whose fruits are not encouraging to Christian faith." If the word is used in its restricted meaning as the mind's consciousness of its own mental states and acts, then the affirmation that outward objects are

known in consciousness would imply that man knows only his own mental states and acts, and would give phenomenalism or subjective idealism as the only true theory of knowledge. The same would be true if we affirm that God is known in consciousness in this restricted meaning. God would then be known merely as a subjective state of our own consciousness without objective reality. The phrase has also been used with a pantheistic meaning. Pantheism teaches that God first comes to consciousness in man. If so, man's consciousness of himself would be consciousness of God; for it would be God's consciousness of himself. Man would be identified with God. But no such errors are hidden in the phrase "consciousness of God," when consciousness is used in its broader application as I have explained it. For this implies the action of God on us, revealing himself in our consciousness in his objective reality, just as we are conscious of outward objects revealing themselves in consciousness by their action on us. Then to say that man is conscious of God is only another way of saying that man knows God immediately in experience. Then the only objection to using the expression would be the danger of confounding it with idealistic and pantheistic meanings which have been attached to it. It is not worth while to contend about a word; but my opinion is that the intelligent use of the word in its broader application would be advantageous in our philosophy and our theology.

The phrases "religious consciousness" and "Christian consciousness," as thus explained, denote only the participation of the individual in the common religious experience of mankind or the common experience of Christians. The Christian of to-day finds in his own religious experience a response to the experience of Christians of former ages. The Christian Scriptures are the medium of this union; they express the deepest spiritual life of every Christian age. The fifty-first and the twenty-third Psalms, the Lord's Prayer, and many other Scriptures, ever since they were written, have expressed the spiritual experience of true worshipers of God more exactly and satisfactorily than any words of their own choosing. They are "the golden bowls full of incense" which from age to age have borne "the prayers of the saints" before the throne of God.¹ And the Christian believer tests his experience, his beliefs and his interpretations of Scripture by the experience and thinking of all Christian people as disclosed in the hymns and liturgies, the confessions and creeds, the devotional and doctrinal literature, the biographies

¹ Rev. v. 8.

and histories, which express the best thought and wisdom, the most devout worship, the truest Christian living of the past. He is thus able to test and broaden his own beliefs and his own interpretations of Scripture by the "capitalized experience" of all Christian people. He is not to study God's revelation of himself isolated in his own individuality. He is "the heir of all the ages," and is to enrich his own private experience and judgment from his inheritance in the accumulated treasures of the religious experience and judgment of mankind.

Paul recognizes this unity of Christian consciousness in his prayer for the Christians of Ephesus: "That ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be strong to comprehend *with all the saints* what is the breadth, and length, and height, and depth, and to know the love of God which passeth knowledge."¹

It is said that in his own personality every man dwells in a solitude into which no other can penetrate. Yet his constitution as personal is common to him with all rational beings. In it the common and universal principles of reason and laws of thought are regulative; upon it presses the common environment of the race; into it penetrate motives and emotions common to all mankind. He finds in himself lines reaching out and binding him in unity with his fellow-men in every utterance of speech, in every communication of thought, in all literatures and civilizations. The same is true in religion. Influences come in upon man's spirit from the spiritual environment which encompasses all men, from God in whom we live and move and have our being. In knowing God the spiritual life of men is made intelligible to us, and we are brought into unity with them as spiritual and religious beings. This is the common religious consciousness. The same is preëminently true of the Christian religion, in which man comes into the most intimate and joyous communion with God and attains the clearest and fullest knowledge of him. However isolated a Christian may be, alone with God in secret communion with him, yet every one who will, is admitted to the same intimacy; and as in this common experience of his graciousness they come nearer to God, they come nearer to one another. Thus each may test, correct and verify the beliefs arising in his own personal Christian experience by the experience of all the Christian ages; and he rejoices in the fact that "with all the saints" he has knowledge of God's surpassing love. This is the common Christian consciousness.

And when a Christian teacher, isolating himself from "all the

¹ Eph. iii. 17, 18.

saints," mistakes the candle which he has lighted in the cell of his own individuality for the light of the world, and occupies himself with declaiming against the narrowness, the bigotry, the foolishness, the absurdities which he thinks he finds in the liturgies, the confessions, the creeds and the theologies of the Christian ages, we seem to hear the voice of inspiration speaking to him out of the ancient time: "Art thou the first man that was born? Wast thou made before the hills?"¹

II. Since we have the idea of God, at least the elements of the idea must have been given in intuition and so brought within the consciousness. This is accordant with the universal law that the mind cannot apprehend in thought what has never been known in intuition and so brought within the consciousness. It is plain therefore at the outset that God is known in consciousness at least in the sense that all the components of the idea are known in intuition, and thus brought within the consciousness; although the idea itself may have been originated by thought combining elements already known. The earth is a legitimate object of thought; but it is only the various components of the idea of it which are known in intuition. By combining these in thought the idea of the earth is attained. When a stone or other body is lifted we are conscious of resistance to our effort; but it is only by thought that the idea of the force of gravity is attained. In the same way the components of the idea of God may have been given in consciousness while the idea itself may be formed from them in thought.

In our idea of God there are two factors, designated by the two words, absolute Spirit. That absolute or unconditioned being exists is known as a necessary truth in rational intuition. As thus known this truth is present in consciousness like other necessary truths of reason. Being is known in the consciousness of self. But the absoluteness of being, considered only as given *a priori*, has no positive contents in consciousness; what it is can be defined only by negations; it is being that is not conditioned in dependence and not limited in time, space or quantity. The second component of the idea is spirit. In knowing ourselves as rational, free agents we know the personal, the supernatural; we thus know what spirit is. Having thus knowledge of the absolute and of spirit we combine the two in our idea of God, the absolute Spirit. The idea is legitimately formed, for the components of it are known in intuition.

¹ Job xv. 7.

Having now this idea of God and knowing that an absolute Being exists, we legitimately inquire whether our idea of him as the absolute Spirit is correct. It is on occasion of our knowledge of the universe that the necessary belief arises that an absolute Being exists as the ultimate Being or Power on which it depends and which is manifested in it. We reasonably conclude that in the absolute Being are all the potencies necessary to account for the universe and manifested in it. Therefore we search the universe of nature and of man to see if we can find evidence that the absolute Being is God, the eternal Spirit. In nature we may find evidence of power which justifies us in believing him to be absolute Power, as Spencer describes him. In man and the moral and spiritual system, we may find evidence that he is God, the eternal Spirit. And in nature itself we may find what can be accounted for only as the manifestation of Spirit. Such a proof that the absolute Being is the absolute Spirit, the personal God, is entirely legitimate according to the laws of scientific thought. And if the evidence is found, the conclusion is valid. Although the naked idea of absoluteness considered *a priori* remains empty of positive contents and can be defined in thought only by negation, yet because according to a fundamental law of thought we know the necessary connection of the universe with absolute Being as its ultimate ground, we may find positive contents for the idea of the absolute as absolute Spirit by examining what the universe is in its two systems, the physical and the spiritual.

We can now answer the common objection that the existence of God cannot be proved because the proof must presuppose the idea. This objection is applied in two ways.

It is sometimes urged that the proof is illegitimate because it presupposes the idea. But this is necessary also in all scientific investigations. If we ask whether God exists, we must know already what we mean by God, and must judge whether the evidence establishes the existence of a being corresponding with the idea. Just the same is true if the inquiry is, whether the force of gravity, or a planet between Mercury and the sun, or any other physical power or agent exists. And not only must the investigation start with the idea of the object, but the idea must be present through the whole investigation to direct it, and to make a conclusion possible. In seeking the unknown cause or law of known effects it is necessary to begin with creating an hypothesis; that is, with creating an idea of the cause or law. Then the

inquiry is, whether the real existence of the supposed cause or law is adequate and necessary to account for the facts. When, with the idea of God already in his mind, the theist begins to inquire whether there is evidence that God exists, he simply conforms to a law by which all scientific search for the unknown is regulated. Here is an example of unfairness sometimes noticeable in the reasoning of skeptics, urging as an objection against theism what is accepted as legitimate and valid in physical science.

In another application of the objection it is urged that there can be no legitimate proof of the existence of God, because he is not known in intuition and thus brought within our consciousness. The answer is that all the components of the idea are known in intuition, and the mind legitimately combines them in reflective thought; and this is all that is required by the law that there is nothing in thought which has not first been given in intuition, either presentative or rational. In this also the theistic argument accords with the methods of physical science.

From the position now attained we are justified in affirming that God is known in consciousness in the sense that the components of the idea are thus known, and are in thought legitimately combined into the idea of God, the absolute Spirit. If now it can be proved that the hypothesis that such a being exists accounts for all the facts, and that no other hypothesis does adequately account for them, this proof of the existence of God is entirely legitimate according to the laws of scientific thought.¹

III. The consciousness of God has a deeper meaning than this. Man knows *God* in experience, not merely elements of thought which he builds up into an idea of him. Through his rational intuitions, ideas and sentiments and his spiritual experience he knows *him*.

1. This is reasonable and antecedently probable. If God is the absolute Reason in whom the universe is grounded, by whom it is ordered and pervaded, if he is immanent in it and in him we live and move and have our being, if he is Love subordinating and directing all things to the highest spiritual ends, then it is reasonable to believe that God may act on man, may throw rays from the light of the universal reason into his mind, may quicken his spiritual susceptibilities, and so present himself in his consciousness and be known in experience.

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 69, 72-81, 286.

But this revelation of the infinite to the finite mind, this revelation of God within the limited experience and consciousness of man must be progressive and at every point of time incomplete. God reveals himself to man. But man's apprehension of God through his experience of the divine manifestation must be commensurate with his own imperfect development and education, and can advance only according to his capacity to understand it and his faithfulness in receiving, interpreting and obeying it. So the world has always been acting on man, presenting itself in his consciousness, known in experience. Yet only step by step through all generations has man been progressively apprehending what the world thus presented in his consciousness is; he has discovered something of it through the eye, something through the ear and through the hand, more by reflecting and reasoning on it, a little here and a little there, something to-day and more to-morrow. Much more must man's apprehension of God, as evermore he is presenting himself in human consciousness, be partial and progressive. So his revelation through inspired prophets must needs be "by divers portions and in divers manners;" and even our Lord must say: "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now."

Thus, as through the impressions of sense we perceive our physical environment, so through rational and spiritual principles, sentiments and susceptibilities we perceive our spiritual environment, the universal and all-illuminating Reason, the absolute Spirit, and the system of personal and spiritual beings related to him. Man is conscious of God in a manner analogous to that in which he is conscious of the outward world.

2. A knowledge of God in experience is implied in the idea of religion, and is essential to its reality. The consciousness of God is involved in man's religious consciousness. Religion essentially implies the presence of God with man, God's action and influence on him, and man's knowledge of God through experience of his action and influence.

The idea of God constructed by combining elements of thought known in experience is a legitimate basis of thought and argument, but not of religion. After it all, God remains apart from us; he does not come into communion with us, does not reveal himself to us by direct action or influence; we have no conscious experience of his presence with us. We believe that he exists as Adams and Verrier believed that the planet Neptune existed before it was discovered. We may even construct a system of the-

ology, like the blind Sanderson who had thorough scientific knowledge of the geometric laws of light, though light had never revealed itself in his consciousness and he had never known in experience light or color or visible form. But all this is not enough to make religion possible. God known thus and not otherwise could not be the object of religious trust and service. Religion in its essence implies communication with God; it implies the action of God on us, the conscious experience of his influence, the conscious yielding to or resisting his drawing, conscious trust and service. For religion he is essentially the God "with whom we have to do."

A crude illustration is man's knowledge of malarial poison, through his conscious experience of its effects within him. He does not see it; he cannot lay hold of it, put it in a phial and analyze it. But he knows its presence and power by its effects which he miserably feels in his own body every day. The poison acts primarily on the body, and it is in this that its presence, power and peculiar action are experienced. But the action of the Spirit of God is primarily on and in the human spirit. His presence and influence are known in the spiritual experience, in the rousing of the spiritual powers and susceptibilities to action, in the quickening of spiritual life, in the transformation of spiritual character, in the growth of spiritual power, purity and blessedness. The man in whose spirit God thus acts, does not see him; God does not stand out in his consciousness in definite form; but the man knows his presence, his power and the nature of his influence by their effects which he experiences. So a material object, a tree for example, acts on the sensorium and causes sensations; through these sensations the mind reacting perceives the object. But the sensations are not the tree nor an image of the tree; and it is only through many sensations and perceptions through the different senses that the tree is fully known. And yet the tree is continually acting on the sensorium, and producing effects through which it presents itself in the consciousness of the percipient. God, who besets us behind and before and lays his hand upon us, acts on our spiritual susceptibilities; in continual spiritual influences producing varied spiritual effects he reveals himself in our consciousness and we know him.

If then religion is not a delusion, if its object is real, if its belief and service are demanded by reason, then we have real knowledge of God in the conscious experience of his presence and influence in the soul.

3. It is a fact that all religions assume a knowledge in experience of the divinity worshiped.

Skeptics are wont to say that physical science and all real knowledge rest primarily on experience, but that religious belief rests on abstract or speculative thought, or on the creations of the imagination. The whole history of religions shows that according to the common consciousness of mankind the fact is just the contrary. Men of every religion, in every age, have believed that their knowledge of their divinity rests on experience.

The teaching of Christianity, that men know God by experience, is distinct and emphatic. In Christian circles, when a man turns to God and begins the new and spiritual life, it is common to describe the change by saying he has experienced religion. A man who in mature manhood had been awakened to the consciousness of God and of the unworthiness of his previous ungodly and selfish life, and who was beginning to feel the joy and inspiration and uplift of the new life of faith and love, said to me: "It must be the Spirit of God that has wrought this change; for there was nothing in me that could have wrought it." The distinctive significance of the whole practical life of Christianity, rests on the reality of the Christian's conscious experience of the presence and power of God. In like manner the history of redemption through Christ, and all the doctrine, precept and promise of the gospel assume the Christian's knowledge of God in experience. Christ and his apostles teach that man, in the action of his own moral nature, knows God and his law, and his own sinfulness against God; that God reveals himself in the courses of human history, by his action redeeming men from sin; that God's Spirit comes to men with gracious and heavenly influences to woo and win them from sin; that the Christian life begins in the man's being born anew under the influences of the Spirit of God; that through Christ the sinner is justified by faith; that without other priest or mediator he comes into the immediate presence of God, and there alone with God, face to face with the Holy One against whom he has sinned, he confesses to God his sins and is forgiven; that thenceforward he enters into his closet and shuts the door, and prays to his Father who is in secret, and his Father who sees in secret rewards him openly; and that thus his whole Christian life becomes a life of communion with God.

Hence the preaching of the gospel is primarily testifying. The apostles testified as witnesses of the historical works and teach-

ings of Jesus. But they also testified of what they had themselves experienced of the redeeming and renovating grace of God. Paul always preached in the spirit of his own declaration, made while in a Roman dungeon he was awaiting his bloody death: "I know him whom I have believed." And in all ages the preaching of Christ by Christians has been, in its deepest and most vital root, their testimony as to what they have experienced of the renovating and saving grace of God. Hence the preacher of the gospel is primarily a prophet; a man whose heart God has touched, and whose teaching is illuminated and vitalized by his experience of that divine touch. In this sense Christianity always realizes the fulfilment of the prophecy quoted by Peter on the day of Pentecost: "I will pour forth my Spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy." And hence, with strict propriety, they who have testified of Christ and sealed their testimony with their blood, are by preëminence called martyrs, that is, witnesses. An ancient Israelite, going to the temple of God to worship, sang: "Come, all ye that fear God, and I will declare what he has done for my soul. Verily God hath heard me; he hath attended to the voice of my prayer. Blessed be God who hath not turned away my prayer, nor his mercy from me." In like manner Christians in every age are witnesses declaring what they have known of God in their communion with him, and in their experience of his grace, awakening and quickening their spiritual powers and inspiring, purifying and strengthening them in the life of faith and love.

The ethnic or pagan religions rest on the assumption that man knows God in experience. In the lowest animism or fetichism the untutored man believes that he experiences good or evil from the invisible power residing in the natural object, and that by his own action toward the invisible power he can avert the evil and win the good. Lucretius says that fear generates the gods. But the fear reveals man's belief that the gods make themselves known by their action on him, and that he by his offerings and worship comes into personal communication with them. Pfeleiderer, on the contrary, says that the primitive Aryans in the earliest times of the Vedic religion were far removed from slavish fear, and were inspired with childlike, cheerful and joyous trust. He cites in proof from the Vedic poems this prayer, addressed to Varuna: "As hens spread their sheltering wings to protect their brood from harm, wilt thou, O Lord, thou who art so great and good, protect us from the evils which terrify us."

He also cites from the same poems lines addressed to Indra beginning: "Thou, Indra, art to us father, mother; companion, thou, and friend and brother."¹ But this cheerful trust in Varuna and Indra implies that the worshiper believed that he knew by experience his dependence on their benignity and that he could communicate with them in his prayer.

In Greece and Rome it was not merely the priestess at the oracle crying "Deus, ecce Deus," in the sense of the presence of the divinity; but the belief that the gods revealed themselves to men, and that men knew by experience their presence and their power, pervaded and controlled the common mind. Professor Tiele says: "Socrates gained his belief in the deity by the path of inward experience, and he heard within him the voice of his good spirit, which was with him no figure of speech, but an intense conviction."² Xenophon attached great importance to prayer. Plato says it is the best and noblest act of a virtuous man to live in continual intercourse with the gods by prayers and vows. The great Greek and Roman orators often began their orations with prayer. Cornelius Scipio never undertook any affair of importance without having passed some time alone in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. All public acts, all important domestic events, and all the great festivals were consecrated with religious acts. In accordance with this, Seneca says: "I tell you, Lucilius, a sacred spirit sits within us, the observer and overseer of our good and evil. As he is treated by us, so he treats us. No one is a good man without God."³

These are instances, not of a religion of fear, but of trust in the benignity of the divinity. Other examples are the confidence of the Romans in their household gods, and the trust of citizens in the tutelary god of their city. Hegel says: "There rules among the heathen the consciousness of their happiness that God is near them as the god of the people, of the city; the feeling that the gods are friendly to them and give them the enjoyment of the best. In this way Athena was known by the Athenians as their divinity, and thus they knew themselves as originally at one with the same, and the divinity herself as the spiritual might of their people."⁴ Philo compares God in

¹ Religionsphilosophie, p. 269.

² Tiele, Outline of the History of Religion, Carpenter's Translation, p. 227.

³ Epist. 41.

⁴ Hegel, Philosophie der Religion, vol. i. pp. 225, 226.

creating the world to a full cup foaming over. In some of the oriental religions the origin of the world is referred to the goodness of God. In creating, the Deity is conceived as surrendering his essence to the world, as dividing and sacrificing himself and thus producing the world. Thus they represent the Divinity's goodness in creating as carried to the extent of self-sacrifice. These facts accord with Paul's testimony at Lystra that among the heathen God "left not himself without witness."

4. The consciousness of God is involved in man's moral consciousness. He is conscious of moral obligation. In this he is conscious of a law commanding him; a law that presents itself as imperative, immutable, universal. Thus he finds himself in the presence of the absolute Reason in which the universal truths, which are independent of man and are laws to his thought and action, are archetypal and eternal. In the "I ought" of the conscience, in the "thou shalt" of the law, he hears the voice of God. If in reflective thought we analyze our own moral consciousness we find in it the consciousness of God, giving it its significance, vitality and power; and in the normal development of the moral constitution in the action of life, we come to recognize God in it. This is a familiar argument in Natural Theology. Even Kant affirms that the idea of God, necessary to the speculative reason as an idea, finds positive contents in consciousness in the moral constitution and consciousness of man. "My belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature, that I am under as little apprehension of having the former torn from me as of losing the latter."¹

No tribe of men has been found which is known to have been without consciousness of moral distinctions, and none known to have been without religious consciousness. But savage tribes have been found in respect to whom there is no evidence that they connect the two; that they think that doing right is the service by which they are to please the divinity, or that the divinity is a moral lawgiver and judge. "So far as savage religions can stand as representing natural religion, the popular idea that the moral government of the universe is an essential tenet of natural religion simply falls to the ground. Savage animism is almost devoid of that ethical element, which to the educated modern mind is the very mainspring of practical religion. Not, as I have said, that morality is absent from the life of the lower

¹ Critique of Pure Reason; Transcendental Doctrine of Method, chap. ii. sect. iii.

racés. Without a code of morals the very existence of the rudest tribe would be impossible. And indeed the moral standards of even savage races are to no small extent well-defined and praiseworthy. The lower animism is not immoral, it is non-moral."¹ Perhaps further knowledge of these savage tribes would have shown that they also recognized a connection of their religion with their morality. If not, the fact would only show that they were not yet sufficiently advanced in their development to recognize the connection. But even these assume that they have knowledge of their divinity in experience and come into communication with him in worship. In all the religions of the world, with this exception, men have not only believed that they know their divinity in experience, but have recognized their moral responsibility to him. They form some conception of him as a moral lawgiver and judge, and as punishing the wicked. They are conscious of guilt, they fear his displeasure, they seek to make expiation for sin and to propitiate him. Their own moral consciousness becomes a consciousness of God.

5. Perhaps, also, it is not too much to say that God presents himself in consciousness, not only in the religious and moral life, but also in the intellectual activity of science. The consciousness of God is involved in man's scientific consciousness.

All science rests on the assumption that the universal principles known in human reason and regulating human thought are true throughout all space and time; that the universe is intelligible in accordance with these principles; and that the universal Reason pervading the universe and revealed in it is the same in kind with the human reason. These are immense assumptions; but all science rests on them, and if they are false, science is impossible. Thus all science rests on the existence and the recognition of the universal Reason. The truths eternal in the absolute and universal Reason are "the true light which lighteth every man."

The scientist, therefore, in his explorations and discoveries, may be said to be in intellectual communication with God. He is illuminated with the light of the eternal Reason, which shines into his mind. When the light of the remotest star enters the astronomer's eye and reveals to him the star, the light of the eternal Reason accompanying it enters the astronomer's mind and reveals to him the scientific significance and law of the star, and therein reveals to him the eternal Reason itself, that is, God.

¹ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. ii. p. 327; see vol. i. p. 386.

And from all microscopic objects, hidden in their littleness from the human senses, but revealed by the microscope, and from the internal composition of bodies, from molecules and ethers revealed not to sense but to pure intelligence by the experiments of the chemist, are revealed also the universal truths and laws of the absolute Reason, regnant in the inmost constitution and essence of things as really as in the remotest space and time. Thus it may be said with a true significance that we see all things in God. This Kepler recognized in saying, "O God, I read thy thoughts after thee," and in the outbursts of his sublime and adoring enthusiasm before the creator of the universe, recorded in various places in his scientific writings. Many others of the greatest scientific geniuses have expressed in a like devout spirit their consciousness of God in their scientific researches. So in ancient times Plotinus regarded philosophical investigation as true prayer to God.

Professor J. R. Seeley, in his "Natural Religion," maintains that the enthusiasm of scientific investigations constitutes a religion, and may fully satisfy the constitutional religiousness of man. Certainly if science limits knowledge to material things and physical forces, if shutting man up in materialism, like a mouse in a glass receiver, it exhausts the air by which the spirit lives, however great the enthusiasm and devotedness with which the scientist works his air-pump, it cannot be religion nor meet the demands of the religious constitution of man. But when a scientist reverently recognizes the fact that the light of all his scientific seeing is the light of truth in the absolute and universal Reason, he must reverently feel that in all his explorations of the universe he is intellectually receiving communications from the God of truth, and his scientific enthusiasm will continually nourish his religious reverence.

It is not meant that in scientific thought the attention of the scientist is directed to the absolute Reason, whose universal principles he trusts without wavering in all his investigations, and on which all his conclusions depend entirely; but only that his dependence thereon, though complete, is implicit, and perhaps the more complete and free from doubt or hesitation because it is implicit. A similar explanation must be made of the consciousness of God in the moral feelings, beliefs and actions. In the distinctively religious consciousness the person's attention is already directed to the divinity as manifested in some way, and he is trying to form an idea of him in thought, and to devise an

acceptable service. In the scientific and moral consciousness the attention is occupied with scientific and moral objects, and the consciousness of God, though necessarily implied, does not arrest attention. Hence the person may never have apprehended it in thought. But a correct and complete analysis of his mental state will disclose this implicit consciousness of God in it; and the normal development of his rational powers and susceptibilities will bring it out into explicitness. Hence it is truly said that in the development of man's consciousness of himself and of his own mental states the consciousness of God is always found in the background.

From the foregoing discussion it is evident that, when in reflective thought we examine the evidence that God exists, we start with the idea of the divinity and with the belief that he exists. The investigation is analogous to the speculative inquiry whether we have good grounds for believing that the outward world exists. The world has presented itself in our consciousness "in divers portions and in divers manners;" but it has to be investigated and defined in thought before we have a definite idea of it; and in every age the question whether we have real knowledge of its existence comes up anew. And in the various forms of idealism, acosmic pantheism, phenomenalism and complete agnosticism, speculative doubt or denial of our knowledge of the outward world has perhaps been avowed by as many as have ever avowed speculative doubt or denial of our knowledge of God; and on very similar grounds. At last we find as the result of our investigation, that the belief in God is as well warranted to be real knowledge as any other of our primitive beliefs.

CHAPTER III.

GOD KNOWN BY REVELATION.

MAN knows God through God's revelation of himself to man. Our first question is, What is revelation?

In thinking on this question it is a common impression that revelation is distinctively and exclusively an act of God. But when we reflect, it is evident that our knowledge of any being whatever presupposes some action of the being by which it reveals itself.

Any object may be said to reveal itself when by action on us it presents itself in consciousness. Revelation, therefore, is not distinctive of man's knowledge of God. It is equally true that man knows the outward world through its revelation of itself to man. The outward object acts in some way on the sensorium and in sensation presents or reveals itself to the consciousness, and the mind reacts and perceives the object. Thus every act of sense-perception has two aspects: the outward reality acting on the sensorium and revealing itself to the consciousness, and the mind reacting and perceiving the object. These are two different but complementary aspects of the act of knowing the object, and each is essential to the reality of the knowledge. And it is in such a perception of an outward reality that man is awakened to the consciousness of himself. And it is on occasion of some impact of an outward object that a rational intuition first flashes into light, like a spark from steel when struck by a flint, and becomes the regulator and guide of all thought and action.

Thus the knowledge of a finite being can never be self-originating and unconditioned. It must first be awakened from without. It depends ultimately on the revelation to the mind of an object beyond it. Absolute knowledge has been defined: "Thought thinking itself, knowing nothing of any other outside of itself;" it is not originated in the mind on occasion of the action on it of any object from without and is completed as knowledge within the consciousness of self. God alone has such knowl-

edge. No revelation is ever made to him. No presentation of any object from without awakens him to consciousness and calls forth his mind to action; he is at once subject and object; the universe is eternally thought in his intelligence, before it is projected by his power into finite reality in space and time. Man is incapable of absolute knowledge. His spirit slumbers till contact with the outward world awakens it to consciousness in knowing the presented object. The revealing of the object to the human spirit is also the revealing of the spirit to itself. Once thus awakened it not only knows outward objects, but can also make itself the object of knowledge, can be at once object and subject of its own thought, and complete the circuit of knowledge within its own self-consciousness. Thus man, even in the sphere of intelligence, is dependent on God. The action of the outward universe on the slumbering spirit awakens it to activity in knowing the presented object, and to the consciousness of itself as spirit. And because God is ever active in the universe, we may properly say it is he who by his touch awakens the slumbering spirit to consciousness and knowledge, as a mother by her loving touch awakens her sleeping child.

Revelation, in its primary meaning, is the immediate presentation of an object in consciousness. But it is not limited to this. It is also revelation when the object presented in consciousness is an external effect from which the mind infers what the agent is that is causing it. If I see arrows successively striking a target, I infer that some one is shooting them. From the motions of the planets, an astronomer infers the force of gravitation with which they act on one another, and the law according to which they uniformly act. From the phenomena of light, scientists infer the existence and vibrations of an ether, an extra-sensible agent never perceived by sense. We properly say that these agents reveal themselves in the effects of their action, though it is only the effect which is presented in consciousness, and the agent is revealed only to the intelligent thought. In these cases it should be noted that the agents are revealing themselves by causing the effects at the time when these are under our observation.

An agent may also reveal what it was when energizing in producing effects, to observers of the effects long after the causal agency had ceased. In the buildings, implements, sculptures and inscriptions disclosed in exploring buried cities, the ancient inhabitants are revealed in their history, character and civiliza-

tion. The men of the early stone-age still reveal their existence and their barbarism in their rude implements of stone. Here also it is only the effect which is presented in consciousness; the agents are revealed only to thought.

Thus the cases in which the object reveals itself directly in the consciousness, are distinguished from those in which only an effect or product presents itself in the consciousness, and the agent that caused the effect is revealed by inference to the thought. In all these ways man's physical environment reveals itself to the man.

In a manner entirely analogous man's spiritual environment reveals itself to man through his spiritual capacities and susceptibilities. There is a spiritual or supernatural system behind the physical and revealing itself through it. For the physical universe itself is an expression of the archetypal thought of God. The spiritual system environs man as really as the physical does, and through his spiritual capacities and susceptibilities he is able to discern it. His spiritual environment reveals itself to him, both directly in its action on him in consciousness and mediately through effects, which he observes, revealing spiritual agency acting at the time or having acted in the past.

The line of demarkation between the personal and the impersonal is also the line of demarkation between the supernatural and the natural, between spirit and matter. This is of fundamental importance in investigating the reasons for believing the existence of God.¹ We start out in our quest after God with knowledge of the supernatural and spiritual already attained in our knowledge of ourselves. With this knowledge we are able to recognize other personal and supernatural beings as they reveal themselves to us. Thus is revealed to us a realm of supersensible, spiritual and supernatural persons, including ourselves and our fellow-men.

Man as a corporeal being is known to us through the senses. If he comes within the range of our vision we see him; if he touches us we feel him; if he is out of sight, buried it may be in a fallen mine, he reveals himself to the ear by his cries. To the senses, however, he is presented only as a corporeal being, like any other body.

How, then, does he reveal himself as a rational free agent? How does he reveal himself as capable of knowing God, and the True, the Right, the Perfect and the Good, and of sympathizing

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp. 409-414.

with us in our interest in these realities? In a word, how does he reveal himself to us as a personal being?

In one way, by the products of his actions in the past. By these he reveals, not only his personality, but also the peculiarities of his individual character, attainments and genius. St. Peter's Church is the thought of Michael Angelo built up in stone. The Sistine Madonna reveals the genius of Raphael and his ideal of beauty. The steam-engine, the power-loom, the electric telegraph, severally reveal the genius and express the thought of their inventors.

Another way in which a man reveals his personality is by his actions under our notice. These reveal what he is; they are symbols or signs through which we read his thought, his character and his powers. In all revelation the mind reacts on the object revealed and apprehends its reality and significance. It sees the invisible through the visible, the supersensible through the sensible. In like manner and by the same power we perceive the personality of a man when he is present and acts before us. We look through his action and perceive his personality. By his action he reveals to us his intelligence, his knowledge of the true, the right, the perfect, the good, and of God; he reveals his conscious freedom and moral responsibility; we know him to be a rational, free person like ourselves. In all his knowing, man's sense and his reason are never parted; his perceptive and his rational intuition act together. When an object of sense is presented, he perceives it as presented to the sense, and in the same instant, by implicit rational intuition, knows it in the forms in which reason sees it. Then in thought he recognizes it as having the qualities which he ascribes to bodies or impersonal beings. In the same way, when a man acts before him, he perceives in him the qualities which he knows in his consciousness of himself as qualities of a rational, free person.

Men also reveal their personality by words. The fact that man is able to use language is itself a revelation of his personal and spiritual power. But when man has acquired the power of communicating thought by words, this of itself is an inadequate way of revealing himself; for it is only through the knowledge of beings and actions that the meaning of the words can be learned. A mother cannot communicate to her child the meaning of the word *mother* by merely telling it, "I am your mother." She reveals the meaning of the word to the child by the life-long action of a mother's love. Actions speak louder than words.

And it is by their action before us that men reveal their powers, their characters and their attainments. But when the meaning of words as symbols of realities has been learned, they become an important medium of revelation.

Another way in which men reveal themselves as personal beings is by natural signs. The soul looks out on us through the eye; it reveals itself through the attitude, the gait, the gestures. What a tell-tale is the human face; how thoughts and feelings flush upon it, even those which the words deny and the actions try to hide. A look may reveal the deepest secret of the heart, a tone may disclose the hidden conflict and sorrow of a life. Soul comes almost into immediate communication with soul. The power of reading these natural signs seems to be spontaneous and untaught. A babe in its mother's arms, long before it can speak, answers its mother's smile with a smile, her frown with tears. All which it sees is a certain configuration of lines and lineaments, of lights and shadows; but through these it looks into her heart and sees her love or her displeasure. It deciphers these hieroglyphics of nature, taught only by him who prompts the wild goose to fly from the arctic winter and

“ from zone to zone

Guides through the pathless sky her certain course.”

There are also alleged facts of telepathy, accounts of a man's revelation of himself to another person at a distance, apparently by some immediate action of mind on mind of which science as yet has no explanation. Such accounts are numerous, and many of them seem to be well authenticated. If true, they would be another and as yet unexplained revelation of man as a rational free personality, a supernatural being.

The revelation of man's personality to man is not merely through outward effects from which, when observed, we infer his personality. There is also action of spirit on spirit, which is immediate, in the sense that the effects produced are *within* the consciousness of the recipient. In the presence of a man of grand moral and spiritual power we are elevated and inspired. The influence of such a man cannot be measured by specific acts. It is a bracing, tonic, health-giving atmosphere, invigorating the whole community. In a great congregation assembled for the accomplishment of a grand moral and spiritual end, the assembly itself, animated by one grand aim, breathes upon the speaker and upon every individual an inspiration such as no speaker alone, however eloquent, can impart. When a human spirit, by

whatever means, succeeds in putting itself into communication with another, it immediately begins to act on and influence that other. Love and friendship quicken and inspire. Sympathy on great speculative questions and practical enterprises redouble the power. One may influence another by argument and persuasion, by example, by courage, hope, lofty aspiration. Two persons may go through life together, loving, inspiring, ennobling and forming each other. The spirit of a man acts continually on the spirit of another, continually reveals itself in the consciousness of the other.

Thus man reveals himself to us. He reveals that in him which is imperceptible to sense, which is supersensible and supernatural. He reveals his personality, his free will, his character and aims. Thus we find ourselves in a moral and spiritual system.

Revelation, therefore, is not peculiar to God. Any being must reveal itself in order to be known.

God also reveals himself to men. This revelation I now proceed to consider.

The revelation of God has come to be regarded by many as solely the revelation recorded in the Bible. But in fact all knowledge of God presupposes some action of God revealing himself. The revelation in Christ and his abiding Spirit is not the only one, but is the culmination of all God's revelations of himself to men. It is only because it is such that all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hid in Christ.

God reveals himself directly to men in consciousness. Even in the sphere of intellect and in all scientific thought, man finds universal principles shining in the firmament of his thought, revealing themselves by their own light, and enlightening, guiding and regulating all his thinking. In these the universal and absolute Reason shines into his mind and reveals itself in his consciousness. All science assumes principles of universal reason, and consists in discovering and declaring the revelations of universal reason in the universe.

In the practical conduct of life man finds himself under obligation to obey moral law. Thus again he finds himself confronted with the absolute Reason, revealing itself in his consciousness and speaking imperatively in his conscience.

Man's distinctively religious consciousness is his consciousness of God revealing himself in his soul.

God reveals himself not merely in the consciousness directly,

but also to intelligent thought in effects which reveal him as their cause.

He reveals himself through the universe itself. It is essential in the theistic idea of the universe that it is the progressive expression of God's thought, the progressive realization of the archetypal ideas of his wisdom and love. As such it is in its essence the continuous and progressive revelation of God. The words in which he reveals himself are worlds and systems and time-long action of providence and redemption. It is a necessity of our rational constitution that in our processes of knowing and thinking we must know that the absolute Being exists as the ground of the universe. But what the absolute Being is, is revealed through the universe itself. All merely *a priori* attempts to define him can lead only to great sounding words signifying nothing.¹

God reveals himself, in the universe as a whole, both in the abiding products of his action in the past and in his continuous action through all time. His revelation of himself to us is not by magical and abnormal processes, but in processes and products which the human mind, in the exercise of its rational faculties according to its rational constitution and laws, can take in and interpret; not through the extraordinary, the special, the miraculous alone, but also through the ordinary and the uniform according to general laws. So Paul says: "The invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity." "He is not far from each one of us." Immanent and continuously active in the universe, he is continuously revealing, in all its wondrously varied and complex action, "the exceedingly variegated wisdom of God."² At all the points in our physical and spiritual constitution at which we are touched by the physical and spiritual universe and receive its influence, we are touched by God and receive his influence and his revelation of himself. So Goethe says: —

"Wouldst thou with thy bounded sight
Make survey of the Infinite?
Look right and left and everywhere
Into the finite; you 'll find it there."³

And the Psalmist gives a striking description of himself as encompassed by God, and beset by his action and influence on

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 287, 289.

² Eph. iii. 10.

³ Goethe: Gott, Gemüth und Welt.

every side. "Thou searchest out my path and my lying down, and art acquainted with all my ways. Thou hast beset me behind and before, and laid thy hand upon me." As the physical world environs a man, acts on him on every side and thus reveals the realities known in physical science, so, in the universe, God environs him, acts on him from every side and reveals the realities known by experience in religion and by reflection in theological thought.

God reveals himself in the physical system, both in the constitution of nature, and in his immanence and action in it continuously and progressively expressing his eternal thought. According to evolution, nature is not a completed and fixed product, but is always plastic, always growing, revealing from epoch to epoch new and higher powers. It is not a casting which any enlargement or change must break. It is more analogous to an organism than to a machine. It requires therefore the recognition of God as always immanent and active in nature, progressively revealing himself in higher and higher manifestations of his perfections.¹

God reveals himself also in the moral and spiritual system.

The fact that man finds himself and his fellow-men in a rational and moral system, of itself necessarily carries the thought to God. The mere knowledge of himself and of other men as isolated persons would not of itself be the knowledge of a moral system. But he does not know himself and other men in isolation, but as fellow-men. As soon as men know one another as rational, personal beings, they know one another as existing in a community, with common knowledge, common principles of reason, common susceptibility of motive and emotion, and under reciprocal obligations. Therein they know themselves in the unity of a rational and moral system. But their unity in such a system is possible only by virtue of their common relations to God, the absolute Reason or Spirit, who is the ultimate ground of the system and reveals himself in it. Without this basis in absolute Reason the system is disintegrated, and only disconnected individuals remain.

God reveals himself also in the constitution of man as a rational, free, personal being, susceptible of rational motives and emotions (*Vernunft-trieb*).

God reveals himself also in his action in human history in providential and moral government.

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 491-536.

He further reveals himself in his action in human history redeeming men from sin, culminating in Jesus the Christ.

He continues to reveal himself in his redemptive action in the world since the death of Christ; in the presence and power of his Spirit renewing and sanctifying men; in all the distinctive Christian consciousness of believers in Christ; and in the development of his kingdom of righteousness, peace and good-will.

God's revelation of himself directly in the consciousness may be called private or prophetic. His revelation of himself in the universe, in the constitution and course of nature, in the constitution and history of man, in his redemption of men in Christ and the establishment of his kingdom on earth, may be called public or historical.

Revelation is not restricted to communicating knowledge of something pertaining to God which had been unknown before. My friend may reveal anew his well-known friendship by acts of friendship every day. And God may reveal to us anew in the experience of every day, his law, his righteousness, his mercy and his sufficient grace. The essence of the revelation is not in the newness of God's perfection revealed, but in the action of God revealing it, "new every morning and fresh every evening."

We may not set up the revelation of man to man as the exact pattern of God's revelation, nor assume that the latter must be confined within the limits of the former. God must have access to the human mind in ways transcending man's; especially in the immediate action of mind on mind we must suppose a freer access of the Spirit of God to the human spirit, and a more intimate communion with it than is possible to man.

From the foregoing explanations it appears that God's revelation of himself to us is analogous to the revelation of themselves to us made by material things or by our fellow-men. God acts on us or under our notice, and our minds reacting thereon know him; it may be immediately, as we perceive outward things, or mediately by thought discovering what the object affecting us is and interpreting its significance. God finds us and we find him. Coleridge says: "In the Bible there is more that finds me than I have experienced in all other books put together; the words of the Bible find me at greater depths of my being; and whatever thus finds me brings with it an irresistible evidence of its having proceeded from the Holy Spirit." It is God who finds us in the reading of the Bible. It is his Spirit who, through its truths, moves our spiritual being in its pro-

foundest depths. God reveals himself to the readers of the Scriptures as really as to their writers. If God exists and man is a spiritual being in his image, it is no more strange or unintelligible that God should reveal himself to man as God, than that outward things should reveal themselves as objects of sense, or men as personal and spiritual beings.

The recognition of the fact that God reveals himself and that our knowledge of him is through his revelation, is essential to the right and wholesome study of theology. It is the teaching alike of the Scriptures and of philosophy that it is primarily God who seeks man, not primarily man who seeks God. And this is true of God's communication with man at every point from the beginning to the end of his historical action redeeming men from sin. This has often been overlooked by theologians. They have pushed their investigations as if by sheer dint of thinking they were to find God and to prove his existence to others. But if there is no movement of God toward us revealing his presence, no action of God on us or before us on which our minds react, we reach after all our toil only figments created by our own thinking. God seeks and finds us before we can find him. And this is only affirming of the knowledge of God what is true of our knowledge of all other beings. The true attitude of a theologian is that of an ancient prophet, the attitude of active receptivity: "I will hear what God, Jehovah, will speak." "As the eyes of servants look unto the hand of their master, as the eyes of a maiden unto the hand of her mistress, so our eyes look unto Jehovah our God." To him who is thus intent to "mark the first signal of his hand," the signs and manifestations of God's presence will appear, through which he reveals his power, wisdom and love.

The question, What is revelation? has now been answered. The next question to be considered is, What does God reveal? The answer is, He reveals himself. As Clement of Alexandria says: "There is a great difference between preaching God and preaching things about God."

God reveals himself in his personality, in his divine power, wisdom and love, as distinguished from communicating certain truths, doctrines or commands enunciated in words; as distinguished from philosophy, ethics or theology. His revelation is not primarily of propositions communicated in words, but he reveals himself in his own action.

What he reveals is himself as distinguished from the Bible.

God's revelation does not consist of inditing the Bible and giving it to men to convert them to the life of faith and love. He reveals himself in the grand courses of his own action in the creation, preservation and progressive evolution of the universe, in providential and moral government, and in redemption.

What he reveals is himself as distinguished from a scientifically formulated system of the universe. Nature reveals no systemized astronomy; it only reveals suns and planets in their complicated movements and interactions. The astronomer must find his astronomy by observing these movements and interactions and calculating their laws. And he does not stop in his formulas, nor let his theorems, his demonstrations and his system hide the starry heaven from his mind; but in it he declares clearly and exactly what the starry heaven is. So, because man is rational, he must try to define and systemize his knowledge of God. But he must not stop in his definitions and his system, nor even in his Bible, nor let them come between him and the living God and hide him. He must use them as declaring what God is as he has revealed himself in his action, and as the man through God's action has found him.

What God reveals is himself as distinguished from a religion. He reveals himself in the experience of the person as the quickener of his faith and love, as the being with whom he communes in worship, and who is with him as a present helper in the work and the burdens, the joys and the sorrows of his life. This communion with God is religion, but it is so because God has revealed himself, and not a religion; and the man has found God in his revelation of himself, and so has found access to him in communion.

CHAPTER IV.

GOD KNOWN THROUGH REVELATION BY THE ACTION OF MAN'S MIND RECEIVING AND UNDERSTANDING IT.

REVELATION imparts no knowledge without the action of the recipient, perceiving the object revealed, attending to it and apprehending it in thought.

1. This is true of all objects presented or revealed in consciousness. We do not so much see with the eye and perceive with the senses as through them. The mind looks through the eye and perceives the invisible; it darts its intelligence through the sense and reads in the presented object a significance transcending sense, yet disclosing the true reality revealed in sense. When one looks on a page of Chinese writing, all which he sees is some black marks on a white surface. When he reads his English Bible and thanks God that we have it "in our easy language," he sees with the eye no more than on the Chinese page; but through the eye his mind reads thoughts which are divine and sees the kingdom of God coming among men. So with the eye man sees the face of the earth, but through his eye he reads its true significance and sees reality which is not seen. When one is prospecting for ore he sees only certain forms and arrangements of rock, but to the intelligent miner these are the signs and pass-words by which his thought passes to the secret of the treasure. Physical science itself is a continual seeing of the unseen, a continual passing through the sensible to the supersensible.¹ To the scientist the objects observed in nature are always signs and symbols by which he penetrates to its secret.

In receiving the revelation of any object, the mind is active both in immediate perception and in reflective thought. It cannot stop in the sensations and impressions subjective in the consciousness, but through them perceives the object which is revealing itself. And the mind cannot stop with the perceived objects; but by reflective thought it reads in them the rational

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp. 415-418.

principles, laws and ends, in accordance with which they are constituted, ordered and reciprocally related in the unity of a scientific system. Man is the interpreter of nature; it is scarcely a figure of speech when we speak of reading the book of nature. All science is like deciphering an inscription. The theist believes it to be an inscription written by the finger of God. Thus in all his knowing man exercises the power of looking through the visible and seeing the invisible, of looking through the sensible and the natural and seeing the supersensible and the supernatural.

In like manner man's mind is active in receiving and interpreting the revelations of God.

It follows that it is possible to communicate knowledge by revelation, only to a mind endowed with powers competent to perceive and apprehend the object revealed. Light gives no vision where there is no eye; undulations of air give no sound where there is no ear; sensation gives no perception where there is no perceiving mind; persons with their spiritual qualities remain unknown when there is no personal and spritual power to apprehend them.

It also follows that a revelation cannot be made to a being that is passive. All knowledge, however communicated, is the act of a mind knowing.

And further, the knowledge of an object revealed cannot be imparted complete in the single act of revelation. When an object is revealed to the mind, it remains for the mind by its reaction on it to perceive what it is, and to investigate what are its peculiarities and relations, and its real place and significance in the system of things. If it is only an ivory die which we have thrown from a box, which we can take up in our fingers and survey on every side in a moment, yet, if we would ascertain all that may be known about it, we find that it reveals an encyclopædia of knowledge. The "open secret" of the earth and skies has been revealed to man through the senses every day and night since the human race existed; yet by the studies of all generations man has not attained the full knowledge of them and their significance. On the cross Jesus said, "It is finished," and he bowed his head and gave up his spirit. The action of his earthly life was ended. The revelation of God which he had made in it was, as Jude expresses it, "once for all." But all who trust him learn more and more, all their lives long, of the love of God to man which his life and death revealed, and are always more and

more able "to apprehend with all the saints, what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge." From his crucifixion until now, more thought has been expended on him in Christian countries than on any other single object of learned investigation. But the studies of all these generations have not mastered all the significance of that revelation in its bearing on the renovation of the world, nor attained "unto all riches of the fulness of understanding, that they may know the mystery of God, even Christ, in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden." We may suppose it to be as true now as when the apostle Peter wrote, that "these things angels desire to look into."

And in this necessity of the reaction of the mind on an object revealed in order that the revelation may give any knowledge, we see that the action of human reason is necessary, both in receiving a divine revelation and in interpreting its meaning. A revelation is utterly nugatory except as human reason receives and apprehends and interprets it.

The three factors of the knowledge of God are divine revelation, religious experience or the consciousness of God as revealed, and the reaction of the mind in spiritual perception and reflective thought.

2. The action of the mind, apprehending and interpreting the revelation by thought, is as follows:—

The man must begin with defining in his own mind what idea he really has of the divinity that is the object of his worship. He finds himself believing in the existence of a supernatural and superhuman being and worshipping it. He thinks he has had experience of its presence and its power. He may think he has knowledge of many such beings. As he reflects on these supposed experiences and this spontaneous belief, he forms in his mind an idea of what the divinity that he worships really is, in his own conception of it. The same is true of the Christian believer, with his larger knowledge and richer experience. He also must begin his investigations by defining to himself what he supposes the God, whom he worships, is.

The next step will be to ascertain the reasons for believing that this God really exists, and that the belief is real knowledge. It is objected that the existence of God is not a legitimate object of proof. This is true in the sense that the idea of God does not arise at the end of our proofs, but at the beginning. We must have an idea of God, before we investigate the reasons for believ-

ing that he exists. The objection would be valid also, if the idea of God were a pure creation of thought, without data in experience, either in presentative or rational intuition, giving at least the elements entering into the idea. If the reasoning starts with such an empty idea, it can only issue in an idea equally empty. But the mind cannot create an idea empty of all contents given in perceptive or rational intuition. And in this case the inquirer starts with belief, founded on experience, in the existence of God, and with an idea of God, founded on that belief, all the elements of which are given in intuition. The proof that God exists is simply the statement of the reasons why we believe him to exist; that is, of the evidence on which the belief rests. If there can be no proof of the existence of God, it must be because there is no evidence of his existence and no reason for believing it.

Jacobi maintains that the existence of God cannot be proved, because to prove it would be to infer it from something, and thus would imply God's dependence on that from which his existence is inferred. He here makes the monstrous mistake of identifying the logical dependence of thought with the causal dependence of concrete reality. He also assumes that an inference is possible only from cause to effect, never from effect to cause. In the latter case the movement of thought is the inverse of the movement of the causal efficiency; in the actual process of the concrete reality the cause precedes the effect; in the logical process of thought the knowledge of the effect precedes the knowledge of the cause. Jacobi's objection implies that to infer the cause from an effect would prove that the cause is dependent on the effect. In perceiving rational words and actions, we infer the existence of a rational person; but that does not imply the dependence of the person's existence on his words and actions, or on my perception of them. So from what one knows in experience and observation, he infers the being of God; but this does not imply that God's being depends on what is thus experienced or observed, nor on the inference from it. The same is true of other regulative principles of reason. In reality the universal is before the particular, the absolute before the conditioned. But in the process of human thought, the particular must be known before the universal, the conditioned before the absolute. In the particular, thought finds the universal revealed, and in the conditioned, the absolute. Among us this objection of Jacobi still finds utterance. But it is only the identification of the world-

process with a logic-process, familiar in German idealistic and pantheistic philosophy.¹

The third result of reflective thought on the revelation of God is the clearing of the idea of God from error, the supplying of defects and the gradual development of it, with the increase of knowledge, to the true idea of the one God, the absolute Reason, the eternal Spirit, and to the ascertaining and enunciating of all truth respecting God and his relations to man which from all sources the human mind can attain. This is doctrinal theology; which is merely the highest result, so far as attained in any age, of human thought, apprehending and defining what God has revealed of himself, and systemizing it, as far as possible, by finding its harmony with itself and with all known reality. ✓

We all remember the transition from our infantile idea of God to the grander conceptions of mature years. We have all experienced liberation and help in dropping oppressive conceptions of God derived from false teaching, or from our own misconceptions of the truth. Every mature Christian is aware of the greatening of the idea of God as he increases in the knowledge of him.

The same is true of the progress of the knowledge of God in the history of the race. In animism and fetichism, the lowest forms of religion, man recognizes an invisible and supernatural power in every natural object. As his knowledge of nature increases, he still recognizes the invisible and supernatural, but regards it as resident in the sun, the moon, the bright and all-embracing heavens, or in others of the higher powers and forms of nature. As he comes to know the natural universe as a Cosmos of which all the parts are in unity under the reign of law, he still finds, in and above all, the invisible and supernatural power, but knows it as the one personal God, revealing in the universe his power, wisdom and love. At last through God's

¹ "Always and necessarily the ground of proof is above that which is proved by it. The former includes the latter under itself. From the former, truth and certainty flow on what is to be proved from it; the latter holds its reality from the former."

This is true only on the assumption of the formal logic, that the only reasoning is the syllogistic distribution of the contents of a general notion already formed and named. It entirely excludes induction, on which science rests, both in its Baconian form of inferring the universal from particulars, and in its Newtonian form of inferring the cause from an effect. It is a confounding of words with things not surpassed by that of a half-civilized oriental monarch, who, having received the present of a coach, ordered the driver's seat to be lowered before he would ride in it; because otherwise the coachman would be "above" the king.

more complete revelation of himself in human history through Christ, man, still retaining the primitive knowledge of the supersensible and the supernatural, and of all by which it had been enriched in his progress to monotheism, now attains his highest and most inspiring conception of God as the redeemer of men from sin.

It is in this process of apprehending and interpreting the revelation in thought and defining the idea of God as revealed, that mistakes are made, and, in the various stages of human development, different and sometimes fantastic ideas of God arise. In the early missions to the Canadian Indians, the Jesuits found that they already had some idea of God. In explaining to them that God punishes the wicked, they said: "When you capture your enemies you torture and burn them; God does the same to his enemies." This produced a powerful impression. But so far as it led them to think God's justice to be the same with their revenge and ferocious cruelty, they might better have been left to work out their idea of God themselves.

The fact that men form erroneous conceptions of the divinity and that this conception varies in different ages and nations, is no argument against the reality of his existence. In the first place, because there are elements of reality which persist through all these diverse and changing conceptions. In all of them is some sense of the infinite. In all of them is the consciousness, more or less clear, of the presence of a supernatural and superhuman power; a power invisible, like the invisible mind of man, manifesting itself in effects inexplicable to the observer by aught which he has known of the powers either of nature or of man. It is contrary to all observed facts in the history of the uncivilized races, to say that the idea of spirit or of the supernatural is of late origin or of difficult attainment. Man's consciousness of himself in his own individuality and identity is so strong, from our earliest knowledge of him, that he believes that death itself does not interrupt the continuity of his existence. Far from being in the beginning a materialist and believing only in what he can see and handle, he is so conscious of the invisible and intangible powers of his own mind, that at first he believes that every object in nature is animated by a mind like his own. Hence when a person dies the survivors believe, not only that his spirit passes into the unseen land, but that the horse sacrificed at his grave, and the food and weapons deposited in it, pass thither with him as the phantom or

spirit of the horse or food or weapon. It is this unseen, spiritual, supernatural power, like his own unseen thought and will and yet above and beyond him, which the uncivilized man believes to exist and which he worships as a divinity. And this idea persists at the basis of all the forms in which he represents his divinity in his thought. His conception of it is purified, corrected and developed only in his progress in knowledge and civilization from age to age. So Schweitzer says: "It is indubitable that the human mind has from the earliest times worshiped the reality hidden behind phenomena, but consciously felt in the heart, and has ascribed to it greater analogy with ideas than with matter and force."¹

Feuerbach raises an objection against theism from the fact that in the ethnic religions the gods are supposed to reveal themselves to men, and that Cicero and other non-Christian writers used arguments for the reality of the objects of pagan faith virtually the same as those urged in the present day for the objects of Christian belief.² But this objection is without validity because the spiritual, the supernatural and the superhuman are always elements in the pagan's divinity, as really as in the Christian's; in whatever form the pagan conceives it in his imagination, it is always a supernatural and spiritual power, like his own unseen thought and will, yet mightier than himself, that is revealed, and whose existence and agency among men the ethnic philosophers adduce arguments to prove. There is always some sense of the spiritual, the supernatural, the infinite. These are fundamental elements in the highest idea of a divinity; if the pagan found the same evidence of the existence of such a being as the Christian finds, it is because to that extent he had a true idea of the deity.

And when men have begun to adduce proofs that there is a God, they have already begun to be civilized and are leaving the puerilities of heathen mythology behind. Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero were not trying to prove that the fables of heathen mythology were true, nor that the idols of the heathen were the true God.

In the second place, in attaining the knowledge of the universe, as really as of God, men have fallen into gross mistakes and have advanced to larger and more correct ideas only by toilsome progress through the centuries. If this discredits our

¹ Schweitzer; *Zukunft der Religion*, page 94.

² Feuerbach; *Wesen des Christenthums*, chap. xxi.

knowledge of God, it equally discredits all physical science. In the progress of knowledge in every sphere there is always a nucleus of real knowledge in a penumbra of obscurity. In the gradual development of the human mind and the progress of culture and knowledge, the nucleus of knowledge persists while it is progressively enlarged, extending its area of light into the obscurity around it. It is incidental to this progress that there be errors and defects, doubt, criticism and new investigation, and thus the correction, clearing and enlarging of the field of knowledge. So in the progress of man's knowledge of God there has been a persistent nucleus of real knowledge, gradually enlarging its area of light into the penumbra of obscurity, and the defects and mistakes attending it have been only such as are incidental to the progress of all knowledge.

3. Because a revelation of God imparts knowledge only as the man receives it in his own active intelligence, it follows that, however he reveals himself, the knowledge of God must be progressive. The knowledge imparted by the revelation must depend on the degree to which the man's receptivity for it has been developed by his own culture and growth. This is not a peculiarity of the knowledge of God, but is equally characteristic of knowledge in every sphere.

What any one finds revealed in any object depends not merely on the keenness of his sense-perception, but also on his range of knowledge, the power of his intellect, the clearness of his spiritual vision, and his varied susceptibilities to impression. When Peter Bell was the observer,

“ A primrose by a river's brim
A yellow primrose was to him,
And it was nothing more.”

This is precisely what is now praised by many as the real and only true view of the world. It is a grasp of the bare facts revealed to the senses, and it is nothing more. Yet almost every one does see something more, and probably each one sees something not perceived by the others. Suppose a tract of land with a stream running through it, and hills and forests in the background. A farmer sees in it its capacity for the growth of wheat and grass. A civil engineer sees in it mill-sites, and already seems to hear the clatter of machinery, and the bustle of a busy city. A sportsman sees a run for game and a chance for trout. A geologist reads in it a history of the construction of the earth. A painter sees in it beauty which, could he transfer it to the

canvas, would be a joy forever. A Christian sees in it the outshining of the glory of God. A savage and an astronomer look on the same starry sky; the former sees only a blue expanse with innumerable shining spangles; the latter sees the depths of space, immeasurable magnitudes and distances, suns and systems, the universal reign of law. The "something more" each one sees is a reality not less than the bare fact of sense grasped by Peter Bell. George Herbert says: "Man is one world and has another to attend him." Rather he has as many worlds to attend him as the spheres of knowledge which his mind has entered. And they are not worlds created by his own fancy but are real. For the universe is the expression of the endlessly varied richness and fulness of the thought and love of God. That is the truly realistic view of the world which knows it in its deepest reality and significance, in its relation to God. Every ascending step in a man's culture and development opens to his vision a new world. So the knowledge which a man receives from any revelation of God, depends on the receptivity and capacity of the man. As in his progress his spiritual capacity and receptivity are enlarged, he sees new significance in the revelation; in it new vistas of the divine glory open to his view. His own progressive growth and development become the Jacob's ladder by which he ascends from height to height of knowledge, with ever widening prospect, till he comes to the open heavens and the presence and vision of God.

A little girl once said she supposed the stars were holes in the sky to let God's glory through. In her infantile mind she was creating myths, as full-grown men were creating them in the infancy of the race. The progress in the knowledge of God from the conception of him held by the little child and by the infantile man to the sublime idea of God as the all-powerful Spirit of wisdom and love, is hardly greater than the progress of the knowledge of the starry heaven from the conception of children and savages to the knowledge of a modern astronomer. The starry heaven in which the astronomy is discovered has spread itself alike before the eyes of the infantile man and of the astronomer; that the latter sees in it immeasurably more than the former is due to his own enlarged receptivity and capacity. So in the constitution and course of nature, and in the constitution and conscious experience of man is a primitive revelation of God, both to the savage and the philosopher. It is the greater culture and growth of the one which enables him to see more in it than the other.

It follows also that the higher revelations of God must be delayed till man becomes competent to receive them. A child cannot be taught to solve problems in proportion and computing interest before it has learned addition. It is impossible to reveal the principle and construction of an electric telegraph or a steam-engine to the lowest savages. A caligraph or a sewing-machine would be useless presents to them, for they could not use them. A missionary in Africa imported a plough and took great pains to teach some of the natives to use it. But when he next visited them he found that, instead of using it, they had set it on end, daubed it with red paint and were worshiping it. Mechanical inventions are useless to man till he has made such progress as to need them. It is not uncommon when a machine is invented to find that a similar invention had been made generations before and had been neglected and forgotten. In like manner God's revelation must adapt itself to the receptivity of the people, and consequently must be progressive. Missionaries to savage tribes find difficulty in communicating to them the Christian ideas of spiritual purity and holiness. In this progressive way the revelation recorded in the Christian Scriptures was in fact made. When the Israelites escaped from Egypt, it was only by a long process and patient painstaking that the molds of thought, which had been wrought into them by heathenism and slavery, and which long continued to receive into themselves and give their own shape to the monotheistic teachings of their leaders and prophets, were broken up. It was necessary to delay the revelation of truths and of applications of truth which transcended their capacity of reception, till they should be educated and developed to a capacity of receiving without transmuting and debasing them. Hence the elements of a higher revelation had to be taught to their gross and debauched minds by restrictions and requirements, by symbols and types, by forms and ceremonies, which, as they accomplished their design, were to make themselves useless and to pass away. On the same principle our Lord said to his disciples, "I have yet many things to say to you, but ye cannot bear them now." Accordingly the coming of our Lord himself was delayed till by various and long continued preparatory agencies the world was, in the fulness of time, in condition to receive the new revelation, and, instead of the hand-leading and schooling of the Old Testament, could be left to the guidance of the invisible Spirit of God sent from Christ and "poured out upon all flesh."

4. The fact that revelation imparts no knowledge without the action of man's mind receiving and interpreting it, throws light on the course of God's revelation of himself recorded in the Bible; it corrects some misapprehensions and exposes the unreasonableness of some objections.

God cannot reveal himself immediately to the senses. It is sometimes asked why God does not reveal himself more plainly, so that we cannot doubt. This complaint searched to the bottom will often be found to involve a demand that God should reveal himself to the senses. But God is a Spirit and as such cannot reveal himself immediately to the senses, but only to the spirit in man. "No man hath seen God at any time." God can reveal himself through physical effects only as media through which the rational spirit of man perceives the present God; only as signs or symbols through which the human mind reads the thought of God.

We see also that God's revelation of himself must be adapted to the development and culture of those to whom it is made. It may be through types and symbols, through forms and institutions, which are to pass away when once man is educated to the knowledge of God as the one absolute Spirit; or in historical acts and prophetic inspiration which, while revealing God in some important particular, carry the thought forward in the expectation of a greater revelation in the future.

Consider, for example, some of the revelations of the Old Testament.¹ On a critical emergency in the journey of Israel through the wilderness, Moses prayed: "I beseech thee, show me thy glory." On the next morning, on the heights of Sinai, his prayer was answered, and the glory of Jehovah passed by before him. But Moses was hidden in a cleft of the rock and saw nothing, for God had said, "Thou shalt not see my face;" he

¹ Learned men are enthusiastically and laboriously studying the ethnic myths and communicating their results as of the highest importance. Professor De Gubernatis tells us in his *Zoölogical Mythology* that the milkmaid with her pail of milk on her head meant "that little pipkin the moon," and that the two ass-ears of Midas meant the morning dawn and the evening twilight, "whose changeableness the mobility of the ears of an ass must have served very well to express." While researches and conclusions like these are lauded as learned and valuable contributions to science, it is not uncommon to hear or read sneers at the theophanies of the Old Testament as puerile and unworthy of scientific attention. But whoever studies them in any real sympathy with the spirit of the Old Testament and its religion, will find in them monotheistic truths of rich, varied and profound significance immeasurably in advance of the ethnic myths.

heard only a voice which proclaimed the memorial name, Jehovah, signifying the covenant-God of Israel; the name, El, the Mighty; and the spiritual and moral attributes of mercy and grace, of goodness and long-suffering, of truth and righteousness. And Moses saw the retreating glory and fell on his face and worshiped.¹ Thus was it revealed to him that God is spirit; that he cannot be revealed directly to the senses; that his glory consists in those spiritual and moral attributes and powers which spiritual and moral beings alone can know. The same was the significance of the Holy of Holies in the tabernacle and the temple. There was the mercy-seat where God revealed his grace to men; but it was hidden by a veil behind which no eye might look; it was in a solitude into which no man entered except the high-priest; and he, but once a year and then bearing the blood of the sacrifice of atonement for himself and the people. There God dwelt in the solitude of his own invisible and spiritual being. And this was a continual teaching to the Israelites that God is a spirit; that what reveals him to the sense is itself a veil which hides him; that he can be represented by no image and worshiped under no visible form; that the material universe, while as the work of his hands it reveals him, is itself also a veil which hides him. No symbol can be conceived more effective to impress on a rude people the fatuity of idol-worship, and to teach them at every entrance into the temple that God is a spirit and that they who worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.

Persons sometimes imagine that if God had revealed himself continually and to all men by working miracles before them, it would have been impossible to doubt his existence. But miracles are presented to the senses and therefore, like the familiar works of nature, are a veil which hides God while revealing him; the mind must pass through them, just as it passes through the sensible phenomena of nature, to the God unseen and spiritual behind the veil. And if miracles were as common as summer showers and rainbows, they would attract no more attention than they. It is sometimes thought that if God should habitually reveal himself in theophanies such as the Bible records, doubt would be no longer possible. But even in the theophanies the prophets did not see God; they saw only signs and symbols through which their spiritual eyes saw what can be only spiritually discerned. Ezekiel saw a cloud coming out of the north

¹ Exod. xxxiii., xxxiv.

with whirlwind and with infolding fire and flashing lightning; and from its amber brightness a crystal firmament evolved borne on four Cherubim, with wheels of beryl so high that they were dreadful, and all moving with flashing light and, to the very wheels, instinct with the spirit of life. On the firmament was a sapphire throne, and on the throne the appearance of a man. But if that vision should rise on our view every morning from the north, wherein would that miniature firmament reveal God any more than the sun which rises every morning in the east, or the firmament with its thousands of stars which wheels majestically above us every night? What theophany presented to the senses can open to view such energies, such swiftness of motion, such greatness and such fineness of being, such grand and harmonious systems, such powers instinct with the spirit of life, such manifestations of reason, such manifestations of God, as science is disclosing in the physical universe itself?

We discover also a certain limitation in the nature of things to the revelation of God through words. Some may think it would be a great help to faith if "GOD IS LOVE" were written across the sky in letters of stars. We might ask in what language it should be written, and might suggest that such an arrangement would imply that the earth is the centre of the universe, and that all other worlds exist for it. But were the words written thus, it would still be only an orderly arrangement of the stars through which the mind must look to read its significance; and orderly arrangements we see everywhere in nature. And how immeasurably more significant the revelation of his love, which God has made in the life and self-sacrificing love of Jesus the Christ.

God reveals himself by words, as people of all religions are wont to believe. Persons, who have had rich experience of his grace, and by intimacy with him have had spiritual reality opened to their thought and life, testify of what they have known; and in a still higher degree prophets and apostles have been inspired to declare the truth of God. We have seen that a woman cannot reveal to her child what she is as mother by words, until she has revealed herself in the action of a mother's love. So the words of prophets and apostles fall without significance on the ear, until God by his divine action has disclosed their meaning. The hearer must first know God by his own experience of God's grace, or by his knowledge of God's action in nature, or in human history, or above all in Christ, in order to understand the prophet's communication.

Feuerbach objects to a revelation of God that it must be "a determinate revelation given at a particular epoch ; God revealed himself once for all in the year so and so, and that, not to universal man, to the men of all times and places, to the reason, to the species, but to certain individuals." ¹

The revelation of God in the broader and deeper meaning of the word is a revelation by the divine action, and goes on in all places and all times ; while special revelations at particular times or to particular persons are not excluded. The revelation culminating in Christ as recorded in the Bible had been progressive in its preparatory stages through all preceding human history, and is perpetuated and made universal in the Christian Scriptures and church, and in the Holy Spirit poured on all flesh and abiding forever.

5. This discussion of man's reception of revelation gives the true significance of the common sayings, that man in his own self-consciousness finds the consciousness of God ; that his consciousness of self, unfolded into its full significance, contains the consciousness of God ; that the consciousness of God is in the background of self-consciousness. It is only as a man knows God and his relation to him, that he becomes aware of his own highest capacities and powers. Conversely, his consciousness of his own highest capacities and powers carries in it the consciousness of God. The outward world acting on the sensorium reveals itself in the consciousness. But in the consciousness of the outward world, man knows himself as perceiving it, living in it, acting on it ; he knows himself in all his susceptibilities and powers as related to the material world ; and he could never have known himself thus if the world had not revealed itself by acting on his sensorium. In an analogous way God acting on man's spirit reveals himself in the man's consciousness, and at the same time the man is revealed to himself ; he knows himself as knowing God, living in his presence, acting in relation to him ; he could never have known himself thus, if God had not revealed himself in his consciousness. Hence we may truly say that in knowing himself, in unfolding the full significance of his self-consciousness, the man knows the outward world ; and that in knowing himself, in unfolding the full significance of his own self-consciousness, he knows God. And we may truly say that the consciousness of the outward world, and the consciousness of God are each in the background of man's consciousness of him-

¹ Wesen des Christenthums, chap. xxi. Trans. p. 209.

self. In this sense Clement of Alexandria says: "The noblest and greatest knowledge is to know one's self; for if any one knows himself he will know God."¹

Thus these sayings are cleared from a pantheistic meaning. They do not imply that man's consciousness of himself is his consciousness of God, and is in reality God's only consciousness of himself. This is implied in Biedermann's definition: "Immediate revelation is an act of God whose content is at the same time content of a subjective spiritual act of man."² Feuerbach puts it plainly: "The antithesis of the divine and the human is altogether illusory; it is nothing else than the antithesis between the human nature in general and the human individual. Religion, at least the Christian religion, is the relation of man to himself, or more correctly to his own nature; but a relation to it viewed as a nature (*Wesen*) apart from his own. The divine being is nothing else than the human being, or rather the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective, that is, contemplated and revered as another, a distinct being."³ The words of Biedermann may be explained as meaning merely that the man receiving the revelation, apprehends in his own thought the same contents or reality which God reveals. But one, who claims to be a Christian theologian, ought to write at least clearly enough to show without ambiguity which, of two systems so widely apart as theism and pantheism, he is teaching.

¹ *Pedagogus*, bk. iii. chap. i.

² *Christliche Dogmatik*, p. 63.

³ *Wesen des Christenthums, Einleitung*, § 2, p. 20.

CHAPTER V.

MAN'S CAPACITY TO RECEIVE GOD'S REVELATION AND TO KNOW HIM THROUGH IT.

THROUGH his spiritual susceptibilities man is receptive of impressions and influence from God, and knows him as thus revealed in his consciousness, in a way analogous to that in which he knows the physical world and his fellow-men.

In the broader sense of the word, consciousness is both subject-consciousness and object-consciousness. Then the object of consciousness may be an object of sense, or a man in his personality, or God, as they severally present themselves.

In its own subjective states and acts, the mind in self-consciousness perceives itself as the one identical subject of them. In its object-consciousness it perceives the sensible object, which presents or reveals itself in the sensations. When a person, by words or deeds affecting the sensorium, makes also the impression, through the spiritual susceptibilities, of rationality, free-will, love or other personal or spiritual properties, the mind, reacting, perceives not only the body through the sensations, but also the rational, free personal being through these impressions of reason or spirit. The man perceives the Thou as well as the I. And, in a similar way, in the conscious religious impressions responsive to the supernatural and the infinite, the mind, reacting, perceives the being that is divine revealing himself in the consciousness.

It is now to be shown that man has capacity to receive such revelations of God, and to know him through it.

1. The possession of this capacity is assumed in all religions. In this we have the testimony of mankind to their common belief that they have and exercise this capacity to receive revelation of a divinity, and to know him through it. It is, therefore, the strongest presumptive evidence that this is a capacity of the human mind.

If the object of the religions of mankind has any reality,

man must be susceptible of receiving revelation from God, and capable of knowing him through it. All religions presuppose communication between God and man. They all presuppose that man knows God in experience; that God reveals himself by some action, influence or impression in the consciousness, and that man knows God through his experience of the effects of this action. As Hegel says: "The substance of religion cannot be brought into a man as anything new; this would be as preposterous as it would be to try to introduce a spirit into a dog by letting him gnaw the printed Scriptures."¹ If, then, the object of religion has reality, there must be in man what Jacobi calls the "Vernunftsin," the reason-sense, the susceptibility of the spirit to impressions and influences from God revealing him in the consciousness, and the power to know God through this revelation. If this is not so, then all religious feeling, belief and action are wholly subjective and have no real object. And if they are wholly subjective, all the religions of the world have been and are sheer illusions. But religion is a common characteristic of humanity, and is rooted in the constitution of man. If all the beliefs, feelings and actions which are essential in religion are sheer illusions, then man's constitutional capacities in their normal exercise are discredited as untrustworthy, and the reality of all human knowledge is impugned. On the other hand, if religion is not an illusion, God, as the object of it, exists and reveals himself in man's consciousness; and man is constituted with spiritual sensitivity to the divine action and influence, and with capacity to know God in the revelation which he makes.

2. The reality of human knowledge and the true conception of man's powers of knowing necessarily imply his capacity to receive God's revelation of himself, and to know him through it. The denial of this capacity can be justified only by some false theory, logically involving the denial of the reality and possibility of human knowledge.

The essential point of difficulty as to the reality of any knowledge is at the transition from the subjective impression to the objective reality. This difficulty, however, is no greater in knowing God than in knowing other beings. On the contrary, the real action of the mind in this transition necessarily implies the existence of God and admits of no reasonable explanation without it. In other words, the existence of God is essential to

¹ Hegel's *Philosophie der Religion*, vol. i. p. 6.

any real knowledge which, as rational and scientific, is anything more than the consciousness and recollection of the impressions of sense. This will be evident from the following considerations.

Physical science rests on natural realism. It assumes without question the reality of matter and motion, of masses, molecules and ethers; of force, molar and molecular; of all reality presented in sense; of extra-sensible realities inferred from observed facts; and of the interaction and relations of all these. It assumes, also, the laws of causation and of the uniformity and continuity of nature, the axioms of mathematics, and other first principles of reason, which are regulative of all thought. It justifies the assumption of these as sustained by experience. It is found by experience that it is always safe to reason under the regulation of these principles, and thus they are continually receiving verification from observed facts. In this natural realism, theism is in entire accord with physical science.

But philosophy, exploring the ultimate grounds of things, goes farther than physical science can go. It recognizes the profounder truths of reason, and shows the grounds of natural realism in reason itself. It thus broadens and deepens natural realism into what may properly be called rational realism. In this, philosophy is in no conflict with physical science, but simply presents the rational grounds of the natural realism in which physical science trusts without question. We thus find the real action of the mind in the transition from the subjective impression to the objective reality.

Sense-perception is the perception, not of mere subjective sensations, but also of the object revealing itself in them. There can be no sense-perception unless an object first acts on us through the sensorium, and thus reveals itself in the consciousness. In his intellectual reaction, the man perceives the object revealed, and at the same time perceives himself as the percipient. In this interaction the perception of the object and the perception of the self are inseparable in one and the same mental act, and the knowledge of the one is as real as of the other. If there is no object perceived there is no subject perceiving; and if there is no subject perceiving there is no object perceived.

Further, when an object thus presents or reveals itself in consciousness, it is perceived not only by sense-perception, but also by rational intuition. In every perceptive intuition a rational intuition is implicit. In one and the same act we perceive the object in the presentation of sense and in the forms of reason. By

the intuition of reason the man knows that every beginning or change has a cause, that every action reveals an agent and every phenomenon a being. Therefore he perceives every presented object in these forms of reason; in every change he perceives a cause, in every action an agent, in every phenomenon a being. He does not merely perceive impressions which are disintegrated and unsubstantial, or only subjective, but he perceives the being which reveals itself in them, and gives them unity and substantiality. His attention is on the object perceived, and he does not take notice of either the rational or the perceptive intuition of it. But both are implicitly present in the knowledge. He knows the object at once in the presentation of sense and in the forms of reason.

Thus the transition from the subjective impression in consciousness to the objective reality is securely made. Thus knowledge in its beginning is ontological; it is the knowledge of being. The object and the subject is each known as a being. The phenomenon or appearance in consciousness is not separated from the being which appears, but is filled with it. It is the being itself which appears.¹

The knowledge makes this transition and remains equally real as knowledge, whether the object is a body presented through the sensorium, or a human being presented bodily through the senses and in his spiritual personality through the spiritual susceptibilities and powers, or God revealed through the spiritual and distinctively religious susceptibilities and powers. The mind cannot leave these presentations disintegrated and unsubstantial in the last case any more than in the others. It recognizes the being actually revealed in them. It knows the object both in the presentation of it in consciousness and in the forms of reason.

The same is true not only of beings, but also of their relations. No object is presented in isolation, but always in relation to something else. Things are presented nebulous and undiscriminated. By attention we apprehend and distinguish them, and find their unity in relations. These relations and unities are not mere subjective concepts of the mind; they are realities objective to the mind. The mind does not create them, it finds them. We know all things in relations simply because all things exist in relations. The human race, for example, is not a mere subjective concept known merely in a name, as the Nominalists taught. It is not the Great Human Being, the Generic Man, as

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 152, 155-158, 167, 168.

the Realists taught; for these also are mere words, and words with no intelligible meaning. But the human race is a concrete reality consisting of all human beings existing in the race relation. If the race were completed, as extinct races of animals now known only as fossils have been, then to a person capable of perceiving the assemblage of them all as they existed in the race-relation, the race would be a concrete object of perception. Every general concept or notion designated by a general name denotes either certain definite real beings existing with certain actual qualities and powers in certain relations, as man, horse, stone, planet; or certain actual qualities, powers or acts of such beings, contemplated abstractly in thought but objectively real in the beings, as whiteness, hardness, virtue, motion, energy; or certain objectively real relations of beings in which they actually exist, as distance, direction, past, future, dependence, resemblance. They are not mere subjective mental concepts and names; they are concepts of beings and their real objective qualities, powers, acts and relations.

Here again the things in relation are known both in the presentations of sense and in the forms of reason. In thought we apprehend and distinguish the objects presented, and find their unity in their various relations. In this process our thought is regulated by the necessary principles of reason. We find also that the outward objects in their relations exist and act in accordance with these principles of reason; these are at once the laws of thought and the laws of things. We reason in accordance with them from what we observe to what we have not observed. Afterwards we find our inference verified by the facts. Thus the principles of reason which regulate all thinking are continuously confirmed by observation and experience, and are found to be objectively real as well as subjectively necessary. Physical science rests on the assumption that these principles are true, and that they regulate things as well as thought. And its great and ever advancing discoveries are a continuous verification of the truth of the principles, and of their objective reality as regulating things, as principles and laws in accordance with which the universe is constituted. These principles are thus found to be the constitution of the universe and the laws of its orderly action and evolution, the matrix in which the universe is molded, the essence and intelligible significance of all things. Hence Aristotle called these rational principles or ideas the essence, or, if we had such a word, the beingness of things.

And we see, further, that these constitutive norms or regulative principles of all things cannot be themselves impersonal, floating as abstract thoughts in vacuity. Since they are universal, and regulative of all thought and energy, they cannot be mere subjective beliefs in the mind of the observer. Since they are themselves the constitution of the universe, they must be the revelation of Reason transcending the universe, and yet energizing in it, and continuously and progressively expressing and realizing in finite beings in the forms of space and time the rational principles, laws, ideals and ends, which are archetypal and eternal in the transcendent Reason. In the absolute Reason we have the ultimate all-conditioning Being of which the whole universe, physical and spiritual, is the revelation. Thus the rational principles, laws, ideals and ends, which are revealed in finite things and constitute their intelligibility, and of which finite things are in this sense the phenomena, are themselves the phenomena in which the absolute Being appears, and reveals itself as the absolute Reason energizing in the universe. And here as before the phenomena are inseparable from the being and are filled with it, and it is the being that appears and reveals itself in the phenomena.

The existence of the absolute Being is also known by a necessary intuition of reason. Man cannot proceed far in the knowledge of the objects and changes about him without finding in himself the irresistible certainty that some being exists which never began to be, something unconditioned and all-conditioning manifested in all that is. And this is not a mere subjective impression. If it is so, then nothing objectively real exists. If we know ourselves and outward things as real beings, then the absolute must be real being. If knowledge begins as ontological, it must go on as ontological to the knowledge of the absolute Being. In knowing myself in self-consciousness, and outward things in sense-perception, I know them in the forms in which reason knows them. In knowing the universe I must know it in the form in which reason knows it, as dependent on some absolute, unconditioned and all-conditioning Being.

In rational intuition the mind knows universal truths and knows them as laws to all thought and action. It has the fundamental ideas of the True, the Right, the Perfect, and of the Good estimated by reason as having true worth. These are universal, transcending the person seeing them in the light of reason. Human reason cannot leave them disintegrated and with-

out substantial being, but must know them as principles, laws, ideas of the universal and absolute Reason. And when we study the universe, we find revealed in it the ideas of the True, the Right, the Perfect and the Good, which we have already found in our own rational intuition, and in our own constitution as rational beings. Thus reason finds in the universe, in nature and in man, the presence and direction of the universal and absolute Reason. The universe is known in the forms of reason as dependent on God and as the revelation of him. Thus scientific knowledge is inseparable from the knowledge of God. In its essence as science it must, explicitly or implicitly, recognize God, the absolute Reason, as the ground of the universe ; and on this the truth of all its conclusions depends.

Such is rational realism. In this philosophy there is no place for Kant's doctrine that the phenomenon is totally separated from the *noumenon* or thing in itself, and that the latter is therefore entirely unknowable, except that it is known not to be like the phenomenon. On the contrary, what we know of an object is the object itself in its essential being, and in its essential significance to rational intelligence. Minds superior to ours may perceive in it reality and intelligible significance which we cannot perceive. But so far as we do know it, it is the object itself which we know, and in its real relations. And no rational being, however superior, can know in it anything contradictory thereto. And we have this knowledge of the thing in itself as really whether the object known is a body, or ourselves, or other rational and personal men, or God.

Thus the evidence that man has capacity to receive God's revelation and to know him through it, is found in his constitution as a rational free person, and in his action and development as such. Jacobi says : " To have reason and to know God is one ; as not to know God and to be a beast is one." At least it may be said that to be a personal being and to have capacity to receive God's revelation and to know him are one ; and not to have this capacity and to be impersonal are one.

But this capacity is not a naked rational intuition by which, as a pure intellectual act in the dry light of reason, man perceives God. As in sense perception there is the reception of action from without through the sensorium, as well as the perceptive intuition, so in the knowledge of God there is the receptive side as well as the intuitive ; there are rational and spiritual susceptibilities through which God reveals himself in the consciousness,

and the reason reacting in its intuition perceives him. This is what has been called the reason-sense, the God-sense, the God-consciousness. And this is recognized in the theological statement that no man knows God by "unaided reason." It is equally true that no man knows the outward world by "unaided reason." The outward world reveals itself through the sensorium before it can be known by perceptive intuition or apprehended in thought; God reveals himself through the rational or spiritual susceptibilities before he can be known in rational intuition or apprehended in thought.

On the other hand, the mind of man is not a colorless surface passively receiving with equal readiness whatever is impressed on it from without. If so it would be totally indifferent to impressions as true or false, and incapable of discriminating between them. It could have no certainty of truth, because it would have in itself no rational norms or standards by which to test it. On the contrary, we are so constituted that what is true appeals to our rational constitution in a wholly different manner from the untrue. Hence the teaching of our current Illuminism that entire indifference is essential to scientific investigation, is always false and in contradiction to man's constitution as rational. It is impossible for a mind, seeing things in the unchanging forms of reason and in the light of its universal principles and laws, to receive indifferently, with no consciousness of their incompatibility, the propositions that two straight lines inclose a space, and that two straight lines cannot inclose a space. Man is constituted rational. The knowledge of the principles and laws of reason and of all things in its unchanging forms is normal, and, in the deepest sense of the word, natural to man; that is, it is accordant with his constitution as rational. The present tendency to recognize physical things as the only objects of knowledge, and sense as its only source, is abnormal, and, in the deepest sense of the word, unnatural. It is contrary to the constitution of man. It proves him to be in an abnormal condition, either degenerate from a healthier condition, or as yet undeveloped. God in revealing himself to man aims to awaken him to the knowledge of his spiritual environment and thereby of his own constitution as rational and spiritual, not as anything abnormal and strange, but as his normal condition and his deepest nature or constitution. It is man's ignorance of the spiritual and supernatural in himself and his environment, not his knowledge of it, which is strange and abnormal.

Thus it is evident that the denial of man's capacity to receive God's revelation and to know him through it rests only on some false conception of man's knowledge and his power of knowing, and logically involves the denial of the reality and possibility of human knowledge.

3. Man as personal or spiritual has likeness to God which makes communion with him and knowledge of him possible.

Jeremy Taylor speaks of the necessity of "the commentary of *kindness*;" we must be of the same *kind* or kin with a being if there is to be any conscious and intelligent intercommunion. In order to such communion between two there must be a common rational and moral constitution, common principles of truth and right to which to appeal, common feelings and motives to action. So far as they thus participate in a common constitution they are intelligible to each other and can hold conscious communion. So far as they do not thus participate, they are separated by an impassable gulf across which even thought is unable to pass. Because man participates both in nature and spirit, both can act upon him and reveal themselves in his consciousness. But though he can act upon stones and trees, he cannot reveal himself to them because they are insensate. On the lower animals, like star-fishes and oysters, he can act so as to produce sensation in them; but they have not intelligence to take any distinct cognizance of him and to acquaint themselves with him in any intelligent intercourse. He can have some intercourse with his dog, his horse, and a few others of the higher animals; for these have some intelligence, and some appetites, desires and affections as motives of action, in common with his own. But these have not the intuitive reason, nor the free will, nor the rational, moral and religious sentiments, which characterize personality.¹ Along the line which distinguishes the personal from the impersonal the impassable gulf opens and separates us even from these. A dog may accompany a boy to school, but he cannot participate in his trouble in learning arithmetic or in his pleasure in any attainment in scholarship. He may accompany his master to public worship, but he remains as insensate to its significance as are the stone pillars of the church. The dog cannot even look across the dividing gulf and become aware of his own ignorance of all which lies beyond it or even of the existence of the separating gulf. No brute can have any consciousness of its ignorance of

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 537-554.

the multiplication-table or of its incompetence to know and worship God.¹

If man is in nothing like God, if he participates in no qualities of the divine, the same impassable gulf opens between them; man is shut out both from all knowledge of God and from all consciousness of his ignorance and of his incompetence to know and worship him. A likeness even in character is necessary to a full understanding of another; contrariety of character makes a person to that extent unintelligible. One who has always abstained from intoxicating drinks cannot understand fully the temptations, the pains and the pleasures of an habitual drunkard; the character of Nero is an enigma and a seeming impossibility to all good men. One cannot rightly appreciate God's love in Christ if he interprets it only from his own life of selfishness. Yet, notwithstanding their difference of character, on account of their similar rational constitution both the righteous and the sinner may know the law of love; the sinner may understand and approve the requirement of the law and condemn himself as a transgressor. But if one lacks entirely a constitutional quality or power possessed by another, so far he is shut out from all knowledge of the other and from all intercourse with him. We cannot understand God's revelation of himself either in the constitution and history of man or in nature, unless we are endowed with reason the same in kind with God, the supreme Reason. It is because man is a personal spirit like God that he is capable of knowing God; capable, like Kepler, of "thinking God's thoughts after him;" capable also of loving like God; and so capable of knowing the things which are spiritually discerned.

Here theism finds a philosophy which shows the reality of man's likeness to God and in what it consists.

As personal or spiritual, man is also supernatural, that is, above nature. Herein is man's likeness to God, which enables him to receive God's revelation of himself and to know God through it.

The line marking the distinction between nature and the supernatural is commonly regarded as the same with that between the finite and the absolute, that is, between finite beings and God. If this is so man is not supernatural; he has no knowledge of the supernatural in experience; it has never presented itself in his consciousness; he is destitute of all elements by

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, p. 18.

which he can construct the idea in thought; it is merely that which is not included in nature; the idea is void of positive contents. When he attempts to throw his thought across the line dividing nature from the supernatural his thought rebounds on him as a mere negation; he has no positive knowledge which he can carry across with him. Thus logically he is forced upon Spencerian agnosticism. If he attempts to escape by saying that he has positive knowledge of what God is through the universe in which God reveals himself, he is driven on another difficulty equally fatal. For by the supposition the whole universe is included in nature; there is in it nothing above nature; and thus nature is all which the theologian has to carry across the line and with which to account for nature. God, then, is only nature; the Great Nature, as he is sometimes called. Then the supernatural has disappeared and nature is all and is from everlasting. Thus if a theologian identifies the line of demarkation between nature and the supernatural with that between the finite and the absolute, logically he has only the alternative between Spencerian agnosticism and a materialism which recognizes nothing but nature going on in its invariable sequences of causal dependence from all eternity. This concession of theologians that the finite universe includes nothing supernatural, cripples them in their conflict with skepticism, agnosticism and materialism; and to this these forms of unbelief in great part owe their prevalence. The question is not so much whether God exists, as whether there is anything spiritual or supernatural in man.

In truth, the line between the supernatural and the natural is between personal beings and impersonal. The rational free will is in its essence supernatural, not as originating power but as directing and exerting it. It is a power which being enlightened by reason is self-directive and self-exertive, and as such is above the correlations of force in the fixed course of nature, and produces effects in nature which nature left to its fixed course would not have produced. Without at least so much as this there can be no free and morally responsible agent in the universe.

Man, therefore, as a personal or spiritual being is supernatural. As such he knows what the supernatural is. He knows in himself reason and free will and rational motives, the essential attributes of a supernatural or spiritual being. As a spirit he is like God who is a Spirit; he participates in reason the same in kind with God, the eternal Reason; he recognizes as imperative in his own reason the same law of love which God commands, he can

love like God. Thus he has something in common with God. He is on the same side of the line with God, he is a rational spirit like him. When he tries to think of God he has positive knowledge of him as personal Spirit, as energizing Reason, or rational Will. His thought is still negative as to the unconditionateness or infinitude of God, but positive as to the rational Spirit that is unconditioned and infinite. And so far as the miraeulous reveals the supernatural; man has knowledge of it in his own rational and free personality, in his own supernatural powers. Thus man is in the image of God. Thus, and thus only, is he capable of communion with God, of receiving revelation of him, of knowing and serving him.

Therefore, in considering whether man has knowledge of God, the decisive question is, Are we rational, free, personal beings? If so, we are supernatural in the true meaning of the word. If we can honestly and heartily affirm our own personality in its true significance, the belief in God, the eternal Spirit, can hardly fail to follow.

This common misplacement of the line of demarkation between nature and the supernatural not only precludes logically the positive knowledge of God, but also the full and correct knowledge of man. It shuts him up in nature with no outlook into the supernatural. But because man is spirit and therein supernatural, he has the knowledge of the supernatural in his consciousness of himself. While as to his physical organization he is in nature as really as are the trees, is sensitive to its action on him, and so knows it in his conscious experience, in his spirit he is supernatural, is sensitive to the action of the supernatural on him, and knows it in his conscious experience. Thus he knows two systems in the universe, the natural, and the spiritual or supernatural. As he belongs to nature, he receives in his sensorium impressions from material things and physical forces, and his consciousness becomes a centre on which all the forces of nature converge and in which they reveal themselves. As spirit he is sensitive to spiritual and supernatural influences from man and God; his consciousness is a centre on which the powers of the spiritual system converge and in which they reveal themselves. Thus he has knowledge of the system of nature and of the rational and moral system, and of their unity in the universe which is the manifestation of God. The unity of the two appears in the subordination of nature to spirit and its harmony with it as the sphere in which it acts and the medium through which it is

revealed. Nature is filled with the divine Spirit and reveals it, as the atmosphere is filled with the sunlight and reveals the sun.

“ The earth is crammed with heaven,
 And every common bush afire with God.
 But only he who sees takes off his shoes ;
 The rest sit round it — and pick blackberries.”

And if the physical organization of man is but the form and medium in and through which the human spirit reveals itself, if all nature is but the form and medium in and through which God and the spiritual system are revealed, the antagonism between nature and the supernatural disappears, but the distinction between them remains ; and man by virtue of his spiritual and supernatural powers is participant in the light of the divine Reason, and is capable of knowing God and of communing with him, of knowing the supernatural and participating in it.

Thus man is at once a supernatural being in a supernatural or spiritual environment, and participant of an animal nature in a physical environment. If we once grasp this reality it will be impossible to doubt that his spiritual environment may reveal itself in his consciousness through his spiritual susceptibilities, as his physical environment reveals itself through his senses. And spirit will no longer be conceived as the ghostly and ghastly, but as the essentially and distinctively human.

4. This capacity to know God is discovered in the examination of man's constitution as a personal being.

As a personal and supernatural being man is endowed with reason, susceptibility to rational and spiritual motives and emotions, and free will. Through each of these he has capacity to receive the revelation of God.

By his human reason man participates in the light of the divine and universal Reason. In this light he knows the divine and universal Reason revealed in his own consciousness. In this light he confronts the universe as the object of his intelligence, and finds the divine and universal Reason revealed in the rational principles and laws which regulate it. He ascends “through nature up to nature's God,” because he sees it in the light of universal principles which are the “constituent elements of reason ;” and these illuminate his thinking because he is in the image of God and the light of the divine Reason shines in his rational intelligence. Beginning at the level of the brute in the impressions of sense, the mind is able to penetrate through sensation far beyond sense, to know the systems both of nature and

spirit, and their unity in their common dependence on God. As Plato says, "The soul is a sort of oracle."¹ This it is by virtue of the fact that it is Reason.

Thus God is revealed to man through his reason, both immediately in his consciousness and mediately through the universe, including both the physical and the moral systems.

And these are revelations and not mere products of thought. Knowledge cannot originate in mere thinking. Thought must strike on some object already revealed, and be reflected back from it, in order to illuminate the mind with knowledge. As the everywhere diffused daylight comes from the reflection of the light of the sun from the atmosphere and innumerable objects, the mind is illuminated with intelligence by thought reflected from innumerable points of reality presented around it. Goethe says: "All the thinking in the world does not bring us to thought. We must be right by nature, so that good thoughts may come before us like free children of God and cry, 'Here we are.'" Genius does not create its great thoughts by thinking. Rather it is a power that sees farther and deeper than others into the realities presented before it. The thoughts that come trooping before it as the children of God crying, "Here we are," come from all the objects of the physical and moral systems, as they present themselves before its "vision and faculty divine," and reveal the spiritual and divine that is in them, visible to him who can see. So in the spiritual life the knowledge of God is not originated by thinking, but presupposes revelation. And there is a spiritual insight analogous to that of genius, which sees into the significance of the reality revealed. In the revelation of God in the Christian consciousness, the humblest mind has a vision of God and of the universe in its relation to him, which ungodly genius with all its powers cannot see.

God reveals himself also through the feelings. While revelation is always to the intellect, it is not always immediately to it, but may be made through other powers and susceptibilities of our being. God reveals himself through man's feelings, the motives which impel him to action and the emotions in which his feelings react on the action and its object; and he is constitutionally endowed with susceptibilities through which he is capable of receiving this revelation. The sensibilities are points of sensitivity to the action of outward agencies, through which they can make their presence felt in the consciousness. The sensorium and the

¹ Μαντικόν γέ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ. Phædrus, 242.

natural appetites, desires and affections are the points of sensitivity at which man's physical environment comes in contact with him and makes its presence felt in his consciousness. The rational sensibilities, the susceptibility of scientific, moral, æsthetic, teleological and religious motives and emotions, are the points of sensitivity to the spiritual environment, through which it makes its presence felt in the spiritual consciousness. Through these God reveals himself; through motives and emotions pertaining to truth, to right and wrong, to perfection and beauty, to the honorable and worthy, to the realization of the true good, and through the religious motives and emotions pertaining directly to God. Man not only knows himself to be a part of the system of nature, but also feels it in the weight of his body, in the impact of physical forces, in hunger and thirst, in all sensation. So he not only knows himself to be a part of the moral and spiritual system, but feels it in all rational and spiritual motives and emotions. In these, spiritual reality is felt and revealed before it is proved or even reflected on in thought. Plato said: "I know nothing more clear and certain than this; that I must be as good and noble as it is possible for me to be." Says W. S. Lilly: "I cannot prove to you the beauty of a sunset, or the sacredness of sorrow, or the nobleness of 'Regulus and of the Scauri, and of Paulus, prodigal of his great soul when the Punic enemy triumphed.'" Religious sentiments are inwrought into our inmost consciousness. In them man knows his contact with the infinite and his kinship with the divine. In them the reality of the unseen and the eternal reveals itself in the soul, and all its sensibilities quiver at the mysterious presence. These religious sensibilities lie deeper than thought; the consciousness of them is antecedent to reasoning, and cannot by reasoning be destroyed; nor by the crowd and turmoil and pressure of other interests be overwhelmed. We are voyagers on the ocean of eternity; and though we go down into the ship and hide the great expanse from our eyes, though there we abandon ourselves to amusement or business, we must sometimes feel the heaving of the infinite ocean on which we sail. It is the voice of God within the soul, not always definite and articulate; it is the felt presence of the Most High.

" Like an æolian harp that wakes
 No certain air, but overtakes
 Far thought with music that it makes;
 Such seemed the whisper at my side.
 What is it thou knowest, sweet voice? I cried.

A hidden hope, the voice replied,
 So heavenly toned that in that hour,
 From out my sullen heart a power
 Broke, like the rainbow from the shower,
 To feel, although no tongue should prove,
 That every cloud that spreads above
 And veileth love, itself is love."

If this is not so, then man is constitutionally endowed with no susceptibility through which he is sensitive to the action of his spiritual environment, or through which any action of God upon him can make itself felt; he is constituted, as Schelling expresses it, with "an original atheism of consciousness."

Man knows God also in the sphere of free will. In the exercise of free will he knows himself as a person; he becomes aware of his own spiritual power, of his moral obligation and responsibility. He knows himself in the moral and spiritual system; law in its reality, universality and imperativeness opens to his view like an all-encompassing firmament glowing with light, in the centre of which and beneath its zenith, move where he will, he must always act. In this knowledge of the all-encompassing and all-illuminating law, he has the vision of the all-encompassing, all-illuminating God, who "besets him behind and before."

The conclusion must be that man is endowed with capacity to receive God's revelation of himself and to know God through it. He finds God within himself revealed in his consciousness. This knowledge is not rooted in any single faculty alone, but in the whole personal or spiritual constitution of the man; and it discloses itself as a factor in the whole life and history of mankind. In his thinking he finds his thought regulated by transcendent and universal principles through which he sees the Reason that is universal and supreme. In his motives and emotions he finds himself drawn to that which is above and beyond him and related to the divine. In his voluntary energizing he finds himself under a law above himself laying obligation on him in every act and speaking within him with the voice of God.¹

5. Man's capacity to know God is not a special faith-faculty.

Some refer our knowledge of God to a special faith-faculty. They are, however, commonly not careful to define with exactness what they mean by it. Hamilton acknowledged a faith in God while denying the knowledge of him; but he nowhere de-

¹ I here merely indicate the evidence in man's constitution of his capacity to know God. It is involved in the evidence in man's constitution of the existence of God, which will be fully presented in a subsequent chapter.

defines what the faith is. Wace explicitly declines to define it: "Without any strict definition we know sufficiently well where to observe it, and on what main principles the structure of the Christian creed is built."¹

It is not worth while to dispute about a word. Of course the mind has power to do whatever it does. If we call this power a faculty it is still nothing but the mind itself in its integral unity considered as capable of doing it. But this is more than a question of words.

In the foregoing discussion it has been shown that the belief in God is rooted in man's constitution as a rational person, and ramified through all the powers and susceptibilities of his personality. There is, therefore, in the constitution of man no psychological basis for an isolated faculty for the knowledge of God, and no facts requiring it for their explanation. On the contrary, the assumption of such a faculty involves serious errors, weakens the defense of theism, and lays it open to difficulties and objections which otherwise would not have arisen.

The treatment of the supposed faith-faculty commonly implies that it is outside of human reason, and that the belief arising from it is not knowledge. Thus theism and all theology are excluded from knowledge and remanded to faith and fancy. The real question is, whether man's belief in God is knowledge, in harmony with reason and with all which is essential in rational personality.

If man has knowledge only through the senses and his intellectual action is limited to reaffirming what is given in sense, and if these are all the powers used in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, then, if he is to know God, he must be endowed with an additional and special faculty for that service. But if man is endowed with reason, by which he knows universal principles and laws regulative of all thought and action, then in rational and religious susceptibilities his being will be open to the revelation of the supernatural and of God, and he will need no special faith-faculty for the knowledge of God. Then his reason is in affinity with the absolute Reason, which has ordered and constituted the universe, and he is capable of knowing both the universe and the God who reveals himself in it.

Religious belief is a spontaneous forth-putting of the constitution of man. It has its roots in all that constitutes him a person

¹ Bampton Lectures, 1879; *The Foundations of Faith*, p. 27. On the faith-faculty, see *Phil. Basis of Theism*, pp. 76-80.

or spirit, and so distinguishes him as human from the brutes. The capacity for religion is inherent in humanity; its manifestation in religion is inseparable from the normal development of man. But this is no longer true if religious belief arises from a special faculty or organ. Then it is no longer rooted in the entire constitution of man as personal; it is isolated from ordinary intelligence, from the ordinary laws of thought, and from all the powers of reason which make him capable of empirical, mathematical, logical and philosophical science. Then the faculty of religious belief is put outside of the community of human faculties, and set apart from all that is essential to constitute man personal and give him knowledge of the universe. It necessarily follows that the faculty of religious belief, set apart from the reason, comes into contradiction to it; antagonism between religious knowledge and science is organized into the constitution of the human mind, and the belief in God can maintain itself only by vaulting over or breaking down the reason, and the rational intelligence which gives us science. Then religion itself is in its essence ghostly and ghastly, but not human, a concern of another and unknown world, but not of this.¹

This error can be eradicated only by correcting the erroneous theory of knowledge on which it is founded. It is not the belief in God which first opens to man a glimpse of the supernatural. By virtue of his personality man is himself supernatural, and his whole experience is in the supernatural sphere not less than in the natural. In every rational intuition of a universal principle or law, in every motive and emotion pertaining to truth, right, perfection or worth, in every choice of free will, he knows himself as supernatural, he sees and feels supernatural realities. His belief in God is his knowledge of the absolute Reason, of whom he himself, as rational, is the image; and in that knowledge alone he finds the reality and unity of all his knowing. We cannot establish theism in the face of agnostic and materialistic science

¹ The words of Leslie Stephen are significant here: "What could be easier than to form a catena of the most philosophical defenders of Christianity, who have exhausted language in declaring the impotence of the unassisted intellect? Comte has not more explicitly enounced the incapacity of man to deal with the absolute and the infinite than the whole series of orthodox writers. 'Trust your reason,' we have been told till we are tired of the phrase, 'and you will become agnostics.' We take you at your word; we will become agnostics." Hegel says that the humility which affirms that the finite cannot know God nor come into direct relations with him, simply ascribes to God powerlessness to make himself known. — *Phil. der Religion*, vol. i. p. 195.

by conceding that man is a creature of nature only, a higher animal, and then adding to his nature a special faculty through which he may catch a glimpse of the supernatural — a sphere of reality which he has never entered and in which, drenched in nature, he does not participate. Such a faculty would be in philosophy what Horace censured in poetry, a purple patch on a worn and faded garment. On the contrary, we must show that man is constituted supernatural and knows the supernatural in knowing himself; that his knowledge of God is at home in the community of his human faculties; and that it arises in the highest exercise of his reason, not in vaulting over it and standing apart in antagonism to it.

Mr. Wace exemplifies the dangerous tendencies which I have pointed out. He says that the faith which believes in God's love and almightiness in face of evil "has abandoned the ground of mere rational belief, and has taken a step which justifies in principle any subsequent advance. It has given up once for all the right to measure its assent by the dictates of reason alone, and has committed itself to the hands of another guide altogether. . . . The faith of the creeds recognizes these difficulties. It owns that they are insuperable on any grounds of mere natural reason, and it offers supernatural realities and supernatural assurances to overcome them." Speaking of attempts to compromise with science by minimizing the articles of faith he says, "As long as we retain any of them as more than bare speculations we go beyond scientific grounds and rest on assurances which transcend the capacity of mere reason." Even the witness and the categorical imperative of conscience he regards as an exercise of a faith-faculty distinct from the reason; "to believe in the absolute supremacy of right over wrong" is "a momentous act of faith, . . . respecting which it is hardly too much to say, in Hume's own words, that it 'subverts all the principles of the understanding.'" ¹ In short, he seems to declare a complete separation and antagonism of reason and faith, and to assert the right and necessity of believing through the faith-faculty what is in contradiction to reason.

I heartily concur with him in affirming that man has capacity to know God; as he intimates, we are in direct contact with him. The objection is to a special organ of faith distinct and isolated from man's reason, his rational intelligence, and his human constitution as a rational and personal being. Man has a distinct

¹ The Foundations of Faith, pp. 15, 18, 43, 44.

faculty of religious knowledge only in the sense in which he has a distinct faculty of mathematical, ethical or æsthetic knowledge. The preëminent and imperative demand on the Christian theism of this day is to establish the synthesis of reason and faith. Faith involves the highest exercise of reason. As Dr. Thomas Arnold defined faith, it is "reason leaning on God." We know God by leaning on him. We know God by leaning on him in the faith which implies an act of will, and which, as such, is essentially trust; we know him thus in experience. But in the case now under consideration it is not will leaning on God, but reason. Reason knows its intuitional principles and laws, which regulate all thought and action, as true, real and universal only as they lean on the absolute Reason and are supported by it as its eternal truths and laws. In the words of Principal Tulloch: "The mind, intuitive in its lowest energy, is equally so in its highest. If looking outward it has no further explanation of the visible world than that it is present in apprehension and therefore must be conceived as existent, so looking upward from the sphere of finite reality, it perceives a higher world of truth which equally makes itself good in apprehension. Such a higher world of intuition, by which we apprehend realities beyond the region of the sensible, is one which is admitted by every school of philosophy save that which, from the extremely unphilosophical assumption lying at its basis, is bound to ignore everything beyond the sensible."¹

Those who find man's knowledge of the supernatural only in an isolated faith-faculty are wont to speak of "mere reason," "natural reason," "unaided reason," as incompetent to know God. To this true philosophy assents. Man does not know God by unaided reason, but only as God by his action has revealed himself to man. And philosophy further affirms that it is equally true that the unaided reason of man cannot know anything. Man does not know the physical world by unaided reason, but only as by its action on the sensorium it first reveals or presents itself in consciousness. He does not know his fellow-men in their personality by unaided reason, but only as by their action on him through his spiritual susceptibilities and powers, they present or reveal themselves as personal in his consciousness; as when we see a heroic act of virtue our spiritual susceptibilities thrill responsive to it. In like manner man does not know God by unaided reason, but only as God by some action

¹ Tulloch; *Theism*, p. 319.

on the man reveals or presents himself in his consciousness. God alone has absolute knowledge independent of revelation from without. In this respect our knowledge of God is the same as our knowledge of the universe. Thus there is a basis for the scientific knowledge of God, the same in kind with the basis for the scientific knowledge of nature and of man. The Christian doctrine of man's dependence on the Spirit of God for spiritual light and life accords with this philosophical principle. The physical world is continually revealing itself in man's consciousness, not only through the sensorium as existing, but also through the appetites, desires and affections of his animal life, as that on which he depends for the satisfaction of his desires and for all merely natural good. In an analogous way God, who environs man spiritually, according to the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, is continually revealing himself in the consciousness, not only as existing, but also as that on which the man depends as the source of all spiritual light, the satisfaction of all spiritual desires, and the realization of all spiritual perfection and good.

Dr. Carpenter says in his *Mental Physiology*, there are branches of science in which "our conclusions rest not on any one set of experiences, but on our unconscious coördination of the whole aggregate of our experience; not on any one train of reasoning, but on the converging of all our lines of thought toward one centre." This is true of our knowledge of God. Its roots are in our feelings, our reason, our consciousness of free will and moral responsibility; in our experience and our reflective thought; in our speculative thinking and our practical action as to the true, the right, the perfect, the good and the absolute; in all the elements and ramifications of human personality. Accordingly Luthardt defines faith as "that mental act in which my whole spiritual being, my knowing, feeling and willing combine in uniting themselves with the object of faith."¹

Because this belief thus springs from man's inmost self, from all in him which constitutes him a human person, it intertwines itself with all his normal action. Therefore it is as certain to him as his own existence. To give up this belief is to give up his belief in himself as a rational, personal man, to give up all that is noblest and most worthy in the development of his being, and in the ends for which he lives.

¹ *Apologetic Lectures on the Fundamental Truths of Christianity*, Trans., page 153.

For the same reason it calls for the consecration of the whole person to God in loving trust and service. A man does not give his life for a mere speculation, a conclusion reached by dint of argument; but for truth which inspires, guides and quickens him in the right conduct of life, and which he believes essential to realizing the true good of mankind. The Christian belief is not a speculation; it is not so much that the believer has laid hold of truth as that he has laid hold of God; not so much that he has laid hold of God as that God has laid hold of him.

And the believer has not merely found God, but therein has also found himself. In discovering his relations to God he has discovered the true greatness of himself, his highest possibilities, his real good, his eternal life. He has also discovered what is the true glory and good of mankind; and in whatever sphere of life he may be, he becomes a witness for God to testify of God to men, and to convince them that only in knowing him can they know what is greatest and best in themselves, and what is of true and imperishable worth in human life.

6. Here the objection is urged that it is absurd to suppose that God, the absolute and infinite, can present himself in the consciousness of a finite mind.

The theist agrees with the objector that it is absurd that a finite mind should have complete knowledge of the absoluteness, the infinitude of God. God alone knows God in completeness. But since the absolute Being has positive qualities and not merely negative, it is possible to have a positive and real, though incomplete, knowledge of him. We have positive knowledge of him as Spirit, supernatural like ourselves. We can know that he is unconditioned or absolute. But what the absoluteness is we can know only negatively, by denying his dependence on anything independent of himself, and his limitation in time, space or quantity. And because God is a Spirit, there is nothing in his absoluteness making it impossible for him to reveal himself as spirit in the consciousness of a finite mind, and to be positively though incompletely known. A babe is incompetent to have a full knowledge of what its mother is. But she is revealing herself to it every day, and more and more, as its mind expands, it knows her. All knowledge begins in spontaneous belief; a nucleus of knowledge within a periphery of indefiniteness opening room for opinion, conjecture and error in thought, and for progressive enlargement of knowledge.

So the spontaneous belief in a divinity arises in the experience

of men. When defined and tested even as it exists in the rudest men, it is found to contain at least the consciousness, however dim, of a supernatural and superhuman being or beings, which is a nucleus of knowledge; and around it a periphery of indefiniteness which opens room for opinion and conjecture, for fancy and error, as to what the being is in detail. This nucleus of religious knowledge will be gradually enlarged as God continuously reveals himself in nature and in man, and is known in the experience of the individual and the history of mankind, and as man continues to define and test his spontaneous beliefs in thought, to set aside the false, to leave the doubtful for the present as opinion, and to verify the others as true and so transform them into definite knowledge.

This is the true Christian agnosticism. From the greatness of what is known of God we become the more conscious of the transcendent mystery and incomprehensibility of his being; the wider area of the known makes visible a larger horizon of the unknown.

It appears, therefore, that God is presented or revealed in consciousness as really as a finite thing or person is; and that the limitations of our immediate knowledge of God are analogous to the limitations of our immediate knowledge of a finite thing or person. We know the one as really as the other in consciousness; and in the one as really as the other it is through impressions and indications made in consciousness by the object that the mind in its reaction knows the being. In the constancy of the action on us of finite persons and things we forget that we know them through impressions which they make in our consciousness, in which the mind in its reaction perceives them, and imagine that somehow we have a sure knowledge of them, such as we cannot have of God. But our knowledge of God is in the same way through impressions and indications in consciousness of his presence and action, and in each case the mind perceives the being through these. It is true that finite persons and things affect us in part sensibly, and God only spiritually; but not that our knowledge of the former is immediate and of the latter is not. The spiritual is deeper in our being than the physical and sensible. If the spiritual wants, on the satisfaction of which our spiritual life depends, were as obtrusive and obstreperous as the natural wants, on the satisfaction of which the natural life depends, if God's touch were on the body instead of on the spirit, if he shone in our eyes instead of in our hearts, if his grace spoke in

the ear instead of in the silence of the spirit, we should think our knowledge of him as immediate as of the sun when it shines on us and of our friends when they speak to us. But the influences of the Spirit of God do not fall on the senses, but on the spirit. The natural man with his natural senses and sensibilities "receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." But the human spirit's knowledge of the things of the divine Spirit is as immediate and real as the natural man's knowledge through the senses of the things of nature.

7. Another objection is that, however man's belief in God arises, it can never become knowledge, but must remain always a mere subjective belief. Agnostics, materialists and skeptics, who acknowledge man's constitutional religiousness, acknowledge that he may have a belief in a god, but deny that it can become knowledge. Theists sometimes so distinguish belief in God from the knowledge of him as to imply that the belief can never become knowledge.

The first question is, What do they mean by belief? For as in the case of the faith-faculty, the term is not clearly defined. Elaborate essays have been written on the distinction between belief and knowledge without making clear what the distinction is or securing for it any fixedness of meaning. In literary and philosophical usage there is a great diversity in the meanings attached to belief as distinguished from knowledge.

Belief is used to denote assent resting on testimony as distinguished from perceptive or ratiocinated knowledge.

Especially it has been used in theology to denote assent resting on the authority of the Bible as the word of God; or on the authority of the church as supposed to declare the meaning of God's word. Here a moral element enters into the belief. It includes the act of the will trusting God, or the church, as authoritative.

Belief is also used to mean subjective assent. In distinction from this, knowledge would be an assent founded on the action of some object on the man revealing itself in his consciousness, on the reaction of the mind perceiving the object, and on the further action of the mind apprehending and defining the object and comprehending it in unity with other things by ascertaining its relations to them. But the subjective assent is an element essential in all knowledge however elaborated, and without it there cannot be any knowledge. On the other hand, the sim-

plest subjective assent implies at least the presentation of some object in consciousness and the reaction of the mind on it in perceiving it.

Belief or faith is also used to denote the self-evident, spontaneous knowledge arising in presentative and rational intuition and in memory. But this belief is not distinct from knowledge. It is knowledge in its nascent state. It is the primitive knowledge on which all knowledge elaborated in thought depends. It furnishes the material about which we think and the laws which regulate the thinking.

Assent arising from the practical experience of life is sometimes called belief, as distinguished from knowledge. By experience, for example, we learn what are the issues of certain lines of conduct and what principles must regulate action in order to attain the highest ends of life. But beliefs thus arising are often the most certain knowledge. It is for beliefs thus springing out of the practical experience of life and intertwined with all human interests that a man may be ready to die a martyr.

Evidently, then, the objection has no force, because belief, as distinguished from knowledge, is used in so many different senses, and those who urge the objection use the word without discriminating between its various meanings, and in their arguing pass interchangeably from one meaning to another.

It must also be noticed that in each of the meanings belief is not in antithesis to knowledge, but is itself knowledge in a particular aspect; and at least in the third and fourth meanings is essential to all knowledge. In each it may be the intellectual equivalent of reality; and knowledge can be no more.

If, indeed, belief in God springs from a special faith-faculty, then it may be distinguished from knowledge and in antithesis to it. But there is no evidence of the existence of such a faculty.

And we find, further, that scientific knowledge itself begins in faith or belief and rests on "assumptions" as really as theism does. The objector says: "Theology, which develops its knowledge from faith, and is itself a belief only, is therefore no science at all, inasmuch as science must be independent of faith and is developed apart from all assumptions." No statement as to science could well be further from the fact. The scientist's knowledge of the physical realities about which he thinks, of himself the thinker, and of all the principles which regulate his thinking and give validity to his conclusions, rests entirely on

self-evident, unproved and unprovable belief. It is spontaneous belief developed by thought. As Ulrici says truly: "Always in science, knowledge (*Wissen*) and belief (*Glauben*), far from a severe separation, are in the closest connection even in the exactest sciences; a great part of our scientific knowledge (*Erkenntniss*) really belongs not to knowledge (*Wissen*), but to the sphere of belief. It is, in fact, only the thoughtlessness and the lack of scientific accuracy in the thinking of modern investigators of nature, which leads them to fancy in all their results, inferences and presuppositions, that they possess a rigorously exact knowledge (*Wissen*), from the height of which they look down on the endeavors of philosophy and the other sciences."

On the other hand, the knowledge of God begins as spontaneous belief through God's revelation of himself in consciousness and man's knowledge of him in experience, grows up in the practical experience of life and intertwines itself with all man's highest interests, is scrutinized and verified by thought, and is thus developed into knowledge in its most highly elaborated form. As Ulrici says: "Religious belief rises to the highest certainty possible, so that for it men sacrifice property and life, which is rarely done for scientific knowledge. This shows that the difference between belief and knowledge is not as to the degree of certainty, not quantitative but qualitative. . . . When religious belief is developed by reflective thought to scientific belief, without losing its living personal conviction, it is the highest attainable form of human knowledge (*Wissen*), and the most perfect expression of genuine humanity."¹

Thus it appears that man's knowledge of God does not differ as knowledge from his knowledge of the universe, but only as to the object known. Thus the objection resolves itself at last into the dogmatic assumption that human knowledge is limited to the objects perceived through the senses.

8. Theology is thought of by many as consisting only of abstractions, as busying itself only with general notions and words, with distinctions and definitions. This mediæval tendency to neglect concrete thought for abstract, to make general notions and words the objects of thought instead of concrete realities, has not wholly passed away from theology,² as it has not from other lines of thought. But in truth theology concerns itself with the living God revealing himself in our own consciousness, in the

¹ Ulrici; *Glauben und Wissen*, pp. 283, 267, 343.

² *Phil. Basis of Theism*, pp. 54-61.

universe, in the history of man, in Christ and the historical establishment of his kingdom ; with man in his relations to God, to his kingdom and to the spiritual system ; with all the deepest realities of human life and of the universe.

Under the lead of physical science the thinking of the present day is setting strongly away from words to things, from the abstract to the concrete. But, as it comes under the influence of skepticism or materialism, it still misses the deepest reality. For it excludes the spiritual, and busies itself only with what presents itself to sense. It contents itself with the mechanism of the world without considering the deeper reality which it reveals. It contents itself with examining the binding, the print, the general getting up of the book of nature, without grasping its significance and its design. Thus it falls into a barren realism scarcely less superficial than the mediæval logomachy. It is satirized by Goethe : —

“ He who seeks to know a thing well
Must first the spirit within expel ;
Then he can count the parts in his hand,
Only without the spiritual band.”

Matthew Arnold tells of a young man at college who turned Shakespeare's “ Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased ? ” into “ Can you not wait on a lunatic ? ” The change strips off the poetry, the sentiment, the real depth of woe, and leaves only the physical disease. The current realism strips off not the poetry and sentiment only, but the philosophy, the religion, all that belongs to the spiritual. It pictures the universe and life without perspective, with all the flatness of a Chinese painting.

Theology is not one-sided in excluding either the physical or the spiritual. It does not exclude the physical world, but reveals it in its true reality and its highest significance. It does not exclude the spiritual world, but reveals it as the deeper reality which is manifested in nature, and to whose higher ends nature is subordinate ; in which man, knowing himself as spirit, finds himself at home and lives in intimacy with God. And his knowledge of God is not vacant in empty thought, but is knowledge of concrete reality in its fullest and richest significance, the knowledge of God and of spiritual realities given in the experience of life. This knowledge does not lie in the mind as gold coins lie in a purse, the purse unchanged and not benefited by its contents, and the coins having no vital connection with the purse ; but the mind has taken it up in the processes of its own life and growth,

as a living plant takes up the soil and water and transforms them into its own living organization.

We see then that knowledge is not an empty, subjective act, but is the subjective intelligence, acting on a presented or revealed object, which gives body and illuminating power to its otherwise thin and uneffulgent flame. If the mind can pass beyond all that is immediately before the senses and explore the universe, it is because it apprehends planets and suns, molecules and masses, motions and forces, bodies and spirits, and, supported on their substantial reality, advances to the knowledge of all that is. So the knowledge of God presupposes a revelation of God. It is a revelation found by the seeker after him in nature, in the history of mankind, and in Christ, but first of all in the soul of the seeker himself. We have seen that God reveals himself in the religious sentiments common to all men. A Christian has the clearer and larger revelation of God in his purer and more powerful experience of God's presence and grace in the Spirit, which testifies of Christ and brings the great motives of God's revelation in him to bear upon the soul. Thus the idea of God and the belief in him is not at the end, but at the beginning of the so-called proof of his existence. We ascertain the elements which enter into the idea, and the reasons why we believe that he exists; we bring the grounds of the belief into the light of reason and judge whether they are reasonable; and we find it reasonable to believe that God reveals himself in our experience; that we know him as present and acting within the compass of our own consciousness. We find him within ourselves. "No man climbs to the throne of God by the pathway of the stars who has not first faced him in the inner sanctuary of his own soul." So Augustine, after his long speculations and his struggle with speculative difficulties, at last with wonder and joy found God revealing himself within his own soul. "Too late I loved thee, O Beauty, ancient yet ever new. Too late I loved thee. I searched for thee abroad, and thou wert within; I, deluded, abroad, plunging amid those fair forms which thou hadst made. Thou wert with me but I was not with thee. Things held me far from thee which, unless they were in thee, were not at all. Thou didst call and shout and burst my deafness. Thou didst flash, shine and scatter my blindness. Thou didst breathe odors and I drew in breath and panted for thee. Thou touchedst me and I burned for thy peace."¹ And when

¹ Confessions, bk. x., xxvii. 38.

once we have found him within, we see all the world full of evidences of his existence, presence and activity. As Hawthorne beautifully says: "Christian faith is a grand cathedral with divinely pictured windows. Standing without, you see no glory nor can possibly imagine any; standing within, every ray of light reveals a harmony of unspeakable splendors."

This knowledge of God revealing himself by his gracious action in the spiritual life within the soul has often been overlooked by modern writers on the evidence of the existence of God. But it has been the confession, the faith and the joy of Christ's spiritual disciples in all ages. Theophilus, writing to Autolyceus, said: "If thou sayest, Show me thy God, I answer, Show me first thy man, and I will show thee my God. Show me first whether the eyes of thy soul see and the ears of thy heart hear. For as the eyes of the body perceive earthly things, light and darkness, white and black, beauty and deformity, and the ear distinguishes sounds, so the ears of the heart and the eyes of the soul can perceive divine things. God is seen, by those who can see him, when they open the eyes of their soul. All men have eyes, but the eyes of some are blinded so that they cannot see the light of the sun. But the sun does not cease to shine because they are blind; they must ascribe it to their blindness that they cannot see. This is thy case, O man. The eyes of thy soul are darkened by sin, even by thy sinful actions. As a mirror must be bright, so man's soul must be pure. If there be rust on the mirror man cannot see his face in it; likewise if there be sin in man's soul he cannot see God." ¹

The necessary conclusion is that man is constituted with capacity to receive revelation from God and to know him through it. As on one side of his being he is part and participant of the system of nature and constituted capable of knowing the realities of the physical world, so on the personal side of his being he is part and participant of the spiritual and moral system and constituted capable of knowing the realities of the spiritual world. As Quinet expresses it: "Man is drawn toward God, his creator, by all the ties of the soul and of the body. The lion when it comes into being moves to the desert, the eagle to the mountain-tops, man to society, to humanity and to God. Yes; behold, the great name is uttered; and if you do not recognize some instinct to the divinity in the heart of the peoples in their cradle, all remains inexplicable." ²

¹ Theophilus to Autolyceus, bk. i. chap. ii.

² Edgar Quinet, *Le Génie des Religions*, p. 28.

CHAPTER VI.

MAN'S SPIRITUAL CAPACITIES NEED TO BE AWAKENED.

MAN'S power to know God needs to be aroused to action and his spiritual vision clarified by the spiritual quickening and development of the man.

1. This may be so because his spiritual powers are not yet developed, or else because they have been voluntarily neglected or perverted.

Paul distinguishes in man the natural or fleshly from the spiritual. This distinction is founded on the fact that man belongs alike to the rational or spiritual system and to the physical or natural. Thus he is a natural or fleshly man and a spiritual man. By the natural is meant all which is common to man with the brutes ; by the spiritual all that is common to him with God.

Here is the basis of Paul's assertion that the natural man cannot know the things of the spirit, because they are spiritually discerned. Man by his merely natural powers as here defined cannot know God, and through them God cannot reveal himself to man. The senses perceive material things but they cannot perceive the spiritual. Hunger, thirst, all merely natural appetites and desires, are responsive to the touch of the divine spirit no more than miry clay to the bow of a musician. They do not lead to God, nor even to any life regulated by truth and law and directed to the realization of rational ideals and ends, but only to a life seeking enjoyment in the gratification of desires. Hedonism, because itself is founded exclusively in the nature-side of man, recognizes this as his highest life ; and thus, because man being rational cannot be blessed in nature alone, sets up Pessimism as the true philosophy. As the brute can have no knowledge of the spiritual in man nor even of its own ignorance of it, so man, by those powers and susceptibilities of nature which are common to him with the brutes, can have no knowledge of God nor even of his own ignorance of him ; and equally no knowledge of any distinctively spiritual power or susceptibility in himself.

God reveals himself to spirit only, and by spirit only can the revelation be received. The work of God in the heavens and the earth may be perceived by the senses, but they do not perceive God. They report the outward form and motion; it is the spirit that through these perceives God.

Here we find in the constitution of man a reason why a spiritual awakening and development are necessary in order that he may know God. The natural in man precedes the development of the spiritual. The spiritual in the human constitution lies potential and dormant for a longer or shorter period, before it begins to reveal itself as an active energy. A new-born babe discloses only the instincts and powers of a little animal. The spiritual capacities are in its constitution. Dr. Maudsley, in his *Treatise on Insanity*, says that an insane infant sometimes shows a precocity of seeming vice which reveals a potentiality, a latent power, which no monkey ever has. But in the healthiest infant it is only a potentiality. By its own action the infantile spirit slowly develops its powers and susceptibilities, educates its own functions, and seems almost to create itself.

By this precedence the sensuous and natural in man has an advantage over the spiritual and overlays it. And because the impulses of nature are essential to the continuance of the natural life, they have an obtrusiveness, urgency and incessancy of influence, which the spiritual powers, as they struggle upward to their legitimate supremacy, at least in the outset, cannot have.

Analogous to the development of the spirit in a child is its development in the history of the race. The history of man's true progress is the history of his growing consciousness of his own rational or spiritual powers, of the rise of the spiritual in him to ascendancy over the natural, subjecting his natural powers to rational laws and directing them to worthy ends; of its rise also to ascendancy over external nature, ascertaining its laws and controlling its powers and resources for the service of man. The history of religion is the history of the emergence of man from the life of nature to the knowledge of God, and of his progress to a true and spiritual religion.

The spiritual may be further submerged beneath the natural by man's voluntary action. He may neglect to exercise his spiritual powers, so that they become enfeebled by disuse; while, living in the life of nature exclusively, all the propensities of the natural life are overgrown. And in a life of selfishness and worldliness, by his voluntary action in sin he is continually per-

verting his powers, dulling his spiritual susceptibilities, and by the whole force of an evil character turning himself away from God.

To this it must be added that in a life of selfishness the spirit of man closes itself against the ever environing influences of God's grace.

Man as a created being is always dependent on God. He is dependent in his rational and spiritual powers not less than in his physical organization. In his normal condition he is always receptive of divine influence. He is not only constituted rational, in the image of God, and thus by his very constitution participant in the light of the divine Reason, but he is also in living communication with God and continuously receiving the influx of illuminating and quickening grace in God's revelation of himself to him. Only in this union with God does he realize the normal illumination of his mind and the normal quickening and development of his spiritual life. Christ declares this when he says that the Christian lives and is fruitful only by union with God, as the branch by its union with the vine.

By sin man repudiates his dependence as a creature on God and sets up for himself in self-sufficiency, and thus wilfully closes the channels through which the ever environing grace of God had penetrated his spirit. Though God continues to reveal himself before him and within his consciousness, he refuses to heed the God that comes to him and to conform his life to his influence. The necessary result is that more and more the channels of spiritual influence are dried, and his spiritual life withers. And in this process the revelation of God in his consciousness is obstructed and his vision of God is obscured. And this may go so far that he loses all consciousness of his ignorance of God, and of his lack of all true spiritual life. He is in the condition which Paul describes in the terrific words, "dead through your trespasses and sins."

For such a man the first requisite for his knowing God is that his spiritual susceptibilities and powers be awakened, so that he may see his separation from God and the spiritual death which he has brought on himself thereby, and may turn to God and open his soul to receive God's ever encompassing light and grace.

This is the act of faith, which is the condition of his justification before God. There are but two possible lines of human action, reception and production. In all finite agents reception must precede production; all production is conditioned on recep-

tion. This is the law of mechanics, of organic life and growth, and of man's spiritual life and energy. God alone can produce without having first received. The act of a person when he turns to God and opens his soul to receive his ever environing grace, is faith. This is the condition of justification, because it is the only possible beginning, in a finite person, of a right character, of a true spiritual life, of the illumination of his spirit in the true knowledge of God, and of that union with God in which alone it is possible for God to communicate to the man the true good, which is primarily the perfection of his being.

This union of God with man through the man's faith and the influx and indwelling of the divine Spirit is essential to the true and most complete knowledge of God, and is what Paul describes as the Spirit of God witnessing with the spirit of man.

Thus separated from God and submerged in fleshly, worldly and selfish interests, the man is deadened to spiritual motives. The religious life seems to him unattractive or even positively repulsive. If you appeal to his deepest aspirations, the response is only, "What shall I eat, what shall I drink, and wherewithal shall I be clothed?" The spiritual life of faith in God and love to God and man does not attract him as good. He is attracted only by what meets the fleshly, the worldly and the selfish demands. In his spiritual insensibility, Feuerbach's coarse pun is pertinent to him: "Der Mensch ist was er isst:" The man is what he eats. To him the true good appears as evil; the real evil appears as the good. Hence all appeals to seek the higher excellence and enjoyment of the spiritual life fall powerless on him. In illustration of this, Fénelon has imagined a dialogue between Ulysses and Grillus, whom Circe had turned into a hog. Ulysses wished to change him back into a man; but Grillus had no desire for it and would not consent to it. He said, "The life of a hog is so much pleasanter." Among other arguments Ulysses says: "You then count as nothing eloquence, poetry, music?" Grillus could only reply: "I am so happy, I am above all these fine things. I would rather grunt than be as eloquent as you." "But," said Ulysses, "how can you endure this nauseating nastiness and stench?" And Grillus answers: "It all depends on the taste; the odor is sweeter to me than that of amber and the mire and filth are sweeter than nectar." ¹

Hence in proportion as the spiritual life in man is overlaid by the sensuous and the material, his capacity for discerning and ap-

¹ Dialogues des Morts, vi. Œuvres, Paris, 1856, tom. ii. p. 551.

preciating the spiritual is dulled. At the annual meeting of the American Scientific Association in Montreal in 1882, a paper was read in which, as reported in the morning papers, it was affirmed that man is brother to the tree. Materialism recognizes in man no powers different in kind from those of the brute; necessarily it must emphasize his lower powers to the neglect of the higher powers distinctive of personality, characterizing him as spirit and allying him with God. In the prevalence of religious unbelief in the last century the savage state was eulogized as that of primitive simplicity and happiness, from which in civilization man has degenerated. Of late in discussions of morals the brutes are sometimes referred to as exemplifying the perfect right. We also find Mr. Whitman, in one of his brawny meditations, looking on them as superior beings and longing to live with them:—

“I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contained,

I stand and look at them long and long.

They do not sweat and whine about their condition,

They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,

They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,

Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things,

Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago,

Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth.”

Hartmann reaches the same pessimistic conclusions: “The happiest folk are the rough savages, and of a civilized people the uncultivated classes. Dissatisfaction increases proportionally with increasing culture. . . . The poor, low, rough conditions of life are happier than the rich, the genteel, the cultured; the stupid are happier than the bright and clever. . . . Beasts are happier, that is, less miserable, than men, because their overplus of dissatisfaction is less. Only think how comfortably an ox or a hog lives, almost as if it had learned from Aristotle to seek for freedom from care and cumber instead of, like man, chasing after happiness. . . . It is important to make beast-life better known to the young as being the most genuine source of pure nature, wherein they may learn to understand their own being in a simple form, and in it revive and refresh themselves after the artificiality and distortion of our social condition.”¹

Thus when in a man the spiritual is submerged in the sensuous, he can see nothing in all the universe above the life of sense. At the touch of science the firmament “bursts its starry floor” and

¹ Philosophie des Unbewussten, part C, xii. pp. 616, 624, 598; part B, xi. p. 314; Ed. Berlin, 1869.

“opens on and up” — revealing to him what? Immensity of space and time, vast masses of matter, innumerable worlds and systems of worlds, forces everywhere active and resistless, motions inconceivably swift, all grinding on forever without intelligence, plan or aim, without guidance, or wisdom or love; behind everything and behind all, mystery impenetrable and the absolute unknowable; and man, who looks through it all and confronts the mystery behind it, is inferior to the beasts and a brother of the trees.

What a contrast to the reality disclosing itself to the Christian theist; man in the likeness of God, sending his intelligence through all the universe, seeing God in all, and everywhere at home with God; God revealing himself in humanity, God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself; Christ, the brightness of God's glory and the express image of his person, the Redeemer of men from sin and “not ashamed to call them brethren;” and man thus redeemed, destined through endless time to “be forever with the Lord,” progressively realizing all perfection and good.

This completes the significance of Paul's representation of the natural man as unable to know the things of the spirit. He is submerged in the life of nature, and insensible to the spiritual realities which encompass him. In the Scriptures he is said to be enslaved, blind, deaf, dead in sin, given up to delusions, and believing lies. To such a man the material heavens and earth are the great, the enduring, the real, while the spiritual is unreal, transitory, a phantom or a dream. And when he looks on men he sees only animals of a higher order, driven in all their vast and complicated labors by the resistless forces of nature, like the plants in germinating and growing, like the winds which blow and the waters which flow. He expects when he dies to be buried and to roll unconscious with the rolling earth; and while he lives he is buried in nature rolling in spiritual unconsciousness with the rolling earth. This is all which the eye of the flesh can see.

To such a person the Bible is as empty of spiritual meaning as is nature. An American studying in a German university became intimate with a young German who was pursuing archaeological studies. He did not believe in Christ nor in God. He could not be induced to read the Bible, declaring that he found nothing in it which interested him. At last the American directed his attention to the account of the building of the taber-

nacle; and the German was so interested that he sat up all night studying it. Here was a man who found nothing to interest him in the history of God's love redeeming men from sin, and revealed in Christ and in the establishment of his kingdom of righteousness and good will on earth, as recorded in the Bible; but the whole capacity of his soul was filled and flooded with the description of the architecture of the tabernacle. Men as dry in rationalism sometimes write criticisms and commentaries on the Bible. But their estimate of its significance is as disproportionate and as superficial as that of this young student; they give the grammar and the archæology, but not the real significance; the letter and the word, but not the life and power. Renan says: "A man who would write the history of a religion must have believed it once, but must believe it no longer." He acknowledges the necessity of knowing religion by experience in order rightly to describe or criticise it. But the sinking back into disbelief would be a positive disqualification. The competent critic and interpreter of any religion may have passed beyond that particular religion to a higher, but must know in his own experience what religion is, and in his own spiritual life and insight be able to sympathize with religious life and belief, however crude the forms in which they appear.

2. The power to know God exists in man's deepest spiritual insensibility.

In an infant the spiritual powers exist only as potential, as yet undeveloped and inactive in the constitution of the child as a personal being. They cannot at first act and reveal themselves through the infantile organism as yet imperfectly developed. But as the natural life of the child goes on, its spiritual powers begin to act. In this action the child gradually becomes distinctly conscious of itself as a person or spirit. The spirit "comes to itself," knows itself as spirit, brings itself forth from the life of nature, and reveals itself to others.

As the person advances in life he may by his own voluntary action submerge the spiritual in him beneath the natural and live in spiritual insensibility. But in the deepest insensibility his spiritual powers remain imperishable in his constitution, and by them he is always free to struggle upward again into the spiritual life, to exalt the spirit to supremacy, and to direct his powers to worthy ends. His spiritual susceptibilities stir within him, but he takes no note of their significance as inciting him to a higher life and worthier ends. He chafes under

his spiritual capacities as they make him conscious of duty and of sin, and incapable of contentment in all which the animal life can give. He envies the ox the placidity of its rumination and the hog the felicity of its sty, and complains of his lot because he cannot, like the horse, be groomed and foddered into blessedness.

The capacity to know God is as persistent as the constitutional powers of the spirit. Of these powers it is one, and from them it is inseparable. It can even be in exercise, and effects of the divine action on the soul may appear in consciousness, without the man's recognizing them as manifestations of God or himself as competent to know God in them.

Analogous to this is the fact that one may believe that his knowledge is limited to the objects of sense, and may deny the validity of rational intuitions, while all his thinking is under their regulation, and he feels rational motives and emotions which presuppose ideas dependent on the rational intuitions. So a person may deny the existence of free will, while constantly exercising it and conscious of freedom and of moral responsibility. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen argues: "If you want me to believe that you possess faculties of which I am destitute, you must prove yourself to be my superior by appealing to faculties which we have in common." He says that a man proves his own power of seeing to a blind man by describing to him a distant object and then leading him to it to feel it with his hand. No one can object to this maxim or to this illustration of it. But he is not as successful in his second illustration. He says that if a man claims to "intue what is going on in Sirius," we may challenge him, in proof of his power, to read a column of the Times across the room.¹ But when I claim that I know by immediate intuition what is going on in Sirius, that is, that I see it luminous or emitting light, I appeal to the same power of immediate vision which the objector himself exercises, when he "intues" a column of the Times distant two feet from his eye, or the figures on the wall-paper across the room, and which he also exercises when he "intues" Sirius emitting light. For all sense-perception is immediate, presentative intuition, self-evident and irrefragable, and yet unproved and unprovable. And when I claim a power of rational intuition by which I know what is beyond the range of sense-perception, I again appeal to a power which the objector himself also has; for he knows that Sirius is a body acting ac-

¹ Article on Authority in Matters of Opinion, in Nineteenth Century, April, 1877, pp. 296, 297.

ording to the laws of gravitation and of the persistence of force, and that light there is the same kind of molecular action with the light which affects his eye on earth. And he knows this by reasoning which rests on the validity of rational intuitions. On the validity of these intuitions, which the objector denies, all science rests, and the progress of science and the experience of mankind are continual verifications of them.

And in affirming that we have capacity to know God, and that we have experienced his gracious revelation of himself in our own souls, we do not appeal in confirmation to extraordinary faculties which others do not possess, but to the powers and susceptibilities of personality common to all men, and by which all men are distinguished from the brutes and allied to God. If the objector does not know God, it is either because he has neglected to exercise his spiritual capacities, or by abnormal living has brought them into an abnormal condition. ✓

When a blind man has once learned that other people see, he is willing to accept their testimony as to what they see. The testimony from age to age of innumerable witnesses to the reality of their knowledge of God in experience, would justify the most skeptical in inquiring whether there may not be something in it. And they will find, if they seek God aright, that the words of an ancient prophet are the true words of God: "Ye shall seek me and find me, when ye shall search for me with all your heart."¹

Against our position that a man may know God in experience through his revelation of himself to the man the objection is urged that there are multitudes of men who are destitute of all religious feeling and belief. The groundlessness of this objection is now obvious. In the first place, the allegation of the objection is contrary to the facts. Religion is a common characteristic of humanity. Atheism is sporadic in individuals; no atheistic race or tribe or clan of men, destitute of religion, has ever been known to exist. In the next place, agnostics, materialists and atheists have the ideas of God and religion; they, for the most part, acknowledge the constitutional religiousness of man and the necessity of providing some satisfactory object for it, and they disclose plainly in themselves religious capacities and susceptibilities in exercise. Lastly, in cases of the deepest insensibility to God, after infancy, we discover obvious evidence of spiritual powers active but perverted.

¹ Jeremiah xxix. 13.

We conclude that man's power to know God exists in his constitution and survives in his deepest spiritual insensibility. It needs only to be awakened and rightly directed. Its greatest possibilities are hidden even from the person himself, because he has not exercised it according to the law of his being, which is the law of universal love. Under new influences or in some new emergency, it may be quickened into activity, and thus at once reveal to him God, and himself as related to God and capable of knowing him. A closed piano reveals itself only as a piece of elaborate cabinet-work. On opening it and studying its construction we may learn something theoretically as to its real and higher design. An ordinary player reveals to the ear something of its musical power. A Liszt touches it and enraptures the listeners by revealing musical capacities in the instrument never before disclosed. So in man there are hidden capacities for knowing, feeling and efficiency, which new influences and emergencies may bring to light. A great orator plays on an audience as a musical genius plays on an instrument, bringing out all its powers. They sit down calmly before him, chatting about indifferent things; he awakens and convinces their intellects, new ideas break in on them and things are seen in a new light; he rouses their feelings, they weep, they laugh, they are indignant; he persuades their wills, they make high resolves, they put forth new energies. He has revealed themselves to them. A great genius in literature or art, in discovery or invention, makes men see in common things a significance and beauty, a fact or law, a power and use, which had never been seen before. A reformer or prophet reveals an application of moral truth which rouses a whole people, and inspires them to great enterprises. Great emergencies, like the late civil war in the United States, reveal to a people, to the surprise of other peoples and of themselves, capacities, never before called forth, for inspiration with the noblest sentiments and the loftiest enthusiasm, for willing self-sacrifice, for heroic enterprise, energy and endurance.

It is a law of human nature that a power is enfeebled by disuse or abuse, but is developed by exercise and training accordant with the laws of man's being. Muscular power astonishes us by the revelation of its hidden capabilities in the dexterity of the skilled workman, in Winship lifting almost a ton, in swimmers, gymnasts and other athletes. The eye, the ear, the finger's end, have hidden powers of perception astonishing when revealed by training. The tactual perception of the blind seems scarcely

less than a new sense. The greatest musical genius cannot reveal the hidden powers of a musical instrument to one who has no musical taste and culture. But such a person can be trained to an appreciation of it. The power to appreciate the beautiful in nature and art is developed by education and culture. The same is true of human powers and susceptibilities in every line of action. They are developed by exercise. The result is often so wonderful that it seems like the creation of a new faculty. Hence, when one who knew a person as a boy in his rustic home meets him, years afterwards, a cultivated and well developed man in some position of commanding influence, he can hardly believe him the same person. And it is this law of development by exercise and training which determines the difference between the dreary simplicity and monotony of savage life and the rich variety of susceptibilities and powers which constitute the many-sidedness of the civilized man.

This principle is equally true of man's spiritual power of knowing God. One may assert that he has no knowledge of God; that he never had any experience of God's presence, or of his action or influence on him, or of his revealing himself to him in any way; he may say that he has "no faculty nor rudiment of a faculty," by which he can know him; that he is unaware of any faith or feeling by which he can come into communication with God or any conscious contact or relation with him. But this does not prove that the man is destitute of such power, any more than the unconsciousness of any other power or susceptibility undeveloped or decayed through lack of exercise, proves that the man is not constitutionally endowed with it and that it is not now latent within him. On studying his constitution, we find that he is constituted for spiritual ends as plainly as the mute piano is found to be constituted for music; and that he gives some expressions, however rude or perverted, of his spiritual capacities. And quickened by appropriate influences, this same man may come to reveal capacities of spiritual vision, feeling and energy like those of saints and martyrs. But as yet he stands mute, incased in nature, giving no utterance to the spiritual harmonies of which he is capable, and himself oblivious of these higher possibilities of his being. As, when the body sleeps, the avenues of communication with the outward world are temporarily closed and all its realities are seen only as transient dreams, so in spiritual slumber the avenues of communication with God and the spiritual world are closed and all spiritual realities are seen, if at all, only

as dreams. To such a man a spiritual awakening is necessary that he may know God and see the reality of spiritual things. There is no lack of constitutional capacity to know God, just as there is no lack of constitutional capacity to appreciate beauty, in the boor who despises his wife's flowers as only weeds or in the worldling who, intent on fashionable ostentation, values his picture-frames more than the pictures; and no lack of constitutional capacity to do good in the millionaire who, at the death of a wealthy townsman distinguished for munificent beneficence during his life, could sum up his estimate of the man and his life only by saying, "He never knew the value of money." In each the latent faculty needs only to be awakened and developed.

3. Christianity teaches that God in his love to man brings on him the gracious influence of his Spirit to awaken him from his spiritual insensibility and to renew and develop the spiritual life.

This awakening can be effected only as, through his conscience and his other spiritual susceptibilities and powers, he is aroused to see the sin and evil into which he has plunged himself, and to begin to appreciate the higher life possible to him in his relation to God and to the spiritual realities of which his senses give him no perception, — a life so grand in itself that its realization is his highest good and his worthiest end of pursuit: "Der Zweck des Lebens ist das Leben selbst."

This awakening comes from the Spirit of God, who brings on men the influences of God's redeeming love in Christ to turn them from their sin, to rouse them from the life of the natural or fleshly man to the life of the spirit. When a man is thus awakened to know God and therein to know himself in his true character, if he turns from his selfishness to the life of faith in God and of love to God and man, he therein experiences the change which is described in the Scriptures by the most extraordinary terms, a passing from darkness to light, an opening of blind eyes, a new birth, a quickening of the dead to life, a putting off of the old man and a putting on of the new. Thus, as Ulrici says of this renovated faith in God: "It must well up from the inmost life of the soul; for the inmost life of the human soul has its root in God himself, while rooted in the man's own religious and moral feeling."¹

In this spiritual renovation, also, there is no impartation of any new faculty, no originating of spiritual powers not already existing in the human constitution, but only an awakening of the

¹ Ulrici, *Gott und der Mensch*, p. 725.

trying. It is not by thinking alone, by arguing with one's self, or by controversial discussions with others, but also by praying, opening the mind and heart to light and warmth from the wisdom and love of God. So Augustine says: "Intelligit, qui orando pulsat, non qui rixando obstrepat ad ostiam veritatis." Nor is it by both of these alone, but also by trying and testing beliefs in the work and conflict of life. We are educated in the school of life, as, with faith in God and love to God and man, we resist the powers of wickedness in ourselves and in the world, and put forth all our energies in the endeavor to realize the highest possibilities of our being, and to accomplish the utmost for the advancement of Christ's kingdom and the reign of truth, righteousness and benevolence throughout the world. Thus false beliefs are exposed by their insufficiency, the true are verified, and new aspects and applications of truth are discovered.

Bunyan gives graphic descriptions of his own struggles to appropriate and assimilate spiritual truths. Of one promise of the gospel he says: "If Satan and I did ever strive for any word of God in all my life, it was for this good word of Christ; he at one end and I at the other. Oh, what work we made. It was for this in John, I say, that we did so tug and strive; he pulled and I pulled; but God be praised, I overcame him; I got sweetness out of it." At another time he writes: "Oh, one sentence of Scripture did more afflict and terrify my mind, — I mean those sentences that stood against me; and I sometimes thought they every one did, — more, I say, than an army of forty thousand men that might come against me." Again: "At this time I saw more in these words, 'heirs of God,' than ever I shall be able to express while I live in this world." At another time: "I had not sat above two or three minutes, but that came bolting in upon me, 'And to an innumerable company of angels;' and withal the twelfth chapter of Hebrews, about the Mount Zion, was set before my eyes. Then with joy I told my wife, Oh, now I know. It was a blessed scripture to me for many days, and through this sentence the Lord led me over and over, first to this word and then to that, and showed me wonderful glory in every one of them. These words have often since that time been great refreshment to my spirit." Thus the divine word, when it meets a spiritual exigency, discloses its own divine meaning, as an eternal truth or reality fitted in the constitution of the universe to the exigencies of a human soul made to dwell in the universe; it becomes a word to the heart, a life-force to the man. We go

among the people and we are wont to find that those whose lives have moral earnestness have their treasury of precious truths, which in the various exigencies of their lives have come to them as angels from heaven for their help. It may be a psalm, a passage from the gospels, a strain of poetry, a clearly stated metaphysical distinction which has relieved a sore perplexity, a golden apothegm, a far-reaching principle of natural science, a widely ramifying analogy, some truth which in some emergency of life flashed light into the inmost soul, and which ever since has remained like a window, then and there opened into the unseen, through which the light of the eternal glory still streams.

As a man goes on thus organizing the knowledge of God into his own being and growth, he not only acquires possession of the truth thus appropriated and knows its significance as bearing on life and disclosing the concrete realities with which he has to do, but he is always gaining thereby new capacity to receive the revelations of God and to know him through them; according to the old maxim, "Quantum sumus scimus," we know as much as we are. The more we appropriate the truth and live by it, and the more we come into the divine likeness, so much the more are we prepared to receive further revelations of God and to gain new and richer knowledge of him. Thus, when the spiritual powers of a man have been awakened and put in the right direction, he may go on to continually larger and richer knowledge and approach more and more to realizing in its full significance "the vision of God."

Hence, when under the influence of the divine Spirit, man returns to God and begins the new life of love to God and man, his love itself becomes the source of new knowledge; it opens to him a larger vision of God; for God is love. Thus being himself rooted and grounded in love, he is able, as Paul testifies, to know the height and the depth, the breadth and the length of God's love, which yet evermore surpasses human knowledge, and to be filled unto all the fulness of God. Thus he brings himself and his life into harmony with God and his law. He chooses God as the supreme object of trust and service. He loves as God loves. He brings his whole character into harmony with God's character and his whole activity into the line of God's activity; he enters into God's plans, stands with him for truth and righteousness and good-will against falsehood, injustice and selfishness; he belongs to God's kingdom and is a "fellow-worker" with him in advancing its interests. He lives a life of confidential inti-

macy with God, and acquaints himself with him in daily communication with him, in the reception of his grace and the indwelling of his spirit. Thus he knows the things which are spiritually discerned; in his love he knows God, as mere intellect without love cannot; it opens to his vision the very heart of God. He can testify in the words of Sidney Lanier:—

“ Sweet friends,
 Man’s love ascends
 To finer and diviner ends
 Than man’s mere thought e’er comprehends.”

Skeptics object that love to God is a bias hindering the discovery of the truth; that the inquirer, if he would be candid, must strip off all feeling and in complete indifference investigate in the light of the intellect alone.¹ Certainly, while the truth is as yet unknown, there must be candor and impartiality in investigating; and after it is discovered the mind should be always conscious of its limits and open to receive new knowledge. But also after the truth is discovered, the love of the truth implies joy in it and fidelity to it as regulative of conduct. The objection excludes this and insists on persistent indifference after the truth is known as much as before. It affirms that the love of the truth is indifference to it. This presupposes that truth can never be known; no belief can have any final authority, not even the belief of the existence of God, nor of the reality of the law of love or of any moral distinctions, nor of one’s own existence or that of the outward world. They who rest in this objection are logically universal skeptics; “they wait to see the future come,” indifferent as to what beliefs it may bring, because all beliefs are essentially alike uncertain. It is indifference which rests on despair of attaining knowledge. The conclusion would be, that if one has any belief respecting God it disqualifies him for theological study; that if one is eminently pure and devout in his Christian life and earnest in his love to God and man, he is most of all incompetent to attain any real knowledge of God. This, however, would not be pertinent to the knowledge of God alone. It would be equally true that any fixed belief on any subject, as that the earth turns on its axis, would make the believer incapable of candor in further investigation and incompetent to attain any real knowledge on that subject. But man is constituted, not for inactive waiting, but for achievement, therefore not for despairing skepticism, but for energetic belief. There-

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 38-43.

fore it is impossible to dispart his knowledge from his feelings ; and if so disparted his knowledge would necessarily be defective and not the true knowledge of the reality. Knowledge commonly bears on the conduct of life, and disparted from this practical bearing must be defective and erroneous. The most important part of knowledge is our knowledge of intelligent beings ; of this the most important part is the knowledge of them in their freedom of will and their moral responsibility and relations, the knowledge of the springs and motives of their action, the ends which they propose to realize, and the principles which determine their well-being ; and this knowledge is possible only to those who participate in the same freedom, act in the same moral sphere, and know in experience similar responsibility and motives under the same moral law. And since knowledge bears practically on the conduct of life, the fact of that bearing is an important part of the reality to be known and an important fact to be considered in weighing the evidence of the truth. He who is most in sympathy with truth and righteousness and God, is best qualified to understand the history of man. It is the history of human feeling and passion, of choice, purpose and character, quite as much as of human thought. It is the history of the struggles of the oppressed against the oppressor, of wrong against right, of selfishness against love, of laborious progress toward realizing higher ideals. How can such questions be decided by dry intellect stripped of all feeling, in entire indifference as to which principles prevail ? To prescribe such conditions as essential to the search after truth is both morally wrong and philosophically false. Love to God is essential to the highest knowledge of him. God is love. Love moves the power which sustains, orders and directs the universe and determines the end for which it exists. That God is love is the greatest and most important truth which man can know. He can know it effectively only as he himself loves like God ; only as he makes love to God and man the spring of his own energies, the quickening, directing and beatifying power throughout the entire sphere of his own activity. "Every one that loveth is begotten of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God ; for God is love."

5. From the positions now attained we see the reasonableness of the Christian doctrine of the witness of the Spirit. This the reformers emphasized. They taught that it is through the testimony of the Spirit of God in the heart of man that he comes to the belief of the existence of God, and of the revelation of him in

Christ ; that it is through the Spirit, witnessing in the heart of the devout seeker after God to the divine truth in the Christian Scriptures, that he knows them to be the revelation of God. The Christian doctrine of the witness of the Spirit is only a more explicit enunciation of a truth implied in all religions. A person cannot lift himself to the knowledge of God by dint of thinking alone. The same is true, as we have seen, of the knowledge of sensible objects and of personal beings. One cannot reach them in thought till they have first presented themselves in his consciousness by their action on him. So God presents himself to a man, besets him behind and before, and lays his hand upon him. To this action of God the human spirit responds recognizing the present God. This general fact is specifically set forth in the Christian doctrine of the witness of the Spirit. It has occupied of late a less prominent place in Christian apologetics and doctrinal theology than in the earlier period of the Reformation. But it is a truth which must be fundamental in all right thinking either in defense of Theism and Christianity, or in the development of their doctrines. As Hegel teaches, finite things act on us through outward media, but it is the spirit that witnesses of the spirit. The true ground of spiritual faith is the witness of the spirit, and the witness of the spirit is in itself spiritually quickening. But it is not merely the human spirit that witnesses to the presence of the divine, but also the divine Spirit that witnesses of its own presence with the human.

CHAPTER VII.

SYNTHESIS OF THE EXPERIENTIAL, THE HISTORICAL AND THE RATIONAL IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

GOD reveals himself in the consciousness of the individual and is thus known in experience. In this case the effects through which God reveals himself are subjective in the consciousness, analogous to the affection of the sensorium through which the external world reveals itself in consciousness. In addition to this, as already shown, God reveals himself in objective and external effects, in the constitution and course of nature and in the constitution and history of man; and above all in Christ and his abiding Spirit reconciling the world to himself and establishing his reign of righteousness and good-will.

This objective revelation of God in nature, man and Christ, I call public or historical. It will be the subject of investigation in the subsequent Parts of this volume. But its relation to the revelation in consciousness must first be more fully considered.

By this public or historical revelation, the revelation of God in consciousness and the spontaneous beliefs arising from it are tested and corrected, and, so far as true, verified and amplified. This is done by the processes of reflective thought in the light of the truths, laws, ideals and ends of reason. Thus all which may be known of God from all sources is apprehended, verified and discriminated, and found to be in unity and harmony in a reasonable system.

Here human reason enters into the process and contributes an element to the knowledge of God. Of this theologians have often manifested an unreasonable jealousy. Certainly there is no way of ascertaining that a belief is reasonable except by the use of reason. In the light of God's historical revelation the spontaneous religious belief is tested and verified negatively. That cannot be a revelation of God which contradicts the universal principles and laws of reason, or the facts and laws of the universe. The spontaneous religious belief is tested and verified by reason positively, by showing its harmony with the principles and laws

of reason, and with the constitution of the universe and its actual facts and laws; and by showing its necessity in order to realize the ideals and ends of reason and to meet the spiritual needs of man. It is further tested by the Christian by ascertaining its harmony with the revelation in Christ as recorded in the Bible.

It must be remembered, however, that human reason is not here represented as sufficient of itself and independent of God, but as knowing itself, in its normal condition and action, dependent on him as the absolute Reason and receptive of his revelation of himself. So in physical science, human reason does not claim to be sufficient of itself to know the physical world, independent of its action on the mind; on the contrary, reason teaches that man's knowledge of the world depends on the world's revelation of itself through the senses, and, as thus dependent, is real and rational knowledge.

There are therefore three elements in the knowledge of God, which may be called the experiential, the historical, and the rational or ideal.

Theological knowledge is the comprehension of these three elements in a unity or synthesis of thought. The historical is the medium for the synthesis of the experiential and the rational.

This chapter is designed to show that the synthesis of the three is essential to the true knowledge of God; that, through all digressions and regressions, the true progress of theology is always toward the completing of this synthesis, and is thus from generation to generation testing, verifying and amplifying man's knowledge of God; and that the recognition of this is necessary to a right understanding of the movement and significance of theological thought at the present day.

The necessity of this synthesis is evident from the fact that thought, which recognizes only one or two of these three elements, issues in disastrous error.

When the experiential belief withdraws into itself, the result is mysticism. When the rational or ideal isolates itself, the first result is dogmatism; the later result is rationalism. In each case the Bible, as the record of God's revelation of himself, recedes toward the background, and ultimately is disregarded. When the historical isolates itself, the result is unspiritual and arid criticism of the Bible, and anthropological and archaeological investigation.

1. Mysticism is the name of religious belief arising spontaneously in the immediate experience or consciousness of God's pres-

ence and action on the spirit, but not apprehended, discriminated and systemized in reflective thought, therefore not tested and verified by the legitimate tests or criteria of knowledge. It is exemplified in the "Yoga" of the Hindus, and it is often said that India is its native home. It may be found, however, in all the higher religions and has often made its appearance in the history of Christianity.

Mysticism is true and strong in its belief in the revelation of God within the consciousness of man and in his immediate communion with God. Its weakness is that it stops in this nebulous consciousness, this undefined experience; that it does not turn on it the light of reason, nor investigate in thought its real significance, nor compare it with the Christian experience and knowledge of the past, nor test it by God's further revelation of himself in nature and in the constitution and history of man, and in Christ as recorded in the Bible.

As thus one-sided it is prolific of errors and fraught with dangerous practical tendencies. It has sunk into mere subjectivity and often degenerated into fanaticism. And since even a mystic cannot cease to think and must have some forms of worship and some intellectual mold for feeling, he either joins a party under the leadership of some hierophant, or, like Madame Guyon, accepts the guidance of a spiritual director and the authority of an infallible church, or, like Böhme, Eckart and others, creates strange theosophies, sometimes verging on Pantheism. It has also sometimes disclosed a tendency to sensuousness, as in the erotic language of Madame Guyon's hymns and of some other hymns and devotional literature.

Because thus one-sided, it becomes a religion of emotion. It subsides into Quietism; it gives itself up to meditation and prayer; it retires to deserts and monasteries; its strength is to sit still. It rejoices in the assurance of salvation in the next world rather than in helping men to live right lives in this. It is introspective; it concentrates the energies on securing one's own peace and joy; it cultivates ecstasies and reports them as the highest result of life. In its continuous introspection, like the Hindu "Yogi" with his eye fixed in motionless contemplation, it transforms its own feelings into divine revelations; it accepts them as "the inner light" and lets it take the place of the Bible, of reason and of common sense. It would have any sudden and inexplicable impulse or emotion accepted as an inspiration of God and followed as his guidance. This characteristic of mys-

ticism appears in various forms in the religious life of our own times. A woman, who supposed that she had attained the "higher Christian life," received news of the illness of her only brother living in a neighboring town, with a request to come to him. In a day or two she received another message that his illness was pronounced fatal, with a more urgent request to come to him. Soon after came information of his death and of the time of his funeral. But she did not comply with his repeated requests nor even attend his funeral, because she had felt no inward impulse, and therefore believed herself not called and drawn by God to do it. Thus, as is usual in fanaticism, in thinking herself divine she became inhuman. Fanaticism like this is often set forth as the representative of the truth that God reveals himself to a man by his action on him and is thus known by the man in experience or consciousness. This truth is sometimes rejected by Christian theists because they confound it with this fanaticism. But a little consideration would show that in denying this truth they are denying the fundamental fact of man's communion with God which is of the essence of all religions, and denying the influence of God's Spirit in the human heart which is an essential truth of Christianity.

Mysticism also takes on darker forms and becomes a religion of awe and terror. God is so great and awful that one who believes himself to be in immediate communication with him is overawed and oppressed by his greatness. Dr. Bellows says that God's creatures are "scorched and shriveled in the glory of his presence."¹ Especially is this the effect in the consciousness of sin against him. "The consciousness of sin is in itself ennobling, but the contrary. It is the consciousness of failure, of unworthiness, of ill-desert. It compels the substitution of self-loathing and self-condemnation for self-respect. It is the consciousness of having no claim to the approval of either God or man. It depresses with fear; it crushes in despair. It makes life a dread of the future, a despair of the present, a lament for the past. The whole consciousness becomes concentrated in the one daily and doleful cry: 'We are all poor creatures.' All religions necessarily intensify the sense of sin. They bring God and the unseen world and retribution close to the soul. The first effect is depressing. The presence of an unseen, mysterious, everywhere present being, whom no cunning can deceive, no art elude, no speed escape and no power resist, paralyzes the soul; his burning inquisition for

¹ The Suspense of Faith, p. 19.

sin terrifies it.”¹ Thus is realized the religion of fear which darkens all the interests of this life with the terrors of the life to come. What is man in the presence of God? What is time in comparison with eternity? What all the interests of this shifting scene compared with the tremendous realities of the unseen, which are forever? “Law supreme, universal, broken by all, penalty terrible and inevitable, hang glooming and threatening over the world. Beneath their shadow pleasure is an impertinence, the interests of earthly life trivial, secular business an intrusion; worldliness is driven out by ‘other-worldliness;’” the sunny cheerfulness of life is driven out by the intensity of responsibility and the dread of the divine wrath; and the religion expends its whole energy in sacrifice and penance to appease the offended divinity.

If then under this gloom and terror the man supposes all his sudden and powerful religious impulses to be inspired communications from God, the door is opened to the most ferocious fanaticism, in which zeal for God may demand the sacrifice of men. For what is man in comparison with God, and what man’s interests in comparison with the interests of God’s kingdom? The man becomes intolerant of dissent, and if he has the power may enforce conformity by putting dissenters to death or by force of arms in war. And since God demands the most precious things, why may not the devotee offer human sacrifices, in obedience to an imagined command of God? Why may not a father offer his own child? Why may not the fanatic believe himself inspired to kill a person who, he believes, hinders God’s plans? Through an identification of such fanaticism with true religion, Feuerbach goes even so far as to insist that it is of the essence of religion to sacrifice man to God: “Thus is the moral sentiment subverted in religion. Thus man sacrifices man to God. The bloody human sacrifice is in fact only a rude, material expression of the inmost secret of religion.”²

Therefore the truth that man receives revelation from God and knows him through it in experience, and that the beliefs thus arising are apprehended, tested and verified, are defined and systemized in thought, must be distinguished from the mysticism which rests solely on the feelings as the inspiration of the Almighty, and which regards these feelings as the more certainly

¹ The Kingdom of Christ on Earth, by Prof. Samuel Harris, pp. 49, 50, 173, 174.

² Wesen des Christenthums, chap. xxvii.

divine, the more they are inexplicable and unaccountable to the reason. The beliefs founded in mysticism must always remain shut up in the subjectivity of an individual, so that there may be as many religions as there are persons. It reveals dangerous practical tendencies, gives rise to various errors, to monstrous misconceptions and perversions of religion, and to prevalent objections and disbelief on the part of many who mistake it for the true representation of religion. Hegel truly says that if religion and the belief in God are rooted in feeling only, no knowledge of God is possible, and materialism or some form of atheism alone can result. This is not peculiar to religion. In any sphere of life, if a man follows the impulse of feeling and regards it as infallible all the more because it is inexplicable and unaccountable to his faculties of intelligence, the issue will be monstrous errors of belief and still more monstrous errors of practice. But the spontaneous religious beliefs are really rooted in the whole spiritual constitution of man, and are tested and verified as real knowledge; and thus the evil practical tendencies are arrested, the misrepresentations corrected and the objections of unbelief answered. The presence and revelation of God and communion with him, instead of scorching and shriveling man, are seen to disclose his real greatness; they lift him to the life of love in fellowship with God and realize in him all the highest possibilities of his being. We need no longer sing:—

“Great God how infinite art thou,
What worthless worms are we.”

But we find in the greatness of God and our intimacy with him, that we are not worthless worms, but participants in the divine. We find that religion does not sacrifice men to God, but that in it they “become partakers of the divine nature;” that the only sacrifice is the self-sacrificing love in which, trusting in God and inspired and strengthened by him, they serve their fellow-men and realize their own perfect development, culture and blessedness in so doing. Even in the Middle Ages, after all which has been said of the terrors and the depressing and oppressing influence of religion in those centuries, we find evidence of its contrary effect, imperfectly as under prevailing errors it could exert its full power. Mr. W. S. Lilly says: “Nothing is more striking than the contrast between the peace and gladness which breathe through the austere mediæval verse, and the deep un-

dertone of melancholy that pervades the strain of the most voluptuous of the ancient poets.”¹

2. The isolation of the ideal or intellectual element in the knowledge of God from the experiential and the historical leads to dogmatism and ultimately issues in rationalism.

Systematic theology is a product of the legitimate action of the intellect, in the light of reason, concentrating its thought on God and his relations to men in whatever way revealed, and thus attaining, as far as possible, a definite, verified and systematic knowledge of him. But when once these doctrines have been formulated and declared, the tendency is to treat them more and more as dogmas to be received on authority; and thus the intellectual element begins to usurp predominance and to isolate itself from the revelation of God and from the witness of his Spirit known in the experience of the individual and the history of man.

The legitimate issue of dogmatism is rationalism. Rationalism in theology passes through successive stages and appears in various forms. But in all its phases it is essentially the doctrine that human reason is of itself sufficient to elicit all religious truth and thereby to quicken and direct the religious life. While mysticism rests on the feelings and restricts itself within the spontaneous belief arising in experience, rationalism, at the opposite extreme, would evolve all religious knowledge from pure thought and, equally one-sided, makes the intellectual or ideal element the whole. In its earlier forms in Germany, it explained away the miraculous in the Christian Scriptures, but retained the historical. In its later stages it came to regard the historical itself only as a vehicle for moral and religious instruction, and its truth or falsehood as a matter of indifference, if only the speculative truths and the moral precepts and motives, which the narrative conveyed, were secured. Strauss wrote his first *Life of Jesus* to show that the truths taught in the story of his life will lose nothing of their value, though the story itself should be found a myth without historical truth. “This is the key to the whole of Christology, that, as subject of the predicate which the church assigns to Christ, we place instead of an individual, an idea; but an idea which has an existence in reality, not in the mind only, like that of Kant. . . . And is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures a real one in a far higher sense, when I regard

¹ Supernaturalism Mediæval and Classical, *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1883.

the whole race of mankind as its realization, than when I single out one man as its realization?"¹ The result is that to the rationalist, the Bible is no longer the revelation of the God of love; it is only the mythical and legendary remains of an ancient literature, in which are some true principles and some fine sentiments, "*rari nantes in gurgite vasto.*" As the process goes on, the intellectual or ideal element comes to occupy the whole ground; philosophy takes the place of theology; and in the philosophy, because it is an attempt to solve the problem of the universe solely by subjective thought, mental abstractions become the objects of attention instead of concrete realities; thought is set forth as the ultimate reality of the universe; God is resolved into pure being, or pure activity, or the order of the world, identical with nothing or the zero of thought; and the evolution of the universe is identified with a process of logic.

This tendency in theology to isolate the ideal or intellectual from the experiential and the historical, this transition through dogmatism to rationalism, is exemplified in the history of Protestantism.

In the second period of this history, theological thought was tending away from the concrete to the abstract; from the vivid conception of the living God known in experience as present and energizing among men to the study of doctrine about God; from the conception of inspiration as imparting spiritual insight and power to the conception of it as securing verbal accuracy; from the conception of the presence and witness of the Spirit, which pervaded and dominated the thinking of the Reformers, to the conception of the letter of the Scriptures as being itself the witness of the Spirit, because inspired by the Spirit, and, as the Formula Consensus Helvetica, the younger Buxtorf and others taught, even to the Hebrew vowel-points.² The thinking and activity of the church became concentrated on the formulating and systemizing of doctrine and promulgating creeds; the intellectual or ideal was isolated from the experiential and historical; and the church was broken into sects on formulas of doctrine. Thus was verified anew the maxim of Paul: "The letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life." Even now we are not free from the

¹ Life of Jesus, Trans. by M. Evans, vol. ii. p. 895.

² The Formula Consensus Helvetica declared that the Old Testament was "inspired by God both as to its consonants and as to its vowels or points, or at least as to the power (or significance) of the points; and both as to the matter and as to the words."

results of this tendency. In a paper on "The Alleged Progress in Theology" read before an association of ministers in Massachusetts in 1883, and afterwards published, the author says: "Any statement of theological doctrines which abandons or modifies the usual terminology, would be a virtual abandonment or modification of the doctrines themselves. Probably of no science, excepting mathematics, is it as true that words are things, as of theology." The movement of theological thought through "words" to "things" is a healthy movement, even though, when we reach the "things," we may sometimes find it necessary to change the "words."

This lapse into dogmatism prepared the way for rationalism. Lessing taught that all the truths revealed in the Bible would eventually have been discovered by man himself, in the progress of human thought, if he had been allowed time enough. By giving the revelation God had helped him and accelerated his progress in discovering truth. Such teaching had become possible because theologians had substituted truth and doctrine, which man might discover by thinking, for the living God and historical redemption. It would have been impossible if the church had held fast the knowledge of the living God revealing himself in historical action in nature and among men, and especially in his historical action in Christ redeeming men from sin, and through all the courses of history organizing out of the world the kingdom of righteousness and good-will and the reign of love, under the lordship of Christ and by the power of the Spirit. By thinking, men may ascertain, define and systemize truth; but thinking cannot give the historical action of God. Thus, through dogmatism, came in upon Germany the rationalism under which, as a long and withering drought, the spiritual life of theological thought was dried away.

3. The isolation of the historical element from the experiential and from all recognition of the witness of the Spirit issues in the study of the religions and the sacred books of mankind merely as a branch of anthropology. The scholarly study of the Bible thus isolated becomes merely an archæological investigation and a criticism of ancient documents. In fact, not infrequently this non-religious study of the Bible starts with the assumption that the miraculous is impossible and that all in the Bible which purports to be a record of a supernatural revelation of God is mythical. Thus by a gratuitous assumption the divine element is arbitrarily ruled out of the Bible. Nothing then remains but an ancient

literature and history, and the only interest in the study of it is critical, archæological and historical. Then the living water has dried away. Instead of a springing fountain we have only a well-curb and a bucket; instead of the river of life only the dry bed of a once running stream; and critical thought busies itself in laboriously tracing its dry and stony course. To such a student the admonition of Faust to his scholar is pertinent: "Is parchment the holy well, a drink from which allays thy thirst forever? Thou hast not gained the cordial if it gushes not from thy own soul." Equally pertinent are the words of the younger of the Piccolomini in Schiller: —

"The oracle within him, that which lives,
He must consult and question — not dead books,
Not ordinances, not mold-rotted papers."

Important as scholarly criticism and interpretation of the Bible are, they need not be separated from the experiential and rational elements in the knowledge of God, and the witness of God's Spirit within the soul. Devout scholarship may be as scholarly as the undevout. And there is something in the Bible which mere scholarship, however keen and critical, cannot see. If the student feels his spiritual needs, if his spiritual sensibilities are awakened and his spiritual powers active, God will find him and he will find God in the study of the Bible. If it is only critical and archæological interest which moves him, criticism and archæology will be all which he will find.

It must be further noticed that only specialists, whether devout or undevout, are learned enough for this critical and archæological investigation. And if this alone is to find all there is in the Bible, then it is not the book for all the people, to be read and interpreted by their private judgment; but an authority is set up to declare its meaning. It is only as encyclicals are issued from some specialist in a university that men can know what to believe. M. Bersier, in one of his sermons, speaks of this result in France: "Many young men believe that they have said all when they appeal to criticism. They say, 'Criticism has decided,' with the same confiding and tranquil tone with which others say, 'The Church has decided.' They think they are exercising their private judgment at the very moment when they are swearing *in verba magistri*, on the faith which they have in him."

Other evils of isolated historical study and criticism are mentioned by Reuss; and the lapse of years since he wrote has added new exemplifications. "As the method became more and more

complicated and the estimate of arguments more and more dependent on the subjective views of the critics, the more impossible was agreement. The rampant undergrowth of unfruitful hypotheses overspread and concealed the solid ground of history, and must be laboriously cleared away again ; skepticism spread ; acuteness and abuse of criticism bordered close on each other and caused the very principles of the latter to be suspected ; and it was often true on both sides in such investigations that it was not so much the historical questions themselves as the theological ones lying behind them which assured to the controversy its importance and at the same time its endlessness.”¹

On the other hand, there is apparent a tendency to isolate the historical revelation from rational thought. It is common for ministers to say that they hold to the facts of Christianity, but not to any doctrine or philosophy which results from human thought in defining, interpreting and vindicating them, or in drawing inferences from them. They would have the Biblical revelation only, without theology. But this is forbidding men to think on religious subjects or to use their rational faculties in ascertaining what God has revealed of himself in the Bible. It also implies a contradiction between the facts of Christianity, and the reason of man and all his thinking in accordance with the principles of reason. It is the admission that Christianity will not bear the scrutiny of human reason, thought and scholarship, not even when these are exercised on it by the most devout and godly men ; and that its facts and teachings cannot be comprehended by human thought in any intelligible and reasonable system. Yet when these persons declare what they believe to be the revelation of the Bible respecting God in any particular, in any words other than the very words of the Bible, they are giving us a theology of their own. And they are often willing to get disciples who will follow their isolated teachings. Thus the question is not between religion without a theology and religion with it. It is the question between religion with a crude, narrow or erroneous theology, and religion with a theology drawn from the Bible with prayerful, scholarly, earnest and rational thought. The issue of this antagonism to Christian intelligence may be in irreligion and unbelief ; in ignorant, fanciful or superstitious interpretations² and applications of the Scriptures ; or in what the

¹ History of the New Testament, vol. ii. pp. 357, 358, Trans.

² It is reported that in a Sunday-school in England, the lesson for the day mentioned that David rose from his bed and walked on the roof of his house.

Bishop of Norwich called "maudlin sentimentalism with its miserable disparagement of any definite doctrine, a nerveless religion without the sinew and bone of doctrine." Thus it opens the way to a false religion of hysterical fanaticism.

4. It follows from what has been said that the true knowledge of God can be attained only in the synthesis of the experiential, the historical and the rational or ideal.

Mysticism is true so far as it insists on the life of immediate communion with God and recognizes God's revelation of himself by his action within the conscious experience of the man. Its error is that it limits the religion to the feelings instead of recognizing it as rooted in the entire spiritual constitution of man, and so shuts up the religious consciousness within this emotional experience, without turning on it the light of intelligence and reason. But the Christian Scriptures give no warrant for this narrowness. They require that the service which we render to God should be a "reasonable service," that is, a service approved, guided and purified by reason. Their requirement is, "Be ready always to give answer to every man that asketh you a reason concerning the hope that is in you." Even in prophets they forbid the mantic fury of a heathen inspiration, and teach that "the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets," and that in receiving alleged divine communications we must "believe not every spirit, but prove the spirits whether they are from God," and this for the significant reason that "God is not a God of confusion."¹ It is preposterous to suppose that the Spirit of God can reveal himself only through the feelings and makes no use of man's reason and common sense, his powers of reflective thought and his already acquired knowledge. And feeling cannot be the ultimate test of truth; for in the light of reason we must always first judge of the feelings themselves whether they are reasonable or unreasonable, right or wrong. But mysticism turns away from all such proving and testing in intelligence as deadening to the power and life of religion. Thus it is, as Professor Pfeleiderer calls it, "a self-forgetting and world-forgetting God-intoxica-

A boy asked how he could walk on the roof without slipping off. The teacher replied sternly, "You must not cavil at the word of God." At the close of the school, as this teacher was leaving the room, another teacher who had overheard the remark took him by the arm and said, "Brother, you did not answer that boy right. You should have said to him, With man it is impossible; but with God all things are possible."

¹ Rom. xii. 1; I. Pet. iii. 15; I. John iv. 1; I. Cor. xiv. 32, 33.

tion ;” and is, as compared with the true knowledge of God, but a folded bud, compared with the blossom unfolded and rich in color and fragrance.¹ The result is that mysticism, while above all claiming revelation, loses hold of the divine reality revealed and retains in its grasp only a subjective and empty consciousness, a mere feeling, the object of which is unknown. Thus it accepts for Christianity the very position into which skepticism is trying to crowd it ; for skepticism admits that man is constitutionally endowed with religious susceptibilities, but it insists that the object of these sensibilities is a creation of the fancy and cannot be an object of knowledge.

Rational thinking is also essential to the true and largest knowledge of God. But unchecked and unsubstantiated by religious experience and historical revelation, it becomes rationalism, runs wild in speculation and misses the true knowledge of God.

The true and largest knowledge of God is possible only in the synthesis of the experiential, the historical and the ideal or rational. These must test, correct and restrain, and at the same time clarify, verify and supplement each other, and thus bring their several results into unity and give the most correct and comprehensive knowledge of God. The young student may chafe under these restraints and imagine that they repress the freedom, independence and range of his thinking. But freedom is safe, healthy and fruitful only as it is regulated by law. The seeming restraint within which his thought is circumscribed is essential to its true freedom and its highest power. It is fabled that the beer working in a bottle thought if it could escape the confinement it would fill the world. But when it burst the confining glass, it was as water spilled on the ground.

5. The historical revelation is the medium through which the synthesis of the three is to be attained. The Bible must be held in solution in theological thought and be vital in spiritual life. Religious experience and theological thought both centre in the living Christ. In him is life ; in him also are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. In the sphere of religious thought and life, he is the centre in which all the radii meet and from which they all issue.

Talleyrand, it is said, once received a deputation of theophilanthropists, who consulted him as to the best way of introducing their proposed new religion. After hearing them he said, Gen-

¹ Religionsphilosophie, p. 307.

lemen, I refer you to an historical fact which may give you some light as to the best way to establish a new religion in the world. When Jesus Christ undertook to establish a new religion, he was crucified, he lay in the grave three days, he arose again and ascended into heaven. If you would succeed, I advise you to do the same. There is a profound significance in this story. God cannot be felt out by feeling alone, nor thought out by thinking alone. Before all religious feeling and thought God must in some way present himself in the consciousness of the individual and in the history of man, as the object of feeling and thought. The world cannot be renovated nor its spiritual needs satisfied by the meditations of quietism nor the dreams and ecstasies of mysticism, nor by the speculations of thought, nor by culture and "sweet reasonableness," nor by morality without religion, nor by philanthropy with no relation to God and no root in the supernatural; but only by the living God revealing himself by his own action in the lives of individuals and the history of man, redeeming men from sin and establishing his kingdom of righteousness and good-will.

6. To attain this synthesis is the great problem of all religious thinking.

In every living organism we find the unity of differences and seeming incompatibilities realized practically in the life. It is the problem of science to apprehend these diversities, to set forth in thought the unity of the manifold thus realized in life, and to discover and declare its principle and law. Religion is the life of the spirit in which differences and seeming incompatibilities appear in unity. It is the business of theology to apprehend and set forth in a unity of thought, the diversified truths and applications of truth already practically in unity in the religious experience and life. Its great problem is to translate experience into thought, to set forth spontaneous beliefs in intellectual forms, to interpret and vindicate them to the reason, to show their place and significance in the constitution and history of man, and thus to make it evident that the synthesis practically experienced in the religious life is apprehended and vindicated in intelligence; it is to show that the God whom the Christian heart worships is the God whose real existence reason demands as necessary to any reasonable explanation of the constitution and history of man, of the constitution and order of the universe, and of its own right to believe itself rational; it is to find the synthesis of the absolute being, that philosophy must recognize in order to be philoso-

phy, with the eternal Spirit, perfect in wisdom and love, that religion recognizes as the object of its trust and service.

In the necessity of this synthesis the process of knowing the spiritual and the supernatural is the same with that of knowing the physical. The knowledge of the physical world begins, like that of the spiritual, in intuitions which cannot be proved but are known only in their own self-evidence. A scientist can no more prove that he has real knowledge of physical realities through sense-perception than a Christian can prove that he has knowledge of spiritual reality through self-consciousness, or of God through experience. Moreover in the primitive consciousness of the scientist, as of every other man, factual realities and rational principles lie together unformulated and undiscriminated as an unresolved nebula. He can do nothing whatever to prove that his perceptions give him real knowledge. All which he can do is to apprehend what the perceived reality is, to distinguish the things which are presented nebulously before him, and to note their reciprocal relations; he can verify his perceptions by repeated observations, and by comparing them with the observations of others and with the highest results of human investigation of the matter under consideration; he can bring all this into the light of reason and under its regulating principles can draw inferences and thus enlarge his knowledge. By these processes he brings the presented realities definitely before his mind, he finds their differences and relations, their harmony with one another and with all the principles of reason and all the legitimate conclusions of reasoning; he brings it all into harmony with the whole scientific system. In this harmony and consistency his mind moves up and down through the whole sphere of his knowledge of the matter in hand and of its relations to all that is known, finding no contradiction or inconsistency of things with each other nor with the results of his own mental processes; then he rests in undoubting conviction of their reality. Thus his continued experience and thinking are a continued verification of his knowledge; without wavering he trusts to it the conduct of his life. He finds errors which he must correct and deficiencies of knowledge to be supplied; but the great mass of his knowledge is confirmed by his experience every day so long as he lives. In like manner while the knowledge of mankind is cleared of errors and enlarged from generation to generation, the great mass of it persists and is confirmed by the experience of the race through all the ages.

The same is true of man's knowledge of the spiritual, of the supernatural and of God. These realities reveal themselves in his consciousness in feelings, in moral duty, in the practical determinations of the will in the conduct of life, as well as in his intellectual action. He examines them in the light of reason and applies to them its universal and necessary principles. Step by step he apprehends their significance, distinguishes them from physical realities and finds their unity in a moral and spiritual system, the recognition of which is necessary to a scientific knowledge of the system of nature. Thus by continued experience of these spiritual realities and continued thinking on them, the whole progress of his knowledge is a continued confirmation of his belief in the spiritual world, which more and more opens itself to his vision as the deepest reality of the universe. Peacefully and without a doubt he rests the conduct and interests of his life on the truth of this belief. As in physical knowledge, he corrects errors and supplies deficiencies; but the great facts of the existence of a divinity and a supernatural world, of moral law and retribution, of the need of the divine favor and the necessity of worship persist unchanged.

It follows that the common objections to theological thinking are unreasonable and invalid. F. W. Robertson gives the following as a principle on which he had always taught: "Spiritual truth is discerned by the spirit instead of intellectually in propositions; and therefore truth should be taught suggestively, not dogmatically." If what I have said is true this principle is not correct. It may as properly be said: "Physical realities are known in sense-perception and not intellectually in propositions; therefore the facts respecting them should be taught suggestively and not scientifically." It is true that spiritual reality is known in spiritual experience; but it must also be known intellectually; just as physical realities are known by sense-perception, and also are known intellectually. And in each case it is incumbent on rational beings to attain the utmost possible precision and completeness of knowledge. So Bishop Butler says: "Reason is the only faculty we have wherewith to judge of any thing, even Revelation itself."¹ And Mr. Wace says: "We advance in faith only so far as reason and conscience are allowed to accompany us, but no further. Neither the prophets of the Old Testament, nor our Lord, nor his apostles ask us for one moment to silence our

¹ Analogy, part ii. chap. iii.

reason or our conscience. . . . Faith, like all other instincts of our nature, requires to be checked by the exercise of reason.”¹

And it is human reason, seeking and following the guidance of God's Spirit, by which this synthesis must be made. By virtue of his rationality man is a personal being and knows himself part and participant of the rational and spiritual system. The realm of spiritual and supernatural reality is not something foreign to a man; something which happens sometimes to glance and strike on him and so arrests his curious attention. His knowledge of it is not accidental and contingent as of a foreign realm, so that it is not necessary for him to know it in order to realize his highest manhood, any more than it is to visit Spitzbergen or Nova Zembla. On the contrary his knowledge of it is the spontaneous issue of his consciousness of himself, and is verified, corrected and enlarged by his experience in doing the legitimate work of his life and realizing the true development and perfection of his being.

7. The historical course of man's religious experience and theological thought has been a gradual working out of this synthesis.

History discloses three stages in the progress of it. The first is the stage of undefined religious experience and spontaneous belief. The second is the stage of reflective thought, in which man tests, and tries to verify, his religious belief. This sometimes issues in doubt and skepticism. And through the tendency to the isolation of the intellectual element, already considered, it may lead to the entire suppression of belief in a God. This issue, however, is abnormal and, as history shows, exceptional. It is a regress and not a progress. The legitimate and reasonable issue, which history shows to have been in fact the common one, is the state of confirmed belief in God and purified and amplified knowledge of him. This is the third stage in the progress of human thought, in which man has tested and verified his religious experience and his spontaneous religious belief by reflective thought, and has found the synthesis of the experiential, the historical and the rational. Thus he has found religion to be a reasonable service and his spontaneous religious beliefs are corrected, confirmed and enlarged into well considered knowledge. In the childhood of the race, man projects outward from himself the spiritual realities which he finds within, and peoples nature with spiritual beings like himself. But these are no mere fictions of the fancy. By a necessity of his rational constitution he must know all phenomena as phenomena of a being, qualities as quali-

¹ Wace, Bamp. Lect. 1879, pp. 207, 251.

ties of a substance, actions as actions of an agent, and changes as effects of a cause. In his religious experience he finds himself the subject of impressions which he cannot account for as caused by himself or by natural objects or by other men. He must refer them to some agent, and he refers them to an agent which is neither a natural object nor a man, and yet is endowed with invisible powers of thought, will and feeling like his own; in other words, to a divinity. In the second stage man has advanced in civilization and culture; yet he is still in a state of partial development, and speculation is still one-sided and immature. Then he may persuade himself that the realm of the spiritual and the supernatural is only an unreal figment of his own brain, and that objects of sense are the only realities. He thus puts nature in contradiction to reason, with a logical issue, which he does not at once perceive, that a scientific knowledge of nature is itself made impossible. In the third stage, he brings the primitive experience and beliefs of the first stage into comparison with the historical revelations of God and under the test and verification of reflective thought. Thus he attains the synthesis of the experiential, the historical and the intellectual, and returns to the religious life with a confirmed belief in God, for which he can now give a reason to every one who asks him. And the individual in his own private history passes through these same three stages through which mankind passes in its history. He passes from the simple experience and the unquestioning and spontaneous belief of childhood to the thoughtful scrutiny of the mature man, often at the present day encountering doubts and difficulties and sometimes making shipwreck of his faith; but oftener passing through the investigation to an intelligent and confirmed belief. In this third stage reason becomes distinctly conscious of its supremacy and asserts it. Then the man recognizes himself as participant in the realms both of the sensible and the spiritual, both of nature and the supernatural; he finds the contradiction between nature and spirit dissolved; he sees nature in the bosom of spirit, spirit manifesting itself in nature, and God in and over all; he sees the physical system in harmony with the spiritual, both expressing the thought and realizing the ends of the absolute and supreme reason; and he sees himself an agent and participant in both under the government of God. Thus he returns to the religious life now justified to the reason in the complete synthesis of the experiential, the historical and the rational.¹

¹ "Leben gab ihr die Fabel, die Schule hat sie entseet,
Schaffendes Leben auf's Neu' giebt die Vernunft ihr zuruck."

And this historical course of man's religious belief and thought is entirely analogous to that of physical science. The fancies and fables of early cosmogonies belong to the science of their time quite as much as to the religion. That all things came from water or from fire, that the flat earth is surrounded by a river of fire, that the sun toils through the foundations of the earth every night, that there cannot be antipodes, these are fancies and fables of primitive science quite as much as of primitive religion. And from these beginnings science has floundered on through as many errors and as many fantastic conceptions as have appeared in the history of religion. Let any one read, for example, the medical prescriptions used in England two hundred years ago.

8. The necessity of this synthesis of the experiential and historical with the intellectual or rational and its influence in the history of religion is the key to the current movement of thought among Christian theists.

The lapse of Protestantism into dogmatism and rationalism was a perversion of Protestantism, not its legitimate development. It has often been said that Protestantism is essentially rationalistic; that rationalism is its legitimate issue; that there are but two roads now open to religious thought, of which one leads to Rome, the other to complete rationalism. One of the latest utterances of this kind is by Mr. Edwin D. Meade, in his volume on Martin Luther: "Luther stands for rationalism. He stands also for Intellectualism in religion. . . . Coming into the science of our time with the same spirit with which he came into the science of four centuries ago, Martin Luther would have been, not Joseph Cook, nor Moody and Sankey, but Theodore Parker."¹

Protestantism powerfully asserted the rational element in religion and stimulated theological thought to intense action. But the emphasis of the assertion was merely incidental to the reaction against the suppression of the rights of the intellect under

¹ It is often said also that the Protestant Reformation carried in its bosom the political revolution. Certainly it waked men up to thought; and in its great doctrine of justification by faith it set forth the dignity and worth of a man in the raw material of his manhood, admitted without human mediation into the presence of God and accepted on condition of his own personal trust in the God of grace; and thus it set forth the sacredness of his rights. But in its essence it was fitted to effect a peaceful progress in securing human rights. Truth and love are not responsible for the convulsions of society occasioned by the resistance of oppressors to their just and benignant influence.

the authority of the hierarchy. Protestantism was equally a revival of spiritual life, and an assertion of the personal religious experience and of the presence and influence of the Holy Spirit, in distinction from the outwardness and formality of ecclesiasticism. The experiential, the historical and the intellectual or rational were all powerful in the movement. Luther himself was its representative in the combination in his character of spiritual experience, reverence for the historical revelation in the Scriptures, and intellectual freedom and daring, in connection with the distinctively human characteristics of a true manhood in contrast with the ghostliness and ghastliness of mediæval sanctity. That Protestantism fell into dogmatism and rationalism was not due to the intellectualism of the movement, but to the imperfection and limitation of man, always swinging to one side. On the other hand, Protestantism, in an equally one-sided way, has sometimes issued in pietism, mysticism and even fanaticism, showing that it was originally a revival of experiential religion as well as the assertion of freedom of thought.

Christian thinking is now moving away from the abstract to the concrete and realistic, from dogmatism and rationalism to historical and spiritual conceptions of God and redemption, through thought to life. This movement did not begin in our day, but can be traced through several generations. The decline of spiritual faith and life in Great Britain and America, deplored in the writings of Bishop Butler and President Edwards, was a result of the arid dogmatism to which I have referred.¹ Another result of it was the English Deism. To the deist, Robert Boyle's conception of the universe as a clock was all-sufficient; God was recognized as existing, but was conceived as a mechanician who had made the clock and set it going, but remained outside of it, having little to do with it except to watch its movement. Even those who attempted to defend Christianity relied almost exclusively on the external evidence of miracles; if they appealed to the Internal Evidences, the one argument was that of Soame Jenyns,² that Christ taught a system of ethics original with him and superior to any ever taught before — an argument blown away by the present conviction of scholars that the principles of morality recognized by all nations are essentially the same. After the beginning of this century Dugald Stewart and others were discussing whether God's action in the universe would not

¹ *Philosophical Basis of Theism*, p. 341.

² *View of the Internal Evidences of the Christian Religion*.

prove the imperfection of his workmanship, just as it would prove the imperfection of a clock, if its maker were obliged to stand by and keep it going with his fingers.¹

The reaction from this meagreness of spiritual thought and life appeared in America in the revivals of religion in the lifetime of President Edwards, and in Great Britain in the Wesleyan movement, and in the evangelical movement in the established church. It is now powerful in both countries in every sphere of religious thought and activity, stirring many minds with discontent, who have never defined to themselves what is the ground of their restlessness nor what is necessary in order to remove it. In Germany, before rationalism had fully developed itself, there was a reaction against dead dogmatism in Francke, Spener and the so-called Pietism. This, however, did not avail to stop the drift of thought into rationalism. After rationalism had gained its sway over German theology, the first reaction effective to check it was with Schleiermacher. He received from his early training among the Moravians a spiritual influence which followed him throughout his life. However defective we find his system of Christian belief to be, in him theology at least oriented itself; it found its East; it turned its face towards the sunrising, and ever since has been advancing with the light of the Sun of Righteousness on its brow.

Perhaps the latest distinctly marked epoch in this movement was the publication of Strauss's *Life of Jesus*. In this, rationalism seemed to reach its highest achievement. It was an application of the Hegelian philosophy to the life of Jesus; it claimed to demonstrate that after we have learned the truth or thought expressed in the story of his life, the story itself is of no value and its historical truth or falsehood a matter of indifference; it applied to the Gospels a criticism keen, learned and destructive, and commonly acknowledged at the time to be the most formidable to which they had ever been subjected. It caused a sort of consternation in the Christian world. But soon after, Neander published his *Life of Jesus Christ* as a reply to Strauss. And since then has followed that series of *Lives of Christ* which have been appearing every year until now, and which have been widely circulated and eagerly read. This is a striking evidence of the power which Christ still has over the minds and hearts of men. The question whether Homer ever existed has been in dispute, but it would be impossible to

¹ D. Stewart's *Active and Moral Powers*, bk. iii. chap. i.

waken any popular interest in its discussion. Except Jesus, there is no personage of antiquity who has such a hold on the interests of men that so many biographies and investigations of his life and work, popular and scholarly, could be written within a single generation and be eagerly read and everywhere discussed. And this we owe to Strauss; for before the publication of his work, Lives of Christ were scarcely known. We are also indebted to Strauss for more than this. He set out to show that the historical narrative of the life of Jesus is of no account; that the whole significance of his life is in the truth which it expresses. Instead of accomplishing this he accomplished just the contrary. He concentrated the thought of all Christendom on the study of the story of Christ's life, on the study of Jesus as an historical personage, and of his history, teaching and influence among men. And the result is that men are seeing, as they never saw before, that the great evidence of Christianity is in Christ himself; that his human life and influence can be accounted for only by admitting that he is divine. They have also come to understand more fully than ever before the profound and far-reaching significance of the Incarnation, and the peculiarity, richness and practical power of the revelation of God made in the humiliation of the Logos and in the earthly life of the Christ.

In our own country, when Strauss published his *Life of Jesus*, the churches were just emerging from the unitarian controversy. They brought out of it with them the theological Christ, but scarcely the historical Jesus. They believed that Christ was God; they could marshal all the proof-texts which imply his divinity. But he was to them scarcely anything but God. In proving him to be divine they had obscured his humanity, in and through which he revealed God and wrought the divine work of redeeming man from sin. Strauss's *Life of Jesus* in its results led the Christian people of America back to the human life of Jesus and thus in him, as the exponent to us under human limitations and conditions of what God is, they found God not the less but the more. Professor Moses Stuart, in lecturing to his classes on messianic prophecy, used to select a few passages from the Old Testament as messianic and give as the reason, that they were quoted and applied to Christ in the New Testament; with the result that many of the students thought that the recognition of messianic prophecy was arbitrary and forced, and were ready to doubt that the Old Testament fairly

interpreted contained any messianic prophecy. But the closer study of the actual history of what God has done for man as recorded in the Bible has led the scholarship of this day to recognize the whole history of Israel as having a messianic outlook and the messianic interpretation of prophecy as entirely unforced and natural, according to the strictest laws of interpretation. Theology, occupied with doctrines and formulas, had lost sight of the historical kingdom of Christ. But the study of his life and teaching on earth brought it again to notice. At that time the New England theology was about consummating its work. It had rendered the great service of defining more exactly the nature and limits of human responsibility and thus opening the way for preaching the duty and obligation of repentance. But necessarily in the very discussion of these questions, it had occupied the mind with nice distinctions and definitions of philosophy. Thus the mind was turned off from the richness of thought and the power of motive in the life of Christ. The assault of Strauss on the gospel histories forced Christian thinking back upon these great themes.

Thus by turning the attention of all Christendom to the human life of Jesus, Strauss's assault on Christianity tended to correct the one-sidedness and deficiencies which had temporarily enfeebled theology, and to turn Christian thinking back to the historical Christ and to the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hid in him. It summoned Christian theologians to recognize anew the fact that the historical Christ is the true centre of all theological thinking and systemizing, and Christian preachers to renewed earnestness in saying with Paul: "I determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified." Goethe once said that the devil was God's best gift to man. Without endorsing this audacious assertion in its literal meaning, we must be grateful to God, always

"From seeming evil still educing good
And better thence again, and better still,
In infinite progression,"

for the evidence given, on occasion of this work of error, that God still reveals himself to men and is still known by faithful souls who seek him, and for the good which has come from the reaction of Christian faith and scholarship against this assault.

Much is said nowadays of a "New movement in theology." Such a movement is healthy, if it is toward the synthesis of the

experiential, the historical and the rational in the knowledge of God; if it is from the abstract to the concrete, from the speculative to the historical, from the dead to the living, from sticking in the letter to the strong grasp of reality; if it is from dogmatism and rationalism to the "God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself," recognized as the centre of all theology, known in experience so that men "acquaint themselves with him and are at peace," preached by those who know him and who testify "what God has done for their souls;" if it is from an emotional, one-sided, self-coddling "other-worldliness," to a recognition of Christ's kingdom advancing on earth, and the hearty consecration of ourselves, as "laborers together with God," to the work of transforming human society into it.

It is necessary both to the clearest and fullest understanding of truth and to its greatest practical power, that it be either embodied or ensouled, that it be presented to our notice in some thing, person or action. As George Eliot says: "Ideas are often poor ghosts; our sun-filled eyes cannot discern them; they pass athwart us in their vapor and cannot make themselves felt. But sometimes they are made flesh; they breathe upon us with warm breath, they touch us with soft responsive hands, they look at us with sad sincere eyes, and speak to us in appealing tones; they are clothed in a living, human soul, with all its conflicts, its faith, its love. Then their presence is a power, then they shake us like a passion, and we are drawn after them with gentle compulsion, as flame is drawn to flame. . . . It is one of the secrets in the change of mental poise which has fitly been named conversion, that to many among us neither heaven nor earth has any revelation till some personality touches theirs with a peculiar influence, subduing them to receptiveness."¹ It is in adaptation to this trait of the human constitution that God has embodied his revelation of himself in nature and ensouled it in the lives of men; that he has revealed himself in the great courses of human history; and especially that he has come to us in the "one Mediator between God and men, himself man, Christ Jesus."

So far then as the movement of theological thought is in this direction, it is in the highest degree healthful, helpful and hopeful. But this is not a new movement. It is only a more advanced stage in the reaction from arid dogmatism and rationalism which in various forms has long been going on. We trace

¹ Janet's Repentance, chap. xix.

in it the struggle to attain the synthesis of experience, history and rational intelligence, in which alone the true and full-orbed theology is possible.

Some have fled to Schleiermacher to escape from abstract dogmas, philosophical speculations and destructive criticism, to the experience of the presence and love of the living God. But it is evident that his doctrine of the religious consciousness, whatever its truth and importance, is one-sided and defective, and inadequate both for Christian truth and life. The movement in this direction issues in pietism or mysticism, various types of which are not uncommon among our religious people.

Others have fled from Schleiermacher to Hegel, because with the former they seemed to find only a belief resting unstable on the feelings and existing merely in the subjective consciousness of the believer, while in the philosophy of the latter they have hoped to find truth fixed and eternal, the Being that is absolute and without change, and the reality and true significance of the universe which all its changing phenomena reveal. Augustine says: "The Christian claims as his Master's own possession every fragment of truth, wherever it may be found." Christianity is comprehensive of all spiritual truth. As the one absolute religion, it must be able to take up all spiritual truth and to accord with all spiritual reality. The profound philosophy of Hegel suggests truths, aspects of reality and lines of thought by which our accepted theology may be broadened, deepened and enriched, and the reasonableness of doctrines received on the authority of revelation be found. I say suggests, for Hegel himself, beclouded in his dialectics and his *a priori* methods, can scarcely be said to have grasped and clearly enunciated the theistic and Christian truths which his philosophy approaches and points to, but never declares. It is legitimate for Christian theists to seek whatever truth is suggested by it, and to use the same to support and enrich the Christian faith. It must be said, however, of all the recent writers who have looked to Hegelianism for help, that, whatever of value they bring to Christian theology, they bring it encompassed with the obscurity and the tenuous speculation characteristic of the philosophy, and with forms of thought and expression which easily lead to idealistic Pantheism and to the mistaking of logical notions and processes for concrete beings and their activities and relations.

In this country the rationalistic movement, where it has not issued in the rejection even of theism, has found visible embodi-

ment in unitarianism. But even among those called evangelical, in the ferment of theological thought rationalistic tendencies come to light and rationalistic opinions are avowed, perhaps sometimes in unconsciousness of their distinctive character. In a recently published book of an eminent and able evangelical author we are told: "The exact facts of the gospels may escape us; we may easily cast on them endless doubts and raise with them endless difficulties. They are shrouded by the gathering mists of centuries. Not so is it with the truths of the gospels. They have lost nothing and have gained much by intervening years. . . . No matter what we may establish about facts which have now passed into the oblivion of nineteen centuries, we must still ask, What are the controlling incentives of the present hour? No matter what we fail to prove concerning these facts, we may still hold fast a spiritual faith, wholly defensible by virtue of the living and potent principles present with us from that place and that period which define the life of Christ." It is not easy to distinguish this from the idea of Strauss in writing his first *Life of Jesus*. The idea that the essential significance of Christ's mission is in the truths and precepts which he taught, while the facts of his personal history are a matter of indifference, is of the essence of rationalism. The same appears in identifying religion with "ethics lit up with emotion," as Matthew Arnold does and in welcoming as a Christian fellow-worker, "the Agnostic who wishes to do good,"¹ as a clergyman of the Church of England has recently done; for these offer us Christianity without Christ and religion without God. Speculations like these show still among us the old movement in theology from dogmatism onward to rationalistic thought. They are lingering puffs from the sand-storms of the great Sahara of rationalism, which the church is leaving behind in its progress toward spiritual reality and life.

It is evident, therefore, that whatever the movement of theological thought may be, the isolation of experience in mysticism, of historical study in unspiritual and arid criticism, and of theological thought in dogmatism or in rationalism are all still present in the religion and the theological thinking of the present time. In speaking of the present movement in theology, men commonly fail to discriminate between these, and group together under that common name lines of religious life and thought which are different and in opposite directions. The religion and the-

¹ *The Gospel of the Secular Life*, by W. H. Fremantle, pp. 162, 163.

ology of the time cannot be intelligently apprehended without discriminating between these several directions of life and thought. A navigator cannot determine his position by latitude alone, but only by both latitude and longitude. So to determine the position of theological thought, we must know it in reference both to the experiential, the historical and the rational. The direction of all healthy thinking is toward the synthesis of the three.

This healthy direction to the synthesis of theological thought with religious experience and historical revelation insures the passage of the thought through the words to the realities signified, through the abstract to the concrete, through the intellectual to the practical. Words and abstract ideas are necessary in investigation. But true and effective thinking must pass through the words and the abstract general notions to the concrete realities. And this is done just so far as we attain the synthesis of theological thought with religious experience and historical revelation.

There is nothing in these conclusions which disparages theological investigation or discourages attempts to clarify, complete and systemize our knowledge of God and of his relations to us and the universe. It is true that religion has suffered from over-definition in theology, in the effort to give an exact answer to every question which can arise in all the finest and most complicated ramifications of thought. It is true that on many points which come into view in the study of God and his works, suggestion reveals more than definition. It is true that the heart is often wiser than the head; that a true faith is consistent with defective knowledge and with many intellectual errors; that we may welcome and love as Christians men "perplexed in faith but pure in deed." But in all this there is no justification of loose thinking, of a mysticism of the feelings unpurified and unverified by thought. Man by his rational constitution is impelled to seek and is under moral obligation to seek the utmost attainable clearness, precision, completeness and unity of his knowledge of God.

There are three points to be noticed here in reference to the facts that what God reveals is himself as distinguished from doctrines, systems and religions, and that the best thinking of the church is tending to bring back the abstract and the rationalistic to its legitimate synthesis with the concrete spiritual reality revealed in the Christian consciousness and in the historical Christ and his kingdom.

The first point is, that it is precisely in this way that we gain the clearest, most trustworthy and complete knowledge. This is true of our knowledge of nature and of man not less than of our knowledge of God. We find the knowledge of principles, laws and systems in the observation and investigation of concrete realities. In concrete forms the eternal principles of mathematics are revealed. Nature presents us no astronomy. It is only by observing and studying the earth and the stars that we find our astronomical system; and the system when found is nothing in itself, but is of significance only because it is the intellectual equivalent of what the universe really is. So in all cases nature simply presents itself in its ongoing. It gives us no physical science. The science is created only by observing and studying nature and apprehending in thought the reality as it is. So it is in the revelation of God. God gives us no theology, just as nature gives us no science. He simply acts in and before us. By the observation and study of his works we learn what he is and what are his relations to us and to the universe. The result of these observations and reflections, expressed as clearly and systematically as we can, is theology. A sparrow, if we would learn all that is to be learned about it, reveals an encyclopædia of knowledge. A brief history may open an immense scope for thought. The brief life of Christ reveals God.

Another point to be noticed is this. The difficulty with our formulas and systems is not so much that they are erroneous as that, however correct, we stop in the words and the abstract propositions, instead of passing through them to the reality. No science can be mastered from books alone. The astronomer must observe the heavens, the chemist must experiment in the laboratory, the botanist and zoölogist must study plants and animals. One would have a very limited and incorrect knowledge of astronomy who had never seen the sun, the moon or the stars; or of botany or zoölogy, who had never seen a plant or an animal. So the doctrine is that we must know God in experience as he reveals himself in his action. We must pass through our formulas and systems to the living God whom they declare. His revelation of himself is broad and bright as the universe. We must find him in it every day. We must freshen our old knowledge with new communications of his grace. We must receive it anew from day to day, as we receive the all-encompassing light by which we live. In the Bible God as he reveals himself is compared to the sun. Science discloses principles and laws accord-

ing to which the light always acts, and which regulate our seeing ; yet the sun is pouring out its light without ceasing, and we must receive it ever anew or we cannot see. So in studying God's revelation of himself we find unchanging principles and laws according to which he acts and which we are bound to obey ; yet his revelation goes on without ceasing, in all nature, in the experience of individuals, and in the history of man ; and we must receive it ever anew or we cannot know him. And as in the former case the necessity of receiving the light always anew does not set aside the science of optics nor detract from its value, so in the latter case the necessity of receiving God's revelation of himself anew does not set aside theology nor detract from its value.

It is to be noticed, further, that this knowledge of God is necessary to realize the true Christian life. Knowledge is of value as the guide, stimulus and strength of life. The Christian ideal of life is the true ideal of the life of man. It is the life of faith in God and of love to God and man ; of self-devotion and self-sacrifice, of truthfulness and courage. The realization of this ideal in the kingdom of God on earth is the end, so far as man is concerned, of all the revelation of God. But for its realization the knowledge of God is necessary. There must be not merely the knowledge of formulas, systems and books, but a knowledge of God, so that the man shall live as in his sight, in constant trust in him and confidential intimacy with him.

PART II.

GOD REVEALED IN THE UNIVERSE AS THE ABSOLUTE BEING.

“No thinking is in a position to deny an absolute, and even those, who have taken the field most zealously against the conception of the absolute, have assumed an absolute.” — Hartmann, *Die Religion des Geistes*, part B, p. 116.

“There ever remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and independently of conditions. . . . We are by the laws of thought prevented from ridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute existence, this consciousness being the obverse of our self-consciousness. And since the only possible measure of relative validity among our beliefs is the degree of their persistence in opposition to the efforts made to change them, it follows that this which persists at all times, under all circumstances, and cannot cease until consciousness ceases, has the highest validity of any. . . . Asserting the persistence of force, is but another mode of asserting an unconditioned reality without beginning or end. . . . The axiomatic truths of physical science unavoidably postulate absolute Being as their common basis. . . . Without this, religion has no subject-matter; and without this, science, subjective and objective, lacks its indispensable datum. We cannot construct a theory of internal phenomena without postulating absolute Being; and unless we postulate absolute Being, or being that persists, we cannot construct a theory of external phenomena. . . . Such is the foundation of any possible system of positive knowledge. Deeper than demonstration — deeper even than definite cognition — deep as the very nature of mind, is the postulate at which we have arrived. Its authority transcends all other whatever; for not only is it given in the constitution of our own consciousness, but it is impossible to imagine a consciousness so constituted as not to give it. . . . Its positive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness; so long as consciousness continues, we cannot for an instant rid it of this datum; and thus the belief which this datum constitutes has a higher warrant than any other whatever.” — H. Spencer, *First Principles*, pp. 96, 255, 256, 258, 98.

“The Mystery of the universe is a fact — not a mere entity, but a something, a being that is mysterious.” — Wilhelm Meyer, *Wesen des Christenthums*, p. 127.

“This idea of the unconditioned, rising irrepressible in the background of our consciousness, is the first ground-premise from which all thought is set in action and driven on over all conditioned and presented-reality, to find rest only in the certainty of an Infinite and All-conditioning.” — I. H. Fichte, *Theistische Welt-ansicht*, p. 3.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ABSOLUTE BEING.

WE are now to explore the universe, so far as open to our investigation, to ascertain whether God reveals himself in it, and if so, what he is as revealed; and whether our spontaneous belief in God as revealed in our own experience is verified by these revelations.

In the outset we shall find that the absolute, unconditioned and all-conditioning Being is revealed or manifested in the universe. Having established this, we shall proceed to ascertain what the absolute Being is, so far as he has thus revealed or manifested himself. We shall consider his revelation of himself in the existence of the universe, in the constitution and course of nature, and in the constitution and history of man. Then we shall inquire whether he has further revealed himself in Christ and in the establishment of his kingdom. This, as a part of the revelation of God in human history, might be considered under that general head. But, while thus it is brought into unity with the whole historic revelation of God, its importance as the culmination of the revelation, in the sphere of man's spiritual life and development, requires for it a place by itself in our investigations.

Thus in the evidence of the existence of God and of what he is we find a unity; not several disconnected arguments, but the development of one continuous and progressive revelation. Beginning with God's revelation of himself in our own consciousness, we proceed to test it in his revelation of himself in the universe. We find in it one continuous revelation of God, first as the absolute Being manifesting himself in all phenomena; then revealing himself as Reason energizing in the physical system until in its evolution man appears. Then in the spiritual system we find him revealing himself further as the absolute Reason energizing in the moral government and education, and in the spiritual development of man. Lastly, when man is prepared for it, God in Christ and the Holy Spirit reveals himself

as the Redeemer of men from sin, establishing among men his kingdom of righteousness and good-will. Through all these revelations we gain progressively a larger and clearer knowledge of what the absolute Being is.

English and American writers on Natural Theology have not been wont to insist on the origin of man's knowledge of God in his revelation of himself in consciousness. And in examining the further evidence in the universe of the existence of God, they have not been wont to begin with recognizing the rational intuition of the existence of the absolute Being as a necessary principle of reason and law of thought. In fact they have not recognized the idea of the absolute otherwise than as a First Cause supposed to be proved to exist by the law of causation, and have proceeded at once to examine the evidence in the universe of the personality of God. For these reasons their arguments have been exposed to damaging criticism and their validity has been denied.

In this investigation we find, first, that the absolute Being exists.

By absolute Being I mean the being that exists not dependent on or conditioned by any reality independent of or prerequisite to itself. It is not dependent for its being on any cause antecedent to or other than itself, nor conditioned in its existence under any necessary limitation or relation independent of itself.

The grounds on which we believe in the existence of the absolute Being are next to be considered.

That absolute Being exists is a necessary and ultimate principle of reason, involved in the constitution of man as rational. The belief is a rational intuition necessarily arising in its own self-evidence in completing the process of thought in any line of inquiry.

In the knowledge of being we know the existence of absolute Being. If something exists now, something must have existed eternally. An absolute, uncaused beginning is absurd and unthinkable.

In knowing anything which is caused, we necessarily know that uncaused being must exist. If we admit the reality of force or energy in the course of nature and believe that every beginning or change of existence has a cause, then we necessarily know that there is a power which is not itself an effect, which persists in all changes, and is the unconditioned ground of the entire series. Otherwise power or force disappears, the course of

nature ravel out, and all which is left is empty antecedence and consequence with nothing which is antecedent and nothing which is consequent. The same is implied in the scientific fact of the persistence of force. As Mr. Spencer says: "The persistence of the universe is the persistence of that Unknown Cause, Power or Force which is manifested to us through all phenomena."

So in the knowledge of rationality, we necessarily postulate absolute Reason. The possibility of concluding reasoning in an inference which gives knowledge, rests on universal truths regulative of all thinking. The validity of these universal truths involves the existence of Reason unconditioned, universal and supreme, the same everywhere and always. If absolute Reason does not exist, no reason and no rational knowledge exist.

Also, in our endeavors to know the manifold in the unity of an all-comprehending system, we find it only as the universe is the manifestation of the absolute and unconditioned One.

Thus in every line of thought the knowledge rises self-evident that there must be an absolute and unconditioned Being. We properly recognize it as a primitive and universal truth, known in rational intuition. The idea of absolute Being and the belief of its existence are in the background of human consciousness, and at the foundation of all knowledge through human thought. The existence of absolute Being underlies the possibility of all finite being, power, reasoning and rational knowledge.

In this rational intuition the absolute Being is revealed to us; and when we have come to know God we properly say that, in this rational intuition and through our rational constitution, God reveals himself in our consciousness as the absolute Being. We find ourselves so constituted that the normal unfolding of our own reason reveals to us the absolute Being.

We have here the knowledge that the absolute Being exists. Whether we can know more about it we are not now inquiring. In the Egyptian sanctuary of Isis at Sais is the inscription: "I am that which is, that which was, and that which will be. No mortal ever lifted my veil." If the worshiper could not lift the veil, he at least read the proclamation that behind it was the eternal Being. Such a sanctuary is the universe. In its laws and processes the absolute Being is veiled; but on this veil reason, exploring it in its own clear light, reads the inscription proclaiming the reality and presence of the absolute Being.

An objection is urged here, that the existence of the absolute Being is not a necessary postulate of the reason, because the uni-

verse can be conceived as an eternal series of causal actions and effects. To this the common answer is that the objection is self-contradictory and absurd ; a series which at every point is a beginning cannot be eternal ; a series which at every point is dependent cannot be independent. But the answer goes deeper than this. The essential idea of the series is that through all the changes something persists unchanged. If not, then at each change there is an absolute end and an absolute beginning ; all that had been ends, and that which had not been begins. If there is a series of causal actions and effects, there is something that through all the changes persists unchanged. The something that persists through all the beginnings and changes of the series is that which is independent of the series and never began to be. This is implied in the scientific law of the persistence of force, which assumes that through all changes the sum of force potential and energetic in the universe is always the same.

Another objection is that the existence of the absolute Being is not known by rational intuition as a primary principle or law of thought, but is inferred from the principle of causation. But this principle pertains only to phenomena in the universe, which have a beginning ; it cannot reach the absolute ground of all things. It arises in consciousness only in view of some observed change or beginning ; and each change requires only a finite cause. And if that cause in its turn is observed to have a beginning, the principle of causation requires no more than a finite cause for this. Thus the belief that every beginning has a cause carries in it no imperative demand for an uncaused cause, but is fully satisfied in the continuous regression through finite effects and causes, and never carries us beyond it. On the contrary the belief that absolute Being exists is an original principle of reason which asserts itself in the consciousness on occasion of the observed succession of effects, but is in no sense an inference from it.

Many theists have held that the existence of God may be proved from the existence of the universe by the law of causation. They thus expose themselves to objections : that the law of causation demands a cause of God ; that it is not applicable until it has first been proved that the universe had a beginning ; that, even if it had a beginning, it is a finite effect and demands only a finite cause. And these theists cannot answer these questions by the idea of cause alone. Instead of a therefore to every wherefore of the skeptic, which the true idea of God should give,

they have only the child's answer, "Because," which calls forth the question anew; their argument is a stone of Sisyphus which always rolls back on them. But the existence of the absolute Being is not an inference from causal sequences; it is an ultimate principle of reason, a necessary law of thought, which no thinking can transcend or escape.

It is further objected that the existence of the absolute involves irreconcilable contradictions. Mr. Spencer says: "If we admit that there can be something uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything. If beyond that finite region over which the First Cause extends, there lies a region which we are compelled to regard as infinite, over which it does not extend — if we admit that there is an infinite uncaused surrounding the finite caused — we tacitly abandon the hypothesis of causation altogether."¹ This and some other alleged contradictions involved in the existence of the absolute arise from supposing that it is inferred from the existence of the universe by the principle of causation. There are here two ultimate laws of thought instead of one. One refers to things that begin and declares that every beginning must have a cause. The other affirms that there must be something that never began to be, but is unconditioned and absolute Being. There is no contradiction here. The assertion that there must be something which never began, is no contradiction of the assertion that whatever does begin has a cause. The contradiction is Mr. Spencer's, who, in face of the objection cited above, himself admits causation in nature, and yet affirms in the strongest language the existence of absolute power which has no antecedent cause. "The First Cause" cannot itself be caused.

Another objection is that the knowledge of the infinite or absolute must be infinite or absolute knowledge. Feuerbach says: "If thou thinkest the infinite, thou perceivest and affirmest the infinitude of the power of thy thought; if thou feelest the infinite, thou feelest and affirmest the infinitude of the power of feeling."²

By absolute knowledge I understand knowledge which depends solely on the mind knowing, without any action on it of external reality revealing itself. If this is what the objection means, then indeed man has no such knowledge either of God or of finite things. Such archetypal and independent knowledge is possible in the absolute Reason alone. But no reason can be given why

¹ First Principles, pp. 37, 38.

² Wesen des Christenthums, chap. i. § 1.

man's knowledge of God must be absolute in this sense any more than his knowledge of finite reality. The absolute Being reveals itself, through the constitution of man, in the ultimate and necessary postulate of every line of thought; and man's mind reacting on it knows that the absolute Being exists.

If by absolute knowledge the objector means complete and all-comprehending knowledge of the absolute, the same would be an equally valid objection against all knowledge; for there is nothing of which man has such knowledge. Every object to which he attends, if he continues to think of it, starts questions which no man can answer, and thus brings the absolute to view. Everything in revealing itself reveals also to the thought the absolute Being. The objection then is as valid against all knowledge as against the knowledge of the absolute. The limitation of knowledge does not preclude its reality.

It must be added that in man's implicit consciousness there may be beliefs controlling thought and action, which as yet he has not definitely formulated nor even apprehended in thought. Such in the minds of children and savages are the principles that every change has a cause, that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, and other first principles of reason. Such also are many beliefs of common sense regulating a man's thought and action, which he cannot state to others nor even define to himself as reasons for his conclusions and actions. Yet in all these cases the knowledge is real, though undefined. Such knowledge Hamilton calls "the unpictured notions of intelligence." Such in the beginning of human development are man's religious beliefs and his idea of a divinity. Principles and ideas thus originally unpictured and undefined in the implicit consciousness, with the progressive development of man are developed in civilizations and in great systems of empirical, mathematical, philosophical and theological science. In the mind of the writer of the first chapter of Genesis the idea was present, however inadequately conceived, that God created man in his own image. The whole history of man and the revelation of God in Christ and in the establishing of his kingdom through the ages, have been unfolding the significance of this truth; and to this day it has not been fully developed in all its significance and its practical applications. And it is equally possible for man to have an unpictured notion of the absolute.

But whatever advance man may make in the knowledge of God and of the universe in its relation to him, and in appre-

hending, formulating, systemizing and applying it, the absolute Being must always transcend the man and his knowledge. He can never be taken up completely and held in the forms of human thought. Yet the knowledge is not for this less real.

Mr. Mansel objects: "To have a partial knowledge of an object is to know a part of it but not the whole. But the part of the infinite supposed to be known must be itself either infinite or finite. If infinite, it presents the same difficulties as before. If finite, the point in question is conceded, and our consciousness is allowed to be limited to finite objects."¹ Hamilton presents the objection in the same form. This is palpable logomachy. It is possible to know an object in its individuality and wholeness while the knowledge is partial and incomplete. I have a slight acquaintance with the man who lives across the street. My partial knowledge of him will increase on further acquaintance. Now the objector says that because the knowledge is partial, I do not know the man in his wholeness, but only a part of him; and he asks whether the part is the whole man. If it is, then he says, You know the whole man, and your knowledge is not partial. But if it is a part, then you do not know the man. I answer to this paltering with words, that I know the man in his personality as a whole, but my knowledge of him is incomplete. So we know God, the one absolute Spirit, but our knowledge of him is incomplete. So Paul said: "Now I know in part."

An objection is sometimes urged, founded on the maxim that like is known only by the like, and therefore the finite being cannot know the absolute Being. This is a misapplication of the maxim. Thus applied it would prove that God cannot know man any more than man can know God. But man, as rational spirit, is like God, the eternal Spirit. Therefore, in accordance with this maxim he can know God in his positive attributes as Spirit, though he can define God's infinitude only by negation. I can know God because I am in his image as a rational spirit, though I am finite and he is infinite. It does not need infinitude to know that some infinite being exists.

And if this maxim, *Simile simili cognoscitur*, is pushed with rabbinical literalness to the extreme, it becomes the childish error, wide-spread even in systems of philosophy, which, overlooking the fact that knowledge must be the intellectual equivalent of its object, insists that no object can be known unless

¹ Limits of Religious Thought, Lect. iii. pp. 97.

itself, or at least its image, is actually present within the mind. But a man's thought cannot be like a stone or a tree ; therefore he can have no knowledge of a stone or a tree ; therefore he can know nothing but ideas ; his knowledge does not reach beyond his own self-consciousness. The Absolute itself becomes the universal ego ; and the issue is idealistic pantheism.

The objection that the knowledge of the absolute or infinite must be absolute or infinite knowledge, in each of these forms, implies that none but an absolute Being can know God ; therefore, that God could not create a being capable of knowing him, or even of knowing the fact that an absolute Being exists. God then would no longer be the absolute Being, but would himself be limited by incapacity to create a finite universe or to reveal himself to rational beings in it, however great their power of intelligence.

As a last resort, it is objected that the idea of the Absolute is merely the gigantic shadow of the man himself. The objector believes that man is so limited that he cannot know even that absolute Being exists. What, then, is there in a being so limited to cast on his horizon a shadow so vast ? And what is the light obstructed by this being, yet encompassing him, which makes the shadow visible ? And if man is incapable of knowing the existence of an absolute being, how has this great idea arisen in his mind, and how does it keep its steadfast hold on him ? Savage tribes, before they come in contact with civilized men, never have in their languages any word meaning savage. So soon as they know themselves savages they are already in the light of civilization, and have advanced at least one step toward it. Man's knowledge of his own dependence and finiteness carries in it the idea of the infinite and the absolute. The existence of the idea discloses the fact that he is already in the light of the absolute Being, and competent to know it if it exists and reveals itself to him.

This objection, then, is no more than a poetical expression of the old and often refuted theory of the relativity of knowledge, that because a man can know objects only through his own powers of rational intelligence, therefore he cannot know anything ; but all which he looks on as objective reality is an illusion, the projected shadows of his own subjective impressions. It discredits all intuition, presentative and rational, all laws of thought, all reasoning, all human intelligence and reason, because the supposed knowledge is relative to a mind knowing,

and man knows only through his powers of knowing. We are under no obligation to spend our lives re-threshing threshed straw because some, who do not believe in the existence of wheat, continue to thrust the empty straw beneath our flails.

Thus it is evident that the objections to the reality of our knowledge that the absolute Being exists are without force.

It remains to notice some further confirmations of our position as to the reality and origin of this knowledge.

The denial of the possibility of knowing that absolute Being exists involves the impossibility of knowing any being, and so relapses into the complete Positivism of Comte or some form of phenomenalism; and this involves complete agnosticism or universal skepticism. For, as Goethe puts the question: —

“What show could be, unless of substance shown?
And what were substance, if not shown to be?”

If there is no absolute Being, there is no reality that persists;

“That changed through all, and yet in all the same,
Great in the earth as in th’ ethereal flame,
Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glow in the stars, and blossoms in the trees;
Lives in all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent.”

Then the fundamental principle, not of philosophy and theology only, but also of physical science, is subverted; for science rests on the postulate that the sum of matter and force is always the same and exists eternal without anything added and without anything annihilated. Then the continuity, the unity and the reality of the universe are gone, and we find ourselves illusions in a universe of illusions, and deluded with thinking that the illusions are real.

It may be said that that which persists is only force. But it is a necessary law of thought that there can be no action without an agent, no motion without something that moves, no force without a being. We may explain matter dynamically; we may speak of dynamids instead of atoms and molecules. But we hypostasize the dynamids all the same; for power persisting in unity and identity is the essential quality of a being.

In fact those who now deny all knowledge of the existence of the Absolute are only those who deny all knowledge of being and limit knowledge to appearance or phenomena. Accordingly physical science has left them behind. At the very time when Comte was writing the Positive Philosophy, insisting that cause,

force, atoms, molecules, ethers were metaphysical ideas to be rigorously excluded from all science, scientists were already working out the law of the correlation and conservation of force, which has brought these proscribed ideas to the front in all scientific discussion and stakes the very existence of physical science on the reality of the objects of metaphysical ideas and the truth of metaphysical principles.

Another confirmation may be noticed. History shows that when once the human mind has begun to think scientifically, it cannot rest in its thinking without the idea of the absolute Being and the belief at least that it exists. So Feuerbach says: "It is a general truth that we feel a blank, a void, a want in ourselves and are consequently unhappy and unsatisfied, so long as we have not come to the last degree of a power, to that than which nothing greater can be thought." And Zeller says: "The spirit of man cannot be satisfied, till it finds in every force the manifestation of an original force and in all beings the product of an original being, till the checkered manifoldness of particular laws is brought back to a highest unity. The same is the inmost and, as it were, the insouling power in the things."¹

This is evident from the earnestness with which the absolute Being has been studied by the greatest thinkers, and the large place which it has held in the whole history of philosophical thought. Ravaisson says: "That at the foundation of all knowledge is an absolute to which the relative corresponds as its opposite, is what was established more than twenty centuries ago, against a doctrine then already prevalent of universal relativity and mobility, by the Platonic dialectic, which broke the way to metaphysics. It did more; it showed that by this absolute, relations are intelligible, because it is the measure by which alone we estimate them. Metaphysics in the hands of its immortal founder did more; it showed that this absolute, by which intelligence measures the relative, is the intelligence itself."² Sir William Hamilton tells us: "From Xenophanes to Leibnitz, the infinite, the absolute, the unconditioned, formed the highest principle of speculation." During all this long period the greatest minds and the most profound thinkers were occupied with questions pertaining to the absolute. Hamilton says: "Kant accomplished much. The result of his examination was the abolition of the metaphysical sciences; all that is not finite, rela-

¹ Quoted by Flügel, *Die Spekulative Theologie der Gegenwart*, p. 103.

² Rapport, p. 66, quoted by Rev. W. Jackson, *Modern Skepticism*, p. 532.

tive and phenomenal is beyond the verge of knowledge." But in fact, far from abolishing metaphysical science, Kant's writings stimulated metaphysical inquiry, especially as to the existence of the absolute, to intense activity which all the political convulsions of the time could not interrupt. And this was not confined to Germany. Cousin's lecturing on philosophy in Paris was the occasion of Hamilton's *Essay on the Philosophy of the Conditioned*. As he himself says: "Two thousand auditors listened, all with admiration, many with enthusiasm, to the eloquent exposition of doctrine intelligible only to the few; and the oral discussion of philosophy awakened in Paris and in France an interest unexampled since the days of Abelard." In this discussion of the absolute Hamilton himself took no inconsiderable part, but with the design to show that the discussion was fruitless and that the expenditure of thought on it through the whole history of civilization had been a waste of intellect. He attempts to prove this by arguments — the fallacies already exposed. He also resorts to ridicule, applying to these thinkers the line, —

"Gens ratione ferox et mentem pasta chimæris;"¹

feeding themselves to fierceness on chimæras as the ancient heroes did on the marrow of bears.

But Hamilton has failed to suppress these questionings as completely as Kant. The generation which has followed him, with its Spencerian agnosticism and its theory of evolution, with the cry, "Back to Kant," and the revival of Hegelianism, has been thinking as earnestly and as universally on the nature of spirit and matter and force, on the ultimate ground and origin of all that is, and on all the questions pertaining to the being of God, as any that preceded it; and with the result that only an inconsiderable minority remains denying the knowledge that some absolute Being exists.

And this is true of those who hold non-theistic theories of the universe in various forms. Spencerian agnostics, pantheists of all types, materialists and deists all agree with theists in affirming the knowledge that absolute Being exists, and that we know it as a first principle of reason and law of thought. Only the few extreme positivists, holding a sensational theory of knowledge like that of Comte, deny it.

It is evident therefore that the human mind cannot rid itself

¹ *Philosophy of Hamilton*, Wight's ed. *Phil. of the Conditioned*, pp. 458, 442, 446.

of the idea of the absolute. It persists in the implicit consciousness, regulating thought, even when theoretically disclaimed. It is evident that without the assumption, explicit or implicit, that the absolute Being exists, the reason of man cannot solve its necessary problems, nor rest satisfied with any intellectual attainment, nor hold steadfastly to the reality of its knowledge, nor know the continuity, the unity and the reality of the universe. The necessary conclusion is that the principle that the absolute Being exists is a primitive and necessary law of thought, a constituent element of reason, and a necessary postulate in all thinking about being.

In this exposition of the origin of the idea of the absolute Being and our belief of its existence, I have set forth the so-called *a priori* argument for the existence of God in its true significance. This is an argument from the idea of the absolute or perfect Being to its existence. In order to the conclusiveness of this argument it must be shown both that the idea of the absolute Being is a necessary idea of reason, and that the existence of the Being is necessarily included in the idea; that is, its existence must be as necessary to the reason as the idea of it. This is what has been shown. That the absolute Being exists is a necessary principle of reason, self-evident to rational intuition; it is the necessary presupposition in all knowledge of being and appears as regulative of all thinking so soon as being is known. Kant also presents the *a priori* argument. In the Critique of Pure Reason he finds the idea of God to be a necessary idea of the reason. And it is not merely the idea, but also the existence of God which is necessary to reason in order that it may solve its necessary problems and attain a rational comprehension of the universe in scientific knowledge. That absolute Being exists would be acknowledged by Kant as a primitive principle or constituent element of reason, not needing to be accounted for or proved otherwise. But on account of his phenomenalism the absolute remains to the pure reason an unknowable; it exists, but what it is we know not. He afterwards finds in the practical reason, that is, in the sphere of moral consciousness, contents for knowing what the absolute is.

Such is the so-called *a priori* argument in its true significance.

We find here in a first principle of reason the starting-point for the whole course of evidence of the existence of God as found by reflective thought. And because this principle asserts itself in consciousness on occasion of our knowing that some

being exists, and presents as self-evident the existence of absolute Being, we see the significance of its name as the ontological argument. But it is not an argument, it is a necessary principle or law of thought.

• The absolute Being is known to the reason as the ground of the universe and manifesting itself in it. Therefore we know that there are in the absolute all the potencies which account for the universe and manifest themselves in it. Thus by exploring the universe, physical and spiritual, we can know what the absolute is as continuously revealing itself in it. And this Kant also recognizes as a principle of reason: "If the conditioned is given, the whole of the conditions, and consequently the absolutely unconditioned is also given, whereby alone the former was possible."¹

The true philosophy of human knowledge teaches that knowledge is ontological in its beginning, that is, it begins as the knowledge of being; and it is always the knowledge of being.

When we know, in the universe, being, we necessarily know absolute Being, the ground of it and revealed in it.

When we know, in the universe, power or causal energy, we necessarily know the absolute Being as Power, the original and continuous source of all finite power.

When we know, in the universe, cause, we necessarily know the absolute Being as first and all-originating Cause.

When we know, in the constitution and course of the universe, physical and spiritual, the manifestation of reason, we know the absolute Being as absolute Reason, the Light that lighteth every man.²

At last when we find in the universe Christ and his kingdom, we know the absolute Being as universal Love, the Redeemer of men from sin.

But before we can proceed in this search after God, the various non-theistic theories of the universe must be noticed.

¹ Critique of Pure Reason, Antinomy of Pure Reason, sects. i., vii.

² Anaxagoras introduced into Greek philosophy the truth that the universe is grounded in reason and that its constitution and order can be explained only on the assumption of eternal Reason energizing in it. This was accepted by Socrates and elaborated into the argument from final causes which we find in Xenophon's Memorabilia. Plato and Aristotle also accepted and taught this conception of the universe.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ABSOLUTE BEING AND NON-THEISTIC THEORIES.

It is to the credit of humanity that men are ashamed to be called atheists. At present positivists, agnostics and nearly all schools of non-theistic thought claim to have a religion and an object of worship, and refuse and resent the name of atheist. In view of this Heinrich Heine calls the pantheist "a bashful atheist." This objection to the name is the outcry of the human soul shrinking from being thought to be and even from thinking itself to be without God in the world.

Etymologically atheist means simply not a theist. If I use the word atheism, it will be in this comprehensive sense, as including all non-theistic theories of the universe; and I use it because there is no other word which so exactly expresses this meaning.

Atheism is not commonly the assertion of positive knowledge that God does not exist. The positive assertion that there is no God is commonly the atheism of passion and hatred. Such was the atheism of the French revolutionists of the last century and such is that of the Nihilists and many of the Socialists now. Atheism may rest on immoral character rather than on intellectual conviction, and thus may arise because the belief in God stands in the way of plans of wickedness or of anarchical destruction of society. It may have been occasioned by the oppression of a hierarchy or a despotism in the name of religion, or by gross misrepresentations of theism in whatever way caused. In a recent article in the Independent by Courtlandt Palmer, President of the Nineteenth Century Club, the following is presented, not as his own belief, but as the argument of the atheist: "Only in the denial of a personal God can morality exist, since, given a God, obedience to his commands becomes obligatory; such obedience, being obligatory, degenerates into slavery, and slavery negatives morality, since morality consists in freedom; that is, in the freedom of the individual to choose for himself, without compulsion, the better part. Not only is such submission to the will of God a divine thralldom, it is a human thralldom also,

since the will of God can only be made known to men by men like in all respects to themselves; therefore to submit to God is only to submit to fallible ecclesiastics who assume to construe him." This implies that the enforcement of just law under the authority of any government is slavery; that all authority of government is necessarily despotism to be resisted and destroyed; that subjection to law, however just, is slavery; that submission to God, the absolute Reason, administering the universe according to the eternal principles of wisdom and love, is slavery. This reasoning, if so it may be called, can issue only in universal anarchy and the disorganization of all society. It is precisely the principle declaimed by Bakunin and the Nihilists. If this is the argument on which the defense of atheism must rest, its defense is its sufficient refutation.¹

Atheism is commonly the denial that man has any knowledge of God or any reasonable grounds for believing that any God exists.

God is the absolute Spirit, with whom the worshiper may come into communication. Kant is right in saying: "The conception of God involves not merely a blindly operating Nature as the eternal root of things, but a Supreme Being that must be the author of all things by free and understanding action; and it is this conception which alone has any interest for us."

The polytheism and fetichism of ruder peoples are not properly called atheism, for they recognize supernatural and superhuman divinities corresponding with the highest idea of the absolute Spirit attained by them. In our modern civilization intelligent people will not fall back into these errors. The atheism of our time will be the denial of all knowledge of the one supreme God, the absolute Spirit, and will fall back on some theory of the universe which excludes a divinity of conscious intelligence, wisdom and love.

The non-theistic theories may be included in two classes, according to their position in respect to the knowledge of the absolute Being.

I. Theories denying all knowledge of the existence of the absolute Being.

II. Theories asserting knowledge of the existence of the absolute Being.

1. Agnosticism.

2. Monism.

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 486, 482.

(a) Pantheistic Monism.

Ontological Pantheism.

Idealistic Pantheism.

(b) Materialistic Monism.

Agnosticism affirms that man has knowledge of the existence of the absolute Being, but cannot know what it is, further than that it is the Power everywhere present and manifesting itself in all phenomena.

Monism affirms that man has knowledge of the existence of the absolute Being and is able also to define what it is. This it does in affirming that the absolute Being, that is the ultimate ground of the universe, is identical with the universe itself.

Theism regards the universe as the whole of finite realities existing in a unity by their common and continuous relations to God, the absolute Spirit. Thus theism distinguishes the universe from God on whom it is always dependent.

Monism annuls this distinction and teaches that the universe and the absolute are one and the same being in two different aspects.

According to theism the unity of all finite beings with one another and with God is rational, dynamical and moral. According to monism it is identity of substance or being.

Pantheistic monism recognizes the absolute Being, as evolving continuously into the universe and thus identical with it. The universe evolving and the universe evolved in identity are the one absolute Being. The necessary inference is that the only real being is the absolute; in the finite universe are no real beings, but only phenomena or manifestations of the one only absolute Being.

Ontological pantheism defines the absolute Being as the one only substance evolving in the universe. Idealistic pantheism supposes the absolute to be unconscious thought or will or reason evolving into all that is. J. G. Fichte proposed to show that "the one original only substance is the Ego; in this one substance are posited all possible accidents and consequently all possible realities." But the universal Ego, as he develops it, is essentially the unconscious moral order of the universe.

The conception of unconscious and impersonal thought or reason or spirit evolving in the universe may be illustrated by the analogy of the mysterious principle of life, the vital force, whatever it may be, evolving in an organism and thus revealing itself. And the evolution of the physical universe has a closer analogy

with organic growth than with mechanism. Hence the conception of some of the Greek philosophers that the universe is a living organism is not so strange as at first it seems. From this it was an easy transition to the conception of God as the vitalizing energy or soul of the world. This type of thought is allied to idealistic pantheism.

Materialistic monism is the theory that matter with the force essential in it is eternal and that all the realities in the universe are matter and force in different modes of existence; that thus the universe contains no rational spirit and is transcended by no absolute Being; its ongoing is only "the redistribution of matter and force."

Pantheism recognizes the absolute Being and denies the real being of the finite universe. It has therefore been called acosmic pantheism.

Materialistic monism affirms the eternity of matter and denies the existence of any absolute Being transcending it. It has therefore been called atheistic pancosmism.

It must be noticed, however, that materialistic monists unconsciously change the essential meaning of matter. They no longer treat it as that which is contained in and occupies space, but as something which transcends both matter and mind, as we know them, and is the common ground of both. Noiré, in expounding his cosmogony of evolution from the originative matter (*Stoff*), predicates of it two attributes, mobility and sensitivity. Thus he abandons pure materialism and identifies matter essentially with the one only substance of ontological pantheism. The same is true of Professor Clifford, who says: "A moving molecule of inorganic matter possesses a small piece of mind-stuff."

Agnosticism agrees with theism in affirming that the absolute Being exists. Monism in both forms agrees with theism in this, and also in affirming that man has knowledge of what it is. In their conception of what the absolute Being is, many of the pantheists agree in important particulars with theists.

Monism in both its forms denies of the absolute Being all intelligent and conscious action and purpose, except as it comes to consciousness in man.

These four non-theistic theories of the universe will be severally examined more particularly.

"Physicus," in *A Candid Examination of Theism*, says: "A favorite piece of apologetic juggling is that of first demolish-

ing atheism, pantheism, materialism, etc., by successively calling on them to explain the mystery of self-existence, and then tacitly assuming that the need of such an explanation is absent in the case of theism — as though the attribute in question were more conceivable when posited in a Deity than when posited elsewhere.” This gross misrepresentation at the beginning of the book augurs ill for the candor announced in the title. Theists never attempt to explain the mystery of self-existence. In common with agnostics, pantheists and materialists, theists assume the existence of some self-existent Being as a necessary principle of reason and law of thought. What they attempt to explain is the universe. In doing this they seek to ascertain all which may be known of the absolute Being acknowledged to be everywhere manifesting itself in the universe. The disproof of the non-theistic theories is found in the positive evidence of the existence of God, the absolute Spirit, and in the impossibility of accounting for and explaining the universe or even of attaining a scientific knowledge of it without the recognition of God. The non-theistic theories are considered first in order clearly to apprehend what they are, to point out the difficulties and contradictions in them and to show that they entirely fail to account for or explain the universe.

I. THE DENIAL OF ALL KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF ABSOLUTE BEING. — Atheism in this form is represented by Comte. It affirms that there is no rational necessity of forming a theory of the universe. It belongs to human thought and intelligence only to observe, classify and coördinate phenomena, without attempting to go behind them to any reality that acts or appears or is manifested in them. The phenomena are sufficient of and for themselves, and it is not legitimate for scientific thought to attempt to refer them to any deeper reality, to find for them any all-comprehending unity, or any ultimate ground, or any rational end. There is no reasonableness objective in the universe and no reason manifested in its constitution or course of action and development. As Chauncey Wright expressed it, all the shifting and drifting phenomena are nothing but “cosmical weather.”

This form of atheism is incompatible with the knowledge of the universe or of any being in it, as really as with the knowledge of God. It implies that real knowledge of anything is impossible to man.¹

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 428-434.

And it is only on this supposition that atheism in this form is possible. Comte could consistently refuse to consider the problem of forming a theory of the universe, because he denied all knowledge of being and rejected as unscientific the ideas of force, cause, molecules and ethers. These ideas are metaphysical, but not unscientific. Physical science itself acknowledges their reality, and has therefore rejected Comte's positivism as inadequate for the purposes of science. The continuous use of metaphysical ideas and principles is essential to the progress, and even to the existence, of physical science. And all who believe that in every act there is an agent, in every motion something that moves and something that caused the motion, all who believe that force is other than motion and cause more than an antecedent, all who believe that they have real knowledge of beings and not merely of a phantasmagoria of subjective impressions, all these must also believe that absolute Being exists. If something exists now, something must have existed always. And all who believe that something has existed always have already accepted the problem of finding a theory of the universe and are seeking its solution. Comte was right in saying that if we admit any cause we must also admit God, the first cause.

Thus the existence of the absolute Being forces itself on human thought. Man cannot rid himself of it. It underlies his thinking whether he recognizes it or not.

It may be added that it is a necessity of human reason to seek to find a theory of the universe. The positivist objection to it is an objection in the name of science against reason itself. It is the fatal mistake of pitting science against reason. Whatever reality is brought to the notice of man, the necessary and always urgent problem of the reason is to find its relation to other reality in the unity of a scientific system; dynamically, by finding a cause of all beginning and change; rationally, by ascertaining what rational idea or truth it expresses, under what rational law it acts, and what rational end it is tending to realize. It is this necessary demand of reason which in all ages has stimulated to scientific inquiry. The irrepressible demand of reason for the comprehension of particular things in dynamic and rational unity in a system, pushes the thought onward to find the unity of all things in one all-comprehending system. The attempt to construct a theory of the universe is, therefore, reasonable and legitimate. And if so, the theistic theory is scientifically as legitimate as any other.¹

¹ Professor Clifford says: "This world which I perceive is my perception

II. SPENCERIAN AGNOSTICISM. — In opposition to Spencerian agnosticism, theism affirms that man has positive, though inadequate knowledge of what the absolute Being is. Mr. Spencer's theory of the universe is not properly called agnosticism. Agnosticism etymologically means the denial of all knowledge. Thus it is properly equivalent to universal skepticism. The Spencerian agnosticism not only recognizes man's knowledge of the universe, but also of the absolute Being itself as existing, as omnipresent Power, and as manifesting or revealing itself in all the phenomena of the universe. Hence it is only a partial agnosticism.

This agnosticism may arise from attempting to develop what the absolute is from its *a priori* idea. In this way we get only negations; the absolute is the unconditioned, the unlimited, the independent. Thus the word remains void of positive contents, a mere adjective without a substantive, negation with no reality of which it can be predicated. Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are recent representatives of this type of thought.

The other and the only true way, in which what the absolute is can be known, is by studying its manifestation of itself in the universe. All Spencerian agnostics and all monists agree with theists that the absolute is the omnipresent Power which is manifested or revealed in the universe. Then in the absolute Being must be all the potencies which are necessary to account for the universe; and these are revealed in it and may be known. This is the theistic method; and as inferring from an effect the nature of a cause whose existence is acknowledged, it is legitimate and

and nothing more." This theory of knowledge is humorously alluded to in *Through the Looking Glass*. Alice went with Tweedledum and Tweedledee to see the Red King. He was asleep, and Tweedledee asked her, "What do you suppose he is dreaming about?" "Nobody can guess that," replied Alice. "Why, about you," Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands triumphantly; "and if he left off dreaming about you, where do you suppose you'd be?" "Where I am now, of course," said Alice. "Not you," Tweedledee retorted contemptuously; "you'd be nowhere. Why you're only a sort of thing in his dream." "If that there king was to awake," added he, "you'd go out — bang — just like a candle." "I should n't," exclaimed Alice indignantly; "besides, if I'm only a sort of thing in his dream, what are you, I should like to know?" "Hush" cried she, "you'll be waking him, I'm afraid, if you make so much noise." "Well, it's no use *your* talking about waking him," said Tweedledum, "when you're only one of the things in his dream. You know very well that you're not real." "I am real," Alice said, and began to cry; "if I was n't real I should n't be able to cry."

accordant with the method of science. No finite mind, beginning with the *a priori* idea of the absolute, can ascertain what it is by an analysis of the idea or deduction from it; that would imply that the finite mind had *a priori* the idea of the absolute comprehending all its contents and significance. Human reason, by the law of its own being as reason, knows that some unconditioned Being exists. It can know what it is only by knowing what it has revealed of itself in the universe.

The very fact that the absolute manifests itself in the universe implies that it is not unknowable in itself. It is unknowable only so far as it has not revealed itself, or as our minds are not great enough to take in all the facts and significance of the revelation. If the absolute Being is manifested in all the ongoing of the universe, then with every enlargement of knowledge and capacity the finite mind, so long as it exists, may continue to advance in the knowledge of God. It is only the absurd, it is only that which contradicts the necessary principles of reason, which is unknowable in itself and constitutes an absolute bar to knowledge. If the absolute exists and manifests itself in the finite, then it cannot be unknowable in itself but must be essentially intelligible. Also, there can be no contradiction between the absolute and the finite. The finite is the medium originating from and ever dependent on the absolute, through which the absolute is forever manifesting or revealing itself.

A second source of agnosticism is that the *a priori* idea of the absolute, with which the inquirer starts and which he attempts to develop, is itself a false idea. Then, as developed, it is found to be unthinkable and in itself unknowable.

The absolute is falsely defined to be that which exists out of all relations. Whereas it is that which exists unconditioned by relations independent of itself. The universe which is in relation to the absolute is always dependent on it for its own existence. It is conditioned by the absolute, but the absolute is not conditioned by it in any necessary relation. Closely allied to this is the conception of the absolute as the thing in itself, out of all relation to our rational faculties. In attempting to deduce from this idea what the absolute is, it is found to be in itself unintelligible and unthinkable, a mere symbol of the cessation of thought; and any revelation of it to a rational mind is therefore impossible.

The idea of the absolute has also been falsely identified with the idea of the *All*, the mathematical sum total of all that is.

Thus conceived it would be the sum of all things; it would be composed of parts; it would be limited. The absolute Being, thus falsely conceived, would involve contradiction and absurdity; it would be in itself unintelligible and unthinkable. Hamilton exemplifies this: "Does not the infinite contain the finite? If it does, then it contains what has parts and is divisible; if it does not, then it is exclusive; the finite is out of the infinite; and the infinite is conditioned, limited, restricted, finite."¹

Another false idea of the absolute is that it is the universal, which resolves itself into the indeterminate. In forming a general notion by resemblance, as we enlarge the extent of the notion we exclude more and more qualities from its content. The notion, *animal*, has fewer essential qualities than the notion, *horse*. If we continue to enlarge the extent, the ultimate notion would exclude all distinctive qualities; it would have no essence and would be entirely indeterminate. It would be the same as nothing. If it is called Pure Being it is not the less indeterminate. We simply hypostasize the copula *is*. Here again the absolute must be unknowable and unthinkable in itself, a mere symbol of the cessation of thought. Thus we have the error, common both in theology and philosophy, of mistaking the processes and creations of logical thought for concrete beings, their actions and relations; of shutting the mind within abstract thought, the objects of which are general notions, and neglecting concrete thinking, the objects of which are real beings and their real interactions.

A third source of agnosticism is, that in developing the idea of the absolute the reasoning rests on the false maxim that all definition limits.²

This maxim sweeps the whole board. In applying it, it is said that the absolute cannot be a personal being, because personality would distinguish it from the impersonal, and therefore would limit it. But the same would be true of every attribute and every act and every mode of existence. The absolute cannot be a power, nor a being, nor even absolute, because these predications define and therefore limit it.

And to this length some agnostics actually carry the application of the maxim. They insist that the absolute Being is limited and ceases to be the absolute, if it has any known attributes, if it acts in producing any finite being or any effects in time, if

¹ Letter to H. Calderwood, *Metaphysics*, p. 685.

² *Phil. Basis of Theism*, pp. 176-178.

it coexists with finite beings, if finite beings have real existence, if the absolute is not both the finite and the infinite, the good and the evil, the holy and the sinful, the subject of all incompatible qualities, if it is in any relation to anything, or distinct from anything, if it can be in any way defined. It is then divested of every quality, power and attribute of a being, it is the subject of all qualities and yet of none, the unity of all contradictions. In developing this application of the maxim Mr. Mansel says: "It is obvious that the infinite cannot be distinguished as such from the finite, by the absence of any quality which the finite possesses; for such absence would be a limitation." But as finiteness means limitation we have here the grave assertion that the absence of limitation from the infinite would be a limitation of the infinite. And the whole argument founded on this maxim is on a level with this logomachy. Thus the absolute becomes a zero, a symbol of the cessation of thought. Hamilton himself says: "A negative notion is only the negation of a notion; we think only by the attribution of certain qualities, and the negation of these qualities and of this attribution is simply in so far a denial of our thinking at all. . . . The infinite is conceived only by the thinking away of every character by which the finite was conceived; in other words, we conceive it only as inconceivable." Hamilton tells us that we have a negative knowledge of the absolute and that a negative knowledge is no knowledge; yet he defines the absolute and subdivides it, and argues at length what it must be and what it cannot be, in order to prove that we can have no knowledge whatever of what it is. Thus agnostics, while making the strongest affirmations that the absolute Being exists, resort to arguments to prove that we do not know what it is, which equally prove that it is not known to exist; and more than this, which not merely prove that the absolute, as these arguments assume it to be, does not exist, but also that it is a mere symbol of the cessation of all thought and intelligence.

The maxim that all definition limits is pertinent to a logical general notion or a mathematical sum total, not to a concrete being. The arguments of agnostics are conclusive as to the false ideas of the absolute which they hold, but have no force against our knowledge of the real absolute or unconditioned being, whose existence the universe reveals as its ultimate ground. The more powers a being manifests, the more reality of being it reveals. But the more powers it reveals, the more determinate it is. There are fewer beings like it; fewer

in the class designated by the general name. The increased determinateness, which restricts the logical general notion to fewer beings, greatens the beings. And when we come to the absolute Being, which is one and reveals itself in all the powers of the universe, it is the Being at once the most determinate and the greatest of all. It is not necessary that the absolute be everything to prevent its being limited by that which it is not. The existence of finite beings dependent on the absolute Being is no limitation of the absolute. On the contrary, if the absolute Being could not manifest itself in finite beings dependent on itself, that inability would be a limitation of it.

It follows from what has been said that this agnosticism, in denying the possibility of knowing what the absolute is, involves the denial of the possibility of knowing any being. If thought vanishes into zero at the absolute it is impotent to give real knowledge either of the absolute or of the finite. If there is no absolute Being, there is nothing which gives reality, power, unity and continuity to the universe, and the universe itself is an illusion, an endlessly shifting phantasmagoria which effects nothing, means nothing, is nothing. Thus this agnosticism, if it is not allowed to contradict and nullify itself by ascribing power and other attributes to the so-called unknowable, as Mr. Spencer does, must contradict itself and nullify all knowledge by affirming the existence of a being of which it knows nothing, a continuous revelation of that being which reveals nothing, and the existence of a being which is annulled if we ascribe to it any essential quality of a being. Thus this partial agnosticism by logical necessity passes over into a complete agnosticism or universal skepticism. It starts with assuming that rational intuition arises merely from mental impotence; it proceeds to the assumption that the knowledge of the absolute is merely the negation of knowledge; and it issues in the necessity of inferring mental impotence to know anything. It is the Nirvana of the intellect, by absorption into which it realizes its highest possibilities by the cessation of all thought in the negative knowledge of absolute Being.

Mr. Huxley boasts that he "invented the word agnostic." It was an ill-omened invention; for the word etymologically denotes the negation of all knowledge, and is synonymous with universal skepticism. Perhaps he builded better than he knew; for the way of thinking to which he applied this name, necessarily involves universal skepticism as its ultimate logical issue.

Professor Huxley, in his volume on Hume, claims him "as the protagonist of that more modern way of thinking which has been called agnosticism." He seems to imagine that the agnostics are teaching Hume's philosophy and may avail themselves of his arguments in affirming the knowledge of the physical world and of the existence of the absolute Being, while denying all knowledge of what that being is. But this is a misapprehension. Hume's teaching was that if through the senses we know only impressions, then the ideas of the mind are equally destitute of substantial reality, and all knowledge disappears. His theory of knowledge coincides with the complete positivism of Comte rather than with agnosticism as expounded by Mr. Spencer. The latter in his exposition of agnosticism — though in his other writings often inconsistent with it — gives us a theory of positive knowledge of finite beings, and of the absolute Being as existing and manifesting itself in the universe. In this he is more in harmony with theism than with any theory of phenomenalism. If the arguments for phenomenalism are also arguments for modern agnosticism, it is because Hamilton, Mansel and others, and sometimes Mr. Spencer himself, assume principles which logically lead to it.

Mr. Spencer's own principle that the absolute is omnipresent Power manifesting itself in the universe in all phenomena, as well as his habit of reasoning from facts, should have led him to adopt the theistic method, and study what the absolute is by observing what it has manifested or revealed of itself in the universe. So far as he has failed to do so he is inconsistent with himself. But in this principle he affirms a real knowledge of what the absolute is, declaring that it is omnipresent Power. Thus he contradicts his agnosticism and takes a position which fully justifies the theist in his further conclusion that the absolute is the absolute omnipresent Spirit as well as the absolute omnipresent Power. While Mr. Spencer approves the agnosticism of Hamilton and Mansel and adopts large extracts from them as expressing his own views, he criticises and rejects their position that we have only a negative knowledge of the absolute Being; he insists that the knowledge of it is positive, and declares in various particulars what is positively known of it. He says, in further criticism of Hamilton's agnosticism: "If the non-relative or absolute is present in thought only as a mere negation, then the relation between it and the relative becomes unthinkable. . . . And if this relation is unthinkable, then the relative itself

is unthinkable, for want of its antithesis ; whence results the disappearance of all thought whatever.”¹

The possession of the idea of the absolute is in itself proof that man is competent to know what the absolute is. The idea has been prominent in human thought ever since philosophy began. No mind that thinks far can avoid coming in sight of it. It is present not only in human thought, but more or less distinctly in all religions, and thus has been a powerful factor in human history. And in face of all speculations that it can be known only negatively, the fact is that it has been held as a distinctively positive idea, involved in the idea of God. I do not urge this here as proof that absolute Being exists, for this the agnostic affirms. But it is proof that if it exists the human mind is competent to know positively, though not completely, what it is. If it does not thus know it, it must be because the absolute Being has not revealed itself within the range of man's knowledge, not because man is incompetent to know it if revealed. And if the finiteness of man makes it impossible for him to know what the absolute Being is, then so long as he is finite it is equally impossible for any revelation to introduce into that finite mind either the idea of the absolute Being or the knowledge of its existence. Yet these agnostics, while holding that man's finiteness precludes all knowledge of what the absolute Being is, affirm both that he has the idea of it and the knowledge that it exists, and that it is revealed in all the phenomena, powers and processes of the universe.

It must also be noticed that the absolute, the existence of which is declared by the agnostics to be known, carries in it the idea of being. Existence implies a being that exists. The power in which it manifests itself cannot be separated from the being ; it is the phenomenon in which the being appears. Therefore the assertion of the existence of absolute Being carries in it the assertion of positive knowledge of what the absolute Being is. Being implies at least power that persists in unity and identity ; so much of positive knowledge of the absolute Being is implied in the assertion that it is known to exist.

These agnostics go further than the recognition of the absolute as Being. Hamilton, while declaring that we have no positive knowledge of the unconditioned, proceeds to classify it as a genus having two species, the absolute and the infinite. He also teaches that “in the very consciousness of our inability to con-

¹ First Principles, §§ 13, 20, 24, 26.

ceive ought above the relative and the finite, we are inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned.”¹ This unknowable unconditioned he presents as the object of faith and of religion. Mr. Mansel, in *The Limits of Religious Thought*, carried out Hamilton’s conclusion as a basis of religious belief and a defense of Christian faith against the objections of skeptics. He thus exposed himself to the severe but merited rebuke of John Stuart Mill: “A view of religion which I hold to be profoundly immoral — that it is our duty to worship a being whose moral attributes are affirmed to be unknowable by us and to be perhaps extremely different from those which, whenever speaking of our fellow-creatures, we call by the same name.” “If, instead of the glad tidings that there exists a Being in whom all the excellences of which the highest human mind can conceive exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a Being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that ‘the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving’ does not sanction them; convince me of it and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this and at the same time call this Being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a Being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him.”²

Both Hamilton and Mansel fall into further inconsistency in affirming that in the future life men will know God; as Hamilton says, “without limitation;” as Mansel says, “the light which now gleams in restless flashes from the ruffled waters of the human soul will settle into the steadfast image of God’s face shining on its unbroken surface.” But their philosophy rests on the supposition that the finite is shut out, because it is finite, from knowing what the infinite or unconditioned is. God then must continue unknowable, as really as now, in the future life and so long as God is infinite and man is finite. Here the deeper reason breaks through their subtle logomachy and unawares they take a position inconsistent with their philosophy and implying that the absolute is not in itself unknowable by a

¹ *Philosophy of the Conditioned*, Wight’s Hamilton, p. 457.

² Mill’s *Autobiography*, p. 375. *Examination of Hamilton*, vol. i. pp. 130, 131.

finite mind, but may be known more and more with the progressive development of the mind. In fact their position here seems to imply, what must be forever impossible, that a finite mind in the life after death may comprehend completely what the absolute Being is.

Mr. Fiske, in his *Cosmic Philosophy*, says of the absolute: "There exists a POWER to which no limit in time or space is conceivable, of which all phenomena, as presented in consciousness, are manifestations, but which we can only know through these manifestations." This doctrine he calls "Cosmic Theism." In a more recent volume he says: "The term Unknowable I have carefully refrained from using." In presenting his view of the absolute he says that it is not sufficient to regard it as physical power, but we must also recognize it as psychical; that an anthropomorphic element is indispensable; that "the total elimination of anthropomorphism from the idea of God abolishes the idea itself;" that a teleology must be recognized in the universe; that "the glorious consummation toward which organic evolution is tending is the production of the highest and most perfect psychical life;" and that "always bearing in mind the symbolic character of the words, we may say that God is Spirit."¹

Mr. Spencer has been emphatic in affirming that the Absolute is the Unknowable, and that the question what it is cannot be answered; it is, as Mr. Harrison put it, "an ever present conundrum to be everlastingly given up." But in evident inconsistency with this, he has always declared the absolute Unknowable to be omnipresent Power, manifesting itself in all the phenomena of the universe. In a recent article in reply to a criticism by Mr. Harrison, he has expressed himself anew with great explicitness.² He cites passages from his published works in which he maintains against Hamilton and Mansel that "our consciousness of the absolute is not negative but positive, and is the one indestructible element of consciousness 'which persists at all times, under all circumstances, and cannot cease until consciousness ceases.'" He cites passages in which he has refused to accept the Comtian positivism, "and in the most emphatic way declined thus to commit intellectual suicide;" and, in opposition to Comte, he adds, "So far from regarding that which transcends phenom-

¹ *The Idea of God*, pp. xvii., xxv., 135, 138, 160, 111-116. See also *The Destiny of Man*.

² *Retrogressive Religion*, *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1884.

ena as 'The All-Nothingness,' I regard it as the All-Being." He defends his definition of the Unknowable, as "an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed;" and says that he originally wrote, "an Infinite and Eternal Energy by which all things are created and sustained;" and that though, to prevent misunderstanding, he changed the last clause in correcting the proof, "the words did not express more than I meant." Mr. Spencer says: "The final outcome of that speculation commenced by the primitive man is that the Power manifested throughout the Universe distinguished as material is the same power which in ourselves wells up in the form of consciousness. . . . This necessity we are under, to think of external energy in terms of the internal energy, gives rather a spiritualistic than a materialistic aspect to the Universe."

Mr. Spencer avows that he has positive knowledge of the absolute, that he knows it as Being, and as a Power ever present and ever manifested in the universe, both in nature and in the form of consciousness. He might legitimately go much farther; with logical consistency he might be a theist rather than an agnostic. A cause or power manifested in its action and effects cannot be unknown. In whatever particulars we may be ignorant of what it is, we must at least know what it manifests in the specific actions and effects. And if the absolute is an ever present Being manifesting its power in the universe, it must be a cause adequate to the effects produced, and thus must be continuously revealing what it is. Instead of stopping in agnosticism, Mr. Spencer might with more logical consistency unite with the theist in his adoring exclamation: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth the work of his hands."

The theist holds that man's knowledge of the absolute Being is always inadequate. But studying the constitution and course of nature and the constitution and history of man, he finds the absolute Being revealed as the absolute Spirit, the God of wisdom and love. And in this way we may find a true meaning even in Cousin's position, that the absolute is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection under relation, difference and plurality; that is, that it may be apprehended in thought, distinguished from the universe and known in unity with the universe, constituting it a dynamic, rational and moral system.

The conclusion is obvious. The absolute Being is not unknowable in itself. There are no reasonable grounds for any agnosticism other than this, that man, knowing that the absolute Being

exists, has also a real knowledge of what it is, a knowledge which may be forever progressive but must be forever incomplete. This theism always recognizes and the Christian Scriptures sublimely declare. God is known, the absolute Spirit, perfect in wisdom and love, yet always transcending us. "Clouds and darkness are round about him ; righteousness and judgment are the foundation of his throne. Mercy and truth go before his face. Mercy and truth are met together ; righteousness and peace have kissed each other." (Psalms xcvi. 2, lxxxix. 14, lxxxv. 10.)

III. PANTHEISM. — The refutation of pantheism, as of all forms of atheism, is found in the positive evidence of the existence of God, which will be considered hereafter. A full examination of pantheism within the limits of this chapter is impossible and will not be attempted.

1. Pantheism is the theory that the absolute is the one and only substance, never as transitive cause creating or causing any effect, but within itself evolving and evolved, and without consciousness or personality.

Other names of the absolute have been substituted for *substance*, and thus pantheism appears in different forms. But in all its forms it is unchanged in its essential principles and the argument is essentially the same.

Spinoza recognizes as underlying the universe but one *noumenon* or thing in itself, the one only substance, the same in all phenomena ; of this, thought and extension are the attributes, and all finite beings are the modes in which that one substance exists and is manifested. And this is what constitutes the reality of the universe.

" No essence into nought resolveth ;
The Eternal through all forms revolveth ;
In Being hold thyself well blessed.
For Being is eternal ; deep
And everlasting laws do keep
The treasures whence the All comes dressed." — Goethe.

In pantheism the transitive cause is not recognized. The one Being can cause no effect *ad extra*. Nothing has been created, nothing has been caused. The action of the universe is a perpetual evolving of the absolute substance into its various modes of existence, but never exerting any power or producing any effect beyond itself. It is an eternal and absolute evolving or becoming. But its efficiency is always immanent, never transitive.

“To recreate the old creation,
 All things work on in fast rotation,
 Lest aught grow fixed and change resist;
 And what was not shall spring to birth,
 As purest sun or painted earth —
 God’s universe can know no rest.
 It must go on creating, changing,
 Through endless shapes forever ranging,
 And rest we only seem to see.
 The Eternal lives through all revolving;
 For all must ever keep dissolving
 Would it continue still to be.” — Goethe, *Eins und Alles*.

Accordingly Spinoza teaches that the universe evolving and the universe evolved in identity is God. “*Natura naturans et natura naturata in identitate est Deus.*” And these cannot be separated. As a quality is nothing apart from the substance of which it is a quality, the universe is nothing apart from the absolute Being which is its substance. The same is true of all things in the universe. Spinoza says: “Individual things are nothing more than affections of the attributes of God or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in certain determinate manners.”¹ Finite things are not real beings. They are merely modes into which the absolute evolves and in which for the time being it is revealed. So soon as the absolute Being evolves into another mode, the finite person or thing ceases to be, as a shadow ceases to be when the body which cast it is no more. On the other hand the absolute, apart from its manifestation in the universe, is, like a substance without qualities, entirely indeterminate, a mere zero. It is only in and through the universe that God is.²

Hence pantheists properly insist that they are misrepresented when they are charged with teaching that everything is God. Everything and even the phenomenal universe itself apart from the one only substance that is evolving, is not God; it is not anything. The whole only is God, and it is the only being. So the Indian Brahmans argue: “The Ganges is navigable by ships; but a portion of Ganges water in a wash-basin is not navigable by ships.”

This world-process, this evolving of the one only substance into its various modes, goes on in impersonality and entire uncon-

¹ Ethics, part i., Corollary to Prop. xxv.

² “*Est-ne Dei sedes nisi terra et pontus et aer
 Et cœlum et virtus? Superos quid quærimus ultra?
 Jupiter est quocumque vides, quocumque moveris.*”

sciousness. Spinoza ascribes to the one substance the two attributes of thought and extension. But he takes pains to tell us and to repeat the saying, that the thought or intelligence of God has no more in common with human intelligence, than the celestial constellation, the Dog, has in common with a barking dog on earth, and perhaps even much less.¹ In the entire evolution there is neither conscious intelligence nor will. Intelligence may be ascribed to the absolute in this process, as it is ascribed to a circle or a steam-engine; it evinces intelligence, but it is not itself intelligent. In the world-process the absolute comes to conscious intelligence first in man. So Schelling says: "Nature sleeps in the plant, dreams in the animal, awakes in man." The pantheistic absolute, therefore, is a substance wholly indeterminate, a zero to the thought. It is eternally circling within itself and evolving into the universe, without consciousness, without plan or purpose or freedom, without causal efficiency or transitive power.

2. Pantheism rests on no reasonable grounds and the arguments in support of it are invalid.

First, it rests on a false theory of knowledge. It assumes that knowledge begins as the knowledge of the universal, not of the particular. And because it assumes that the absolute is the one only being, it necessarily denies the real being of finite persons and things. Thus it contradicts the fundamental fact that human knowledge begins as the knowledge of self and of an outward object presented in consciousness and perceived in one and the same mental action, and thus is in its beginning the knowledge of being. Herein pantheism also contradicts all human consciousness. The concrete, determinate, individual being is the ultimate unit of all thought; as such it is present in all knowledge, is implied in all laws of thought and all ideas of reason, and is essential in all reality. It is known immediately in the knowledge of self and is necessarily postulated in the knowledge of bodies, as the atom, molecule, or the ultimate unit of matter by whatever name it may be called.

Pantheism is thus in direct contradiction to science, which begins with observing particulars, ascertains their real relations and unities, and thus proceeds to the general and universal as concrete systems of real beings in the unity of dynamic and rational relations. Pantheism, on the contrary, beginning with the universal, finds the unity of all things in the absolute and only One,

¹ *Cogitata Metaphysica*, part ii. § 3. *Ethics*, part i., Prop. xvii. Scholium.

of whose existence finite beings are but modes. It finds the unity of the universe only by the crude and clumsy expedient of identifying the absolute and the finite, the All and the One. The roots of pantheism in all its forms are cut through by every science which recognizes men as personal beings in a moral system, or atoms or any ultimate units of matter in a physical system, or which discovers many beings in any system in unity through dynamic and rational relations.

A necessary logical inference from pantheism is that real knowledge is impossible to man. The knowledge of being begins in the knowledge of self in the perception of an outward reality. Beginning thus, it is the knowledge of being through all its processes and progress. But if, as pantheism teaches, the knowledge of self, and of external things in which knowledge begins, is unreal and illusive, then knowledge in all its processes and progress is equally unreal and illusive, and universal skepticism is the necessary issue.

Thus pantheism rests on a totally false theory of human knowledge. It is in direct contradiction to physical science and to the natural realism on which it rests; and also to the rational realism which explains and justifies the reality of human knowledge and is the basis of all sound philosophy. Extremes meet. Pantheism, which at the outset seems at the farthest remove from positivism and all phenomenalism, is, through its own essential errors, brought round by logical necessity to identity with them.

A second criticism is that pantheism assumes a purely *a priori* idea of what the absolute is, and its argument is only an analysis or unfolding of the contents of that idea, or inferences from what is implied in it. That the absolute Being exists as the ultimate ground of the universe and is manifested in it, is a self-evident and ultimate law of thought. What it is can be known only by studying its self-revelation in the universe. The pantheist, on the contrary, creates *a priori* an idea of what the absolute is. In his argument he merely takes out what he himself had put in. The different forms of pantheism are characterized by different ideas of the absolute; but in all it is open to this criticism.

Spinoza, for example, assumes that the absolute Being is the one only Substance. He says: "By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived *per se*; that is, the conception of which does not require the conception of anything else antecedent to it."¹ Here he defines substance as the absolute Being.

¹ Ethics, part i., Definition 3.

His argument becomes a mere begging of the question. Having defined substance as the absolute Being, he proceeds to argue that the absolute Being is the one only substance.

Pantheism assumes that the absolute is the one only being and there can be no other. This contradicts all human consciousness. It has no warrant in reason. The existence of one being is no contradiction to the existence of another. For what reason does the pantheist affirm that there can be no other? He includes self-existence in his definition of a being. Then he presents his definition in the form of an inference and affirms that only one being can exist and there cannot be another. He argues, further, that there can be but one being, because, if there were two co-existent beings, they could not act on each other; each would be shut up within its own separate being and could not act on the other nor in any way come into communication with it. Here again pantheism contradicts the common consciousness of mankind as well as all science; for both affirm the knowledge of beings coexisting and interacting. The pantheist is driven to this contradiction only by his own preconceived definition of being.

Spinoza argues from the maxim that if things have nothing in common, one of them cannot exert any causal energy on the other.¹ From this it is inferred that, because the absolute or infinite and the finite have nothing in common, neither can act on the other. The maxim is true and important in its legitimate application. Motor-force in the cause must be motor-force in the effect; it cannot be transformed into thought; thought cannot lift weights nor be measured by foot-pounds; likeness of rational constitution is necessary to rational intercommunication. But in these cases the unlikeness is of positive power and quality, not a mere inequality of quantity. But the unlikeness of the infinite and the finite is rather an inequality of quantity than an unlikeness of positive quality or power. Man as a rational, free, moral being is like God in positive powers and qualities, however dependent on God or inferior by limitation in time and space, and in quantity or degree of intelligence and power. The inference that this is impossible is drawn only from some *a priori* and false idea of the absolute Being.

A third criticism is that, in developing his *a priori* idea of the absolute, the pantheist's argument is commonly vitiated by substituting logical general notions for actual beings and logical processes of thought for the dynamic energies and orderly processes

¹ Ethics, part i., Prop. iii.

of the universe. Hence the reasoning assumes as a maxim that all definition or determinateness limits. For this, as we have seen, is true of mathematical totals and of logical general notions, but not of real beings. On the contrary the more determinate and definite a being is by multiplied powers and increased complexity of constitution, the higher it is in the order of being. The determinateness does not limit the being, but makes it greater.

Sometimes the pantheistic idea of the absolute is that of a mathematical total of all things. Oftener the absolute is thought as the largest logical general notion, and therefore indeterminate.

This fallacy is exemplified in the thinking of Hartmann; he says that God is not identical with every individual thing, as the individual sheep is not the flock; still the universe as a whole is God. As the flock is nothing without the sheep, so God is nothing without the world. That is, God sustains the same relation to the world that the idea of the flock sustains to the individual sheep. Others, describing the relation of God to the world, have said, as the general notion, tree, is nothing for itself, but has reality only in the individual trees, so God has being only in the world, and is existent only as the world.¹ Plainly here God is to the world only what a logical general notion is to the individuals included under it. Pantheists appeal to the fact that the mind necessarily seeks the unity of the manifold; this they exemplify in the tendency to logical generalization, in which individuals are thought in a general notion under a common name. Man, they say, can never be satisfied in his thinking till for all thought a highest unity is found, which is the most general idea and includes all individuals. Thought as thus built up to unity in a general idea they sometimes compare to a pyramid, the common idea, which includes all the individuals in a unity, being the apex. And the All in this unity of the ultimate general notion is the All in One, or the absolute Being. The same is exemplified in Hegel's Universal. This is not a resting-place for thought, satisfied in finding the solution of the ultimate problem of reason, but a cessation of thought through its impotence to generalize any further; its necessary problem as to the reality and unity of the universe remains unsolved, thought is balked rather than satisfied and continues restless in a fruitless activity, finding no final explanation of anything. But the necessary problem of reason is solved in the unity of the universe

¹ Flügel, *Die Spekulative Theologie der Gegenwart*, pp. 60, 120.

as a concrete system dependent on God, the absolute Reason, progressively realizing the truths, laws, ideals and ends of his perfect wisdom and love. Thought cannot penetrate behind the absolute Reason and comprehend it. Yet in its light human reason finds the solution of its ultimate and necessary problems, and is enabled to make continual advance in the knowledge of God, and of the universe in its relations to him. Though God is the greatest of mysteries, he is the solution of all. The darkness and clouds which are round about him are gathered from the face of the universe, leaving it in light. If God is lost to thought, the mystery that had enshrouded him spreads over all things, and again to human view the universe is chaos, and darkness is on the face of the deep.

Thus pantheistic reasoning is little more than an analysis and distribution of the contents of a general notion already formed. To it is applicable the sneer sometimes applied to all philosophical reasoning, that it only takes out what it had first put in. With whatever satisfaction the conclusion is reached, it is like the gusto with which one relishes the stuffing of a roasted fowl; he has only taken out what he had previously put in.¹ Sometimes the reasoning implies that the universal has caused or produced the particular, the genus the species, and the species the individual. Accordingly we find writers arguing against pantheism that the universal cannot be the cause of the particular, the genus of the species, the tree of the birch, beech and linden, because the distinctive qualities of the species are not contained in the genus. And these writers themselves seem entirely unaware that the real fallacy is the substitution of a logical, general notion for God.

3. Pantheism involves contradictions. Contradiction is often involved in its assumed idea of what the absolute is. It is thought without a thinker; an Ego or Reason or Spirit without consciousness or personality; being identical with nothing; pure action with no being that acts.

Contradiction is involved in its maxims. It cannot be the subject of any attribute; for to attribute to it any quality or power would define and limit it. It cannot be a cause, because that would distinguish it from the effect; it cannot create a finite being and thus reveal itself in a finite universe of real beings,

¹ "Ein philosophischer Begriff gebratener Gans entspricht; Dass sie von selber Äpfel fräss', gesehen hab' ich's nicht. Doch jeder freut des Inhalts sich, wenn man sie bringt zum Schmaus; Das, was man hat hineingethan, nimmt wieder man heraus."

physical and spiritual, because it would be limited by the existence of any being other than itself. But in thus guarding the absolute, the pantheist limits it; the absolute is shut up within itself and cannot cause any effect external to itself. Should it cause the least effect external to itself, should it give being to a single grain of sand or a single rational person, it would annul its own absoluteness, it would destroy itself.

Another contradiction in pantheism is that it affirms that the same being is at once absolute and finite, unconditioned and conditioned. But this is unthinkable. The actual issue is that, while the pantheist speaks of the two as really one, he has to determine which of the two is the one. He may think of the Absolute as the One that is the All. Or the universe may be regarded as the All that is the One. In the latter case, the One of Parmenides and the Eleatics, fixed and unchanging through all changes, is found to resolve itself into the never-ceasing flux of Heraclitus; the doctrine that something eternal stands resolves itself into the doctrine that everything flows. Some pantheists even affirm an absolute becoming (*das absolut Werden*). But an absolute becoming is precisely the ceaseless flux of Heraclitus, in which nothing persists and therefore nothing subsists. The absolute itself as the absolute becoming, is not the eternal Being, but the eternally transient and phenomenal; and this is unthinkable and absurd.

A further contradiction arises in the attempt to think the pantheistic evolution of the absolute into the universe. If the absolute is perfect, then the evolution is of the perfect into the imperfect. According to Spinoza's pantheism, if the absolute is the one only substance, then as substance it is wholly indeterminate. Then by evolution into the finite it becomes determinate and therefore, as the pantheist always assumes, imperfect. This is what is sometimes called "the fall of the absolute." If, on the other hand, determinateness is a perfection and the evolution, which at last reaches conscious intelligence and freedom, is a progressive realization of the higher and the better, then the primitive substance was imperfect and is being gradually developed to perfection. This latter is the type of German pantheism. Its God is at the end of the process not at its beginning. The absolute comes to consciousness in man; man is the highest being in the universe. The philosopher who is expounding pantheism is a person conscious and intelligent; the absolute Being is not. The finite then is of a higher order and nearer to perfection than the absolute.

Spinoza says that the absolute without attributes would be entirely indeterminate; he therefore ascribes to it the two attributes of extension and thought. But this only reveals the contradiction in a new form. He affirms that extension is an attribute of God, yet God is incorporeal; and thought is an attribute of God, yet God is not an intelligent being, not a rational personal Spirit. Moreover bodies are said to be modes of extension, while extension has no significance except as a property of a body; and thought is an attribute of God, yet it has no likeness to anything which we know as thought and is therefore a mere zero. Then God's two attributes are extension which makes him limited in space, and a zero. All then which we know of God is that he is extended in space.

Pantheism, therefore, issues in complete agnosticism; as we push out upon the vast and misty wild we find ourselves driven up and down in

“a dark

Illimitable ocean, without bound,
Without dimension, where length, breadth and height,
And time and place are lost.”

4. As a theory of the universe, pantheism proves itself inadequate to account for it or to solve the necessary problems of reason arising in the investigation of it.

Pantheism not only assumes an *a priori* idea of the absolute, but the idea thus assumed is false. It is either substance alone, leaving out both causal energy and rational personality; or it is an idea alone, an unconscious abstraction of thought, without substance, or causal energy, or personal reason.

Recourse is had to pantheism to escape certain metaphysical difficulties in conceiving the creation of the universe. True philosophy however accepts the fact that a finite mind can never conceive or picture the mode in which God creates. To create is the prerogative of God alone. Finite beings can never know it in experience. Theism accepts this limitation of human knowledge. It accepts the fact that the universe is always dependent for its being on the absolute Being, that transcends it and yet always manifests itself in it. It accepts the transcendence and the immanence of the absolute as facts fully substantiated to the reason, though the mode of the creation cannot be conceived or pictured by a finite mind.

Pantheism does not explain or remove any of these difficulties. It arbitrarily denies the fact of creation and the reality of any

transitive cause ; that is, of any causal efficiency producing effects external to the being exerting it. It denies both the transcendence and the immanence of the absolute by asserting its identity with the universe. It does not solve the problem ; it simply sets it aside by an arbitrary assertion of identity. And when it has done this, all the old difficulties remain and, as already shown, new difficulties and contradictions are created.

If now we consider pantheism as a theory of the existing universe, we find it entirely inadequate. The bare idea of substance starts the mind on no regress to find a beginning, arouses it to no question as to the origin of things. An atom in solid singleness, as Lucretius conceived it, when considered by itself, suggests no beginning or change and demands no cause. In this idea of it there is suggested no impossibility of its having existed forever. Hence the pantheist rests on his one only substance and thinks he has solved the problem of the universe, and forever silenced all questions as to origin and cause. But when he looks out from his own abstractions into the universe as it actually exists, he finds the stubborn fact that it is not a mere substance suggesting no beginning and demanding no cause. Every being in it is energizing in intense activity. Everything carries the thought back demanding a cause and a reason. The atoms themselves are no longer conceived in solid singleness, but intensely energizing, perhaps themselves complicated systems. Pantheism cannot account for the universe as it actually exists. When we ask how its existence is accounted for, pantheism only reiterates, It exists. When asked why it is as it is, with its mighty causal energies, its order and laws, its progressive realization of ideals, its complex systems, its scientific constitution, its rationality, wisdom, love and religion, pantheism mumbles, It is the one only substance. If asked how the never-ceasing energizing is accounted for, pantheism answers that it is the absolute and unconditioned becoming of the one substance. It cannot account for the intelligent direction of the universe, for the order and law pervading it, nor for its existence in a scientific system comprehending innumerable beings in unity by dynamic and rational relations. It cannot tell why the realities in the universe can be apprehended in their intellectual equivalents, nor why, when so apprehended, they constitute science, nor why in all thinking we assume that the universe in all its parts is intelligible, capable of being taken up in the forms of reason and expounded in reasonable and scientific thought. Thus pantheism, when it comes out from its closed

closets of speculation to face the actual universe is found to be utterly inadequate.

Theism is the only theory of the universe which harmonizes with the fact that it is a rational and scientifically intelligible system, and explains why it must be so. Mr. John Fiske says truly: "Our reason demands that there shall be a reasonableness in the constitution of things. . . . No ingenuity of argument can bring us to believe that the infinite Sustainer of the universe will put us to permanent intellectual confusion. . . . Our belief in what we call the evidence of our senses is less strong than our faith that in the orderly sequence of events there is a meaning which our minds could fathom were they only vast enough."¹ For explaining the universe as a reasonable and scientifically intelligible system pantheism is helpless, and equally so in all its forms.

The question whether the absolute One can coexist with the many appeared early in Greek philosophy. The Eleatics held to the existence of the absolute One and maintained that this excluded the existence of the many. Plato discusses the question in the *Parmenides*, maintaining the reality both of the absolute One and of the finite many, and aiming to point out what truth there was in the Eleatic doctrine. He teaches that behind the phenomenal world is the world of ideas. In these ideas Plato found the essential reality and the essential intelligibility of all finite beings. The later Platonists recognized these ideas as the archetypal thoughts of God. So Plutarch says: "An idea is incorporeal and has no subsistence of itself, but gives figure and form unto shapeless matter, and becomes the cause of its manifestation. Socrates and Plato conjecture that these ideas are essences separate from matter, having their existence in the reason and imagination of the Deity, that is, of mind or reason."² The New Platonists of Alexandria developed this thought more fully. And when the conflict of Christianity began, to attain a philosophical basis for Christian theism amid the earnest philosophical thinking of the time and against the assaults of unchristian philosophy, Christian thinkers found one basis for it in this Platonic philosophy. As Plato says: "The universe is the finite image of real perfection." Therefore its evolution must be the progressive realization of the perfection which it images, and a progressive expression and revelation of the perfect archetype in the

¹ *The Idea of God*, p. 138.

² *Sentiments of Nature with which Philosophers were delighted*, bk. i. ch. x.

eternal Reason. Here is a true realism and a true idealism combined in the theory of the universe. Here is a philosophical basis for modern science, which is intensely realistic and also rests on the assumption of the essential intelligibility or reasonableness of the universe. As resting on this rational realism, science is in harmony with theism. For theism not only assumes the reality and the intelligibility or reasonableness of the universe, but discloses the reason why it is so.

In opposition to this rational realism of theism and of modern science, the pantheists still perpetuate the ancient error, that only one being can exist and that finite persons and things are not real beings but mere modes in which the absolute one exists. The Eleatic philosophy began as a pronounced ontology. But it became more and more abstract and dialectical. In Zeno it reached its legitimate issue and became little more than logical abstractions and even logical puzzles, and the processes of the universe were confounded with processes of logic. Modern pantheism reveals the same tendency.

It is evident that the universe cannot be accounted for and explained by an absolute that is substance only, nor by an absolute that is substance and cause only. It must be also Reason. The universe can be accounted for and understood only by its relation to an absolute Being that is the three in one: Substance, that is, being persisting in unity and identity; Cause, that is, being endowed with power and energizing efficiently, the First Cause; and Reason, that is, being energizing in rational intelligence and freedom. The universe, therefore, as theism theoretically constructs it, is a rational system in which a multitude of individual, determinate beings are united in common dependence on God for their being and powers, and which in its constitution and evolution is the expression of the archetypal ideas of God, the absolute Reason, and the progressive realization of the ends of his wisdom and love.

5. Pantheism is incompatible with free will, with moral responsibility and obligation, and with religion.

Spinoza, it is true, uses the word freedom; he defines it: "That is said to be free which exists by the sole necessity of its nature, and is determined to action by itself alone. That is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined to exist and to act in a certain determinate manner by something else." Freedom as thus defined can be predicated of the self-existent Being alone. And even as predicated of the absolute Being, it affirms only

that it acts according to the necessity of its nature, not by a rational free choice. Freedom of the will in its proper sense, as freedom to determine in the light of reason the exertion and direction of energy, he explicitly denies both of God and man. While he says "God alone is a free cause" in the sense of his definition, he says also: "Will cannot be called a free cause," and "God does not act from freedom of will," and "In the mind there is no such thing as absolute or free will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is determined by another cause, and so on to infinity." This results necessarily from the pantheistic conception that the finite has no real being, but consists of modes of the absolute. A man is not a person; his mind is only a "collection of ideas;" "will and understanding are nothing but particular ideas and volitions." Hence he is careful to explain that the common belief in free will is an illusion: "Men believe they are free because they are conscious of their volitions and inclinations, and ignorant of the causes by which they are disposed to desire and will." We are truly free, according to his teaching, only when we affirm something self-evident or demonstratively certain, as that two and two make four. The series of ideas and volitions which constitute the mind of man is determined as resistlessly by the power of the absolute in its unconscious and necessary evolution as is the motion of the planets or the flowing of water. Spinoza says that he conceives of "the soul acting under fixed laws, and, as it were, a sort of spiritual automaton."¹ And here again in this conception of the mind as a series of states of consciousness, we see pantheism, which would have the knowledge of being begin with the knowledge of the absolute, coming out into agreement with Spencer, Mill and Comte, and teaching a doctrine which involves phenomenalism and universal skepticism. Thus it is evident that pantheism excludes all free will both from man and God.

But if there is in the universe no rational free choice, no power of determining in the light of reason the exertion and direction of energy, then there is in the universe no basis of moral obligation, law and character; the words are entirely without meaning. Spinoza has written a treatise on ethics, and was himself a careful observer of moral law. This, however,

¹ Spinoza, *Ethics*, part i. Def. 7; Prop. 17, Cor. 2; Prop. 32 and Cor. 1; part ii. Prop. 48, Prop. 15, Prop. 49; part i. Appendix; Letter 34, to Blyenbergh; *De Intell. Emend.* cap. xi. § 85.

was a merely factual recognition of man's moral constitution, which no philosopher can overlook. But there is in his philosophy no basis for the distinctively ethical ideas.

As it gives no basis for moral ideas, so it gives no scope for moral action. Christianity has revealed the worth of a man in his individual personality and the sacredness of his rights. It reveals him as a personal spirit in the likeness of God, as a child of the heavenly Father, the subject of God's law; as, after he had sinned, the object of God's redeeming love, accepted and justified on condition of his own personal return to God in penitential trust, admitted to communion with him, destined to be glorified with him forever. Pantheism takes all this away. Man is no longer a personal spirit, a child of God; he is only a transient mode in which for the time being the unconscious substance of the universe exists; and this substance knows him not, for it has no knowledge of itself. Hence pantheism knows no personal immortality. Its old comparison is always true; man is like a bottle of water in the ocean. The water is separated for a little time in its inclosure; but when the glass is broken, it is lost again in the ocean whence it came and part of which it was. Spinoza, it is true, holds to a certain immortality. But as the soul is but a collection of ideas, the immortality is the continued existence of the ideas as truths, not in the least the conscious existence of a personal spirit.

Pantheism also gives no basis for recognizing the dependence of society on the action of man to make it better; it knows no kingdom of God rising by the prayers and labors of self-denying men and women. The world cannot be made better than it is, for it is the necessary unfolding of the absolute Being. Even if it is unfolding to better conditions, a man can do nothing to hasten the evolution, which rolls on its fixed course made necessary by the nature of the absolute Being. And here again pantheism comes into agreement with the current agnostic and materialistic speculations respecting evolution.

Pantheism cannot satisfy the religious needs of man. It reveals no personal, intelligent God, no heavenly Father who has either knowledge or care of men, no God with whom communion is possible or the worship of whom can have any significance. Religion is needed for the very purpose of lifting man from exclusive dependence on the blind and resistless forces of nature to the consciousness of dependence on and trust in the God of perfect wisdom and love. Pantheism intensifies this conscious need

into despair, by revealing God himself as only the insensate substance of the universe which holds us helpless in its blind and resistless mechanism.

As to sin against God it does not exist. What we call sin is simply the necessary action of man in accordance with his nature, as the absolute substance resistlessly unrolls itself in him. On this basis Spinoza constructs a theodicy: "This necessary substance is obliged to modify itself according to all reality possible, so that error, crime, pain and sorrow, being modes of existence as really as virtue, truth and happiness, the universe must contain all these." "The original principle of things having power to produce evil and good and doing all that it has power to do, there must be both good and evil in the universe."

Since pantheism gives no basis either for moral law, obligation and character or for religion, it is obliged to fall back for the guidance of life on the principle, "Follow nature." This, though with varying meanings, was the maxim of Stoicism, which in its original form was pantheistic. This is the legitimate outcome of pantheism. All the action in the universe is the necessary unrolling or evolving of the one absolute substance according to its nature, and all finite things are the modes in which that necessary evolution goes on and is manifested. Hence every being must act according to its nature. As to avoiding sin and evil by obedience to any moral law, it is idle to attempt it; one cannot escape his own nature. So Goethe puts it, and Carlyle quotes it with admiration: —

"What wilt thou teach me the foremost thing?

Wilt teach me from off my own shadow to spring?"

Ralph W. Emerson, who seemed in one period of his life to be tintured with pantheistic sentiments, often falls into this line of moral teaching. "Nature is no saint. The lights of the church, the ascetics, Gentoos, Grahamites, she does not distinguish by any favor; she comes eating and drinking and sinning. Her darlings, the great, the strong, the beautiful, are not children of our law; do not come out of the Sunday-school; nor weigh their food; nor punctually keep the commandments. If we will be strong with her strength we must not harbor such disconsolate consciences, borrowed too from the consciences of other nations. We must set up the strong present tense against the rumors of wrath past or to come." In *Self-reliance* he says: "My friend suggested, These impulses may be from below not from above. I replied, They do not seem to me to be such; but if I am the

devil's child, I will live then for the devil ; no law can be sacred to me but that of my own nature ; good and bad are but names readily transferable to that or this. The only right is that which is after my constitution ; the only wrong what is against it. . . . My life is not an apology but a life ; it is for itself and not for a spectacle. I much prefer it should be of a lower strain, so it be genuine and equal, than that it should be glittering and unsteady. . . . I know that for myself it makes no difference whether I do or forbear those actions which are reckoned excellent ; I cannot consent to pay for a privilege when I have intrinsic right." In the Nominalist and Realist he says : "All the universe over there is but one thing — this old two-face, Creator-creature, mind-matter, right-wrong, of which any proposition may be affirmed or denied."

In like manner this philosophy explains all human history as the necessary development of nature. The cruelties of the Inquisition, the corruption of imperial Rome, the rise and fall of religions are necessary results of the development of nature in human history. In Hare's *Life of Sterling* the latter is reported as saying : "All beliefs have followed each other according to a fixed law, and are connected by the same with all the circumstances of each generation ; in obedience to this law they emerge, unfold themselves, pass away, or are transmuted into other modes of faith." And Emerson says in *Representative Men* : "Our colossal theologies of Judaism, Christism, Buddhism, Mahometanism are the necessary and structural action of the human mind."

Pantheism in its practical application has a peculiar fascination for many minds. In the maxim, "Follow nature," a side of truth is presented which is overlooked in the conception of right living founded exclusively on law and duty and tending to perfunctory obedience, morbid self-scrutiny in conscious constraint and restraint, and ascetic service. Christianity abundantly supplies this deficiency, while supplementing also the much greater one-sidedness and deficiencies of pantheism. It quickens man's spiritual powers and susceptibilities, and in the life of Christian faith and love realizes all the spontaneity and much more than all the power of a life energized merely by the impulses of nature ; these it also corrects and purifies, develops them to their normal activity, regulates and directs them in righteousness, and realizes the spontaneous, full and harmonious action of all the powers in the life of Christian faith and love.

For many persons, in whom the æsthetic predominates over the moral and makes the imperative of the law irksome, there is a fascination in the pantheistic conception of God as present in all the ongoing of the universe and revealing himself in all its beauty and sublimity. This, however, can repel only from a deistic idea of God as the first cause, whom nature hides rather than reveals, and who is separated from us by the whole series of events in the course of nature ; a period of duration, as evolution now presents it, so inconceivably long as practically to exclude God from the universe. But theism rightly apprehended gives, as really as pantheism, the God present and revealing himself in all the ongoing of the universe. And it gives far more than pantheism ; for in the theistic conception it is no longer the presence and revelation of unconscious indeterminate substance or pure being or the unconscious absolute, by whatever name it may be called ; but it is the presence and revelation of the living God, the absolute Reason, energizing in perfect wisdom and love, the heavenly Father whom all his children may trust, love and obey, and with whom they may work for the establishment over all the earth of the reign of righteousness and good-will. Feuerbach sneers at theism: "To enrich God, man must become poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing." This is entirely true of pantheism. The very contrary is true of theism. The greatness of God reveals the greatness of man, who is the object of God's moral government and paternal love, who can know God, commune with him and serve him.

6. Pantheism has appeared in various forms differing primarily in the idea of what the absolute is. For the sake of definiteness of thought I have principally kept in view, in this brief discussion, Spinoza's pantheism, which is perhaps the most intelligible and the most completely and consistently wrought out of all the forms of the doctrine. In another form of it, the Ego has been assumed as the "original one and only substance, and in this one substance all possible accidents and all possible realities are posited;" and "the living and active moral order is God; we need no other God, and can comprehend no other." The absolute One has also been assumed to be the subject and object in identity, the absolute subject-object taking the place of Spinoza's one and only substance. It has been assumed to be pure being which is wholly indeterminate and identical with nothing; it is a thinking process, an "immanent infinite negativity;" thought is identical with being, and the processes of the universe are iden-

tical with processes of logic; the absolute becomes a logical order, as in another form it had become a moral order, and the issue is absolute idealism. It has been called the Unconscious and described as reason existing without personality, consciousness or freedom. It has appeared in mysticism in which the soul rapt in devotion passes into abnegation of itself and loses itself and all things in God. But in all these types Spinozism takes on new forms but remains unchanged in its essential principles; and the arguments which refute it are applicable without essential change to pantheism in all its forms. Their authors sometimes reject the name of pantheism; but it is as a savage, when his child is ill, thinks that by changing its name the evil disease will be deceived and misled and the child will escape its assaults. These several theosophies all imply that the universe and its ultimate ground are one and the same; that finite beings are only modes in which the absolute exists, and have no real being themselves; that the unity of the universe is not in causal dependence, that its ongoing is not by the energizing of a transitive cause, but is an everlasting becoming, the unrolling or evolution of the absolute Being into its varying modes of existence; that this evolution goes on in unconsciousness and necessity, without intelligence or freedom; that the absolute Being first comes to consciousness in man; that there is no individual immortality; that there is no free agency either in God or man; and the legitimate inference is that there is no basis for moral responsibility, obligation and law. They all present an unconscious and impersonal absolute, by faith in which man cannot be lifted from his conscious dependence on the necessary and resistless forces of nature; which can no more be the object of trust, worship, communion and love than a log of wood or a block of marble; which is fashioned into a god by the imagination as an idol is by the hand; and which, should it come to consciousness, would be as much astonished at finding itself a god as was the wooden garden-god of Horace:—

“Olim truncus eram ficulnus, inutile lignum;
 Cum faber incertus scannum, faceretne Priapum,
 Maluit esse Deum. Deus inde ego.” — *Sat. lib. i. viii. 1-3.*

7. These profound speculations are not to be dismissed as idle and worthless. They have brought to notice aspects of truth which in the dogmatizing, rationalistic and deistic tendencies of thought had fallen into obscurity, and which Christian theism cannot safely overlook. Among these may be mentioned the

immanence of God in nature and his presence with the spirit of man and his action on it; the idea of the absolute as the supreme and universal Reason energizing and expressing its archetypal thoughts in the universe, and with which the reason of man in its constituent elements and essential principles is in harmony; the intimations of God in the constitution of man, so that the man, in unfolding his consciousness of himself, finds it inseparably interwoven with the consciousness of God; the continuity of the world-process and the true relations and harmony of matter and spirit; the participation of man in the sphere of the spiritual and the supernatural, so that he finds himself "at home" in it and in the presence of God and in fellowship with him "in whom we live and move and have our being." It will be a fatal mistake if Christian teachers heedlessly think that these important truths are inseparable from pantheism, and for their support begin to put under them distinctive elements of pantheistic monism and to declare that Christian theism requires pantheism for its full development and vindication. The Christian doctrine that God is the eternal and personal spirit, the heavenly Father, the gracious Redeemer in Christ, carries in it all these truths, and presents them with a clearness, self-consistency, fulness and power which pantheism can never attain. To present them effectually is one great work to which Christian theologians of this day are called. And no one is a pantheist who recognizes the conscious personality of God, the absolute Reason or Spirit energizing in freedom, and man in God's likeness as a rational and free personal being.

It is specially claimed in behalf of idealistic pantheism that it, more than theism, recognizes deity as immanent in nature, and realizes the demand of religion for a continuous consciousness of his presence.

In reading Hegel one is impressed with the immediacy of the divine presence. Every energy acting in nature is presented as the immediate energy of God acting before and on and in us. When believers in God have practically fallen into deistic conceptions and think of him only as outside of the mechanism of the universe and removed far away into the past at the beginning of things, then the pantheistic teaching may practically recall the thought to the immediate presence of God in all that is. But when we think farther we see that this excellent practical influence is inconsistent with pantheism itself. The whole conception of nearness to God becomes an illusion when we re-

gard him as the only being and men but modes in which the being exists. The absolute is no longer a personal being with whom man can commune, and the man is not a personal being to commune with him. The conception, which seemed at first so grand and so inspiring, sinks into the clammy conception of God as the one only substance, or as pure or indeterminate being necessarily evolving unconscious and insensate into all that is; and of man, not as a personal individual with reason, free will, personal obligation and responsibility, but only as a mode in which the absolute in its helpless and resistless evolving appears for the time being. It is theism, not pantheism, which gives us God, the eternal Spirit, immanent in the universe, directing all its energies to the ends of wisdom and love and revealing himself in all its ongoing; and which gives us man, the personal spirit in the image of God, receiving God's continuous revelation, conscious of his own responsibility and obligation to him, accepting his grace and living in his immediate presence — the spirit of man face to face with the Spirit of God.

IV. MATERIALISM. — Materialism is the doctrine that matter with the force essential in it is eternal and that all the realities in the universe are merely matter and force in different modes of existence. It excludes spirit, personality, the supernatural, whether in God or man.

Materialism is monism in the sense that the absolute ground of the universe and the universe itself are the same; also as Haeckel says, it assumes "the inseparable connection of matter, form and force. . . . Nowhere in the whole domain of knowledge does it recognize real metaphysics, but only physics."¹ It declares that physical nature is all.

But materialism is not monism in the strictest sense, because it recognizes an eternal plurality of beings, the atoms. Matter is only a general term for this innumerable multitude of individuals; their unity is not that of one only being, like that of the pantheistic monism, but a dynamic unity of the many in a system, acting in invariable uniformity under fixed causal laws. In strict propriety monism is the name only of the pantheistic doctrine that the absolute is the one and only being. On the contrary the atomic theory of the universe has been inherent in materialism from the days of Democritus and Lucretius until now.

Whatever the likeness in the practical issues of pantheism and materialism, they belong genetically, from the root up, to two in-

¹ Creation, vol. i. pp. 35, 37, Trans.

compatible theories of knowledge and types of thought. Pantheism begins with the universal of which all particulars are only the manifestation, having no individual and real being of themselves. Materialism begins with individuals, each known as a concrete being, and proceeds to a unity of these in dynamic relations and under fixed laws in a system capable of being known scientifically. They differ also in method. The former proceeds by the *a priori* method. It starts with the idea of the absolute Being and deduces from it what the absolute Being must be and what the universe must be in which the absolute must manifest itself. By this *a priori* method it deduces, not only what the absolute Being is, but also the very process by which it evolves itself into the finite and returns into itself again enriched by the evolution; in the same way is determined what the course of the world's history must be. Hence pantheism asks no evidences of the existence of its so-called God and admits none. It is not surprising therefore that pantheists ridicule the proofs that God exists, as worthless to cultivated minds, and that one of them, quoted by Ulrici, said that they are only "sweetened water for sloppy girls." The advocates of materialism, on the contrary, are generally loud in claiming that all knowledge proceeds slowly and cautiously by observing particulars and individuals and by the induction of general laws.

It is evident that physical science belongs to the latter of these two types of thought; and to a sedulous adherence to its principles and methods physical science owes its great progress. To this type of thought theism also belongs. It proceeds from the individual to the universal, from the many to the unity of all. It is evident that the only unity possible in this type of thought is a unity of the many in a scientific system, a unity of beings in dynamic relations under rational principles and laws and directed to rational ideals and ends. And it is evident, further, that, in this type of thought, the only ultimate unity conceivable rests on perfect Reason, as the ultimate ground of the universe, expressing therein its archetypal thought and progressively realizing the ends of its wisdom and love.

It seems strange that materialists, claiming above all things to be scientific, appropriate to their doctrine the pantheistic name of monism and try to put themselves on the "high priori road" which belongs to a totally different type of thought. And yet perhaps we need not wonder. If with physical science and theism we begin with the particular and the individual and proceed to

the general and the universal, the only unity of all things which is possible is in a rational system of interaction under law; and this is possible only in the recognition of God, the absolute Reason. If the scientist will deny God he must abandon the principles and methods of scientific investigation and transport himself to the false metaphysics and methods of pantheism. Evidently, then, the two systems, the pantheistic and the materialistic, are different in principle and origin and totally incompatible. Science and its methods can never lead to pantheistic monism, the unity of the all in one only being. According to the true theory of knowledge and the principle and methods of scientific investigation, pantheism is impossible. And according to the same, materialism has no standing ground; for the existence of God is necessary to solving the problem of the reason and reaching the unity of the many in a rational system.

Materialism is, more than pantheism, in accord with theism, in that it begins with the knowledge of particular beings, and proceeds from the individual to the general, from the finite and conditioned to the absolute and unconditioned; also in that it necessitates a unity, not of one substance and one being, but of many beings in a rational system. On the other hand it is, less than pantheism, in accord with theism in that it practically fails to recognize the true absolute and leaves us shut up within the finite.

And this leads to another criticism of materialism. It does not give the real absolute. Matter cannot be the absolute or unconditioned being. In its essence it is dependent and limited. By its definition it is contained in and occupies space, is composed of parts, is divisible; its parts are in continual motion and change; and materialism assumes a definite quantity of matter and force, never increased or diminished, conceivably measurable in bulk as occupying so many cubic miles, in weight as so many tons, in foot-pounds as doing so much work. Professor Clerk-Maxwell says of the atoms: "Though in the course of ages catastrophes have occurred and may yet occur in the heavens, though ancient systems be dissolved and new systems evolved out of their ruins, the molecules out of which these systems are built, the foundation stones of the material universe, remain unbroken and unworn." But when we consider more closely the atoms as science now regards them, we find that even these are not ultimate, but point back unmistakably to a cause beyond all the course of nature and beyond themselves. Materi-

alism still leaves also the dualism of matter and force. Plainly materialism gives us no real absolute or unconditioned, and no real monism. We must go beyond and behind matter to find the ultimate ground and unity of the universe. Accordingly Mr. Huxley says: "The man of science, who forgetting the limits of philosophical inquiry slides from these (physical) formulas and symbols into what is commonly understood by materialism, seems to me to place himself on a level with the mathematician, who should mistake the *x*'s and *y*'s with which he works his problems for real entities — and with this disadvantage as compared with the mathematician, that the blunders of the latter are of no practical consequence, while the errors of systematic materialism may paralyze the energies and destroy the beauty of a life."¹

Another criticism is that materialism rests on the unwarranted assumption that man has knowledge only through the senses. This is the subjective side of materialism to which the corresponding objective side is that nothing exists but matter and force. For this theory there is no positive argument, while the evidence of consciousness and of reason is against it. The argument for materialism, so far as it rests on this theory, resolves itself into the puerile remark of Laplace, that he had searched the heavens with his telescope but had found no God. This is simply saying that nothing exists which the senses cannot perceive. If he had found with his telescope what he took for God, the fact that he found it with a telescope would prove that it was not God. This argument was well parodied by the farmer who said he had searched his sack of meal through and through and could find no miller. Virchow says: "Of all kinds of dogmatism, the materialistic is the most dangerous, because it denies its own dogmatism and appears in the garb of science; because it professes to rest on fact when it is but speculation; and because it attempts to annex territories to natural science before they have been fairly conquered."²

Materialism, while denying personality, cannot account for the facts of personality. And in denying it, it departs from the methods of scientific reasoning. Crookes discovered a new metal, Thallium, from a sharp brilliant green line differing essentially from any one before observed. If he had reasoned as the materialist does, he would have said, "As there are but sixty-four elements, this must be one of them." But he did reason scientifically and said, "This is a new line never before seen in the

¹ Lay Sermons, p. 160.

² Nature, Nov. 1874.

spectrum ; it must reveal a new element never known before." The scientific method, applied in like manner to the facts of personality observed in man, requires the inference that there must be something which transcends the mechanism of physics and is not included in matter and its forces.

It is equally true that materialism cannot account for the physical phenomena of the universe. Chemical affinity, heat, light and electricity, gravitation, the persistence of force make clear the course of physical action within certain limits, but each fails to be in its own sphere the ultimate explanation, and brings us face to face with the mysterious power beyond. This is continually appearing in the speculations of scientists. In discussing the supposed dissipation of heat and the consequent loss of energy from the universe, Rankine suggests that the interstellar medium may be bounded on all sides by empty space. On reaching these bounds the radiant heat would be turned back and as it were piled up around the edges of the universe, and at last would be accumulated in foci. Then if any dead world moving through space should come into one of these foci, it would be vaporized and resolved into its elements, and thus its energies would be liberated from their equilibrium and restored to activity in the universe. Claudius, who quotes this hypothesis, proceeds to demonstrate that it is mathematically impossible.¹ The same is exemplified in speculations respecting the ether, so tenuous that it passes through all substances and is not known to retard the motion of any planet, yet elastic and as solid as adamant. It revives in a new form the old idea of a crystalline sphere. So in all scientific speculation from age to age we are brought back to the questions which the mind must ask, but which physical science with its matter and force cannot answer. And the larger and clearer our scientific knowledge of matter and force, the more vividly do we feel ourselves confronted by the mystery that is behind them.

Materialism is a congeries of contradictions. Perhaps no doctrine which has had any considerable currency has been marked by this characteristic to an equal degree. Subjective materialism, that we know only what is perceived through the senses, involves phenomenalism and complete agnosticism ; objective materialism, that matter is eternal, implies that knowledge transcends the senses, is ontological in its beginning, and is the knowledge of eternal, indestructible, absolute Being. It propounds, as

¹ Mechanical Theory of Heat (8th Memoir), p. 291.

this eternal Being, matter, which in its essence is finite and limited. It holds that motor-force is transformed into thought. It holds that mind is a product and manifestation of matter; and at the same time that matter is merely a perception or idea of mind; and while holding the latter, also holds that matter existed ages before there was a perceiving mind. By thus predicating mental phenomena of matter, as well as by propounding it as absolute Being, it changes the essential meaning of matter, and yet continues to use it in both senses without discrimination. It teaches that matter and force are the ultimate ground of the universe and the ultimate explanation of all that exists, and that the whole history of the universe is the history of their evolution; at the same time it holds to the scientific theory which implies that the evolution must have an end and must have had a beginning; if so it must have had an absolute beginning, that is, a beginning without a cause, and it will have an absolute end, that is, it will issue in an effect void of all causative energy to produce any subsequent change or effect.¹

The necessary conclusion is that materialism, as a theory of the universe, is not only inadequate to account for it and to interpret its significance, but on account of its contradictions is impossible to human thought, except by essentially changing the accepted meaning of matter.

¹ In the *Philosophical Basis of Theism*, chap. xvi. the impossibility of accounting for the phenomena either of personality or of the physical universe by matter and force is shown; and in chap. xvii. the more important materialistic objections to personality are fully considered. It would be repetition to pursue the discussion further here. Pages 408-554.

CHAPTER X.

THE ABSOLUTE BEING AND THEISM.

THE words polytheism and monotheism imply that theism is the genus of which these are species. But in fact the word theism is commonly used as a synonym of monotheism; leaving us with no generic name for the two.

The different forms of belief in a divinity may be classified in four classes: —

Polytheism, the belief in a plurality of divinities. In this may be included animism, the primitive belief of men that natural things were animated by minds or souls like their own; and the consequent fetichism, the belief that any thing might be the shrine of a divinity to be worshiped.

Ditheism, the belief in two Gods, each self-existent and eternal, one the author of all good, the other of all evil. This appears in the ancient religion of Persia and in Manicheism.

Monotheism, the belief in the one only God, the energizing Reason, the eternal Spirit, the personal God.

Christian monotheism, the belief in the one personal God, the Redeemer of the world from sin, revealed in Jesus the Christ, as recorded in the Christian Scriptures.

These are classed together as forms of religious or, in its broadest meaning, theistic belief, because they all recognize a divinity as the object of worship and service. The four forms of atheism are excluded because they recognize no divinity. For it is of the essence of religion that it lifts man above his dependence on the unconscious and necessary forces of nature into relation with a personal divinity to whom he may come for guidance and help.

It is objected that the ideas of the divinity in these four types of religious belief have nothing in common but the name; that in the lower forms of polytheism is no trace of the absolute Spirit whom Christians worship. The answer is that the same objection may be made against the identity of the objects of physical science which are differently conceived in different ages. There have been great changes in man's idea of the sun; yet it is the

same sun which has been shining before the eyes of men through all the ages; and in certain particulars men's conceptions of it have always been the same. So it is the same absolute Spirit that has been shining on the minds of men through all the ages; and different as their conceptions of him have been, in certain particulars they have been always the same. In them all we find clear traces of the absolute Spirit. The divinity is always conceived more or less clearly as an intelligent free person, like man, and therein supernatural; and as beyond and above man and above the world as man knows it; and therein a shadow of the absolute lies on the spirit of man.

To this it is objected that this explanation is inconsistent with the doctrine that God reveals himself to man and is known by man in his experience of the revelation. If so, it is asked, why are there atheists? Why any need of exhorting to piety more than to believe in things seen and felt? Why so many different ideas of God? Does any one think the sun black or square? But we remember that Anaxagoras once suggested that the sun might be as large as the Peloponnesus, and was arrested for the bold assertion on the charge of contravening the established dogmas of religion; for was not Apollo a god and the sun his chariot? and should it be turned into a blazing mass of metal as big as the Peloponnesus? Here the scientific conception of the sun was as really imperfect as the conception of the divinity. The conception of Anaxagoras marked an advance in science towards a truer conception of the sun, which history has always commemorated. And he himself made a notable advance in the conception of God as Reason energizing in the universe and arranging and ordering it, an advance carried still further by Plato and Aristotle. If men have always known that the sun is round and luminous and other facts respecting it, the recognition of which has persisted in all the progress of astronomy, so every worshiper of a divinity has regarded it as an intelligent Power transcending him and all that he could touch or control, all that constituted to him the world in which he could act, and has believed truths respecting God which have persisted through all the progress of the human mind. The revelation of God in this respect is like the revelation of the universe. Neither the one nor the other is revealed independently of the faculties of man or so as to leave no need of human investigation and thought. If the universe had been so revealed, man would have missed the means of education, discipline and development, and would have remained al-

ways but a grown up child. And if God had been so revealed man would have missed the means of spiritual discipline and development. So Kant says: "If such an enlightenment were given us as we desire and some think they have found, that God and eternity with their awful majesty lie open unceasingly before the eyes, then the moral conduct of man, so long as his nature is what it is, would be changed into mere mechanism, in which as in a play of puppets all gesticulate well, but in the figures there is no life."¹

Having now the knowledge that the absolute Being exists and may be truly though partially known, the next step in our investigation must be to show that the absolute Being is absolute Reason energizing in the universe, the eternal Spirit, the one personal God.

It is often assumed that it is difficult or even impossible to show that the absolute Being of philosophy is the personal God whom we worship. Jacobi says that one may be in his head a heathen, in his metaphysical speculations an atheist, and in his heart a Christian. Flügel cites Schleiermacher as an example, "who, with a theory which is the death of religion, was still an honest and hearty confessor and defender of Christianity."² Some Christian thinkers accept without inquiry this alleged incompatibility of the absolute of philosophy and the God of theism, and affirm that in philosophical thought and theoretical knowledge there is no basis for any knowledge of the existence of God or of what he is; but that religious belief must rest on the ethical and spiritual feelings alone and on the word of God in the Bible attested by the witness of the Spirit. Professor Charles Hodge says: "If the philosophical notion of the absolute is to decide every question concerning the divine nature, we must give up all confidence in our apprehensions of God as an object of knowledge;" and he quotes the words of Strauss: "The ideas of the absolute and of the holy are incompatible. He who holds to the former must give up the latter, since holiness implies relation; and he who holds the idea of God as holy must renounce the idea of his being absolute."³ Professor W. D. Wilson regards it as not essential to the defense of theism to challenge or contradict the doctrine of the eternal self-existence of matter, and asserts that "if the present order of

¹ Werke von Rosenkranz herausgegeben, viii. 293.

² Die Spekulative Theologie der Gegenwart, pp. 230, 232.

³ System of Theology, vol. i. p. 414.

things had no beginning, Evolution must have produced a Supreme Being long before this time.”¹

We are to consider hereafter the evidence that the absolute Being is personal Spirit or Reason, the one only living and true God. Here I only call attention to some points which it is important to notice before examining the evidence of the personality of God.

1. The difficulty of identifying the absolute Being of philosophy with the personal God of theism arises in part from the falsity of the philosophy with which theism is compared; it propounds a false idea of the absolute and a false method of ascertaining what it is. These errors have already been exposed. It is with a similar false philosophy that Professor Royce holds that if the absolute Being should create, it must be a perfect universe completed at a stroke; that once thus created, any progressive development would be impossible; that the conception of a progressive revelation of the absolute in the evolution of a finite universe is incompatible with the idea of the absolute. This involves a dilemma between two absurdities: Either the absolute Being must create another absolute and unconditioned Being, or he cannot create anything and thus is himself limited and incapable. His argument also implies that we cannot know that the absolute Being creates unless we know how he does it; that because we cannot show how a mind can know an object that is not within itself and not identical with the mind's idea, therefore we cannot know the object; also that if we cannot prove the reality of knowledge we cannot know any thing.² It is not surprising that theism cannot be reconciled with a philosophy like this. It is impossible to reconcile true theism with false philosophy. The assumed metaphysical ideas and principles on which the German pantheism is founded are not only irreconcilable with the knowledge that the absolute is the personal God, but, as has been shown, they are equally irreconcilable with the knowledge of any thing. If the New Kantians teach that the knowledge of God must be held on the ground of moral feelings and independent of metaphysics, it is equally true that all knowledge, popular and scientific, must be held in equal independence of the false and pantheistic metaphysics to which the New-Kantians refer.

With metaphysics and philosophy vitiated by these and similar errors, it is impossible to attain the knowledge that the absolute,

¹ Foundations of Religious Belief, pp. 62-65.

² Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 258, 263, 274, 275, 303.

as thus falsely conceived, is the personal God. The absolute is thus an illusion in which all reality and all knowledge are swallowed up. In these and similar cases, we cannot identify the God of theism with the absolute Being of philosophy, because we compare true theism with false philosophy.

But if we begin with the ideas and principles of a true philosophy, there is no *a priori* impossibility that the absolute be a personal Spirit or Reason energizing, and nothing to invalidate the evidence that it is so.

2. The difficulty in identifying the absolute of philosophy with the God of theism arises in part from false conceptions of what the God of theism is. Non-theistic thinkers commonly assume that the theistic conception is that God created the universe, complete and finished, at a stroke, and, ever since, his action in it and his revelation of himself have been only in capricious and miraculous interference with its laws; as Carlyle puts it: "An absentee God, sitting idle ever since the first sabbath at the outside of the universe and seeing it go." Whereas in truth theism recognizes the absolute Being as at once distinguished from and transcending the universe and immanent in it. It solves the great problem of the transcendence and the immanence by recognizing the absolute Being as the absolute Reason energizing in the universe and progressively realizing in the finite the ideal of all that is true, right, perfect and good as it is archetypal and eternal in the divine mind. Thus the absolute Spirit is evermore revealing himself by expressing the thought of his eternal wisdom and love in the finite creation. And the revelation must be ever progressive, and never complete and finished at any point of time. The infinite can never be fully expressed and revealed in the finite.

The difficulty, however, does not arise wholly from erroneous conceptions of theism on the part of its opponents, but also in part from errors on the part of theists. Theologians have conceived of the universe as completed and finished at the time of its creation. This in fact became a common conception of Christian theology. It is noticeable that from time to time in the history of the Church a pantheistic type of thought has made its appearance. In many of these cases, what Dr. Hunt and others call pantheism is no more than an attempt to break away from the conception of the universe as a rigid and finished mechanism with God outside of it, and to return to the conception of God as immanent in it and progressively revealing himself in the realiza-

tion of the archetypal ideas of the eternal and universal Reason, both in the physical system and in the spiritual; in the latter by the presence of his Spirit and the progressive growth of his kingdom of righteousness through the redemption in Christ. Even now in the general return to the conception of God as at once transcendent and immanent, some theologians, mistaking the significance of the movement, are losing their way and are moving towards pantheistic ideas. It is important to guard against this error. On the other hand, it is not less important to know that the doctrine of God's transcendence of the universe and his immanence in it is a distinctive doctrine of theism. To call it Christian pantheism is a gross misrepresentation. So far is it from pantheism that it is incompatible with pantheism. The latter, by identifying the absolute with the universe, excludes both the transcendence and the immanence, and reduces the absolute and the universe in their identity to a blind and unknowable somewhat, evolving necessarily without freedom or personality, without conscious intelligence or reasonable end or aim.

Theism, while claiming a positive knowledge of the absolute Being and of what it is, affirms that the knowledge is not adequate and complete. Mystery must always lie all along the line where the absolute energizes in the finite, and the revelation of the absolute therein must at every point of time be incomplete. Hence theists do not profess to define how God creates the universe or energizes in it. And different minds may picture or symbolize the action in different ways. But this must not be confounded with pantheism. The thought remains theistic and excludes pantheism, so long as it recognizes men as rational, free, personal beings; and also recognizes the absolute Being as distinct from and transcending the universe, as conscious personal Spirit known positively though inadequately, as in the likeness of human reason, however transcending it, and as progressively realizing in the universe rational ideals and ends.

It may be added that agnosticism, pantheism and materialism arise in part from unwarrantably limiting knowledge to the conceivable and denying creation and God's transcendence and immanence because they cannot be pictured in the imagination.

3. A third source of the difficulty in identifying the God of theism with the absolute of philosophy is found in false ideas of personality.

The objection is that personality, if predicated of the absolute

Being, would imply limitation. It has already been shown that this objection is founded on a false idea of the absolute; that if valid it would equally prove that the absolute, as thus falsely conceived, would be limited by predicating of it power or any other attribute, by affirming that it is being, and even by affirming that it is the absolute or unconditioned and thus distinguishing it from the finite. It assumes that determinateness is in its essence limitation. But we have seen that determinateness is of the essence of being; that the indeterminate is no being; it is not even nothing as distinguished from being, nor being as distinguished from nothing. And we have seen that the more determinate a being is, that is, the more the powers and attributes characterizing it, the greater the being. If God is indeterminate he is void of every attribute by which it is possible to think of him. The objection implies that he is entirely unknowable. It would require that the absolute be at once infinite and finite, conditioned and unconditioned, perfect and imperfect, good and evil, mind and matter, personal and impersonal, being and nothing. The absolute thus becomes a mere zero or symbol of the cessation of thought. It is no longer the ground of all things but, as the Germans would say, the *Abgrund*, the abyss in which all thought, all intelligence and all reality are swallowed up. The fact that God is the absolute implies that he is the fulness of all perfection. As the unconditioned he must be the all-conditioning; as such in him must be all the potencies which account for the universe.

In addition to this, the objection that the absolute cannot be a person rests on a false idea of personality.

It falsely assumes that the self or ego as known in consciousness is merely a series of sensations or impressions; or it assumes that the consciousness of self is the consciousness only of a negation; or it gives some other definition which leaves out the essence of personality. As thus falsely defined personality cannot be predicated of the absolute Being. But a person is a rational free being conscious of self as persisting, one and the same, through all changes. Personality thus defined is not incompatible with the true absolute. Persistence in unity and identity through all changes is central in the idea of the absolute Being. Here in the finite person is an element not only compatible with the absolute but essential to it. The centre of a circle remains unchanged so long as the circle remains, however the circumference may be enlarged. This central element of personality

must remain unchanged whatever limitations are removed. Otherwise all substantiality of being disappears, and the absolute is totally lost in nonentity.

In the next place, the attributes of personality are in their essence such as may be positive attributes of the absolute Being. The principles and laws of reason are universal and unconditioned; they condition everything, they are conditioned by nothing; they are unlimited in time and space, unmeasurable in quantity; the same in all times and all places; power can neither create nor annul them. The will is free in the sense that it is a power which determines itself in the light of reason, and is thus self-directive and self-exertive. Freedom in its essence is exemption from conditions and limitations. In his rational free will man is above nature, a supernatural being; and so far he is exempt from necessary conditions and limitations and is free. The absolute Being, exempt from all necessary conditions and limitations, must be himself the absolute and universal Reason; and luminous with its light, must be self-directive, self-exertive and free. And a person's consciousness of self is not a limitation. On the contrary, consciousness marks a superior order of beings, and its absence would be a limitation and an imperfection. It has been already shown that if the absolute Being first comes to consciousness in man, then it is itself developed in time from the less to the greater, and man is superior to the absolute previously unconscious and undeveloped. A babe is unconscious of its spiritual capacities and is gradually developed to the knowledge of itself and the world. But here is propounded, as philosophy, the absurdity that the absolute Being, like the finite babe, is gradually developed in time till it attains to its highest in man, and then continues to acquire knowledge of itself and of the world as the years roll on.

Thus it is evident that personality in its true significance is compatible with the true absolute, and that its essential attributes must be attributes of the absolute Being.

Accordingly, in the exercise of man's personal powers are intimations and shadowings that he is in the likeness of God. In his self-consciousness he is at once the subject and object of his own knowledge; in his free will he determines his action and character, and is at once the subject and object of his own free energy. He can complete within himself the circle of object and subject both in intellectual and efficient action. Thus in his personality he is self-contained.

Another false assumption is that the finiteness of the human person is of the essence of personality.

Hartmann, Pfeiderer and others hold that God is Spirit or Reason, but is not a person. Here they change the essential meaning of personality. They call the absolute Being Spirit and predicate of it rationality and freedom, essential attributes of personality; they then deny its conscious personality, because, as they think, this would be a limitation. This implies that personality essentially consists of dependence and of limitation in time, space and quantity. They fail to distinguish between personality and its limitations. The limitation is not of the essence of personality, but its accident. The objection confounds quality or power with quantity. The predication of personality carries over to the absolute only the positive properties of a person, conscious reason, self-determining power, unity and identity, not his accidental limitations. It must be added that consciousness is essential to intelligence and freedom. Where there is no consciousness there can be no knowledge, therefore no energy intelligently and freely exerted and directed. Thus we have the absolute Being acting in the universe blindly and necessarily, without intelligence or freedom, without wisdom or love. And here again the absolute Being is recognized as undeveloped and imperfect; and this conception of God is found to be undistinguishable from pantheism.

Kant and J. G. Fichte object that we cannot predicate personality of the Absolute, because we know personality only under the limitations of the finite. This objection is equally valid against predicating power, existence or any reality of the absolute, since, in the same sense, we know these also only under the limits of the finite. In fact, in the very idea of the finite, man has already the idea of the infinite, and in the idea of dependence he has the idea of the independent and absolute. In these ideas his thought is already active in that transcendent sphere. And in our consciousness of self we have consciousness of reason participating in the principles of Reason supreme and universal, and consciousness of free will acting under law of supreme and universal obligation.

Spencer and the agnostics who follow him push their objection farther. Because there can be but one absolute Being, it cannot be classed with any other; therefore it cannot be known; and because it cannot be known it cannot be a person. This reasoning is only an example of the common error substituting

general notions and abstractions for real concrete beings. It belongs to that type of thought which proceeds from the universal to the particular, and consists in analyzing general notions. It is a survival of mediæval scholasticism, instances of which are occasionally found in Mr. Spencer's writings. It is only in such a type of thought that this objection has force. Scientific knowledge begins with the individual and proceeds to the class. Of course it must know the individual before it can know the class. In classifying, as individuals are found to be more and more determinate, the number included in a species becomes less. When we come to God, as the absolute Being, he stands alone. But in passing from a finite or limited reality to the unlimited, we do not drop out the reality and retain only the empty denial of limitation. An unlimited power does not cease to be a power; it is power unlimited. No more does personality cease if it is unconditioned personality. So J. S. Mill says: "Any thing carried to the infinite must have all the properties of the same thing as finite, except such as depend on the finiteness." He exemplifies by infinite space that it does not cease to be space, and infinite goodness that it does not cease to be goodness.¹

4. Man's knowledge of the absolute Being as the personal God is real and positive, but incomplete.

Theism makes no pretension to the complete knowledge of God; but it rightly insists that, though the knowledge of him is incomplete, it is real and positive; not of a part of God, for God has no parts, but of *him*, the one only living and personal God.

Accordingly it concedes to the agnostic that in some respects the knowledge of God can be expressed only as a negation. This is plain from the distinction already pointed out between the positive powers of a being and their limitation. In a steam-engine of forty horse-power the power is one thing, the limitation of the quantity of that power is an entirely different thing. The power is the positive quality in which the engine is revealed; the limitation is a mere indication of quantity, which aside from the power is empty of all significance, an empty form of thought. In like manner we know God as a personal being endowed with rational, self-determining power energizing always in harmony with reason; and we know him as absolute being unconditioned by dependence on any other, and his powers

¹ Exam. of Hamilton, vol. i. p. 129.

unlimited in time, space or quantity. The former are the positive attributes of his being; the latter are merely the denial of dependence and limitation, empty forms of thought except as they refer to the positive powers. Of the former our knowledge is positive, because we know reason, free will, personality in ourselves; of the latter our knowledge may be called negative, because it can be expressed only by a negation. The knowledge of the absolute Being and its powers is positive; it is negative only in form. Hence the attributes of God are properly classified as positive, or the attributes included in personality, and negative, or the attributes defined by the negation of dependence, and of limitation in time, space and quantity. Thus our knowledge of God, the absolute Being, is positive and real, although it is incomplete.

Sir William Hamilton, on the contrary, objects that because our knowledge of infinitude or illimitation can be expressed only by negation, therefore all our knowledge of God is negative, or, what is the same, no knowledge. Malebranche comes to a similar conclusion as to the spiritual attributes of God: "We ought not to call God a Spirit to express positively what he is, but rather to signify only that he is not matter. . . . His true name is He that is; or, in other words, being without restriction, All-being, the being infinite and universal."¹ The error arises from overlooking the distinction of the positive powers of a being and their limitation. The denial of dependence and limitation does not annul the being and powers which are independent and unlimited. Fénelon insists that it is the finite which implies negation; that the infinite implies affirmation.² And Trendelenburg says the same: "The Absolute is not a negative notion. We reach it by a negative process; we remove everything which limits it. But the notion itself is positive, and if it is correctly thought is the most positive of all notions, because not limited."³

¹ Recherche de la Vérité, bk. iii. chap. 9.

² De l'Existence et des Attributs de Dieu, part ii. preuve ii.

³ Professor Max Müller says: "The true idea of the infinite is not a negation nor a modification of any other idea. The finite, on the contrary, is in reality the limitation or modification of the infinite, nor is it possible, if we reason in good earnest, to conceive of the finite in any other sense than as the shadow of the infinite." He adds a quotation from Roger Bacon: "It is called infinite not by negation of limits of quantity, but by negation of imperfection and non-being." — *Lect. on Language*, Second Series, pp. 596, 597.

Descartes denies that the infinite is a negative idea made up by negation of finiteness: "The idea of the infinite is very clear and very distinct, since

And it is true that if one affirms a limitation he denies the existence of the power beyond the limit. On the contrary, if he affirms illimitation he denies limitation, and this denial is the negation of a negation, and affirms the existence of the power beyond all limits. So immortality is in form a negative, but in fact it is the affirmation of life that never ends; and independence is negative in form, but in fact it is the affirmation of self-sustaining power.

Another error often implied in the objection to a positive but incomplete knowledge of the absolute, consists in hypostasizing the words finite and infinite, conditioned and unconditioned, as if they meant beings instead of mere limitation or illimitation of a being. The agnostic speaks of the absolute as if it were God, instead of being a mere adjective which denies all conditions and limitations. Of an absolute abstracted from being we certainly have no positive conception; we define it by negation. When this abstraction of absoluteness is substituted for the absolute Being, it is found to be only a tangle of negations and contradictions.

The objection is valid also against the false idea of the absolute as the subject of all contradictory attributes. So Hegel asks, "What kind of an absolute is that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included?" And Mansel accepts the conclusion as supported by unassailable reasoning.¹ But the reasoning rests on the false and even absurd idea that the absolute is simply the sum total of all things. They who accept this conclusion and yet believe that the absolute exists, must assume that the law that two contradictory principles cannot both be true of the same object, is not applicable to the absolute. Thus, as J. S. Mill rightly infers, they extinguish all reasoning respecting the absolute by a reduction *ad absurdissimum*.² Such an absolute would be not only unknowable, but a congeries of contradictions. Of such a God we may adopt the words of a philosopher a thousand years ago: "Deus ipse nescit se, quid est, quia non est quid."

We therefore conclude that the absolute Being cannot be known all which my mind clearly and distinctly conceives as true and real is wholly wrapped up and contained in this idea. . . . I plainly see that there is more reality in an infinite substance than in a finite one, since to conceive the latter we must take away something from our idea of the former and so far limit and restrict it. Hence in some way my mind must conceive the infinite before it can have any notion of the finite."

¹ Limits of Religious Thought, p. 76.

² Exam. of Hamilton, vol. i. pp. 60, 61.

completely by the finite mind, whether man or angel, whether in this life or through everlasting ages in the life to come. On the other hand we affirm with equal decisiveness that the finite mind has positive and real knowledge of God. And the finite spirit may be "increasing in the knowledge of God" forever. Christian writers sometimes make admissions in which unawares they affirm sheer agnosticism. Richard Hooker says: "Though to know him be life, and joy to make mention of his name, yet our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as indeed he is, neither can know him; and our safest eloquence is our silence, whereby we confess without confession that his glory is inexplicable, his greatness beyond our capacity and reach." With all its affluence of diction this is a denial that man has any knowledge of God as he is.¹

Christian poetry and devotion may say with Thomson: —

" But I lose
Myself in him, in Light ineffable; .
Come then expressive silence, muse his praise."

But it is said, not by logic and philosophy, not in conscious ignorance of God, but at the summit of knowledge of him already attained, in the vision of his perfections already revealed, in the loftiest flight of devotion looking beyond the revealed perfection on the glory that is unspeakable, that dazzles and blinds with excess of light.

5. Theism claims that the absolute Being is the all-conditioning as well as the unconditioned. If the absolute is a being and not a mere abstraction of a negation, the fact that it is unconditioned implies that it is the all-conditioning. The absolute Being, as the ultimate ground of the universe and accounting for it and all that is in it, cannot be included in the universe and must condition it and all in it. And theism insists that the unconditioned and all-conditioning Being must be the absolute, personal, energizing Reason, because no other can fill the positive idea of the absolute as the all-conditioning and account for the universe.

Thus we have the idea of the absolute as the original, eternal Power that has given being to the universe, and the immanent Power that sustains, energizes and directs its ongoing; the source of life which subordinates the energies of all the parts to the realizing of the end of the whole; the eternal and universal Rea-

¹ Augustine says: "Deus . . . sine qualitate bonus, sine quantitate magnus, sine indigentia creator, sine situ præsens, sine habitu omnia continens, sine loco ubique totus, sine tempore sempiternus, sine ulla mutatione mutabilia faciens, nihilque patiens." — *De Trinitate*, v. i. 2.

son, in which the universe lies eternal and archetypal in its principles, laws, ideals and ends ; the absolute Will in harmony with reason and ever progressively realizing its eternal and archetypal ideas and expressing in finite things its perfect wisdom and love ; and yet not plural, but the one indivisible Spirit, at once Reason and Will, living and energizing in wisdom and love. Thus theism explains the possibility of apprehending the universe in thought because it is the 'expression of archetypal thought, and so can be translated back into thought and the things in it apprehended in their intellectual equivalents. Hence it exists as a cosmos and may be known in systems of science. Hence it is progressively realizing higher ends and we find in it the strata of its progress in the past. We find in the universe a sphere of force ; and because a stronger force must always prevail over a weaker, we find in this sphere the law of the survival of the fittest, the strong overpowers and crowds out the weak. We find in it also the organic sphere, vegetable and animal, in which is the higher law that all the parts must act in subordination to realizing the idea of the whole — homologous with the law of love. We find in it personal beings in a rational system under the law of love. The unity of these wondrous spheres of mechanism, life and spirit in one reasonable, scientific and harmonious system is thinkable only in their common relation to God, the absolute Reason, the ground and support of the universe, energizing and directing in all. In him alone the antitheses of knowledge and being, thought and things, spirit and matter, infinite and finite find their synthesis and unity in the two systems of nature and spirit in one all-comprehending system, progressively realizing in finite beings the truths, laws, ideals and ends of perfect wisdom and love. In this alone do we find the explanation of man. The contradictions in his being have been the theme of both philosophers and poets. Pascal's vivid presentation of them is famous and familiar. Pope has set them forth in verse : —

“ Chaos of thought and passion all confused,
 Still by himself abused or disabused ;
 In doubt his mind or body to prefer,
 Born but to die and reasoning but to err ;
 Created half to rise and half to fall,
 Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all ;
 Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurled ;
 The glory, jest and riddle of the world.”

The explanation is found only when we know man as participating in the systems both of nature and of spirit, the object of

God's care, redeeming him from sin and from submersion in the life of nature to the spiritual life of faith in God and communion with him, and to participation in the divine life of love and in the divine work of delivering men from sin and evil.

Agnosticism fixes an impassable gulf between the absolute and the finite. We see the gulf and know that there is a somewhat beyond it; but thought itself cannot pass over to get even a glimpse of what the somewhat is. Pantheism attempts to bridge the gulf by the one only substance, or the all, or the universal, or some other entity. But all its attempts fail. Either the finite is lost in the absolute, or the absolute is lost in the finite, or the bridge proves to be a bridge of words which breaks down under the first reality which attempts to cross on it, and the gulf between the two is left impassable; the Spirit of God cannot come to the spirit of man, nor the spirit of man to the Spirit of God. The synthesis of the two in a unity satisfying all the demands of thought is found only when the absolute Being is known as the energizing Reason, the eternal Spirit revealing himself, through all his works and in the human consciousness, to the kindred spirit of man.

6. Atheism is not in agreement with itself, and in each of its forms is in some particulars in agreement with theism.

Atheism is not a self-consistent unity. Its four forms are not a solid phalanx against theism, but are in conflict with each other. Each rejects the conclusions and refutes the arguments of each of the others. Hence in controversy with theism the same objector cannot in consistency with himself use indiscriminately the objections of all the four; although this is often done. Each of them also fails to give any reasonable explanation of the universe or any satisfactory answer to the necessary and ultimate questions of the reason. To each also we may apply Mr. Huxley's warning as to his own speculations in the *Physical Basis of Life*: "I bid you beware that in accepting these conclusions you are placing your feet on the first rung of a ladder which in most people's estimation is the reverse of that of Jacob and leads to the antipodes of heaven." They agree only in erring from the truth and in their failure to satisfy either the intellect or the heart. Each proclaims the deviation of the others while never finding the path of truth itself.¹

¹ "Velut silvis, ubi passim
Palantes error certo de tramite pellit;
Ille sinistrorsum, hic dextrorsum abit; unus utrique
Error, sed variis illudit partibus." — Horace, *Sat.* lib. ii. 3, 48-51.

Atheism in each of its forms is in some particulars in agreement with theism.

The extreme positivism of Comte, which is at the farthest remove from theism, may be supposed to have nothing in common with it. It renounces all attempt to give a theoretical or philosophical construction of the universe and regards "the investigation of what are called causes, whether primal or final, as for us absolutely inaccessible and void of meaning." Yet positivism agrees with theism in recognizing the necessity of religion and proposing an object for it. In Comte's *Positive Philosophy* no such recognition is found. After its publication, in his love for Madame Clotilde de Vaux and his grief at her death, the religious element in his constitution seems to have been awakened and to have asserted itself in his consciousness. He speaks of his "moral regeneration" brought about by this "incomparable angel." In subsequent works he recognizes religion, proposes humanity as the Grand Être to be worshiped and prescribes an elaborate ritual. Of this Mr. Huxley said that it is Roman Catholicism with the religion left out. This religion, as expounded by Mr. Frederic Harrison, presents the ideal of all that is strongest, wisest, noblest and best in humanity as the object of worship. Here is agreement with theism in recognizing religion as necessary to man and in proposing as its object, not the universe nor any thing physical or material, but the true, the right, the perfect, the worthy and good, the rational and spiritual, in the highest forms in which they are known in the constitution and history of man. The fatal defect is that this grand object is only an abstract idea, not a being; much less a personal Spirit that can know, love and help the worshiper and be the object of his trust and hope and love.

Agnostics and monists generally agree with theism in the recognition of religion as constitutional in man and the necessity of providing for it, at least in the imagination, some object of worship.

Agnostics and monists further agree with theism in affirming the knowledge that absolute Being exists as the ultimate ground of the universe. Since physical science has left the Comtist positivism behind as inadequate to the purposes of science, the number who deny the knowledge that an absolute Being exists is inconsiderable; and the theist is justified in assuming that its existence at least is conceded by all who hold to the reality of knowledge in distinction from phenomenalism.

Monists, both pantheistic and materialistic, agree still further with theism in asserting that it is possible for man to have some positive and real knowledge of what the absolute Being is. This being admitted the next question at issue is, whether the absolute Being is Reason or Spirit.

On this question, again, the idealistic pantheists agree with the theist in affirming that, in some sense, it is so. Hartmann, for example, presents with great clearness and force convincing evidence that the absolute Being is Spirit. With pantheists of this type the question at issue is reduced to this: Is the absolute Reason or Spirit a conscious personal Spirit?

Materialism has little in common with theism beyond the bare recognition that something unconditioned exists and that we may know what it is; if indeed at the present day there are any materialists in the strict meaning of the word. Professor Haeckel and Dr. Büchner perhaps are as near as any among educated men to being representatives of this form of unbelief. Haeckel, after defining what he calls "scientific materialism," says: "Moral or ethical materialism . . . is quite distinct. . . . It proposes no other aim to man than the most refined possible gratification of the senses. It is based on the delusion that purely material enjoyment can alone give satisfaction to man. . . . The profound truth that the real value of life does not lie in material enjoyment but in moral action, that true happiness does not depend on external possessions but only on a virtuous life — this is unknown to ethical materialists."¹ Lange makes the same distinction: "If by practical materialism we understand a dominant inclination to material acquisition and enjoyment, then theoretical materialism is opposed to it, as is every effort of the spirit towards knowledge."² Materialism, denying that any thing exists except matter and its forces, is logically shut off from recognizing this higher end of life which transcends sensuous enjoyment and material acquisitions. These disclaimers, expressing the consciousness of cultivated men, are unwitting protests against materialism as not capable of satisfying the higher nature of man; they are unwitting revelations of the existence of that higher spiritual capacity which demands other than sensuous pleasures and material possessions; thus they are evidence that man can be comprehended only as a spirit related to God, the absolute Spirit. From many, who, whether properly called materialists or not, have lost their

¹ History of the Creation, vol. i. pp. 35-37, Trans.

² History of Materialism, vol. i. p. 46, Thomas's Trans.

belief in God, similar testimony comes in the sorrow and sometimes the anguish with which they see this great inspiration of the higher life dying out. Of the same purport is their testimony that in their best hours it spontaneously reasserts its power. Such is the testimony of Mr. Tyndall: "Christian men are proved by their writings to have their hours of weakness and doubt, as well as their hours of strength and conviction; and men like myself share, in their own way, these variations of mood and tense. . . . I have noticed during years of self-observation that it is not in hours of clearness and vigor that this doctrine (of materialistic atheism) commends itself to my mind; that in the presence of stronger and healthier thought it ever dissolves and disappears, as offering no solution of the mystery in which we dwell and of which we form a part."¹

Theism takes up whatever religious truth is implied in any form of atheism or in any line of human thought, supplies their defects, and gives, and it alone gives, a reasonable and satisfactory explanation of the universe.

7. It remains to notice some pantheistic misconceptions which some theists are inclining to accept as broadening and strengthening the positions of theism, but which only embarrass and confuse theistic thought. Whatever of truth is in these conceptions is more clearly, correctly and effectively set forth in theism itself, without the pantheistic error.

Kant says: "Reason has no ground, in regard to the category of substance, to proceed regressively with conditions. For accidents (qualities) so far as they inhere in a substance are coördinated with each other and do not constitute a series. And they are not properly subordinated to substance, but are the mode of existence of the substance itself. It is therefore only in the category of causality that we can find a series of causes to a given effect, in which we ascend from the effect as conditioned to the cause as conditioning, and thus answer the question of reason."² The questions of reason which theism must answer pertain not to substance but to cause, law and end; to the interaction of individual finite agents, personal and impersonal, and their unity in a dynamic and rational system. The essential conception of pantheism is that the universe is one in substance, by whatever name the substance may be called. This sets aside at once the essential and fundamental conceptions of theism.

¹ Preface to Address before the British Association at Belfast.

² Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, bk. ii. chap. ii. sect. 1.

From this unwarranted primal assumption of pantheism arises a swarm of inferences incompatible with theism.

Hegel says that if one considers the reality of things he must renounce his own individuality, cease to regard reason as his own in a distinct personality, and must regard himself as universal consciousness; for the reason is the divine spirit; and only in this way can he escape the antitheses which appear in the universe. This is a necessary inference if there is but one being and man is only a mode of the universal substance, having no personal being and destined to be reabsorbed into the absolute again. But theism recognizes individual persons who know God, are subjects of his law and objects of his love, and who live in communion with him. Therefore, according to theism, the nearer man comes to God, and the more clearly and fully he sees him in the grandeur of his perfections, the breadth, purity and inviolability of his law, and the greatness of his redeeming love, the more is he aware of his own personal greatness and worth, the more does his personality reveal its godlike powers, the more does he become aware of the responsibility, obligations and possibilities of his personal being.

Hegel also says that to apprehend God as the supreme Being is to make him hollow, empty and poor. This is a necessary inference from pantheism. God is the one only being; he cannot be the supreme Being, for this would distinguish him from other beings. But according to theism God is distinguished from all finite beings as the ground of their existence. He is the supreme Being as the absolute Reason in whom all truth and law are eternal, the eternal ground of all truth, law, authority and obligation.

Hegel says that the wisdom of this age has made God an infinite ghost (*Gesperst*) which is far from us beyond the stars; and so has made human perception (*Erkenntniss*) into an empty ghost of finiteness, or into a mirror on which fall only forms and phenomena. But the alternative is not between one only being, and God a ghost beyond the stars; for according to the theistic idea God is not far from every one of us, we know him, trust him, commune with him, serve him. And this is not the pantheistic losing of ourselves in the absolute, but it is standing before God face to face, it is being received by him as his children, it is greatening the personality of man by his communion with God and service of him, it is knowing him, as Niebulr says, "Heart to heart with us."

Those who have merely an historical knowledge of God and have not become personally acquainted with him in experience are compared by Hegel to book-keepers in a great commercial house who keep account of all the transactions but own nothing themselves in the concern.¹ The distinction is important and the comparison striking. Yet since the pantheist thinks himself merely a mode of the absolute Being, and will himself eventually lose his individual being in the All whence he came, it is he who knows the absolute while personally he owns no interest therein; it is not the theist, who knows God as the giver of all good; who is the recipient of his blessings, active in his service, filled with his fulness, and can say: "Thou art my Father, my God and the rock of my salvation;" and who looks forward to personal immortality in communion with him.

Hartmann objects: "God cannot be called holy, because he has not, like a limited personality, to govern his relations to other persons by moral laws. God, as the cause of moral law, is indeed its sanctifier, but he is not holy according to its criterion. Only when it is shown that God does not stand with his personal caprice behind the law as its maker, but goes out with his will into the moral world-order, and also that the moral world-order, so far as it affects man, can itself be identified with God, may the holiness of the moral world-order be transferred to the God identical with it."² But here is the error that the alternative is between God as the unconscious constitution of things, and a God standing with his personal caprice behind law, thus making law to be the arbitrary decree of a capricious will. Whereas theism presents God as the absolute Reason in whom all truth and law are archetypal and eternal. These eternal principles and laws are the constitution of the universe. No power of either physical force or personal agency, no will-power of man or God can annul, subvert or change them. And with these truths and laws, these rational ideals and ends, God's will in free spontaneity is eternally in harmony. The universe as the progressive and never ending realization of these principles is the progressive expression and revelation of the eternal and perfect Reason.

An objection is urged that in ascribing reason, will and various attributes to God we think of him as divided, as dual or plural. But as theism puts it, these are merely different names of the one absolute Being revealed in different aspects. When we think

¹ Hegel, *Philosophie der Religion*, vol. i. pp. 31, 34, 37, 42.

² *Die Religion des Geistes*, pp. 171, 172, part B.

that all truths, laws, ideals and ends, and all archetypes of things in accordance with the same, are eternal in the absolute Being, we call him Reason. When we think of him energizing in accordance with these truths and laws for the realization of all perfection and good, we call him Will or Power; and in reference to his character revealed in the eternal harmony of the will with the reason, we call him Love and Wisdom. When we think of him as conscious of himself in unity and identity, we call him Person. When we think of him as unconditioned in dependence and unlimited in time, space and quantity, we call him the Absolute and the Infinite. When we think of him as the author and supporter of the universe, we call him the All-conditioning, the "Great First Cause." But as the one being existing in all these aspects, we call him God, the eternal Spirit.

As theism puts it, God is the ground alike of all finite being, power and rational intelligence. Reason must be universal; truth and right, the rational standards of perfection and worth, must be everywhere and always the same. The power that orders the universe must order it according to the universal principles, laws, ideals and ends of the one absolute Reason; otherwise no rational conclusion would be possible, no scientific observation would be trustworthy, no scientific system could be verified, science would be disintegrated, and all knowledge crumbled into isolated and illusive impressions. Hence God is essential to the reality of all knowledge as well as of all being. We cannot think him away; for without the assumption explicit or implied of his existence, all ratiocinated thought becomes empty and cannot conclude in knowledge. If thought rests ultimately on zero all its creations and conclusions must be zero.

If we assume that God, as indeterminate being, is zero and that he comes to consciousness in man, then it is man who creates God rather than God who creates man. So J. G. Fichte is said to have announced to his class: "To-morrow we will create God." If we assume the external existence, independent of God, of gross matter, or of a homogeneous nebulous matter, or of a formless and motionless fluid, or of something still more subtile, the principles and laws which are the constitution of the universe, then God is conditioned by this reality existing independent of himself and becomes a mere demiurge, shaping the worlds as under these external and independent conditions he best can. And here again the ultimate ground of the universe is in the impersonal and the unconscious.

On either of these last mentioned assumptions a man may consistently amuse himself by toying with the idea of God. He may ask himself what would be if God were other than he is, or if he did not exist, and may imagine that he can answer the questions. He may think of God as non-existent and yet may imagine the universe with its constitution and laws remaining as it is, and himself existing and thinking under the regulative principles of reason as now. What difference does the non-existence of God make to his rationality? Neither his own rational constitution nor the constitution of the universe is dependent on God. He is above God and can in thought dismiss him from the universe. God is not essential to his knowledge and rationality. He admits God indeed to a corner of his mind. He timorously pleads that it is possible to have some knowledge of God; or if not knowledge, at least an indefinable belief. The knowledge of God is dubiously admitted, while the knowledge of the universe is pronounced real and indubitable and would remain indubitable knowledge if there were no God. Hence his religion may consistently be crowded into a corner of his life, into a closet in which he worships; while the great area of life and its interests lies entirely outside of it; and both his thinking about God and his religion take on unreality.

When one accustomed to such thoughts of God begins to see that God is the absolute Reason, that he cannot be thought otherwise without annulling man's own reason, that if he is non-existent the universe with its constitution, its rational principles and laws, its ideals and its good, disappears with him and there no longer remains any reason or any intelligent thought, then his knowledge of God will take on a reality, grandeur and power such as he had never conceived. Instead of timorously pleading to be allowed some belief in God in a corner of his knowledge, he will see that his own rationality and all rational intelligence rest on the existence of God, the supreme Reason. Instead of amusing himself with thinking God other than he is or non-existent, he will see that all rational intelligence rests on his existence; and that if God were not or were other than he is, all rational thought and knowledge would cease, there would be no difference between the reasonable and the absurd and the one would be as possible as the other, and the universe and all its principles and laws, its perfection and its worth, would be no more. Now the knowledge of God, no longer crowded into a corner and affirmed with doubt, becomes the basis of all rational

thinking and the all-pervading and sustaining life of all rational intelligence. And religion, no longer secluded in a corner, takes possession of man's whole being, inspires and ennobles all his activity, is that which alone makes life worth living. He begins to understand that God is not far from every one of us; that in him we live and move and have our being.

Man's consciousness of his limitations reveals his consciousness of the absolute. He beats against the bars of his cage because he has wings and is competent to soar in the empyrean beyond. Brutes follow their instincts with no irksomeness under their limitations and no consciousness that they are limited. It is because their limitation is complete and they have no capacity for another sphere. Complete limitation excludes all consciousness of the limit. Man's consciousness of limitation is the consciousness of a reserved power which would find its sphere if the limitations were removed. Man cannot be content in the finite only. He aspires to know the absolute Being, to enter into communion with him and to know all reality in unity in relation to him. It is this aspiration toward the absolute, this struggle to transcend the limits of sense and matter, this longing to commune with the eternal Spirit, which reveals the grandeur of man's being, and which has been the spring of all that is noblest and greatest in the achievements of the individual and in the history of mankind.

We have already considered the belief in a divinity which arises spontaneously from the constitution of man as acted on by his environment, and have thus ascertained the origin of the idea of God. We have seen that this spontaneous belief must be verified in thought. The verification is the proof that God exists. We have been considering the verification of this belief directly from the intuitive reason, and have found that it is a principle of reason and a necessary law of thought that an absolute Being exists. Here then we have, if I may so say, two legs of the belief in God resting firmly on what is constitutional, spontaneous and intuitive in man. We have the primitive belief in a divinity arising in experience, and the belief that absolute Being exists, arising in rational intuition. We proceed to inquire what this absolute Being must be and whether it is the God whom we ought to worship. Is the God whom we worship the absolute Being that reason reveals?

PART III.

GOD REVEALED IN THE UNIVERSE AS PERSONAL SPIRIT THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE AND THE CONSTITUTION AND HISTORY OF MAN.

“Wouldst know the whole? then scan the parts; for all
That molds the great lies mirrored in the small.” — Goethe.

“If we insist on penetrating the insoluble mystery of the essential cause of phenomena, there is no hypothesis more satisfactory than that they proceed from wills dwelling in them or outside of them. . . . Were it not for the pride induced by metaphysical and scientific studies it would be inconceivable that any atheist, ancient or modern, should have believed that his vague hypothesis on such a subject was preferable to this direct mode of explanation. And it was the only mode which really satisfied reason, until men began to see the utter folly and inutility of all search for absolute truth. The order of nature is doubtless very imperfect; but its production is far more compatible with the hypothesis of an intelligent will than with that of a blind mechanism. Persistent atheists therefore would seem to be the most illogical of theologians; for they occupy themselves with the same questions, yet reject the only appropriate method of handling them.” — Comte, *Politique Positive*, Translation, vol. i. p. 37, London ed. 1875.

“Very little thought is required to satisfy one's self that the natural, all and everywhere, rests upon the supernatural and terminates in it. Every atom of nature still preaches its supernatural origin and being.” — Hartmann, *Die Religion des Geistes*, part B, p. 118.

“Nature is a kind of illuminated table of the contents of the spirit.” — Novalis.

“Esse apibus partem divinæ mentis, et haustus
Æthereos dixere; deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cælumque profundum.”
Virgil, *Georgic* iv. 220–223.

“Man is man's A, B, C; there's none that can
Read God aright unless he first spell man.” — Quarles.

“Res non tam sub duratione quam sub quadam specie æternitatis percipit et numero infinito.” — Spinoza, *De Intellectus Emendatione*, Opera, vol. ii. p. 41, Leipsic, ed. 1844.

“No bar the spirit-world hath ever borne;
It is thy thought is shut, thy heart is dead.
Up, scholar, bathe, unwearied and unworn,
Thine earthly breast in morning's beams of red.”

CHAPTER XI.

GOD REVEALED IN THE UNIVERSE AS THE POWER FROM WHICH IT ORIGINATES AND ON WHICH IT DEPENDS.

THEISM affirms that the absolute Being is revealed in the universe as the personal God, the eternal Spirit, both in the physical system and in the moral or spiritual. This revelation is three-fold.

God is revealed in the causal energy acting in the universe, as the Power from which it originates and on which it depends; as the First Cause, whose power is manifested continuously and everywhere in the universe.

God is revealed in the universe as personal Spirit through the constitution and course of nature.

God is further revealed in the universe as personal Spirit through the constitution and history of man. These three lines of God's revelation of himself in the universe will be the subjects of the three chapters of this Third Part.

These three lines of evidence are commonly called arguments. They consist rather in tracing out and interpreting the manifestations or revelations of the absolute Being in the universe. So far as they involve argument it consists in inferring from these manifestations what the absolute Being is revealed to be.

In controverting these arguments it is commonly assumed that they are presented as evidences that the absolute Being exists. But thus the true point and significance of the evidence are missed, and at the utmost all which is refuted is what the evidence is not designed to prove. We already know that the absolute Being exists. This is a necessary principle of reason or law of thought underlying all proving and all thinking.

Assuming this, in the three lines of evidence now to be considered we are not proving that the absolute Being exists, but by the study of the universe so far as open to our observation, we are ascertaining what can be known of the absolute Being everywhere manifested in it. Theism claims that it finds in the universe manifestations of the absolute Being, unchanging in its

eternal essence, the all-originating and ever energizing first Cause, the universal and supreme Reason. This is being in its highest form, Being, Power, Reason, the three in one, unconditioned, unchangeable, the eternal Spirit, the personal God. We are to examine the universe to ascertain whether this claim of theism can be substantiated.

The first of the three lines of evidence is called the cosmological argument.

This considers the universe merely as existing and manifesting power or causal energy; it takes no notice of the existence of rational beings in the universe nor of the evidence of rational direction and design. And all which the theist aims to establish by it is, that the absolute Being is revealed in the universe as the first Cause, as the absolute and unconditioned source of the causal energies ever acting in it, as the transcendent Power from which it proceeds and on which it depends. It is not therefore the whole evidence as to what the absolute Being is, but only a single step in attaining the knowledge of it. All objections to this line of evidence, because it does not prove something other than this, are entirely aside from the point.

In examining this evidence, the essential point is to ascertain whether the absolute Being is a first Cause that transcends the universe or is simply identical with it.

Monism, pantheistic and materialistic, affirms that the absolute Being is identical with the universe; that there is therefore no occasion to inquire for any transcendent cause. The false ideas and methods, the difficulties and contradictions involved in all monistic theories have already been exposed. In contradiction of these, theism affirms that the universe, so far as known to us, is found to be incompatible with the monistic theories; that it is essentially limited, conditioned and dependent; that therefore it cannot itself be the absolute Being; that consequently it must be dependent on causal power other than and transcending the universe. The cosmological argument consists in establishing this position from an examination of the universe so far as we can know it. Hence Leibnitz rightly called it the argument from the contingency of the world. It is necessary to this argument to establish the fact that the universe is always conditioned and dependent, consequently an effect. Then the inference is inevitable that the universe is not itself the eternal, self-existent, unconditioned Being, but that it reveals the power of the absolute Being transcending it and on which it depends.

Here it is objected that in order to prove that the universe is an effect we must prove that it had a beginning. And it is urged with triumphant confidence that this is impossible. Of course it is impossible to prove by any historical testimony that the universe had a beginning. But an object, an arrangement, an equilibrium of forces may be known to be an effect, although the causal act has not been observed. The most of scientific discoveries of unknown causes rest on the assumption that causes may be thus discovered. In the same manner we may know that the universe is an effect. It is known to be so because it bears in its essence unmistakable marks of finiteness and dependence. This becomes continually more evident the more thoroughly science explores it.

First, the universe cannot be comprehended scientifically by the recognition only of its multitudinous and finite forces in disintegration. Science is found to be possible only on the basis of the maxim that the sum of all forces potential and energetic is always the same. Nothing can ever be added to it or taken from it; and it is manifested or revealed in all the particular and measurable forces observed in the universe. This maxim physical science assumes without proof as a self-evident principle of reason or law of thought and necessary to all scientific knowledge of the universe. Thus science by its exploration of the universe has discovered that it, with all its multitudinous beings and forces, is in the unity of a dynamic system; that it is an effect; and that it is the effect of one cause. Here then the first requisite of the cosmological argument is already scientifically established.

And it is evident that this power is not merely the sum of all the finite powers acting in the universe; for this would imply that it is consequent and dependent on them; whereas, if this power is to meet the demand of science under this necessary law of thought, it must be their antecedent and cause. Therefore it must be the absolute, originant and transcendent cause of the universe.

And this power or cause cannot be finite. Whatever power is finite and measurable must be capable of increase or diminution. This power, which is the one power from which the universe proceeds, and which is manifested in all its finite energies, and is incapable of increase or diminution, must be the absolute and transcendent Power.

But there can be no power without a being. Power or force is unthinkable except as exerted or conveyed by a being. If we

hypostasize the power, we only delude ourselves by transferring to it the essential attributes of substantial being.

Thus physical science brings us to the same necessary law of thought which is recognized in philosophy and theology; the power from which the universe proceeds is the power of the absolute Being, transcending the universe and manifested or revealed in it.

It may be added that science finds the universe to be not merely in a dynamic but also in a rational unity. At the basis of all science is the assumption that the universe is throughout a reasonable universe, capable of being scientifically known by rational beings so far as their rational powers are developed and they have opportunity to observe it; and this assumption is confirmed by the whole progress of scientific investigation. This implies the absolute and universal Reason, everywhere the same and everywhere energizing and directing. Here again science discloses the unity of the universe as an effect depending on a cause transcending itself. Further than this the application of this thought is not pertinent in the line of evidence now under consideration.

It may be added, however, in respect to the moral system, that while men know themselves rational and free, they also know in their own self-consciousness that they are limited, conditioned and dependent. They know that the ultimate ground of the universe is not in man. The very consciousness of moral obligation carries in it the consciousness of a law above man, eternal in the Reason that is absolute and supreme. Therefore, so far as the universe has come to any consciousness of itself, it is a consciousness of limitation and dependence, and of a law transcending the universe and significant only as it is eternal in the absolute Reason.

In the second place, the physical universe is in its essence finite and conditioned. To know it as such it is not necessary to push our observations to its utmost limits and to trace with our own eyes its farthest bounds. Limitation and conditionateness are of the essence of matter, for it is essentially that which is contained in and occupies space, and is in other particulars in its essence dependent and finite. In its masses and its molecules, and in every form of its existence in time and space, it is essentially finite and conditioned, and cannot be the absolute and unconditioned Being.

Materialism supposes a definite quantity of matter and force

in the universe, conceivably measurable. This is a necessary conception from the essential finiteness of matter. If now it is assumed that the power from which the universe proceeds and on which it depends is identical with the universe itself, it is a limited power. The universe then becomes a mechanism which constructs itself, generates its own force, expends energy in work forever, and continually reproduces the force expended. This implies a mechanism realizing the absurdity of a perpetual self-generating motion. And this is as absurd in a great machine as in a small one.

Thus again science discovers that the causal energy which originates and sustains the universe cannot be the same with the universe itself, but must transcend it. The conception that it is identical with the universe is unthinkable, unless the essential meaning of matter is changed and it is assumed to be endowed with the attributes of the absolute Being.

Thirdly, the universe is found in fact to be an effect in all its parts and in every condition in which man knows it.

According to the old conception of a universe finished and at rest and of the inertia of matter, this would not have been evident. A mere unchanging substance carries the mind back on no regression to a cause. But science has discovered that nothing in the universe is inactive or at rest. Everywhere and always, everything, from the largest mass to the minutest molecule, is in intense activity putting forth and receiving energy. Wherever we find the universe or any thing in it, we find it an effect of previous energy and a cause of new conditions. And a series of causal actions, with nothing that originates it and nothing that persists and is manifested in it, is unthinkable.

Thus, in whatever condition the physical universe is found, we must always go back to an antecedent condition in order to account for it. In its determinate condition it is always found to be an effect. Accordingly Kant says: "As every determination of matter which constitutes what is real in it is an effect which must have had a cause, and is for this reason always derived, the notion of matter cannot harmonize with the idea of a necessary being in its character as the principle of all derived unity."¹

Further, in its search for physical causes science seems to be receding from matter and recognizing causes which continually approximate to an abandonment of its essential idea. In accounting for masses of matter it recognizes molecules; in explaining

¹ Critique of Pure Reason, Transc. Dialectic, bk. iii. chap. iii. sect. 5.

the molecules it supposes atoms; in explaining the ethers it supposes atoms of a second order; and in explaining the atoms it supposes that the atom itself may be a complicated system with its parts moving and interacting. Thus in finding the physical causes of the various determinate conditions of matter science seems to be demonstrating that physical effects cannot be ultimately accounted for by physical causes; it seems to find itself gradually forced out of the material universe to look for a cause that transcends it.

If we push our inquiries into the internal constitution of matter to the molecules and ultimate atoms, we must indeed suppose that they exist unchanged through all the changes of nature. But this very fact is urged by Clerk-Maxwell to prove that they are not products of nature. "The formation of the molecule is an event not belonging to that order of nature under which we live. It is an operation of a kind which is not, so far as we are aware, going on on earth, or in the sun or the stars, either now or since these bodies were formed. It must be referred to the epoch, not of the formation of the earth or of the solar system, but of the establishment of the existing order of nature, and till not only these worlds and systems, but the very order of nature itself is dissolved, we have no reason to expect the occurrence of any operation of a similar kind."

To many minds there seems to be a contradiction involved in the eternal existence of the atoms, on account of their limitation in space and the multitude of them. Professor Maxwell adds that they are alike. "There are immense numbers of atoms of the same kind, and the constants of each of these atoms are incapable of adjustment by any process now in action. Each is physically independent of all the others. Whether or not the conception of a multitude of beings existing from all eternity is in itself self-contradictory, the conception becomes palpably absurd when we attribute a relation of quantitative equality to all these beings. We are then forced to look beyond them to some common cause or common origin to explain why this singular relation of equality exists, rather than any one of the infinite number of possible relations of inequality. Science is incompetent to reason on the creation of the world out of nothing. We have reached the utmost limit of our thinking faculties when we have admitted that, because matter cannot be eternal and self-existent, it must have been created."¹

¹ Encyc. Brit. vol. iii. art. Atom, p. 49, 9th ed.

Thus, from its ultimate atoms to its largest masses and its grandest systems, nature reveals itself finite and dependent. Nowhere in all our search through the material worlds do we find any cause which accounts for the universe itself nor ultimately for any of its parts. Modern science repeats with new emphasis the ancient words of Job: "The depth saith, It is not in me, and the sea saith, It is not in me." But the universe and everything in it points to a cause beyond itself.

Fourthly, this conclusion is confirmed by the theory of evolution. This supposes a beginning of motion; for when motion begins the nebulous matter must cease to be homogeneous. The theory does not profess to account for the beginning of motion except by the intimation of a force incident on the homogeneous; this, if it means anything, means a cause of motion outside of the universe itself. Therefore, even if we suppose matter to have been without beginning as a formless and motionless fluid, imperceptible by sense till motion began, as some scientists conjecture, or as a homogeneous nebulous matter, as Spencer supposes, it could never have been the cause of its own motion, but the motion must have been communicated from without. Then the universe as we now know it is the effect of a cause that transcends it. Evolution also involves the necessary eventual cessation of motion. If by its continuous and necessary interaction all its forces must come into equilibrium and all motion cease, this proves that the motion and the energy revealed in it must have had a beginning. Thus modern researches in the science of heat seem to give us scientific knowledge that the universe had a beginning and is an effect, and as such is conditioned and dependent.¹

Finally, there are gaps or breaks, both in the interaction of bodies in the physical system and in its evolution, which cannot be accounted for under the law of the conservation and correlation of force. Science teaches that bodies, whether molar or molecular, never come into real contact. In cohesion, chemical affinity and gravitation, the action is always at a distance. Whether we suppose the force acting in the universe to be inherent in the masses or the molecules, or to be communicated by impact, we are confronted in every direction by this mystery of action at a distance and by other difficulties which science has never resolved. And in the evolution of the cosmos there are breaks, in the appearance of higher powers unaccounted for by

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 455-536.

any cause or force known to science. Such are the beginning of organic life, the beginning of sensitivity, and the beginning of rational personality.¹

From these distinct lines of evidence the conclusion is inevitable that the universe is essentially dependent and conditioned, and that the absolute Being cannot be the universe itself but must transcend it.

When we found that man has knowledge that the absolute Being exists we parted company with the extreme positivists. Here we part from the monists, pantheistic and materialistic; for we have refuted their theory that the absolute Being is the same with the universe. We have learned that the universe has not its ultimate ground and cause in itself. This necessarily implies that the absolute Being is distinct from the universe and transcends it; that it is the eternal Being from which the universe proceeds; the first and ever energizing cause on which the universe depends always for its existence, and whose power is continually manifested in it.

Mr. Spencer goes with the theist to this point. He maintains as strenuously as the theist that we have knowledge that the absolute Being exists, and that this is a necessary law of thought, "the best guaranteed of all." He also maintains that we know the absolute positively as the omnipresent Power manifesting itself in the universe. He affirms essentially the same knowledge of God which the theist reaches, aside from religious experience, in the conclusion of this cosmological argument. It is only in inconsistency with himself that he persists in affirming that the absolute Being is the Unknowable. He ought also to see that the evidence in the universe that the absolute is Reason, is of the same kind and equally convincing with the evidence that the absolute is Power. It is surprising that he and other rejecters of theism do not see that the conception of the universe as grounded in and directed by energizing Reason or God, is as completely a scientific comprehension of it as the conception of it as grounded in an insensate homogeneous, or in Power, or in the one substance, or in primordial atoms, or matter in any form; and that the theistic subordination of the physical to the spiritual completes the unity of these, the duality of which cannot be removed by atheism in any form, but remains a separating gulf which non-theistic theories can never bridge.

An objection is urged that theism implies a beginning of the

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, 420-427, 491-526.

universe; and there is always a difficulty in thinking of its beginning. But it is a difficulty which presses just as heavily on pantheism, materialism, agnosticism and evolution, as on theism. Theism accounts for this difficulty. The absolute reveals itself as Reason energizing in wisdom and love. Yet it must always reveal itself as the absolute; and there must be mystery all along the line at which the absolute expresses or reveals itself in the finite. Creation can be thought in the sense that the universe is always dependent on God for its existence. God is through all time the *prius* of the universe and the ground of its existence.

Another objection is that this argument proves only that the cause of the universe is adequate to the effect actually produced, but not that it is unconditioned and unlimited in power. Thus Hegel argues that an infinite cause cannot be inferred from a finite effect.¹ Hume has urged the same objection: "The cause must be proportioned to the effect. . . . Allowing the gods to be the authors of the existence and order of the universe, it follows that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence and benevolence which appears in their workmanship; but nothing further can be proved."

It may be replied that if the argument proves the existence of a being with power adequate to cause the universe, then the power of this being must transcend all other power actually existing, which, as derived from the first cause and dependent on it, must be inferior to it. The first cause is then practically the supreme and almighty Being.

But the radical error in this objection is that it assumes that the existence of the absolute is proved by an inference from effect to cause. Under the principle of causation we can infer from an effect only a cause adequate to produce it; and from the universe as an effect we can infer, as the objector insists, only a cause adequate to produce it. And this does not give us the absolute Being in its true meaning. On the contrary, that the absolute Being exists is a necessary intuition of reason, a fundamental law of thought, which asserts itself as the necessary ultimate postulate in every line of thought. Against this position this and analogous objections are powerless. And the position itself is impregnable, so long as knowledge of being is admitted. This is now accepted, as we have seen, as an ultimate postulate and necessary law of thought, by materialists, pantheists and

¹ Philosophie der Religion, vol. ii. pp. 23, 24.

Spencerian agnostics. It is also implied in the fundamental postulate of physical science, that the sum of matter and of force potential and energetic is forever the same. And thus it may truly be said that the last word of science is the first word of theology.

Closely allied to the objection last considered is another, founded on the persistence of force; that there is an exact equivalence of causes and effects; that the effect is the cause itself reappearing in a new form; that therefore in reasoning from the effect to the cause we simply find in the cause that which we had already found in the effect. To this also the answer is the same, that we do not profess to prove the existence of God merely by reasoning from effect to cause under the law of causation.

This objection implies also another error, that the cause is simply the force which is transmitted and reappears in a new form. But the cause implies a being that exerts or conveys the force and the effect is some change in the being that receives the force. If a cannon ball strikes a building and shatters it, the force that shattered the building is the same with the force which was in the moving ball; but the ball which conveyed the force and caused the effect is not the same with the effect, and has not passed into the effect and disappeared. The theory that the cause is the force and in the effect remains the same in a new form, is tenable only on some theory which denies all real being and resolves all reality into disembodied force. But if the cannon ball is nothing but a force, the force, which constitutes it a ball and abides in it as such, is just as completely distinguished, and not only distinguished but separated from the force it conveys and transmits, as it is if the ball is a being. Hence it is necessarily hypostasized, or regarded in thought as a being. So that, think of it as one will, a cause is not identical with its effect, is not transmitted into the effect, does not disappear in the effect, but remains capable of further causal efficiency. In reasoning from an effect, therefore, the causal judgment requires not merely a force exerted, but also a being that conveyed or exerted it. Pushing our thought back under the demands of the causal judgment, we are obliged at last, by a necessary law of thought, to believe in the existence of a Being that is the first cause in which all the powers actually found in the universe exist potentially. And the being that is the cause of the universe is not identical with it. When we apply a similar train of thought to rational free agents, who are self-directive and self-exertive,

the futility of the objection becomes still more apparent. In fact the force of the objection rests on the assumption that the universe consists solely of physical forces acting in the fixed course of nature, and that no supernatural being and in fact no real being of any kind exists.

Hegel objects that if we argue from effect to cause, we condition the cause by the effect.¹ This, however, is only one of those pantheistic objections which arise from a false idea of the absolute as the sum total of all realities, or as indeterminate being, or as out of all relations, and from the false method of confounding the order of a logical process with the order of historical and concrete reality. It can be no limitation of a potential cause that it is able to exert its powers in action; it would be a limitation if it could not. It may be added that it is as much a limitation of absolute substance to unroll itself into many modes, as for an absolute cause to exert its energies in causing many effects, or for absolute reason to express its thoughts of wisdom and love in finite forms. But these answers need not be insisted on, for this objection, like those preceding, derives its force from the error that the existence of God is proved solely by reasoning from effect to cause.

There are also various objections to the cosmological argument which are founded on erroneous definitions of a cause.

Some of them rest on the error that cause and effect denote merely antecedent and consequent. Mr. Boole exemplifies it: A little boy asked his brother, Why does going to sleep at night make it light in the morning? His brother, a year or two older, could answer, that it would be light in the morning even if little boys did not go to sleep at night.² Men always distinguish between a cause, in which they recognize power or force, and a mere antecedent. Even the child in the anecdote made this distinction, for he thought his going to bed made the sun rise. His mistake was not as to the nature of a cause but as to the question of fact, what was the particular cause of a particular effect. This objection is nullified by the present scientific conception of force and its fundamental importance in all scientific thought. Science does not recognize mere antecedence and consequence, but energy actually exerted. The law of the correlation and conservation of force is a scientific recognition of this in causation. The objection is consistent only with complete phenomenalism

¹ *Phil. der Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 24, 25.

² *Boole's Laws of Thought*, p. 361.

or Comtist positivism, which rejects the reality of force, "as a mere figment of the imagination." Yet even these positivists are obliged to use the word, and their language implies that they, in common with all men, in describing actual events, have a consciousness of the reality of the efficient power which they deny. Hence Mr. Spencer says: "The consciousness of cause can be abolished only by abolishing consciousness itself."¹ And Dr. Carpenter says: "The notion of force is one of those elementary forms of thought with which we can no more dispense than we can with the notion of space or of succession."²

There are also objections founded on the theory that the belief in causation is the result of mental impotence. But it has been shown that the causal judgment does not rest on mental impotence, but on the positive, self-evident intuition of reason. The same is true of all the first principles of reason, which are laws of thought and action. They do not arise from mental impotence, but from mental power. They are the constituent elements of reason, by which man is distinguished from the brutes, is capable of reasonable knowledge, attains scientific comprehension of the universe, and is in affinity with God and in his likeness. On them not only theology and philosophy, but also all the reasoning of empirical science, must rest.

Other objections are founded on the supposition that the causal judgment is merely the result of an association of ideas in experience. Resting on this theory Professor Clifford ridicules the argument from causation as invalid and even silly. He says that the Greek word represented by cause "has sixty-four meanings in Plato, and forty-eight in Aristotle." The latter defines explicitly the four meanings of cause as he uses the word. But if the assertion of Professor Clifford were true, his inference from it would rest on the puerile conception that a word cannot be used with exactness in science and philosophy if it is also used with various other meanings in common speech. In precisely the same way the arguments of scientists respecting "force" may be ridiculed, because the word "force" is sometimes used to denote the stuffing of a turkey for roasting, and the Imperial Dictionary gives it twenty-eight separately numbered definitions, with a number of synonyms under almost every one. This is not an argument but an appeal to ignorance. Charity would hope that it was also from ignorance. But this is not easy to be believed

¹ The Classification of the Sciences, p. 36.

² Address before the British Association, 1872.

of a man characterized in the Rede Lecture before the University of Cambridge in 1885 as "one of the most powerful intellects ever sent out into the world by this University." Professor Clifford proceeds to give the significance of the causal judgment as he views it, and ridicules the use of it in philosophy and theology. When we have become familiar with a property of any being and so this has become associated in our minds with its other properties, we transfer this property by analogy to any other being that has any casual resemblance to it. You come to a scarecrow and ask what its cause is. You learn that it is designed to frighten birds. You conclude that every thing is like the scarecrow and exists for a purpose. You see a hair-dresser's rotary brush and ask for the cause of its motion; you learn that it is a man at the handle; you conclude that every thing has a man at the handle. By and by a case arises to which your simile will not apply; you say that is a mystery. In illustration of this he supposes a man to infer from his own nervous system that his umbrella has a nervous system; but, as he cannot make that out, he says the nervous system of his umbrella is a mystery. Whereas he should say that it has no nervous system.¹ In this caricature, for it cannot be called an argument, he confuses under the idea of cause the efficient cause, the final cause and the principle of the uniformity and continuity of nature, apparently without being aware of the difference between them. And the belief in causation he explains as the result of a casual association of ideas and some loose resemblance unscientifically observed. But if this is the true conception of the causal judgment, it involves the denial of the validity of all inferences from an effect to its cause or from the uniformity and continuity of nature. But since all physical science rests helplessly on the principles on which these inferences rest, his ridicule is as effective against it as against philosophy and theology.

Physicus, in Theism, thinks that he has put it forever beyond controversy that the persistence of force, the indestructibility of matter and the fact of evolution absolutely shut out all scientific evidence of the existence of God or of any first cause or absolute Being as the ultimate ground of the universe; and that, though metaphysical reasoning on the subject is still possible, it pertains to an unknowable and scientifically illegitimate object of thought and yields only the slightest probability that some such

¹ Aims and Instruments of Scientific Thought, Lectures and Essays, vol. i. pp. 149, 150.

being may exist.¹ But while he announces his conclusions as the result of rigidly logical processes, an examination shows that they rest on the assumption that empirical science is the only scientific knowledge, and on a theory of the relativity of knowledge by which all knowledge is invalidated. Unlike Mr. Spencer, who sees clearly that the knowledge that some absolute Being exists is a self-evident and necessary law of thought, Physicus assumes that the existence of the absolute can be known only by being logically proved from the law of causation. The impossibility of this proof intelligent theists are equally decisive in affirming. Physicus assumes with Mr. Spencer that the mind is merely a series of states of consciousness. Hence he infers that the theist, by his hypothesis of the divine Mind or Reason as the first cause and ultimate ground of the universe, does not escape an infinite series nor reach an absolute being any more than the materialist does; God himself would be merely a series of states of consciousness. If we admit, what everybody practically believes in the face of all theorizing, that a man has knowledge of himself as one and the same being in successive states of consciousness, his elaborate reasoning crumbles into utter inconclusiveness. If we once see the absurdity which is involved in Spencer's conception of the mind, that separate and successive events in a series are conscious of themselves as in the unity of a series and at the same time always and necessarily mistake themselves for one and the same person; if we admit the simple proposition imperatively demanded alike by common sense and philosophy, that every motion, thought and action must be the motion, thought or action of a being, then we must admit the existence of the absolute Being, as the eternal principle and ground of all beginning and change, of all finite power, knowledge and being. And conversely, if no absolute Being exists as the ultimate ground of all, then there is no being and no knowledge; but all knowledge is volatilized into a phantasmagoria of nothingness. An examination of the seemingly exact reasoning of Physicus shows that it is vitiated by the false theory of the relativity of knowledge; and that its conclusions are valid only on the basis of the complete positivism of Comte, who clearly saw and plainly affirmed that if the idea of force or cause is once admitted, God as the first cause will have to be admitted with it. Thus we are brought again face to face with the fact that the denial of the knowledge of God, the absolute Being, involves the denial of all knowledge.

¹ Theism, chap. vi.

It may be added, that if, as Physicus assumes, the mere existence and persistence of matter and force suggest no need of a beginning or cause, but permit us to believe them eternal, the equally certain fact of the existence and persistence of reason suggests no necessity for a cause, but permits us to believe that reason is eternal; and eternal reason is God.

The foregoing objections all assume that the existence of the absolute Being cannot be known unless it is proved, and that the proof must rest on the principle that every beginning or change of existence must have a cause. They have held a large place in the discussion of the evidence of the existence of God. And theists are unable to refute them so far as they have failed to see and expose the fundamental error of the assumption on which the objections rest. The theists have not been shaken in their belief, because it has rested, not on the conclusiveness of their arguments, but on a necessary law of thought, which underlies all argument. As soon as the true ground of the belief of the existence of the absolute Being is recognized, every one of these objections falls powerless. Then they are exposed in their real significance, as striking at the foundation of all real knowledge. Then are brought into clear light the facts that the existence of absolute Being is essential to the reality of any being and to the possibility of any knowledge of beings; and that the existence of absolute Reason is essential to the possibility of any reasonable and scientific knowledge. Thus these objections only project into more intense light the imperative demand of reason for the existence of the absolute, unconditioned and all-conditioning Being.

Before leaving this topic some consideration must be given to the question whether the revelation of God as causal power of itself conveys any intimation of his personality.

Some philosophers have taught that the idea of will is inherent and essential in the idea of an efficient cause, because the idea of power and cause first arises in the exertion of our own wills. If this is true then, if we have evidence that the universe has a cause, we rightly infer that the first Cause is a rational free will, that is, a self-exertive and self-directive power. But in the premise of this argument the origin of the idea of cause seems to be inadequately set forth. As in one and the same mental state one has knowledge of himself as knowing and of an object known, so in a voluntary exertion of power one is conscious in one and the same act of his own exertion of power

and of a power from without which acts upon him. In rolling a heavy stone one is conscious at once of his own power and of the resistance of the stone. Thus in the very origin of the idea of causal efficiency or power we have knowledge of it both in ourselves and as acting on us from without. Therefore from the origin of our idea of causal power we can no more infer that there is no cause but will, than we can infer from the origin of knowledge that the only objects of knowledge are subjective ideas and that all reality is comprehended within the sphere of one's own self-consciousness.

But the origin of the idea of causal efficiency does establish so much as this: that the knowledge of free power is given in the very origin of our knowledge of power; and that thus in this very origin is laid the foundation for the distinction which cleaves all human thought, whether scientific or popular, between a personal agent self-directive and self-exertive and a body which is the unconscious vehicle of conveying a force previously communicated from without. The free or personal cause as distinguished from physical force cannot be excluded from the powers known in the universe.

It follows that there is no place for dogmatic materialism, which denies free will, and which affirms that all power in the universe is merely physical, or even that the universe is mere mechanism and the only power in it is mechanical motor-force. The consciousness of free power is given in the consciousness of power; if either is to be denied it must be the physical power external to and acting on us, rather than the free power which is inherent in us and known in our consciousness of ourselves.

This refutes dogmatic materialism also in its arbitrary and unwarranted assertion that in the ultimate cause or ground of the universe rational free power does not exist. There is nothing in causal efficiency which excludes from the first Cause rational free will; on the contrary, it includes it.

We must advance a step further. Physical things which cause effects are mere vehicles which convey and communicate a force imparted from another. In the strict sense of the words they neither exert nor direct the force which they communicate. But so long as, in observing physical things, the mind finds that they only communicate a force which they had previously received, it cannot rest in them as the real and ultimate cause. It can rest only when it finds a cause which itself exerts and directs the force which it imparts. The ultimate cause, therefore, must be

self-exertive and self-directive; in other words, it must be a rational, personal spirit. All physical causation, therefore, seems necessarily to carry us back to spirit as its first cause. In this conception the mind rests.

Some theists incline to the position that all acts of physical force in nature are immediate acts of God's will. But if the action of physical force is the action of will, then will and physical force seem to be identified, and the distinction between the two, so sharply marked in every act of man on nature, is lost; the distinction between God and the universe is lost, and we fall into the pantheistic conception of God as unconscious spirit identical with the universe. The true and theistic conception is, not that all physical force is the immediate action of God's will, but that, as we observe its action in the course of nature, we are obliged to refer it ultimately to the rational will of the eternal Spirit as its first cause.

We find that the absolute Being reveals himself in the universe as its first cause, the original source of all its power. In the words of Mr. Spencer, the theist has attained "the one absolute certainty that he is in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed." And the powers acting in the universe reveal him, and help us to form some idea of that power which is forever immeasurable.

And the physical force energizing in the course of nature does of itself carry the thought back to mind or spirit, to rational power, self-exertive and self-directive, as the original first cause of all the forces and the course of nature. Accordingly Dr. Carpenter says: "Science points to the origination of all power in mind. This is no new doctrine. . . . It is as old as Socrates. But I think it derives new importance from the recent development of the dynamic philosophy, which looks at matter as the mere vehicle of force, and regards the various modes of force as convertible." "The deep-seated instincts of humanity and the profoundest researches of philosophy alike point to Mind as the one and only source of power."¹ Mr. Grove says: "Causation is the will, Creation is the Power of God."² Sir John Herschel says: "It is but reasonable to regard the force of gravitation as the direct or indirect result of a consciousness and a will existing somewhere."³ These are utterances of scientists. Shel-

¹ Mind and Will in Nature, Cont. Rev. 1872; Address, Brit. Association, 1872.

² Correlation of Forces, p. 199.

³ Quoted, Bray on Force, p. 64.

ley gives poetical utterance to the human consciousness which even in his speculative atheism he did not escape:—

“The awful shadow of some unseen Power
Floats, though unseen, among us.”

It is sometimes said by theistic writers that the assaults of agnosticism have compelled human reason to abate its pretensions as to knowledge of the supernatural. It is true that on rational grounds and in accordance with the teachings of Christianity from the beginning, theologians are learning — that great part of human wisdom — equanimity in being ignorant as to many details of God’s relation to the world and his action in it, in being unable to picture the mode in which God reveals himself in the finite, and in refraining from excessive refining and defining. But the discussion of the current skepticism has issued in a clearer apprehension and higher appreciation of the powers of the human reason in its deeper significance. It is more and more fixing attention on the facts that the ultimate ground of the universe is the absolute Reason that is ever energizing in it; that this is essential to the reality of the universe and to the possibility of scientific knowledge of it; that human reason is cognizant of ultimate, self-evident principles, which are constituent elements of all rationality; that all science postulates the truth and universality of these principles; that it is continually verifying this postulation by discovering that the universe is constituted in accordance with them and with the inferences from observed facts which these principles require; that reason in harmony with human reason pervades and directs the universe, and thus makes human science possible; that human reason is in the likeness of the divine, and therefore capable of receiving and interpreting the revelation of God.

In this chapter we have considered only the existence of the physical world and of its forces as they act in nature. We have found them always forcing our minds back to a cause antecedent to themselves; as we trace them backwards we have found them converging on a first cause as their common origin and revealing its power; and even carrying the thought to mind or spirit as their common source, “sloping through darkness up to God.” This, however, is but the beginning of the evidence which nature gives of what the absolute Being is. We are next to consider what further and clearer evidence it presents that the absolute Being is the energizing Reason, the eternal Spirit, the personal God.

CHAPTER XII.

GOD REVEALED AS PERSONAL SPIRIT IN THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

PROFESSOR T. H. GREEN has felicitously described philosophy as the result of "a progressive effort toward a fully articulated conception of the world as rational." This conception is true only if the universe is grounded in reason and the absolute Being manifested in it is the absolute Reason, the eternal Spirit, the personal God. Theism is the basis and the only basis on which such a philosophy is possible.

We have already ascertained that the absolute Being exists and manifests itself in the universe as the first Cause or absolute Power from which it proceeds and on which it depends. We are next to consider the evidence of the presence and directive action of reason in the universe, in which the absolute Power reveals itself as the personal God.

The evidence of this in the spiritual system as known to us in the constitution and history of man will be examined hereafter. In this chapter only the evidence from the physical system will be considered.

This evidence is called by Kant the Physico-theological Argument. This name properly denotes all the evidence in the physical system of the existence of a personal God. It is the evidence or proof that nature exists in the unity of a reasonable and scientific system, that in the constitution and course of nature rational ideas, laws and ends are disclosed and the presence and direction of Reason are revealed, and that thus the absolute Being, whose power is manifested in the universe, is revealed to be the absolute Reason, the personal God.

Here we take another step in attaining knowledge of what the absolute Being is. Yet it is but one step and not the whole revelation. Since impersonal beings are not responsible subjects of moral law, we do not look in the sphere of the impersonal for the primary and principal evidence of the righteousness and benevolence of God. It is important to notice this, because many

of the objections against this evidence spring from misconceiving its scope, as if, because it does not prove everything for theism, it proves nothing. The revelation of God from each source explains, confirms, and enlarges the revelation from every other. It is God's revelation of himself through various media, one continuous revelation, to be completed for man only with the completion of human history.

Trendelenburg says: "The so-called proofs of the existence of God have worth only as points of view which cannot be understood without the absolute. They are indirect proofs which develop the ground-theme of the unconditioned. . . . They point out what confusion must arise if we do not postulate the existence of God. In this they have their constraining power."¹

But he himself affirms that we have a positive knowledge of the absolute Being. Therefore the so-called proofs are the examination of the universe to ascertain in it what the Absolute has revealed itself to be. Also we have the revelation of God in consciousness through which he is known in experience. These are not indirect proofs. Further, in the cosmological proof we find the absolute revealed in the universe as Power; and in the physico-theological proof, as Reason. These are simple inferences from the nature of the effect to the character of the cause. The latter of these two proofs is in fact a Newtonian induction, ascertaining the cause from the effect by hypothesis, deduction and verification. These are not indirect proofs, but direct, the same as are employed in science. It must be added that the indirect proof itself is valid. This is denied by some. Professor Sidgwick, for example, says: "The mere fact that I cannot act rationally without assuming a certain proposition, does not appear to me, as it does to some minds, a sufficient reason for believing it to be true."² But it seems incontrovertible that reason must accept as true every principle, the truth of which is necessary to its own rationality and capacity of knowing. If the rejection of a proposition involves the confusion of reason itself, that certainly is valid ground for accepting it as true. And this indirect proof itself rests on direct and positive knowledge. It is only when the rejection of a proposition involves contradiction of a universal principle of reason and necessary law of thought that its rejection involves the confusion of reason.

At the outset we are met with objections warning us off from this investigation as unscientific and illegitimate.

¹ Logische Untersuchungen, vol. ii. p. 339.

² Methods of Ethics, p. 471.

It is objected that the idea of God as a rational power or personal being is not a scientific idea and therefore is not admissible in a hypothesis. But the true cause required in a hypothesis is merely one of a kind already known; or at least its component elements must be of a kind already known. This is true of the idea of God. We know power; we know reason as well as we know power; we know ourselves and our fellow-men as personal beings; and we know the absolute in a necessary intuition of reason. Therefore the hypothesis that the universe reveals the absolute Being energizing in the light and under the direction of reason is scientifically legitimate. And if it is found that the facts and laws of nature can be accounted for and known in the unity of a system by this hypothesis and not as well accounted for and systemized by any other, the theistic hypothesis is verified. The objection, that it is not verified till God is brought under the observation of the senses, is not scientific. It is not demanded in scientific verification. The hypotheses by which science explains light, heat, electricity, molecular action of every kind, gravitation, the origin of fossils, the makers of stone implements, are all verified and accepted as established without any observation of the agents supposed to be the causes of the observed effects. Our proposed investigation of the evidence of a directing reason in nature will be a verification of the theistic hypothesis. It must also be remembered that agnostics, pantheists and materialists acknowledge the existence of an absolute Being and construct hypotheses or theories of the constitution of the universe accordingly. The objection, therefore, can be urged consistently only by complete positivists or phenomenologists, who deny all knowledge of the existence of the absolute Being and, by logical necessity, of all beings. And their position is itself rejected as unscientific by scientists themselves.

It is objected further that the idea of rational, free personality is itself unscientific and illegitimate, because it involves the supernatural and therefore transcends the uniformity and continuity of nature.

The answer is that rationality and free choice are indisputable facts, known in the same way in which force and bodies are known, that is, in our own consciousness. Science recognizes them as facts and declares that they are phenomena which cannot be identified with motion, and that all the discoveries respecting brain and nerve leave thought, volition and all mental phenomena as completely unexplained as ever. It is then unscien-

tific to exclude these facts from science. It is the condition on which science stands or falls that it takes up all known facts and brings them under its laws. A so-called science which accepts matter and force as the only reality, breaks down if it fails to explain by matter and force all the facts which come under observation. The only scientific course is to recognize these facts of rationality and free will, and when confessedly they cannot be explained by matter and force, then to admit that some other agent transcending matter and force is revealed in them. The doctrine that there is nothing in the universe but matter and force is a mere assumption, which cannot stand in the presence of rationality and free will revealing rational free personality. And the attempt thus to construct a theory of the universe always issues in a silent change of the essential meaning of the words matter and force.

It is not uncommon for scientists to acknowledge the distinction between the physical and the spiritual and yet to insist that both must be included in nature ; and they use nature as synonymous with the realm of law, and the supernatural as synonymous with a realm without law. Here it becomes a question as to the use of words. On the one hand, the scientist, when he has given the name, nature, both to the physical system and the spiritual or personal, is immediately confronted with the old distinction of mind and matter, and all the old questions and difficulties come back on him. He has gained nothing but to hide the facts from his own eyes. On the other hand, the theist, recognizing both the spiritual system and the physical or natural, insists as strenuously as the scientist that both are under the reign of law. In fact while the scientist accepts the order, uniformity and continuity of nature under law merely as a necessary but inexplicable fact, theism, by showing that the universe is grounded in reason and is the expression or revelation of its eternal and unchanging principles, laws, ideals and ends, not only affirms the universal reign of law but shows also why it must be universal. Theism also shows the unity of the spiritual and the natural in one all-comprehending system, by the fact that the natural is subordinate to the spiritual as the expression of its principles and ideas, as regulated by its laws, and progressively realizing its rational ideals and ends. Theism shows for the universe, spiritual and physical, one Cause, one Power, one universal Reason, one end in the realization of the rational archetypes of all wisdom and love. Here are a unity at once dynamic and ra-

tional, and a uniformity and continuity comprehensive as the domain of the universal Reason, and fixed and unchangeable as its eternal principles and laws. This is "a fully articulated conception of the world as rational." This, more than any other conception, accords with J. S. Mill's law, that science must always ask: "What are the fewest and simplest assumptions, which being granted, the existing order of nature would follow?"

The principle on which the physico-theological argument depends is simply that there must be an adequate cause for every effect. As we know the personal and therein the supernatural in our knowledge of ourselves, we can recognize it when revealed in action, just as we know power in our knowledge of ourselves and can recognize it when it is revealed in action.

This evidence or proof of mind revealed in nature is often called the teleological argument, or the argument from final causes. This assumes that the whole evidence is exhausted in showing that many arrangements in nature subserve a good end; or still narrower, that they are useful to man. This is but a small part of the physico-theological evidence. A large part of the objections against this evidence are founded on this narrow view of it and would have no force against it rightly understood.

The physical system manifests the presence and direction of reason. In this manifestation the absolute Being, already revealed as the Power working in the universe, is further revealed as a rational Power, that is, as the personal God.

The evidence of this revelation in the physical system may be presented under five heads, of which the four first correspond to the four fundamental ideas or norms of reason, the True, the Right, the Perfect, and the Good.

1. Nature is symbolic; it expresses thought.
2. Nature is orderly, or uniform and continuous under law.
3. Nature is progressive toward the realization of ideals.
4. Nature is telic, being subordinate to the spiritual or personal system and subservient to its ends.
5. Nature is in harmony and unity with the spiritual system under the true law of continuity.

Under each of these heads the evidence of mind may be found in the constitution and action of particular objects, as the eye, and their adaptation to other objects; and in the unity of system in the constitution and course of nature and its progressive evolution, as a whole.

Examples of the revelation of mind in nature are innumerable;

for it is the whole physical universe through which the revelation is made, and in every branch of physical science examples abound. Diderot hardly put it too strongly when he maintained that one could slay the atheist with a butterfly's wing or the eye of a gnat, and still have in reserve the weight of the universe with which to crush him. It is needless therefore to dwell on examples. It is sufficient to indicate the different lines of evidence.

I. NATURE SYMBOLIC. — Nature is symbolic; it expresses thought; it is significant of ideas.

First, this is implied in the fact that outward objects can be apprehended by the mind in ideas which are their intellectual equivalents.

Ever since philosophical thought began thinkers have been perplexed with the question how it is possible for a mind to apprehend a material thing; how that which is pure intelligence can apprehend that which is solid matter; how stones, trees and other material things, which have not the distinctive qualities of mind, can be apprehended in ideas which have no resemblance to the objects and are yet their intellectual equivalents through which the mind knows them. To remove this difficulty various fruitless suppositions have been suggested, as, for example, that ethereal images of the objects in some way enter the mind. The mind seems to demand that, in every apprehension of an outward object in an idea, some inherent relation of the object to the idea, some likeness between them, some inherent ideal significance in the object must be presupposed. The object must in some way be symbolic of the idea or thought.

When an object acts on the sensorium and reveals itself in a sensation, the mind reacts in its power of intelligence and perceives the object, knows it in the forms of reason, and in thought apprehends it in an idea. This object, therefore, is revealed to the mind not merely as an external object occupying space, but also as having the quality of intelligibility; it is capable of being apprehended in an idea and, through this as its intellectual equivalent, of being known. It being revealed to the mind as an object, it is also revealed as an intelligible or knowable object. And this is involved in the fundamental law of thought that knowledge implies a subject knowing, an object known and the knowledge which is the relation between them.

But the object was susceptible of being apprehended in intelligence, before I perceived and apprehended it. It had a quality of ideality, that is, of being apprehended in an idea, before I had

any idea of it in my consciousness. Every object in nature, therefore, is inherently and essentially intelligible. But the ideality of the object, its susceptibility of being apprehended in an intellectual equivalent, exists in the object independent of man's conscious apprehension of it. We may therefore say that the idea of the object existing subjective in my consciousness of it, existed objective and independent of my consciousness in the object; existed potentially, waiting only the presence of a mind in order to be revealed. Thus the object presupposes its idea. Hence we may truly say that the object is symbolic, it expresses thought; when presented to a conscious mind the object reveals itself as having significance to thought, it calls forth in the conscious mind an idea which is the intellectual equivalent of the object. As sensation gives no intelligence except as the intellect reacts in perception of the object and then apprehends it in an idea; so, on the other hand, the object could not be apprehended by intelligence if it had not already ideality in itself; that is, the quality of intelligibility and the capacity of being apprehended in its idea. Hence through sensation the mind is revealed to itself as intelligent, and the intelligibility or ideality of the object is revealed to the mind. As a visible spark reveals the invisible ether which causes it, and its crackling reveals the unseen undulations which cause the sound, so the sensation reveals the supersensible sphere of intelligence both in the person perceiving and in the object perceived.

Non-theistic philosophies fail to give any reasonable explanation of the fact that the mind apprehends material objects in ideas. Theism alone gives a reasonable explanation.¹ It recognizes material things as real beings; they are not independent, but are creations of God, the conscious, personal absolute Reason; in creating them he has expressed or revealed in them his archetypal thought under the limits of space and time. Thus they are in their essence symbols; that is, they express the thought of their creator, as a steam-engine expresses and reveals the thought of its maker, or as written words express the thought of the writer. This accords with the true meaning of the maxim, "Like is known only by like." Objects which are the creation and expression of thought can be apprehended by thought. Material things can be apprehended in ideas because they are, in themselves and their relations, expressions of ideas, that is, of the archetypal thought of God. Being them-

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 89, 90.

selves the expression of thought they reveal themselves as such and return to their primal form as thought or idea in the mind to which they are presented. The idea is thus objectively real, independently of the consciousness of the observer; not in itself nor in the object, but as the archetypal thought of the eternal Reason expressed in the object.¹

In this sense every material object is symbolic of the archetypal thought of God; and the objective reality of its idea is independent of the consciousness of the observer, and has an intelligible and real significance, which it lacks in every non-theistic philosophy.

This gives us, also, the real significance of the maxim that whatever is real is rational. Its real meaning is that whatever is real is essentially intelligible; it has the quality of intelligibility or ideality. And this is true, even when, through lack of information or opportunity, we may be at present ignorant respecting it. All science rests on this assumption; for it assumes that whatever is real is a legitimate object of scientific investigation and may be scientifically known. Science and practical wisdom would alike be impossible and inconceivable, if the world were unreasonable, a lawless chaos, not rationally ordered, and therefore not capable of being rationally understood. Scientific knowledge is possible only on the presupposition of rational coherence, arrangement and direction. So Hegel says: "The form of the natural is nature as pervaded by thought:"² That is, the only form in which a scientific comprehension of nature is possible is the form of nature as pervaded, arranged and ordered by intelligence.

We see also the real significance of the old phrase, *Mundus Intelligibilis* or *Κόσμος Νοητός*, which denotes the objective reality of the idea of the world as archetypal and eternal. If every object in nature has the quality of intelligibility and so has its ideal side, the universe itself has the same quality and presupposes its idea; and its idea would be the universe of archetypal thought of which the existing universe is the progressive expression or

¹ "When the sculptor develops his Apollo or his Venus from the quarried marble, it is his own creation and has his image stamped on it; but the truth which the man of science extracts has an absolute character of its own, which no power of genius can transform and which is neither attributable to accident nor born of human parentage. It pervades the meanest chip of stone which the artist rejects." — *Ideality of Physical Science*, by Professor Benj. Peirce, of Harvard, p. 26.

² *Philosophie der Religion*, vol. i. p. 275.

revelation. We study the universe and find in it the *Mundus Intelligibilis*, the world of archetypal thought. Science is nothing but the enunciation of what this world of archetypal thought revealed in universe is. If this world of ideas were known to exist without the universe that reveals it, we should necessarily believe that it existed as the thought or idea of some mind; for thought or idea without a mind is as unthinkable and as impossible as motion without a body which moves and a force which moves it. And this inference is not the less necessary because we find the archetypal universe progressively revealed in the actual universe which is its expression, the book in which we read it, the word of God which declares it. On the contrary all the more must we infer that the universe itself is the product of an efficient mind or energizing Reason progressively expressing in it his archetypal thoughts.

We see, then, that nature is symbolic; it is the expression or revelation of thought. And the thought is presupposed in the existence of nature and must be archetypal in the eternal Reason that is revealing itself in it.

In this discussion we see the starting point and significance of Plato's doctrine of ideas. He recognizes the objective intelligibility or ideality of all things, existing independent of his own conscious apprehension of them. He thus recognizes the fact that the object presupposes its idea existing independent of the consciousness of the human percipient. These ideas, presupposed in the objects and appearing in the consciousness of the observer, he recognizes as eternal ideas which are at once the forms of thought and the forms of things. So far his doctrine is true; and by virtue of this great truth his philosophy has held its place and influence in human thought through the ages. The theist finds the reality and significance of these ideas in the archetypal thought of God.

Hegel also recognizes the objective reality of the idea. His recognition of the universe as the revelation of thought is the truth which gives the value to his philosophy, opening to various applications which are helpful to theistic thought. But his fundamental and fatal error is that the idea or thought is not referred to the personal Reason or Spirit. "The essence of nature as a system of laws is nothing other than the generic or universal (*Das Allgemeine*)."¹ The essence or ultimate ground of the universe is thought, or the objective Idea. The idea is creative,

¹ Philosophie der Religion, vol. i. p. 275.

evolving itself into the universe. But it is impersonal and unconscious, it is the abstract logical general notion, the widest possible. And this logical general notion, the universal, is treated as a creative idea, which has unfolded itself into the universe and eventually has come to consciousness in man. The world-process by which it has evolved itself into the universe is identical with a process of logic. Thus we are abandoned to idealistic pantheism. And ultimately the idea comes to be confounded with subjective conscious thought and the universe itself is lost in subjective idealism. Here, as a witty writer suggests, is a catastrophe the reverse of that of Korah; the earth has not swallowed up the man, but the man has swallowed up the universe. And in this fatal error must every system issue, which assumes that the universe is grounded in thought, and yet that the thought floats in emptiness, thought without a thinker, without a rational personal mind existing eternally and energizing in the universe.

In the second place, that nature is symbolic is evident in the fact that it is capable of being comprehended in a scientific system and thus is found to be the expression of mind in harmony with our own. The mind finds in nature its own rational principles, its own inferences, its own mental creations. The observation of nature is a continual confirmation in experience of the truth of the primitive intuitions of reason and the validity of the processes of thought. Man finds in nature the expression of his own reason. Thus he finds himself "at home" in the physical system to its remotest worlds, because everywhere he finds in it the expression of intelligence like his own.

This is evident from the fact that physical science exists. Physical science is nothing but the setting forth of the realities of nature in the forms of intelligence and in the order of its principles and laws. We explore the outward world and we find it the expression of the intelligence of which we are conscious in our own minds; we find it conformed to the principles and laws which regulate our own thinking. We observe bodies and their motions, but they conform to the laws of mind and express its thoughts. Nature is scientifically known only as we know the thought which it expresses. Science is itself the knowledge of nature in its most exact and complete form. It declares the mental ideas, laws, harmonies which it finds in nature; the exact knowledge which it enunciates it has read in nature. If nature was not the expression of intelligence like our own, there could be no science. If nature were not already the expression of ideas,

and ordered according to law it could never be translated into thought. Science observes nature and finds intelligence expressed everywhere in it. It finds all things in nature to be symbols and it interprets them. It deciphers nature and learns the thought which it expresses, as Champollion deciphered the Egyptian hieroglyphics. If the hieroglyphics had not first been symbols of intelligent thought, no diligence could have found intelligence in them. They have objective reality and ideality; and the essential significance of their objective reality is in their objective ideality. As Dr. Carpenter says: "We cannot proceed a step without translating the actual phenomena of nature into intellectual representations of those phenomena."¹

That the Reason revealed in nature is like our own is remarkable in scientific prevision; and Comte insists that the power of foreseeing and foretelling phenomena is essentially distinctive of science; and that any knowledge which does not reach this power is unworthy of the name of science. In this he is doubtless in error. Yet physical science has already attained this power in many cases. It knows so exactly the laws under which the forces of nature are ordered that it can foretell events ages distant in the future to the fraction of a second.

The same is remarkable in scientific discovery. The mind forms its hypothesis of what must be; and then goes out into nature and finds that it is so. The genius of the discoverer creates a prophetic picture and says: "Nature must be so and so;" then he goes out into nature and finds his conception there, already realized in nature ages before he had thought it; and yet, all the same, a pure intellectual conception. This is the almost universal history of discovery; it is an intellectual creation, a prophetic idea, afterwards found expressed and realized in the material creation. And not infrequently the prophetic conception of genius is announced years or even centuries before it is actually discovered and verified by observation.

Another exemplification is in invention. The inventor creates his machine in thought before he realizes it in actual construction; and the steel and brass and wood, the water, the fire, the electricity, created as expressions of intelligent thought, yield readily to the thought of the inventor, obey the laws which guided him in creating his idea, and steadily do the work which he directs. And when he investigates nature he finds in it

¹ Man as the Interpreter of Nature; Popular Science Monthly, Oct. 1872, p. 687.

similar contrivances doing the same kind of work according to the same laws. And often it is the contrivance in nature which suggests the invention to man. The divine art in nature is the model for human art.

The use of mathematics in science is another striking illustration. We spin our geometrical lines and figures out of our own thoughts and within our own minds without the slightest reference to experience. Yet when we go out into the material universe we find it everywhere constructed according to the purely *a priori* geometry of our own minds. There are no meridional or equatorial lines and circles on the earth or in the sky, yet the universe is constructed according to the principles and demonstrations of mathematics. We construct a crystal *a priori* and geometrically. We examine nature and find crystals constructed according to the same plan. "Every atom solves differential equations which, if written out in full, might belt the earth."¹ Professor Peirce, of Harvard University, several years ago published a volume on Mathematics, in which, as those competent to follow him in his course of thought tell us, he proved that "from our *a priori* conceptions of form, number and power we should be inevitably led, were creation intrusted to us, to create a world similar in its plan to this." In like manner by mathematical reasoning we determine the form best fitted for motion through air or water; and in birds and fishes we find forms accordant with these *a priori* demonstrations of our own pure intelligence. "In Peirce's Integral Calculus, published in 1843, is a problem invented and solved purely in the enthusiasm of following mathematical symbols; but in 1863 it proved to be a complete prophetic discussion and solution of the problem of two pendulums suspended from one horizontal cord. Thus also Galileo's discussion of the cycloid proved long afterward to be a key to problems concerning the pendulum, falling bodies and resistance to transverse pressure. Four centuries before Christ Plato and his scholars were occupied on the ellipse as a purely geometrical speculation. But in the seventeenth century Kepler discovered that the architect of the heavens had given us magnificent diagrams of the ellipse in the starry heavens."²

We must conclude that in every observation of nature "reason disengages an element exclusively its own;" and that "the no-

¹ Jevons, Principles of Science, p. 756.

² Natural Sources of Theology, by Thomas Hill, D. D., LL. D., pp. 66, 67.

tion of a perfect science is a delusion when it does not find its root in an invisible world.”¹

Therefore not only does nature, as scientifically investigated, express thought and reveal mind; it also expresses thought and reveals mind in unison with our own. The intelligence, the principles, the laws, the ideas, which science finds revealed everywhere in nature, which it finds determining the constitution of the physical universe, and on which it rests its own claim to be science, are the intelligence, the principles, the laws, the ideas of the human mind. The inevitable inference is that the human reason is in the likeness of the Reason that has constituted the universe, the Reason that is universal; and that reason throughout the universe, in God and in man, is one and the same in kind. This is the necessary presupposition of all science. For science is nothing but human intelligence. It becomes a science of the universe solely by the processes of human intelligence and in accordance with its ideas, principles and laws. If reason and its principles and laws are not the same through all space and time, if in other worlds or in other ages intelligence is something wholly unlike human intelligence and therefore to us inconceivable, if its principles and laws supersede or contradict the principles and laws of human intelligence, then science is impossible, its observations and inductions, its logic and mathematics give no knowledge of those other worlds and ages, human perceptions, ideas and inferences have no objective reality, and human intelligence fades into mere sensations within the consciousness of an individual.²

From the foregoing considerations it is evident that physical science in its fundamental assumptions and its consequent methods is in essential harmony with theism and not antagonistic. In all its investigations and discoveries it rests, consciously or unconsciously, on the theory of knowledge which I have called Rational Realism, on which theism also rests. It is true, some scientists hold theoretically that man has knowledge only of subjective impressions and phenomena. But these very men in their actual scientific investigations and discoveries have assumed without being aware of it the truth of Rational Realism, a theory of knowledge contradictory of their own philosophical speculations. They have “builted wiser than they knew.” Physical

¹ Prof. Wm. Archer Butler, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, vol. ii. pp. 116, 130.

² *Phil. Basis of Theism*, pp. 142-151, 560-564.

science in all its actual work as such has definitely abandoned phenomenalism and the positivism of Comte. It builds on the recognition of the objective reality of beings, of their relations, and of the principles, laws, ideals and ends of reason revealed in them. Physical science, therefore, in its fundamental assumptions and its methods consequent on them, is in real alliance with theism. In all its discoveries it is verifying that Rational Realism which is the philosophical basis of theism.

A third evidence of symbolism in nature is the common recognition in human action and language of a correspondence between spirit and nature.

This correspondence is indicated in the tendency of man to construct his ideas in physical forms, in mechanical inventions, in architecture, painting and sculpture.

This correspondence is also incorporated into language. Spiritual realities are designated by words originally appropriated to physical realities. This fact accords with the theistic conception and corroborates it. The eternal Spirit expresses his archetypal thought in the physical universe. This is the primitive medium of revelation, the first Word of God. The book of nature is the primer, in which he sets his children first to spell out his name and to read what he is. Therefore in all languages the names of spiritual things continue to indicate the primitive medium of revelation.

This correspondence of nature and spirit has forced itself into the thinking of men in all ages and in all spheres of thought. If, as theism declares, the eternal Spirit has revealed himself in nature, there must be, not an antagonism and reciprocal repulsion, but a correspondence between them; nature must be the fit medium for the revelation, the garment in which the Spirit clothes himself with visibility. And history shows that men have always acted, though unreflectively, under this impression. Theism says that spirit reveals itself in nature; and in their religion from the earliest times men have found spirit revealed in nature. Theism says that God has expressed his thought in nature; and in all ages men have read thought in nature, though sometimes miscalling the words, or missing the true meaning, or spelling the words without taking the sense. This correspondence is also recognized, as we have seen, in empirical and philosophical science; for it consists in reading the thought revealed in the universe, and all its conclusions rest on the presupposition that reason, one and the same in kind, pervades the universe and

reveals its thought in it. The correspondence of nature and spirit is also recognized, unconsciously it may be, in man's delight in personification and poetry which look through the symbols of nature to its significance and picture life and spirit in inanimate things. Heine's lonely tree is an example: —

“A Pine-tree stands forsaken, all alone,
 Upon yon far-off, towering, vasty height;
 And mourning, chilled to heart by Winter's blight,
 Trembles and sways, by every rude wind blown.
 Warm dreams of love keep the cold tree from death,
 Dreams of a Palm-tree in the Orient land;
 Ah, on a rocky cliff, in burning sand,
 The Palm-tree pants to feel the Pine-tree's breath.”

Thus religion, empirical and philosophical science, and poetry unite in recognizing the correspondence of nature and spirit; all find in nature the expression of an intelligence, the revelation of a rational spirit like our own. Each presents nature as a mirror in which the spirit of man sees the reflected image of itself. It is the same mirror in different frames.¹

Finally, that nature is expressive of thought is evident from the fact that all material beings and their physical forces exist in the unity of a system which is the cosmos or the physical universe. This conception is essential in all science. But a system in its essence involves intelligence. It supposes a plurality of objects acting in harmony in accordance with common laws and a controlling idea. Knowledge must have made great progress before man could have formed the idea of a universe. Yet this idea was so ancient that its origin is lost in oblivion. The unity of all material things in a system, the universe or cosmos, is now familiar to all civilized people, and is assumed as unquestionable in all science. It is of itself indisputable evidence that nature reveals intelligence and expresses thought. And it proves not merely this, but also that the system is the product of one rational mind, the same in kind with the mind of man and pervading and controlling the universe.

It is also a system embracing in its larger unity innumerable smaller systems, so that all these systems are harmonious constituents of the one all-comprehending system, expressing one all-comprehending idea or plan. In it our sun and planets constitute a solar system. As there are numberless suns, there are probably numberless solar systems, all in unity in the one system

¹ “Ein Spiegel mit zwei Namen
 Verschieden nur durch Schliff und andren Rahmen.”

of the universe. And on earth we find many systems. Organized beings are grouped in genera and species; and they are not merely thus classified, but are also systemized in the subordination of lower types to higher and in the progressive development of higher types. Every organized being is also individually in itself a system of innumerable cells, all acting harmoniously in subordination to the idea of the organism. All atoms and molecules in their interaction are acting harmoniously in the system. And finally passing downward from the cosmos which includes all, to these ultimate elements, science finds itself unable to retain the ancient simple atom in solid singleness, but finds it, though infrangible, yet composed of parts, and endowed with potencies, and so a system in itself. The theory of the vortex-atom represents it as a sort of infinitesimal solar system as complex as our solar system, revolving like it according to fixed laws, and requiring an astronomy of the infinitesimal as mathematical and complex as that of our solar system. And if this theory be never established, the molecule at least is recognized in science as a complex whole, with many potencies, and the source of powerful energies. Each of these numberless minor systems is an expression of mind; and so, but immensely more, is their combination in the unity of the one all-comprehending system of the cosmos. And the unity of this system is neither conceivable nor thinkable except as the effect of one absolute Reason energizing in the realization of its own eternal and never changing archetypal plan.

Physical science is rapidly enlarging our knowledge of the unity of nature. It has been proved that the law of gravitation extends beyond the solar system to the stars. The mysterious ether pervading all space binds all worlds in unity; a commotion in the flaming sun moves at once every magnetic needle on the earth. The spectroscope shows in the sun and other heavenly bodies the same elements which we find on earth. Thus science discloses the unity of the cosmos through all space. And in evolution it is disclosing its unity in progressive development through all time.

The necessary conclusion is that all nature is symbolic of thought and thus reveals the universal Reason. Atheistic science discovers the symbol and stops. Theism passes through the symbol to the reality behind it and thus interprets its significance.

II. NATURE ORDERLY UNDER LAW. — Nature is orderly or uniform and continuous under law.

There is no question here as to moral law. The physical system, comprising only the impersonal, is not subject to moral law. But law in its most general meaning is truth considered as regulating action.¹ Thus the truths or principles regulating mechanical action are the laws of mechanics; a steam-engine constructed according to these laws is said to be constructed right; and if it is in perfect order, its action is said to be right; that is, it acts according to the law of its being. In this sense the physical system and all things in it may be said to be constructed right, that is, according to a law, and to act right, that is, in accordance with a law. The uniform factual sequences observed in nature are also called laws of nature. But these are so called only in a secondary sense. In truth they are only factual manifestations or revelations of law in its true significance, which is always a principle or law of reason.

From the order or uniformity of action we infer a law regulating the action. If a stone hits a spot in a wall, we make no inference as to intelligent direction. But if twenty stones in close succession hit the same spot, we infer that they were intelligently directed. If a player with dice throws double sixes a dozen times in succession we have no doubt that the dice are loaded. Thus uniformity in a brief series of very simple acts forces us to infer an intelligent intention regulating the action.

This inference is seen to be reasonable when we reckon the possible combinations of a very few units. Professor Jevons says: "In whist the four hands are simultaneously held; and the number of distinct deals becomes so vast that it would require twenty-eight figures to express it. If the whole population of the world — say one thousand millions — were to deal cards day and night for a hundred million years, they would not in that time have exhausted the one hundred thousandth part of the possible deals. . . . It is in the highest degree improbable that any one game of whist was ever exactly like another, except it were intentionally so."² Laplace estimated that the forty-three independent motions of bodies in the solar system as known in his day admitted of 4,400,000,000,000 combinations.

Thus the coincidence of a few elements in a continuous order of succession is decisive evidence of intelligent direction. The

¹ *Phil. Basis of Theism*, pp. 185, 186.

² *Principles of Science*, pp. 190, 191.

irresistibleness of the evidence becomes more and more apparent with every increase in the number of the units, the complexity of the idea, the complication of the arrangement, and the invariable accordance of the arrangement with the idea. It increases so rapidly that a very small number of units and a moderate degree of complexity make the inference of intelligent direction from uniformity a resistless certainty.

The physical system of the universe is pervaded with order, from the planets and suns and solar systems down to the ultimate atoms. Wherever matter is, there is order. The innumerable agents in nature, in all their complicated combinations and interactions, act in unvarying order and according to law. All science is engaged in discovering this order of nature. All induction is founded on it. The plans of everyday life are made in dependence on it; if one observes the signs of the sky and says, "It looks like rain," he is merely drawing an inference from previous observations, founded on the uniform order of nature. If then a dozen uniform throws of a pair of dice convince us at once that some intelligence has loaded the dice and thus caused the uniformity to result in accordance with the law of gravitation, how much more must we infer from the order pervading the universe, with beings so innumerable, with interactions and complications so intricate, with extent so immense, with order and uniformity persisting through all time, that this uniformity and order under law is the result of intelligent direction. Even an opponent of theism, one of the ablest in our day, has said: "Let us think of this supreme causality as we may, the fact remains that from it there emanates a directive influence of uninterrupted consistency on a scale of stupendous magnitude and exact precision worthy of our highest possible conceptions of Deity."

Physical science rests on the law of the uniformity and continuity of nature as its fundamental postulate. Thus the necessity of recognizing God immanent and energizing in nature is disclosed by physical science itself.

In the first place it is necessary to any rational explanation of the fundamental postulates of physical science.

One postulate is, that the sum of all force potential and energetic is always the same; no action makes it greater and no cessation of action makes it less. The assumption is that the universe consists of a fixed quantity of matter and force eternally acting. This assumption implies that the universe is a machine

keeping itself in motion forever without external force. Then the fundamental principle of science involves the absurdity of a perpetual motion; and this absurdity it is impossible to eliminate. Physical science itself exposes this absurdity and escapes it only by denying the perpetuity of the motion. For it discovers that eventually all the forces must come into equilibrium and the whole machinery must stop. Once thus stopped it is stopped forever; for by the supposition there is no power exterior to the machine to renew the motion.

Theism affirms this fundamental principle of science, and removes the difficulties which physical science reveals but cannot remove. The sum of all force potential and energetic is eternal in God. It is unchanging and inexhaustible, incapable of increase or diminution, because God is the absolute Being. It is directive and regulative, because God is the absolute Reason. It may be potential or energetic, because God exerts his power in the finite or refrains from exerting it at will.

Another fundamental postulate is that nature is orderly under law. But the continuity and uniformity of nature and its unity in a system depend themselves on the existence of God and his immanence and action in nature.

Physical science assumes the continuity and uniformity of nature, but cannot prove or account for it. It is sometimes claimed that the belief rests on experience and observation. Scientific observation and experiment continually confirm these principles, but cannot be said to prove them. Scientific observation cannot be universal, and cannot establish a universal truth. And in fact there are many effects the causes of which cannot be observed, and many events in which the continuity and uniformity do not appear to the observation of sense. Hence science is obliged to assume the principle and work by it without proof. It is not science which establishes the principle of the uniformity and continuity of nature, but it is the principle of the uniformity and continuity of nature which makes science possible.

Theism not only accepts the principle, but also gives a philosophical basis for it. The action of an almighty will in perfect harmony with Reason must give the highest uniformity, continuity and unity.

In the second place, science discovers facts in nature which can be harmonized with its uniformity, continuity and unity only on the supposition that a supernatural power is immanently active in it.

Such facts are found in nature in its space-relations. Physical science cannot explain gravitation, cohesion, nor light and heat, either as forces inherent in matter or as caused by impact; but in the attempt to explain them it encounters unresolvable objections and contradictions.¹ It is assumed that neither masses nor molecules ever come in contact. With stronger vision we should see every mass of matter perforated with vacant space surrounding every molecule. It follows that the action of one body, molar or molecular, on another must always be action at a distance. The acting force must always pass disembodied through empty space.

Nature presents similar difficulties in its time-relations.

Physical science cannot account for the beginning of motion. The finiteness of the universe demonstrates that it must have had a beginning. The evolution of a finite universe must come to an end, and must have had a beginning. The only escape from these conclusions is by recognizing the existence of an infinite and absolute power above and beyond nature, which perpetually sustains it, supplies it with force and directs its development.

Mr. Spencer's primitive homogeneous matter involves in its essential idea a beginning of motion. In the homogeneous, as he defines it, the sixty-four elemental substances or primitive units are "so uniformly dispersed among each other that any portion of the mass shall be like any other portion in its sensible properties."² This would imply that in every cubic inch of the nebulous matter every one of these elements would be found; and if so, then necessarily the quantity of each in every cubic inch must be in the same proportion to the quantity of all the rest as it is in the universe. In every cubic inch there would be yttrium, vanadium, thorium, glucinum and every element of which the whole quantity in the world is very little, and its universal diffusion would be inconceivably tenuous; and of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon and others, which compose almost the whole globe. If a cubic inch of iron or silver existed anywhere, the homogeneous would already have become heterogeneous. This uniformity of distribution itself reveals the direction of mind. Besides this, the equilibrium of the homogeneous implies the entire absence of motion. Necessarily, then, there must have been a beginning of motion. This cannot be accounted for by the homogeneous itself, but necessarily implies

¹ *Phil. Basis of Theism*, pp. 420-426.

² *First Principles*, p. 335.

a power beyond and above it that acts on it. The universe itself, in the light of modern science, can no more account for the beginning of motion than it could in the days of Aristotle.

Physical science is confronted by similar insuperable difficulties in its attempts to explain the course of nature. The evolution of the nebulous matter cannot be explained, consistently with known facts, as a mere development or disentangling of what already existed in it. There are successive epochs or stages in the evolution, in which new and higher powers are revealed, acting on a higher plane. Notable are the epochs of the appearance of life, of sensitivity and of rational persons. No power disclosed in the previous stages can account for these higher manifestations. If there is no power beyond the universe itself, these higher stages of being are effects without a cause.¹

Thus physical science discloses facts which of itself it cannot reconcile with the continuity and uniformity of nature.

But theism removes these difficulties, and shows the harmony of these facts with the continuity and uniformity of nature in the unity of a system. It teaches that the universe is the continuous and progressive expression of God's thought. God, the absolute Reason, is continually energizing on and through it, directing its action and development to rational ends. The universe is the medium in and through which God is revealing himself. But the infinite cannot be revealed in the finite all at once. God cannot reveal his eternal wisdom and love at a stroke. If the infinite is revealed in the finite the revelation must be progressive, and cannot be complete at any terminal bound of time or space. And matter itself must be elaborated in and from lower forms to higher and finer, in order to be made receptive of higher manifestations of God's thought and power. We may conceive of the energy of God's inexhaustible and never diminished wisdom and power in perpetual tension within the universe developing it to higher receptivity and capacity, and manifesting through it higher potencies, bringing in higher orders of beings, disclosing new and higher spheres of activity and achievement, as fast as the finite is developed to a capacity to be a medium for the higher action and the higher manifestation of the divine perfection. And thus the material world itself is developed and revealed. Modern science is more and more disclosing the mystery and capacity of what we call matter. Matter has been called an *x*, an unknown quantity. But it is an unknown, not

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp. 472, 491-502, 454.

an unknowable, and science is continually revealing to us more and more its hidden capacities and energies. The progressive revelation of God in nature is also a progressive revelation of the "Open Secret" of the universe and of the mysteries hidden in matter itself.

Thus it appears that the continuity and uniformity of nature and its unity in a system depend on the existence of God and his immanence and action in nature. It has been objected to philosophy that it ultimately breaks down in contradictions or antinomies. We find that, if there is no God and no system of rational and free persons, then these antinomies are irreconcilable contradictions and reason is discredited. But if there is a God and a spiritual system of rational free agency, then these antinomies are not contradictions, but complementary truths.¹ In like manner we find antinomies in physical science. And the same is true of these as of the antinomies of philosophy. If God does not exist they are irreconcilable contradictions. Then the maxim that nature is uniform and continuous, on which physical science rests, is contradicted by indisputable facts which science discovers. But if God exists immanent and acting in nature, they are no longer contradictions, but manifestations of the uniformity, continuity and unity of nature, as expressing the truth and law and realizing the ideals and ends of the absolute Reason energizing in it. It is the existence of God which makes the continuity, uniformity and unity of nature possible. Thus physical science itself reveals its own insufficiency and points unmistakably to a sphere of existence beyond itself. -

III. NATURE REALIZING IDEALS. — Nature reveals action directed toward the realization of ideals.

We come here to that part of the physico-theological proof which is more specifically teleological; the consideration of the ends for which nature and all which it includes exist. The ends subserved by nature and its agencies and processes are twofold, and may be distinguished as internal and external. The overlooking of this distinction has caused much confusion of thought on the subject.

The internal end of anything in nature is the realization of its plan or ideal. The external end is the uses which it may subserve after it is completed according to its ideal.

The first of these ends is to be considered here. The other will constitute the fourth line of evidence.

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp. 128-135.

It may be assumed that whenever any agent is working according to a plan, the work has always a final cause or end in the realization of the plan. That is, all the parts and agencies are subordinate to the plan of the whole. This is often said to be the distinctive characteristic of living organisms. Hence it is said that final causes are found only in them. But the final cause seems to be not less a characteristic of mechanism. When one is making a steam-engine every part is subordinated to the whole, and every stroke in making it is for the purpose of realizing its ideal or plan. After it is made the engine is used for purposes external to itself; yet its structure still reveals the fact that it was made according to a plan and that every part is subordinate to the ideal of the whole. An organism differs from a machine in the fact that the former is seen to grow; and after it has ceased to grow we see the vital processes continually going on to repair waste and to preserve the life and power of the organism. During its whole existence from the seed or egg onward it is seen to have its end in itself, and every organ and function exists for the organism. In a machine, on the contrary, it is only during the process of its construction that our attention is directed to the fact that it has its end in itself, and that every part is subordinated to realizing the plan of the whole. After it is finished our attention is directed to the ends beyond itself for which it is used. On the other hand, organisms subserve external ends, in bearing fruit, presenting beauty and fragrance, supplying material and fuel, yielding medicines, promoting health and fertility, and in other ways. Therefore organism and mechanism each subserves both internal and external ends; although in the former the internal, and in the latter the external end most attracts attention.

Our present thought is that throughout nature, organic and inorganic, we find the realization of ideals, the continuous and progressive completing of plans and systems. I shall consider, first, the realization, in specific things and systems, of subordinate plans or ideals; secondly, the progressive realization of the plan or ideal of the cosmos as a whole; and, thirdly, the revelation of the beautiful in nature. The theory of evolution, by presenting the cosmos as unfinished and in continuous and progressive development, enables us to look at it in the process and see it progressively realizing the plan or ideal, as we see the process of constructing a steam-engine, or of the germination of a seed and the growth of the plant.

1. We are to consider the evidence of action directed toward the realization of ideals in specific things and subordinate systems.

In the first place, many objects in their structure give evidence of action directed toward the realization of an ideal ; such are the eye, the hand, and in fact all the organs of animal and vegetable life ; for every organ is fitted for its function.

In the second place, the truth of this proposition is exemplified in processes going on under observation. A striking example is in the development of a germ or egg. Mr. Huxley says : " Examine the recently laid egg of some common animal, such as a salamander or a newt. It is a minute spheroid in which the best microscope will reveal nothing but a structureless sac inclosing a glairy fluid holding granules in suspension. But strange possibilities lie dormant in that semi-fluid globule. Let a moderate supply of warmth reach its watery cradle, and the plastic matter undergoes changes so rapid, and yet so steady and purpose-like in their succession, that one can only compare them to those operated by a skilful modeler upon a formless lump of clay. As with an invisible trowel the mass is divided and subdivided into smaller and smaller portions, until it is reduced to an aggregation of granules not too large to build withal the finest fabrics of the nascent organism. And then it is as if a delicate finger traced out the line to be occupied by the spinal-column and molded the contour of the body, pinching up the head at one end and the tail at the other, and fashioning flank and limb in due salamandrine proportions, in so artistic a way that, after watching the process hour by hour, one is almost involuntarily possessed by the notion that some more subtle aid to vision than an achromatic would show the hidden artist, with his plan before him, striving with skilful manipulation to perfect his work." ¹

Other examples are found in the vital processes of an organism after birth. Professor Newcomb says : " Should we see in visible masses of matter the same kind of motions which we know must take place among the molecules of matter as they arrange themselves into the complex attitudes necessary to form the leaf of a plant, we should at once conclude they were under the direction of a living being, who was superintending the execution of these arrangements." And could we see the particles arranging themselves in the formation of a crystal, it would seem to us like soldiers at the roll of the drum coming from their resting places and taking each his proper position in the ranks.

¹ Lay Sermons, pp. 260, 261.

We may notice, next, the process of selection in the germination, nourishing and development of an organism. Different portions of germinal matter, differing from each other in nothing which science can observe, grow severally into different organisms, one into an oak, another into an oyster and another into a man. Different seeds grow each without fail into a plant of its own kind ; and so persistent is this distinguishing energy, that if a scion of one species is grafted into the stock of another, it persists in bearing fruit of its own kind. It cannot be that this determination is effected by soil or climate, by any cosmic influence or any cultivation, because under precisely the same external influences the seeds develop severally each its peculiar life. Here is evidence of a selecting agency directing the action to the realization of a specific ideal.

A selecting agency is equally remarkable in the growth of the organism and its continued sustenance. At different points in the organism the nutriment is converted into different tissues ; various glands exude various secretions ; from the same blood some agency takes out at different points material for muscle, nerve, bone, skin, hair, eyes, the enamel of the teeth, and shapes it into different forms to meet the needs of the organism. Besides this, the body is in a perpetual process of waste and restoration ; from the innumerable particles which are acting together some are selected to be thrown out, while new ones take their places for a time. If all these processes were visible, we could not resist the conclusion that these selections are made, immediately or mediately, by some intelligent agency.

And, fourthly, we notice the coördination and coöperation of many agencies all acting together according to one plan to realize an ideal.

In their own conscious action men form plans and then put forth their energies to realize them. One may be spending his energies for years and even for his whole life in realizing a plan. Men exist in society. They form plans together and coöperate in their realization. Men may coöperate in realizing a common plan on which through successive generations and many centuries they expend their energies. A nation may work for the realizing of an idea through centuries. Christians have been laboring, ever since Christ died, for the realization of the idea of the kingdom of God on earth. Thus man has the conception of a plan, and of the coördination of many agents in working for its realization as an ideal end.

As we extend our researches downward through the physical system, we find at every grade of descent evidence of the coöperative action of many agents for the realization of a plan or ideal end.

In the higher orders of brutes, we find them in the exercise of instinct individually performing a series of actions for the attainment of an end. Often also we find a pair or a larger company coöperating to accomplish a plan, as birds build nests, and beavers build dams, and wolves hunt in packs.

Among insects we find swarms, which, rather than individuals, seem to be the units of the life of the species. All the bees in a swarm work together all summer to realize a complicated plan, each part of the work having significance only in reference to something further in the future. Every ant in a swarm works in like manner in coöperation with every other, not only in work which has significance only in its relation to the realization of the plan in the future, but also in a marvelous division of labor, in which the work of each class has significance only in its relation to the entirely different work of the others.

Descending still lower to the protozoa, we find the same co-ordination and coöperation among them. A striking example is the building of a coral structure called Neptune's cup. This cup is built by myriads of coral polyps, and by many successive generations of them. Yet from the beginning these myriads of polyps work all on the same plan, progressively realizing the same ideal. At first many successive generations of them build the broad and gently swelling circular base. Then they simultaneously change the direction and fashion the cylindrical stem. Then the stem is gradually swelled out and fashioned into the regularly curved hollow bowl. Surely some power other than these barely animate creatures directed the myriads of them as, in entire isolation from each other, they steadily, through many successive generations, wrought out this plan and realized this ideal.

Descending to a lower grade, we come to the cells of living organisms, animal and vegetable. We find them, like the coral polyps, working together through many years and through innumerable lifetimes of the working cells, which continually perish and pass away; and working in the progressive realization of a plan more complicated than that of the Neptune's cup; a fungus, a lichen, a rose-bush and roses, an oak-tree, a salmon, an eagle, a horse, a man. Here again is evidence of coördination of myr-

iads of agents under some directing intelligence in progressively realizing an ideal.

Descending to a lower grade we find the molecules which have combined to form the cells are coördinated in action to realize an ideal, namely, a cell. And the coördination of molecules is not merely in the production of the cells which are the basis of organic matter. In inorganic matter they are marshaled in order in crystallization. The chemical elements acting on one another combine in definite mathematical proportions. The law of chemical equivalents indicates that the combining molecules are fitted accurately to their positions and, it might almost be said, stamped with their combining numbers; as the parts of Waltham watches and of Springfield rifles are made each to fit into its appropriate place in any watch or rifle; or as blocks of stone are shaped and numbered in the quarry, each for its appropriate place in the building. Thus all of them are coördinated by the intelligence of the builder to realize the ideal of the building. Hence Sir J. Herschel and after him Professor Maxwell said that the ultimate atoms have the marks of manufactured articles.

Passing from molecules to masses, we find them also coördinated, working together to realize the idea of a habitable earth, a solar system, a cosmos.

2. We are to consider the evidence in the progressive realization of the plan or ideal of the cosmos as a whole.

This plan is disclosed in the fact that the physical system reveals gradation and subordination. In it beings exist in different grades, inorganic and organic, and in each of these are subordinate gradations. Animals of the lowest grade are by virtue of sensitivity superior to vegetables of the highest. Yet animal life in its lowest grade does not originate from vegetable life in its highest. They seem to be two parallel series. It is the lower orders of both animal and vegetable organization which are so much alike that it is difficult to determine to which of the organic kingdoms they respectively belong. In each kingdom there is a succession of ascending grades, in which the individuals are more and more highly organized.

In the inorganic world we find also a gradation: the mechanical action of masses; superior to that, the mechanical action of molecules in electricity, heat and light; superior to this, the elemental or chemical forces.¹

Further and decisive evidence is found in the fact, disclosed by

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, p. 495.

science, that nature is progressive in realizing the plan or ideal of the physical system or cosmos.

The physical system as a whole is a cosmos; that is, a whole that is ordered in unity under law. We trace in it gradation and subordination and infer from its structure that it is the product of action directed to the realization of an ideal.

But of late our position in respect to this argument is changed. Science has discovered in the earth itself the effects of mighty agencies active in remote ages through long periods of time forming it into its present condition; and has disclosed marvelous changes through which it has passed and the processes by which it has gradually been brought into its present state. And science gives us reason to suppose that the whole cosmos may have been brought to its present condition through a process of evolution. We are, therefore, not to look on the universe as a product finished in its creation, but as the result of processes which have been going on in the past and which are not yet completed, but which are always directed toward realizing in the universe a grand ideal. We are no longer shut up to reasoning from the structure of the universe as a product finished at a stroke in the creation. We are able to look into the past and catch some glimpses of the processes by which the world was formed and from their discovered effects learn something of the agencies which were active in them. We thus discover that the gradations which we have observed in nature were actual historical results of successive advances of the energy working in nature and revealing new potencies in new products which mark grades or stages in the progress of the universe. Thus while the universe goes on in order and uniformity and so seems to be advancing in a circle, we now discover that the seeming circle is a spiral which at each return is on a higher plane than before. And, as an organism is characterized by germination and growth and by the subordination of one organ and its function to another and of all to the whole organism, the universe in these respects has more analogy to organism than to mechanism. And as the universe advances to the revelation of mechanical force and of the highest powers of it in molecular motion, to the revelation of the higher chemical or elemental force, to the revelation of the power of life, and ultimately to the revelation of personal and spiritual power in man, we are obliged to recognize behind all that appears in the universe a power transcending it and revealing itself progressively in it.¹

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 491-502.

The theory of evolution, therefore, confirms rather than annuls the evidence of a power in and above nature directing its energies toward the realization of an ideal. We are not confined to evidences of the progressive realization of ideals in particular structures, processes and systems, but find the same in the evolution of the cosmos as a whole. Mr. Wordsworth says: "The idea of law conceived as a formula capable of enunciation once for all in set terms and having an eternal changeless validity, has gradually given way before that of process in almost all departments of scientific observation."¹ But the fact of process does not do away with fixed law. It is essential to the idea of a process that it go on under fixed law. The law is revealed in the process. The error to be corrected is that the universe was finished at once in a fiat of creation, and that it can be studied only as a finished and fixed product. Whereas we now know its present condition to be the result of immensely long processes in the past, which in fact have realized higher and higher ends, and have culminated in the appearance of rational man. Thus it is found to be a fact that the power which energizes in nature has been working toward the realization of an ideal, and we have the basis for an induction that it will continue to work toward an ideal in the future.

Whatever may have been the origin of the universe, its subsequent condition at any point of time is not the product of an immediate fiat of God's will. It is the result of a process, in which the existing material and agencies have been prepared for higher manifestations; and the progress is limited by the material in which and the agencies through which the result is effected. According to Mr. Spencer the doctrine of evolution is that the type of the universe is an organism which grows, and not a machine which is made and finished once for all. Christian theism accepts this; it is in harmony with the words of Jesus, who declares that the type also of the spiritual system, the kingdom of God on earth, is the growing grain: first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear.

Because the action is progressive through the development of finite material and the action of finite agencies, it follows that the universe at every period in time and every boundary in space is unfinished and incomplete. Therefore if we find imperfection in it, if we can conceive of a universe more nearly perfect than this, if we find evil in it, this is not inconsistent with the pro-

¹ The One Religion; Bampton Lectures, 1881, p. 307.

gressive realization of a perfect universe, but is incidental to the progressiveness. In ages before man existed it was less developed, and therefore more imperfect than now. So much progress is a fact already known. In philosophy we know, from the idea of the infinite and the finite, that if the universe is the revelation of the infinite in the finite, the revelation can never be finished or complete. And now physical science, discovering that the universe is in fact progressive, teaches that it is always working toward the realization of an ideal archetype, but is never its finished and complete realization. In the infinite, however manifested in the finite, there is always something remaining to be manifested.

Evolution, therefore, does not annul the evidence of the existence of God found in particular beings and arrangements in nature. The fact of a process does not annul the facts of order and law, and of progress toward realizing an ideal. On the other hand it presents the argument on the grandest scale by emphasizing its application to the universe as a whole.¹ It shows that the universe from its beginning, as a whole as well as in its parts, in all times as well as in all places, has revealed the presence and action of a power continuously and progressively working towards the realization of one grand ideal. And its not realizing the ideal in its fulness at any point of time is not failure and defeat; it results from fulness, not from deficiency; the outflowing can never be finished or complete, because it is continuous fulness which overflows. The divine communication in and to the finite is ever greater and greater; but in all communication of the infinite there is always something which remains uncommunicated. That is the Infinite itself; the Incommunicable Name.

3. Nature in its beauty reveals ideals of perfection.

Beauty, as the revelation or at least the indication or suggestion of an ideal of perfection in some concrete object or combination of objects, always reveals mind. In appreciating beauty the mind sees in the beautiful object the revelation of an ideal creation by a mind.²

¹ "The force of evolution is as brute and unconscious as that of fire; there is no more royalty in it than in the log which Jupiter threw down to the frogs. In its descent it has made a frightful splash in the pool of science; but the world will recover from it, as it did from the dangerous doctrine of the earth's motion." — Prof. Benj. Peiree, *Ideality of the Physical Sciences*, p. 35.

² Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 227-243, 250.

The physical world is full of beauty and sublimity. The cosmos, as we think of it in its unity, awakens the emotion of the sublime. We see expressed in it an archetypal ideal of all things in the unity and harmony of a system.

Individual objects in nature and their combinations and arrangements are beautiful. In fact one seldom gets anywhere a wide view of nature without finding it either beautiful or sublime.

Painters and poets are interpreters of nature. The "vision and faculty divine of genius" sees the significance of nature and the ideals it reveals, and in art or poetry sets them forth to the view of others. The artist reveals the significance of nature, not by copying its forms, but by seizing the ideals which they express, the spirit which reveals itself through them. Thus in these creations all men may see what genius sees in nature, what nature reveals to the most clear-seeing and deep-seeing minds.

If to these minds the forms of nature reveal ideals of the perfect and so kindle them to enthusiasm in æsthetic admiration, then, in all these beautiful forms, are revealed the creations of some mind. For how can a poet or artist find nature full of these ideals, unless first some mind has expressed its own ideals in nature's forms?

IV. NATURE SUBSERVES USES. — Nature subserves the uses of sentient beings and preëminently of man.

Here we come to the teleological evidence in its narrowest meaning. Much of the discussion on both sides has been misleading because it has accepted this as the whole. But while it is not the whole it presents a part of the evidence which is important to its full significance. We have been considering the internal end, the realization of a plan, ideal or system in the particular arrangements and processes of nature and in nature as a whole. We come now to the external end, to the subservience of physical agents and processes to the uses of sentient and preëminently of rational beings.

Here also two lines of thought present themselves: First, the subservience of particular agents and processes in nature to the uses of sentient and preëminently of rational beings; Secondly, the subservience of nature as a whole or cosmos to these ends.

1. The evidence in the first of these lines of thought is too abundant to be presented in its details. It will be sufficient to exemplify it in a few instances.

In the outset it must be noticed that the cosmic agencies of inorganic nature are subservient to all organic life.

Jesus says, "Consider the lilies, how they grow;" he teaches that it is God's care which clothes them with beauty. Accordingly we find that every agency in nature is laid under contribution to promote the lily's growth. The sun quickens it by its beams; the earth and the atmosphere contribute material for its structure; the ocean gives water which the winds bear to the growing flower; all chemical and organic forces are energizing in it; gravitation bends its gracefully drooping head.

Jesus says that God cares for every sparrow and notes its fall. And science reveals in the little bird the evidence of a divine knowledge and power. Examine it and learn all which may be known about it. But this would involve an encyclopædia of knowledge. There must be the knowledge of mechanics to understand the leverage of its limbs and the flow of its blood; of chemistry, to know the composition of its body; of terrestrial physics, to explain its weight and its relation to the air in flying; of anatomy and physiology, to know its organs and their functions; of zoölogy, to know its place and relations in the animal system; of physical geography, to learn its distribution over the earth; of palæontology, to learn when it first appeared; and of some of the profoundest questions of metaphysics, to learn what its life is, what is the instinct by which it builds its nest, and wherein its intelligence differs, if at all, from human reason. Thus the whole compass of human science is concentrated and exemplified in a sparrow.

And this is how the lily grows and the sparrow is formed under the care of God. And this concentration of thought and energy on so small a creature is no evidence of defect of power, but of the overflowing fulness of the power always energizing in the world. It is no evidence of waste of energy on a small effect. The lily and the sparrow are small only in bulk; they are great as the blossoms of the great tree of the universe, after its growth through ages maturing itself to capacity for the great result, the blossoming into life, the production of living organisms. And since the universe must mature for ages before it is fitted for the production of organic life, the lily and the sparrow reveal in themselves the product of cosmic forces through ages, as the fruit of a tree reveals the result of years of growth. Each is a physical universe in little, so far as the cosmic powers were developed at the appearance of vegetable and animal life. The powers of the universe have concentrated their energies in developing a lily or a sparrow as if this little thing were the only object of

action, the one ultimate and highest end of the universe; and the same is done for every other organism; as every fruit on a tree is the product of the united energies of the whole tree. And yet the universe and all its energies remain unwasted for new productions. This is not a deficiency of power but an inexhaustible fulness; not waste, but an expenditure commensurate with the resources of the agent. If God does anything he must do it as God. And every lily and every sparrow, because it is the work of his hand, reveals in itself the thought and power of God.

Thus we see that all cosmic forces of inorganic nature are subservient to organic life.

In the next place, the vegetable kingdom is subservient to the animal. Unorganized matter cannot sustain and nourish animal life; it must be organized into plants before it can be food for sentient beings. It was impossible for animals to exist on the earth until it had been clothed with vegetation. The animal kingdom depends on the vegetable kingdom for its existence. The latter exists to subserve the uses of the former.

In the next place, there is a remarkable adjustment of the organs, functions and instincts of sensitive beings to their environment. The being and its environment are fitted to each other as a coin to the die, or a molding to the matrix. They seem to have been made for each other. As Goethe puts it poetically, so it is scientifically true:—

“From the cold earth, in earliest spring,
A flower peeped out, dear, fragrant thing!
Then sipped a bee, as half afraid;
Sure each was for the other made.”¹

There are adaptations or adjustments of particular organs to the medium in which they severally act; as the eye to the light, the lungs to the air. There are provisions in the environment for supplying nourishment to organisms. There are adaptations of particular beings to their peculiar environment. A fish has gills instead of lungs; a bird in its entire organization is constructed for flying. Dr. Darwin in his treatise on Orchids describes the fertilization of flowers by the action of insects, and points out various remarkable contrivances in the flower to attract the insects and to direct their action so as rightly to distribute the pollen. There are changes in the organs and functions of the same individual to meet changing conditions of life, as in frogs

¹ Gleich und Gleich.

and insects in their several transformations, and in the gradual extinction of an organ when in a different environment there is no further use for it. There are also temporary changes to meet a temporary change of condition; the scent of a pheasant is suppressed during incubation, and this protects her from dogs.¹ There is a power of modification to meet new conditions, as the healing power in nature, the marvelous power of perception in the finger's end of the blind. There are guiding and preserving instincts.

There is also the great complexity and nicety of the adjustments on which life depends. No single agent or action effects such an adjustment. It is the result of different or opposing forces nicely balanced; of agencies acting under different laws nicely concurring to produce a definite result. Any disturbance in the proportions or the adjustment would change the effect, and might transform what had sustained life into a power destructive of it. The air is composed of the same elements as nitric acid, and if chemically combined the air might be transformed into that corrosive agent. The chemical principles of tea and strychnine are composed of the same elements differently combined. The whole earth, with its atmosphere, is composed of sixty-four elements; much the larger number of these exist, so far as known, in very small quantities. It has been estimated that some twenty of these make up almost the entire globe. It is evident that there must be great variety and nicety of their combinations to form the multitude of diverse kinds of things in the world. And these nice adjustments of agents, forces and laws imply the action of mind. And since it is by these that sentient beings are sustained and nourished, it is plain that nature is constituted and administered in subservience to the uses of sentient beings. Evolution, if true, does not alter these facts; nor does it invalidate the argument that the facts reveal mind. For if these adjustments come to pass in a process of evolution, the original constitution of that which is evolved, the appearance at the fit time of organic and then of sentient beings, and the direction of the evolution to effect the adjustments necessary to their preservation and sustenance, still reveal the agency of mind.

In like manner nature subserves the uses of man as one class of its sentient beings. We find in him similar adaptations and adjustments to his environment. The earth is habitable. It

¹ Nature, May 15, 1873, pp. 48-50.

yields him food fitted to his needs. It supplies him with wood, stone, coal, the earths and the metals, material for building, for tools and machinery. The strata of its crust are tilted up, giving access to buried mineral deposits which he could never have reached had the strata been uniformly horizontal; and thus its surface is thrown up into mountains, hills and valleys, giving a bed for the ocean, and springs and streams of living water, and fit sites for happy homes. All the energies of nature wait his bidding and do his work. Earth, air, fire and water offer themselves for his use.

In all instances of this kind the adaptations and subservience to uses are facts found in nature and scientifically established. The theist says they are evidence of rational intelligence directing the plan and development of nature to rational ends.

2. We come now to the second line of thought: Nature as a whole is subservient to the spiritual system and to man as belonging to it.

Here we are to consider what is the external end, the end beyond itself, for which the physical system as a whole exists.

It may safely be said that to the rational spirit of man, with all his spiritual faculties and susceptibilities awake, the physical system in itself presents no worthy end for its existence, no end which can meet and satisfy the demands of reason and of the spiritual life. We must look beyond nature to find the end for which it exists.

Beyond nature there is nothing known to us but the sphere of the spiritual and personal. This sphere man already knows in his consciousness of himself and his knowledge of his fellow-men. He knows it as a sphere distinct from and above all impersonal being and all that belongs merely to the physical system. He knows nature by observation to be a realm of means and instrumentalities. Everything in it is the effect of a previous cause and a means or instrument of a subsequent effect. Everything in it is an intermediate, receiving from something before and transmitting to something coming after. Everything in it exists only as a means subordinate to an end. On the contrary, in his own moral consciousness of freedom and personality he knows the sphere of the spiritual and personal to be a realm of ends. He knows that a rational free person is not a tool to be used, but a being to be served. He rightly assumes that in this higher system, this realm of ends, the highest and true end of the physical system may be found.¹

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 357-361.

It is a fact that, so far as we on this earth know the evolution of the cosmos, it has culminated in the appearance of men, of rational moral agents. It has culminated in the appearance of just this moral system, this realm of ends. And this has been the highest result of the progressive evolution of the cosmos through successive higher and higher stages of being until man appeared.

We therefore infer that the physical system as a whole exists not for itself, but as subservient to the bringing in of the spiritual system and of man as belonging to it.¹

This may be illustrated from organic life and growth. If one watches the germination of a peach-stone and its subsequent growth, the first revelation of its living force and its specific character is the pale and tender shoot; the next higher is the leaf, then higher still is the blossom; and the last and consummate revelation is the ripe fruit. When we see this highest and consummate revelation of the living force and specific character of the peach-stone, we conclude that the tree exists to produce peaches; for that in fact is what it does.

The most perfect type of the evolving universe is a living and growing organism. The universe in its development reveals its power and its specific character, first in mechanical action preparing the homogeneous material for chemical combinations; then in chemical affinities, preparing the material for vital action; then in vegetable life, preparing the earth for the sustenance of animals; then in animal life, fructifying and ripening in rational man. We thus know the fact that its highest product, so far as its gradations come under our observation in the history of this planet, is rational man. And we reasonably conclude that this earth exists for the production of rational man; and the further inference is, that the universe exists for the production of rational beings as its highest and consummate product.

We also infer that rational man is, so far as this earth is

¹ "There is in every earnest thinker a craving after a final cause; and this craving can no more be extinguished than our belief in objective reality. . . . The glorious consummation toward which organic evolution is tending is the production of the highest and most perfect psychical life. . . . When from the dawn of life we see all things working together toward the evolution of the highest spiritual attributes of man, we know, however the words may stumble in which we try to say it, that God is in the deepest sense a moral Being." — John Fiske, *The Idea of God*, pp. 138, 160, 167.

Mr. Spenceer speaks of "the naturally revealed end towards which the Power manifested in Evolution works." — *Data of Ethics*, § 62.

concerned, the being to whose uses preëminently nature is subordinate and subservient; that nature is subservient to man preëminently as a rational and spiritual being and belonging to the spiritual system; it is subservient to the spiritual interests and ends of man; and that the physical system as a whole is subordinate and subservient to the spiritual system.

This is inferred from the fact that in the evolution of the universe rational, spiritual beings in a rational, spiritual system have actually been produced, and are actually its highest and consummate product. Man finds himself rational, spiritual and therefore supernatural. Born of nature he finds himself above nature. He finds himself personal and free, determining himself, exerting and directing his own energies, seeing rational truth and knowing himself subject to rational, moral and spiritual law; he sees himself with his fellow-men rational and free like himself, united under moral and spiritual law in a moral and spiritual system. Here is the indisputable fact that nature in its processes and progressive development has issued in the production, either by itself or by a power present in it but above it, of rational, moral and spiritual beings, knowing themselves to be under a common law in a rational, moral and spiritual system. And this is the highest and consummate product of the development of the universe.

We say then that nature exists for the spiritual interests of man, and that the physical system is subordinate and subservient to a spiritual system, because, as a matter of fact, rational, moral and spiritual beings, recognizing themselves as under rational, moral and spiritual law in a moral and spiritual system, are actually its highest and consummate product.

We have further evidence in the observed fact that the physical system gives scope to the rational, moral and spiritual activity and culture of man. In contact with it man is wakened to consciousness of himself. In the investigation of it his intellect is quickened and developed. In subduing, cultivating, developing and civilizing nature he subdues, cultivates, develops and civilizes himself. In resisting temptation from the nature-side of his own being and subjecting it to the spiritual he develops his own spiritual purity, insight and power. And the physical universe in its grandeur reveals the glory of God and is a magnificent and fit temple for his worship and service.

V. UNITY OF NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL. — To complete this evidence it is necessary to show that in theism, and

in it alone, we find adequate ground for the complete harmony and unity of the two systems, the physical and the spiritual, under the true law of continuity.

In the foregoing discussion we have opened to our view the universe consisting of two grand systems, of nature and of spirit. In the subordination of the former to the latter we see the only conceivable end worthy of the existence of the physical universe in its vastness, magnificence and grandeur. And in this is discovered the solution of the otherwise intractable problem of finding harmony and unity in the duality of the natural and the supernatural, of matter and mind.

Reason demands for the universe unity of dependence on some common original ground or cause, unity of order and law, of common intelligibility and significance, and of rational end; and theism meets and satisfies these demands. It presents, as the absolute ground or cause from which all things originate, the absolute Reason, self-exerting and self-directing. In the last analysis of physical force science always finds a power transcending it and suggestive of will-power. In all its explorations of nature and its explanations of it by natural laws, it carries us into sight of the mystery of the infinite which no natural law can explain. But theism shows us the mystery itself as the absolute Reason progressively revealing itself in the universe. Theism finds the order, law and significance of nature in the fact that it is the expression of the archetypal thought of absolute Reason in conformity with rational laws. It finds unity of end in the subordination of nature to the spiritual system. The spiritual system is in its essence a realm of ends; every spiritual or personal being has rights and is in himself an object of service, never a tool to be used. In the sublime ideas of spiritual development, of the realization of the kingdom of God, the reign of peace and love on earth and its perpetuation in heaven, we see an end to be attained by the existence of the universe which reason pronounces of true worth. Theism, therefore, gives the harmony and unity of the physical and spiritual systems in the universe as the creation of God, the absolute Reason, dependent on him, expressing his archetypal thought, ordered under rational laws, and progressively realizing in the spiritual sphere the ideals and ends of perfect wisdom and love.

Here also we find the synthesis of nature, man and God. The ultimate significance and the deepest reality of the universe are the rational principles and truths, the thoughts of the absolute

Reason which it expresses and in which it reveals God. Theism explains why in the investigation of the universe we always find science. It teaches that the universe is the expression or manifestation of the thoughts of God; it is the revelation of the eternal Reason. And since the reason of man is the same in kind with the universal Reason and participates in its light, man can apprehend the universe in his thought because it is the expression of the divine thought; the world without is the expression and revelation of the spiritual principles within. Here we find the true meaning of a principle of Kant's philosophy: "Man's knowledge of his own spirit is the starting-point and key of his knowledge of the world." Here we find the synthesis of nature and spirit; nature is not antagonistic to spirit, for it is the expression of the spirit. Here we find the synthesis of nature, man and God; for the spiritual system and the physical are the manifestation of God, the absolute Reason, and are in unity through their common relation to him. The eternal Spirit reveals himself, not in the spiritual system only, but in the physical system which to superficial thought seems entirely contrary to him. As we think more deeply and devoutly, we find ourselves saying with Carlyle: "The whole creation seems more and more divine to me, the natural more and more supernatural."¹

The constitution of the physical system is the archetypal thought of God expressed in it. Its invariable factual sequences which are called the laws of nature and constitute its uniformity and continuity, are accordant with the truths, laws, ideals and ends which are eternal in the absolute Reason. Mr. Drummond maintains that the laws of nature extend to the spiritual world and are its laws. He writes in defense of theism and with the laudable intent to remove the common error that nature and spirit are contradictory and separated by an impassable gulf, and to show that the law of continuity extends from the one to the other and connects them in unity. But his way of putting it is that the laws of nature extend to the spiritual world. This implies that spirit is generated from nature, not that nature is the manifestation of spirit. In the last century skepticism in France busied itself with proving that the spiritual and the material, the supernatural and the natural are the same; but it was trying to do it, not by lifting the natural into relation with the spiritual, but by sinking the spiritual into the natural. The materialistic

¹ Froude's *Life of Carlyle*, vol. ii. p. 258.

evolutionists of the present day are trying to do the same. Mr. Drummond does not accept this inference; he even says explicitly that the spiritual precedes the natural, and that its laws are projected into the natural; he speaks of matter as an x or symbol and so verges close upon idealism.¹ From this the logical inference is that the principles of the spiritual system pass over into the natural and determine its factual sequences and evolution. He is inconsistent with himself in teaching the contrary, that the laws of nature pass over to the spiritual system and determine it. Yet this latter is his doctrine both in his statement of his principle and in the successive chapters in which he applies natural laws to spiritual facts. Thus he unwittingly concedes the essential premises of materialistic evolution. But in truth it is the spiritual which gives laws to the natural, not the natural which gives laws to the spiritual. It is the spirit which manifests itself in nature, not nature which manifests itself in spirit. The law of uniformity and continuity extends through the realms both of spirit and of nature; but it passes from the realm of spirit into that of nature, not from the realm of nature into that of spirit. The uniformity and continuity of the universe are the uniformity and continuity of the absolute Spirit continuously and progressively expressing the truths which are eternal in the unchanging Reason, by action according with its unchanging laws, and realizing its unchanging ideals and ends.

Accordingly, if I may use a significant expression of Hegel, man finds himself "at home"² in nature, not merely because as to his physical organization he is in nature and is acted on by it through his sensorium, but also because he finds in it the principles of his own reason, in its accordance with which he can comprehend it in science; in studying it, he finds it revealing his own spiritual being to himself and opening to him the range and power of his own intelligence; he finds its correspondence with his own spiritual life, so that it furnishes the symbols which illustrate and the words which declare spiritual realities; in its forms of beauty he rejoices to discover his own ideals of perfection; and everywhere sees the wisdom of God, the perfect Reason. The words of Sidney Lanier are hardly too strong:—

"His heart found neighbors in great hills and trees,
And streams and clouds and suns and birds and bees,
And throbbed with neighbor-loves in loving these."

¹ *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, pp. 53-57.

² See, for example, Hegel, *Philosophie der Religion*, vol. i. pp. 17, 26.

On the other hand, he finds himself no stranger in the realm of the spiritual and the supernatural; there also he is "at home" with God and all that is spiritual and supernatural, for he is a child of God the father of spirits, and is himself in his inmost being spiritual and supernatural. As spirit he feels his spiritual environment. And the fact that man thus finds himself at home with God and with spiritual realities is a decisive evidence of the existence of God and his communication with man, and of the reality of the spiritual realm.

Nature, therefore, is not in antagonism to spirit. It is itself the manifestation of God, the expression of his archetypal thought, the sphere in which he is continuously active, revealing himself so far as he can be revealed in physical forces and their interaction. It throbs all through with spiritual energies more subtle and more mighty than the currents of electricity and magnetism or the vibration of the all-pervading ether flashing with light and heat. With all its vastness and sublimity it is but the ground, the place, the sphere for what is greater, for the rise and development of the spiritual system. It is made for the abode and the sphere of action of persons, rational and free, in the image of God, constituting a rational and spiritual system in which through endless time and space God realizes progressively the purpose of his wisdom in acts of love. So man finds in nature the resources for the accomplishment of his purposes, the material, the instruments and the forces which he lays hold of and directs and uses for his own ends; in his acquisition of the resources of nature he is himself disciplined and developed and so revealed to himself in his real capacities and powers; and in his own development he cultivates, civilizes and develops the earth itself, which advances step by step with him in his progress. The physical world, therefore, presents no antagonism to the spiritual, but is a sphere for life and action, fitted for rendering service to God, for the spiritual work and culture of man, and for the establishment and growth of God's kingdom of righteousness and good-will, of peace and blessedness.

And around all the universe, physical and spiritual, rolls the great ocean of the infinite, mysterious and incomprehensible. This also verifies the belief in God; for if this were not so God would not be infinite. Yet in the evolution of the universe what he is continually comes more and more to light. As in the beginning the islands and the continents at the word of God were heaved up slowly from beneath the all-pervading waters, and

the waters receded as the rising land enlarged, so in the evolution of the universe God is continually emerging from the darkness and vastness of the infinite, and the area of the knowledge of God within which men may live on solid and fruitful ground and happily serve him, is enlarging; yet for that very reason the boundless ocean of his infinitude greatens to the view along the lengthening shore as the waters give place to the rising and enlarging land.

Thus the whole universe, natural and spiritual, known speculatively or practically, attests and verifies through all ages the reality of the existence of God, *certissima scientia et clamante conscientia*.¹

VI. THE INFERENCE. — In the five lines of investigation which have been indicated we find, in facts and laws scientifically established, evidence of the presence and direction of reason in the constitution and course of nature. This constitutes the verification of the theistic hypothesis that the cosmos is grounded in reason, and that the absolute Power manifested in it is a rational power, the universal Reason energizing, the personal God.

The verification is complete if no other hypothesis is found which as well accords with the known facts and laws and accounts for them.

Physical science forces on the attention the problem of finding a theory of the universe, but properly declines to attempt its solution as not being within its sphere. As it pushes onward the investigation of nature's forces attracting and repelling, of its elemental constitution, its ethers and their vibrations, its progressive evolution, it finds itself involved in insuperable difficulties and contradictions. Thus it finds that the ultimate explanation of the physical system must come from beyond the system and from beyond all which empirical science can discover. So Lord Rayleigh, President of the British Association, in his opening address at the meeting in Montreal in 1884, said of "the scientific worker:" "In his heart he knows that underneath the theories that he constructs there lie contradictions which he cannot reconcile. The highest mysteries of being, if penetrable at all by human intellect, require other weapons than those of calculation and experiment."

Passing from empirical to philosophical and theological science, it has already been shown that positivism, denying all knowledge of beings and forces, refuses to entertain the prob-

¹ Augustine, — De Trinitate, bk. xiii. chap. i. 3.

lem of finding an explanation of the universe, that agnosticism is inconsistent with itself, and that pantheistic and materialistic monism each fails to accord with the facts and to account for them, and falls into insuperable difficulties and contradictions. And every hypothesis, which denies that the cosmos is grounded in reason and manifests rational direction in its facts and laws, fails. It explains phenomena only by some physical antecedent equally needing explanation; as if one should account for the music of a piano as caused by the keys, with no recognition of the composer or the pianist. The deduction from such an hypothesis would be that nature would disclose no rational direction and no rational beings; and the deduction would be contradicted by the observed facts at every point.

In the theistic hypothesis, that the universe is grounded in personal Reason and manifests it directing and energizing, and in this alone, the contradictions disappear and the universe is accounted for in its rational cause, in its existence in the unity of a rational system, and in its progressive realization of rational ideals and its existence for worthy rational ends.

Nature itself through all its changes reveals laws which never change. If the universe was once nebulous matter, yet through all the changes during uncounted ages until now its laws have been unchanged. The laws of gravitation, of mechanics, of light, heat and electricity, of chemical affinity, all determined with mathematical exactness, have been persistently the same. Thus nature gives us a symbol of God immanent in nature through all changes; and more than a symbol; for nature, in its unchanging principles, laws and types, expresses the unchanging thought of God. And as nature reveals God, so God reveals nature; for we know the real significance of nature, only as we know the infinite in the finite, the ideal in the physical, the God in nature. As the diamond reveals the light that continuously falls on it, so the light reveals the diamond. The diamond would be little esteemed if estimated only by what is known of it in the darkness. God is the light of the world, and he knows little of the real significance of nature who knows it only as nature and without God. So Jean Paul Richter strikingly describes the immanence of God unchangeable in the ever-changing flux of nature: "The Reason mirrors itself in the world-stream, like the sunlight in the water-fall;" the sunshine unchanging in the stream, but the stream ever flowing. Thus even in our scientific investigations of nature we are confronted

everywhere with God : "Thou hast beset me behind and before, and laid thine hand upon me. Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence?"

VII. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE EVIDENCE. — The objections are of two classes: those against the evidence; and those against the legitimacy of the inference from it.

The principal objections against the evidence may be grouped under three heads.

Some objections arise from isolating a single fact adduced in the evidence and insisting that it alone does not prove a directing intelligence in nature. Theists by insisting on isolated and even trivial instances have sometimes given occasion for such objections. The whole force of these arises from considering a single fact, and that perhaps a trivial one, in isolation, as if it included the whole evidence. But the evidence is not in single facts, but in processes, and in combinations of facts, and especially in the unity of innumerable processes and combinations in nature as a whole. One may laugh at the argument that we see the goodness of God in the adaptation of the bark of cork-trees to be made into stopples, and of eggs to be made into omelets. But the fact that the world as a whole is adjusted to man as a fit habitation, yielding to his skill and industry food, clothing and shelter, and all manner of material, instruments and agencies for the accomplishment of his ends, is certainly an evidence that it is constituted by a directing intelligence for a reasonable end. Even when a single object is adduced in evidence, as an eye, a lily or a sparrow, it is found to involve the concurrence in unity of many complicated agencies and processes, and to present in the evidence the consilience of many lines of thought. As we extend our thought to larger and larger wholes, with the unity of ever increasing complications, the evidence of intelligent direction becomes irresistible to one who has the concrete facts clear before his mind. And when we contemplate the cosmos as a whole in the unity of a scientific system, orderly and uniform under the law of continuity, evolving through ages of time in progressively realizing a plan, and subserving successively higher and higher ends till man appears, the evidence of intellectual direction is as complete as it is conceivable the evidence of any fact not immediately perceived can be. Goethe says: "The teachers of whom I speak would think they lost their God if they did not adore him who gave the ox horns to defend himself with. But let them permit me to venerate him who is so

great in the magnificence of his creation as, after making a thousand-fold plants, to comprehend them all in one; and after a thousand-fold animals, to make that one who comprehends them all — man. Farther, they venerate him who gives the beast his fodder and man meat and drink as much as he can enjoy. But I worship him who has infused into the world such a power of production that, if only the millionth part of it should pass into life, the world must swarm with creatures to such a degree that war, pestilence, fire and water cannot prevail against them. This is my God.”¹

Other objections to the evidence are founded on the allegation that the very objects adduced in the evidence are discovered to be imperfect.

For example, Professor Helmholtz alleges that the eye, as an optical instrument, has defects, several of which he specifies. He speaks of it as more defective than optical instruments made by man.²

The first reply is that the eye is superior to all optical instruments made by man in the fact that it sees. Without an eye applied to it every optical instrument in the world is useless. Not one of them can see. The eye was made to see and adapted to that end. Optical instruments are made for the eye to see through, and are adapted to that end. If the eye were exactly like the most perfect optical instrument made by man, it would be a total failure for all the purposes of an eye.

A telescope is made to assist the eye in seeing distant objects; a microscope to assist it in seeing minute objects close at hand. Each is unfit for the purpose of the other. An eye is made to see both near and remote objects, as the purposes of life may require. In this also it is superior to any optical instrument. The objection therefore is analogous to saying that a razor is inferior to an axe because trees cannot be felled with it.

Further, the eye is a living organ in a living organism; it must be delicately sensitive; it must conform to the laws of the organism and is affected by all its organic action; it must be adapted to all these organic conditions as well as to the mechanical action of light, and to all its environment. Professor J. P. Cooke says: “The capacity of self-adjustment, preserving always a perfect achromatism and freedom from spherical aberration, has never been reached in nearly the same degree by art.”³ An

¹ Eckermann, *Conversations with Goethe*, Trans. pp. 370, 371.

² *Popular Lect. on Scientific Subjects*, pp. 212–228.

³ *Religion and Chemistry*, p. 231.

organ with all these varied adjustments and meeting successfully all these conditions is a far more admirable instrument than a telescope or microscope. And Professor Helmholtz himself says that the defects of the eye are counteracted; that "the adaptation of the eye to its function is most complete, and is seen in the very limits given to its defects;" and that "every useless refinement would have rendered it more delicate and slower in its use" as an eye. It appears therefore that the defects in the eye, which have been so much talked of, do after all enhance the evidence of a directing intelligence in its structure. It has been only by long study that the defects in the primitive optical instruments have been step by step corrected. Now we find that in the eye nature has already made these corrections. It evinces not only the highest skill directing its construction, but also adapting it to the uses of a living organism and counteracting the influence of defects found by all opticians to be inseparable from the construction of optical instruments.

Other examples of objections of this kind are those founded on the alleged waste of power and resources in effecting a result in nature; as in the multitude of germs which perish in comparison with the number which grow into mature organisms. This, it is said, is "like shooting a million loaded guns in a field to kill one hare," or "spilling a gallon of wine in filling one wine-glass." But in view of all the conditions and processes of the universe it is not known that this prodigality involves waste. And it indicates the affluence of resources, the inexhaustible prolificness of the power energizing in nature and its fixed purpose to preserve and perpetuate the species against all adverse agencies.

To all objections like these, founded on a supposed imperfection in a product or process of nature, there is an additional answer. They assume that the perfection of a product or arrangement is necessary in order to prove intelligent direction. This is erroneous. The pictures drawn by the cave men on tusks of ivory are far from perfect, the implements of the earlier stone-age are of the rudest kind; yet all scientists recognize in them indisputable evidence of the workmanship of rational beings. And it must be borne in mind that our present argument is not intended to establish the existence of the absolute Being and his manifestation of his power in nature, for these are already known; nor to complete the proof of his perfection, for in order to do this it must be supplemented by other evidence. It is simply evidence that the power manifested in nature is guided by intelligence.

Further replies equally pertinent to these objections will be found in the answers to those of the next group.

Objections of the third group assert that the theist does not take note of all the facts bearing on the question ; they allege the existence of evil in various forms as positive evidence against theism.

These facts are of two classes.

The first is moral evil, that is, sin. Sin, as a fact, is fully accounted for by the existence of finite free agents. Through their freedom they determine by their own choice whether to do right or wrong ; and through their finiteness they are liable to err. Since there can be no moral system without finite free agents, there can be no moral system without the possibility of sin. The objection therefore is not ultimately against the fact that some beings sin, but against the possibility of sin ; therefore against the existence of any moral system. It demands a system of finite free agents in which sin is impossible. But this is demanding an absurdity. To this it is replied by the objector that the answer implies that sin is necessary in the constitution of things. But this rejoinder is founded on the failure of the objector to discriminate between the fact of sin and its possibility. The fact of sin is not necessary in the constitution of things, because all moral agents are free to do right ; if they do wrong it is of their own free choice and not of any necessity. But the possibility of doing wrong is inherent in the constitution of any moral system. If then any one freely chooses the wrong, this does not impeach the wisdom of constituting a moral system ; it only shows that some one in the system has in his freedom made an unwise choice. The reasons which justify and demand the existence of the moral system remain unchanged. This is as far as we can here proceed in the discussion of this side of the objection. The full consideration of these reasons is possible only when we are prepared for an examination of the moral system in its relation to the government of God, and in the light of his revelation of himself in Christ.

The second class of facts adduced by the objector are those of physical evil in various forms. This includes pain and suffering, and all agencies and arrangements, all imperfections and mal-adjustments which are adapted to cause them.

In respect to these objections from the existence of evil in both kinds it must be noted in the outset that the belief in the supremacy of reason and of the moral law does not originate in any

empirical estimate of the comparative amount of happiness and misery in the world. This belief wells up spontaneously from the rational constitution of man. In studying the evidence of the existence of God we do not begin with stripping ourselves of our consciousness of moral obligation, of the distinction between right and wrong, and of the supreme authority of moral law.¹ Therefore if the theist discovers facts which he cannot explain in harmony with the reign of righteousness, he is justified in his faith that the moral ordering of the universe is supreme and that these facts, when all is known, will be found explicable in harmony with it. In scientific investigation it is assumed that every fact is capable of being apprehended in science, though at present its scientific relations are not discovered. Just so and on the ground of the same confidence in the supremacy and universality of reason, we are justified in assuming that every fact can be explained in harmony with the universality and supremacy of the practical Reason in its moral ordering of the world. The atheist claims that he has the same right to assume that the evidences of benevolent design and righteous rule in the world are explicable in harmony with a supreme malevolence and injustice, and so to rest in faith in the supremacy of these in face of facts which he cannot explain in harmony with them. But he has this right only if the reason of man and its necessary principles are untrustworthy, if its moral intuitions are illusions and there is no essential distinction between right and wrong.

Before considering the objection from physical evil it may be premised that the physical system being impersonal and not subject to moral law cannot reasonably be expected to furnish complete evidence of the righteousness and benevolence of the absolute Being manifested in it. To answer this objection fully we must have also the knowledge of God obtained from his revelation of himself in the constitution and history of man, and especially from his revelation in Christ.

It must also be premised that theism alone even attempts to answer this objection. Whether theism is true or not, the imperfection and suffering designated as physical evil remain facts. They must either be explained as consistent with the directing agency of reason or it must be admitted that the universe is not a reasonable system. The objection urges these facts to prove that the universe is not reasonable. But this is an objection against all science as really as against theism; for all science rests

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, chap. ix. pp. 185-226.

on the assumption that the universe is a reasonable system and that everything in it is essentially intelligible and explicable to reason. And whoever is intellectually troubled and perplexed by the existence of physical evil as something demanding explanation, therein reveals his own consciousness that the universe must be a reasonable system. And the very existence of a reasonable system implies a rational plan and therein also implies a rational end.

As a reasonable explanation of imperfection and suffering theism presents three principal lines of thought in answer to the objection.

The first answer is, that imperfection, privation and liability to evil are involved in finiteness.

The second answer is, that physical evil is subservient to the education and development of man and thus to the ends of the higher spiritual system.

The third answer is that, notwithstanding physical evil, the physical system does reveal God's benevolent disposition to promote happiness.

First Answer : Imperfection, privation and liability to evil are involved in the limitations of finite beings. And this line of thought is applicable both to physical and moral evil.

In carrying out this line of thought, theism rests on two principles. One is this : The universe is the expression in the finite of the archetypal thought or ideal of the absolute Reason, which is the ultimate ground of its existence ; the infinite can never be fully expressed in the finite ; therefore the expression of the infinite in the universe must be progressive, and at every point of time or bound of space it must be incomplete and thus imperfect. The other is this : the progressive expression or realization of the archetypal ideal is in the finite universe and through the action of its finite agencies.

Physical science declares the same. The universe is in continuous evolution from lower to higher grades of being ; the evolution goes on in the finite through the interaction of finite agencies ; beings of a higher grade never appear until through this interaction the stuff existing in a lower grade has been prepared for them ; and the universe is found to be the progressive expression and realization of archetypal thought, because the human mind applying itself to it in observation and thought takes from it into itself its intellectual equivalent, as an imprint is taken from type ; and the imprint is found to be science.

The objection before us contradicts in these respects both physical science and theism. It assumes that the universe is a completed product finished in all its parts, and that therefore everything in it must be found to be perfect. It also assumes that the universe is made what it is by an arbitrary fiat of almighty will, which at every moment effects whatever its caprice decrees in entire disconnection from all existing finite things and agencies and from the existing conditions, powers and capacities of the universe.

Theism and physical science concur in setting aside these assumptions, and thus entirely take away the foundation on which the objection rests.

We look now at the first of these two principles. It is evident that if God expresses his archetypal thought in the universe, it must be expressed in the finite. Hence its expression as actually made in the universe must at every point of time and bound of space be incomplete and imperfect. The archetypal plan or ideal eternal in the absolute Reason is perfect; its realization in the finite must be progressive; the universe in which it is progressively realized can never be finished and complete. The manifestation of the infinite in it must go on progressively forever. Only the eternal word, which God sees in himself as the archetype of the universe, is the complete and perfect word of God. The word of God is uttered in the universe; but the utterance always falls short of the infinite fulness of meaning in the word to be uttered. In the universe God is always uttering his incommunicable name. So Dante heard in Paradise: —

“ He who a compass turned
 On the world's outer verge, and who within it
 Devised so much occult and manifest,
 Could not the impress of his power so make
 On all the universe, as that his Word
 Should not remain in infinite excess.
 And this makes certain that the first proud being,
 Who was the paragon of every creature,
 By not awaiting light fell immature.
 And hence appears it, that each minor nature
 Is scant receptacle unto that good
 Which has no end, and by itself is measured.
 In consequence our vision, which perforce
 Must be some ray of that intelligence
 With which all things whatever are replete,
 Cannot in its own nature be so potent,
 That it shall not its origin discern
 Far beyond that which is apparent to it.
 Therefore into the justice sempiternal

The power of vision that your world receives,
As eye into the ocean penetrates ;
Which, though it sees the bottom near the shore,
Upon the deep perceives it not ; and yet
'T is there, but it is hidden by the depth." ¹

We look next at the second of the two principles. When the universe has come into existence, it has a reality and efficiency of its own which must determine the effects which it is possible to bring to pass in it or through its agencies. If this were not so, God by his action would break in on the fixed course of nature ; or rather there would be no fixed course of nature ; God's action would be entirely above it and independent of it, and the universe would be a mere illusion, seeming to be and act without really being and acting. But God's action is not above the universe but in it and upon it, not irruptive into it but through its beings and powers, not a miracle-working but a continuous action progressively developing the higher from the lower. The effect produced by a power however great in a finite thing must be commensurate with the capacity of the thing. No power can put a gallon of water into a pint-measure, nor move a stone by argument or persuasion, nor deprive a free will of its freedom by chains and fetters. And the effect produced by any power through a finite agent must be commensurate with the power of the agent. No power can produce an effect by a moving body greater than is commensurate with its mass and velocity.

These two principles are a basis for the explanation of physical imperfection and suffering consistently with the supremacy of reason in the universe.

The limitation of a finite being is imperfection, negatively as the absence of good, positively as liability to evil. A mouse is negatively imperfect in that, while it has a certain size, swiftness, force and other qualities which are good, it lacks all higher degrees of those qualities. A stone lacks life ; a plant lacks feeling ; a brute lacks reason. A finite being is positively imperfect because it is liable to be overcome by the stronger. Through all nature the law is that a weaker force must give way before the stronger. Hence in all vegetable and animal life are the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. So all beings on earth are subject to overpowering cosmic agencies, to winter's cold and summer's heat, to lightning, tornadoes and earthquakes, to the miasma of pestilence, which no human power can resist and no human skill escape.

¹ *Paradiso. Canto xix. 40-63, Longfellow's Translation.*

This imperfection, negative and positive, is sometimes called metaphysical imperfection to distinguish it from moral. Finiteness does not necessarily involve pain and suffering. These are occasional and exceptional. But the liability to pain is inseparable from a sentient organization and is an imperfection. And as to the absence of good, in common speech we quite as often characterize a being by its deficiency of good as by its possession of it. A babe is called weak. Yet it has strength. A boy is strong in comparison with the babe, but weak in comparison with a man; and the man is weak in comparison with an elephant, the elephant in comparison with a steam-engine and so on indefinitely. Of every finite being it is true that its strength is weakness.

This imperfection is inseparable from finiteness. In mechanics what is gained in power is lost in time. Light, if obstructed, must cast a shadow, and if absent there must be darkness. Nerves sentient to pleasure must be sentient to pain. Organic life must be liable to death. Where one body is another cannot be. If it is asked why the constitution of things and the course and laws of nature might not be changed, the answer is that, however changed, the universe and all in it must still be finite and therefore incomplete and imperfect.

The greater are the variety and range of the capacity for good, the greater the variety and range of the liability to evil. A stone cannot die; a plant cannot suffer; a brute cannot sin.

It is objected that God created the material of the universe and therefore is himself responsible for its refractoriness under his working. This objection goes back to the error that the ultimate ground of the universe is an almighty and capricious will. It is of no force against the theistic doctrine that the universe is grounded in absolute Reason, and no power, not even almightiness, can either create or annul any of its eternal principles or give reality to that which contradicts them and is absurd. The distinction between the absolute and the conditioned, the infinite and the finite, rests on a primitive and constituent principle of reason, which no power of will can create or annul. God therefore did not create it. He has simply created finite beings in accordance with that eternal distinction. The impossibility of causing an effect, in a finite being or through a finite agency, greater than its capacity is not created by any fiat of God's will.

The objection therefore involves the absurdity that God has no right to create a finite being; nor any being except an absolute

or unconditioned being. The objection is against the finiteness of the creature, not against any particular degree of limitation, whether more or less.¹

It follows that no degree of physical limitation or imperfection is a valid objection against the supremacy of reason in the universe or against the moral perfection of God; because the objection is not against the degree of limitation, but against finiteness in the creature. It demands that every creature must be equal with God.

Hence the finiteness of a creature, whatever its limitation may be, is no just ground of complaint against the reasonableness of the creation or the equity of God in creating. If a star-fish could complain that it is not a trout, the trout might as well complain that it is not a horse, the horse that it is not a man, the man that he is not an angel, the angel that he is not a thousand times greater. If I may complain that I live but seventy years, Methuselah might with equal propriety complain that he lived but a thousand; and when told that I am immortal I might as well complain that I was not brought into being a million of years before. In their real significance these all are forms of the absurd complaint that God did not make all creatures gods by one instantaneous fiat of his will. And this limitation of God's revelation of himself in the finite is not an imperfection of God, but results from the perfection of absolute Reason regulating all the divine action.

Here we see the significance and the wisdom of the Syrophœnician woman's saying which our Lord commended: "Truth, Lord, yet the dogs eat the crumbs which fall from their masters' table."

It is unnecessary to delay to consider in detail the various forms of physical imperfection and evil which have been urged in objections; such as the existence of pain and suffering, the fact of death, the existence of carnivorous animals with weapons of assault and defense. If all animals were immortal the number enjoying life on earth would be immeasurably reduced. If all were graminivorous there would be a diminution of the number which the earth could support. So in all details, the removal of the

¹ Using the word evil in the sense of metaphysical imperfection, we may say with Biedermann that "it belongs essentially to the finite universe. . . . A universe without it is no longer a universe distinct from God, but would be nothing but the universe taken back again into the absolute being of God." — Biedermann, *Dogmatik*, § 723, p. 650.

limitation at one point would make necessary an equivalent limitation somewhere else.

The same principle answers all objections constituting what Professor Haeckel has called dysteleology, from the existence in living beings of rudimentary organs, simulating organs useful in other organisms, but useless, so far as known, in the organism in which they are found in their rudimentary forms; from the existence of organs wasting away from disuse; from the existence of organs not only useless but dangerous to the organism in which they exist; an example of which is the cul-de-sac or pocket known as the vermiform appendix in the intestines of man. As it has no outlet, a hard substance slipping in may cause inflammation and death. To this class of objections it may be answered that some of these are known to be of use to the organism; in respect to others there is evidence establishing more or less probability that they are of use; at least one writer, for example, has attempted to prove that the vermiform appendix is useful.¹ If they are organs wasting by disuse under new conditions, they were useful in the former conditions; and if under changed conditions they are no longer useful, it is for the good of the organism that they should waste away; and this wasting will not be effected by a miraculous fiat of God, but by a process of nature. It may be added that, if Darwinism is true, organs which persistently survive must be useful to the organism; otherwise their continued existence would be contrary to the law of the survival of the fittest. It may further be replied that the physico-theological argument does not rest exclusively on the discovery of final causes; but also on the discovery in nature of rational significance, of order and law, of ideals of perfection. If, further, we consider the whole system of things progressively realizing an archetypal plan in and through finite beings and agencies, then these dysteleological facts may be mere incidents in the development of the system and reveal merely the necessary limitations of the finite. If the universe is to develop higher and higher orders of life in and through finite agencies, then the transition from lower to higher forms must be expected to reveal traces of former organs and functions now passing into disuse; and this would be no impeachment of the reasonableness and wisdom of the system. Otherwise the transition must be made by a miracle transcending all finite agencies.

The same principle answers all objections that the universe is

¹ Paget, Hunterian Lectures.

imperfect because at any point of time we can conceive of a better; that the evolution is not farther advanced; that cosmic processes are so slow.

It may be noted in passing that these principles are also applicable to questions arising in the study of Christianity. The type of the kingdom of God on earth is an organic growth; first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear. It has successive dispensations, each lasting for ages. Its movement, like that of the cosmic agencies, is slow. We ask why Christ did not come earlier and why Christianity has not already transformed society into the kingdom of righteousness. The answer is that God is acting on and in finite free agents and through their limited and imperfect agency; and that in no other way is it possible to set up a kingdom of God and to renovate, train and educate sinful men to be its citizens. Christianity emphasizes the imperfection of man's present condition; but holds forth the never changing promise that in the progress of Christ's kingdom the future shall be better than the past, and progressively fulfils it from age to age, and from dispensation to dispensation.

All right reasoning on this subject must recognize the fundamental fact that the universe is not governed by capricious almightiness, but by reason illuminating and directing the almightiness which always acts in harmony with it. The universe is a system constituted under principles and laws of reason which no power can annul; it is composed of innumerable finite beings that interact in the most intricate complications; nothing exists and acts of or for itself alone; and at every period of time the universe and everything in it are the complex result of the interaction of these beings through the ages. In this system almighty power regulated by reason cannot work faster nor effect results greater than are commensurate with the limits or finiteness of the system and ordered under its laws. A power regulated by reason acts always under the laws of reason. A locomotive constructed and guided by reason does not put forth its power at random, running wild and terrific. It follows with regulated speed the lines and curves of the rails which intelligence has laid down, it stops at stations as rational guidance demands; and so with comparative slowness reaches its goal and accomplishes its rational design. Or if stationary, it does not put forth the full power pent up in it, which would be destructive; but guides and attenuates it with the utmost nicety and delicacy, drawing out a wire as fine as a hair, cutting, bending and inserting the teeth of

a card, twisting a braid or a fringe. So in nature almighty power, acting under the guidance of reason, wields the worlds and moves them with precision and continuity in their orbits, and also etches the flowerlike tracery of the frost, models the delicate snow-flakes in varied forms of beauty, and makes the nicest adjustments of vegetable and animal organisms. This regulated and restrained and skilful action, ordered under law and adapted to the limits of finite things, characterizes all God's action in the universe.

“The way of ancient ordinance, though it winds,
Is yet no devious way. Straightforward goes
The lightning's path, and straight the fearful path
Of the cannon-ball. Direct it flies and rapid,
Shattering that it may reach and shattering what it reaches.

“My son, the road the human being travels,
That on which BLESSING comes and goes, doth follow
The river's course, the valley's playful windings,
Curves round the corn-field and the hill of vines,
Honoring the holy bounds of property ;
And thus secure, though late, leads to its ends.”¹

And such is the action of God in the universe, because he is a rational being ; because he has created the universe in accordance with reason, and it thus has a rational constitution and laws which he cannot reasonably change ; because all creatures are limited in finiteness which power cannot annul ; and because in it are personality and freedom with rights which he is bound in reason to respect. This gives a reasonable ground for explaining imperfections and physical evil incidental to the finiteness of the creature and to the progressive development of the system, without impeaching the perfection of its plan and design. The objection has force only against the conception of God as arbitrary and capricious Almightyness unregulated by reason.

Second Answer : Physical evil is subservient to the education and development of man and thus to the ends of the higher spiritual system. Theism, recognizing the two systems, the physical and the spiritual or moral, finds the unity of the two in one all-comprehending system through the subordination of the former to the latter.

The facts included under the name, physical evil, remain facts, whether God exists or not. The limitation essential in finiteness sufficiently accounts for them as facts incidental to the physical

¹ Schiller, Piccolomini, act i. scene iv.

system. But if we ask whether any end is accomplished by them which makes it worth while that this system, with the evil incidental in it, should exist, the physical system itself presents no adequate answer. The question now arises: Is there any higher system to which the physical system is subservient; and is the existence of the so-called physical evil further accounted for to the reason by finding that it accomplishes worthy ends in that higher system? This subserviency of the physical to the spiritual is recognized by theism as a fact.

From the foregoing considerations it is already evident that, if the universe exists for any reasonable end, that end cannot be the immediate gratification of appetite and desire nor the mere quantity of enjoyment empirically measured; but must be an end approved by reason as worthy of pursuit by rational beings and estimated by reason as having worth according to its unchanging truths, laws and ideals. Also the physical system by its all-pervading impersonality turns the thought to the existence of a higher system presenting higher ends. Of this higher system man has knowledge in his consciousness of himself and his acquaintance with his fellow-men as rational persons. A being existing solely in the physical system could have no knowledge of a higher. But man, from his superior position as a rational moral agent, looks on nature and in its all-pervading impersonality sees that it is not the highest. He cannot find in it what satisfies the intellectual demands of reason; for it cannot show within itself either the cause, the law or the end of its existence. No more can it satisfy the moral and spiritual demands of reason. Man knows himself subject to the law of love and so belonging to a moral system. Nature does indeed reveal the fact that it is a system in which nothing exists for itself alone. Thus it shows in itself an analogy to the law of love. But pervaded with the energy of physical force, everywhere and always in it the one law is that the stronger must prevail. Thus the man finds himself in contrast with the physical system, and in that very contrast his mind turns to another and higher system. Unable to show within itself its cause, or its law, or the end for which it exists, unable to satisfy either the intellectual, the moral or the spiritual demands of reason, it by its very deficiency points unmistakably to a higher system on which it depends and to whose ends it is subservient.

It is also a fact noticed already in presenting the evidence, that the highest order of beings produced on the earth is man. The

evolution has gone on until it has issued on this planet in the appearance of a being who knows himself to be a rational, free, moral agent. The impersonal, by the action of a power above it, has blossomed into the rational. The rational and moral system has actually appeared and men know themselves as existing in it. Since this is the highest result of all cosmic agencies, which has thus far appeared on earth, we have seen that it is reasonable to infer that the realization of this is the end to which these agencies in the lower spheres of their action have been directed, and its progressive development the end to which they are still subservient. In a universe of inanimate matter there would be no beings who could know God, or be the objects of his love and the recipients of his blessing. There would be no end for which such a universe could be rationally conceived to exist. The theistic hypothesis is, that God created rational beings to be the recipients of his blessings and of the overflowing fulness of his love. This commends itself to the reason as a worthy end for which the physical system exists and to which it is always subservient. Since all the resources and energies of the inorganic world are laid under contribution to the ends of organic life, it is not surprising if the whole physical system is subordinated to the uses and ends of rational and moral beings and of the system to which they belong.

It is also found to be a fact that the physical system is fitted to the support, education and development of rational beings and does subserve that end.

It is evident from the observation of the physical system that its dominant end is not primarily and simply the avoidance of pain and the multiplication of pleasure. It is designed rather to develop men to realize the highest possibilities of their being. Parents cannot train their children to their highest power and best character by coaxing them with sugar-plums. And God does not train his children by coaxing them with sugar-plums. He trains them to develop them, to make them strong, wise and good. "Fortiter amat." Reason approves of this end; for it sits in judgment on pleasures and their sources and approves or condemns them as worthy or unworthy of a rational being. The good which God aims to realize for men is the perfection of their being, their harmony with the constitution and laws of the universe, and such joys as result from these.¹

The physical system is fitted to promote this training and edu-

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, chap. xi. pp. 256-285.

cation. It is the sphere in which rational persons live and do their work; and thus in strenuous endeavor, in surmounting difficulties, in getting knowledge of the laws and possession of the powers and resources of nature, in resisting temptation, in bearing up under disappointment and sorrow, in self-control, in doing Christian work for the needy, in standing for truth and righteousness and God, they are trained, disciplined and developed to bring out their hidden powers and all in them that is divine. It is the sphere in which the kingdom of God is growing up, first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear.

The so-called physical evil is itself a means of discipline, training and education, by which the man's rational and spiritual powers are developed and strengthened, and he is advanced toward his perfection as an individual and toward the highest civilization of society.

The facts which are regarded as natural evil are incentives which call the energies into action. Such are hunger, thirst, cold and other imperative needs. Their law is imperative; work or die.

They train to prudence and self-control. But for pain the hand might lie in the fire till it was consumed, and the man be unconscious of it. The evil is not the pain, but it is the painlessness of the burning flesh. It is objected that pain does not give warning beforehand of the approach of danger. No one experiences pain when he breathes malaria or takes the measles or the yellow fever. But because it does not do every thing is no proof that it does not do any thing. It warns of present injury and incites to prudence and self-control thereafter.

It is a discipline and development of the faculties. Labor involves expenditure of energy; it is fatiguing, sometimes painful. Yet it is work which develops and strengthens the powers. Without work man would be morally, intellectually and physically good for nothing. But nature imposes on us the law that we must work for what we get. She offers her treasures to us with one hand and fights us off with the other. It is only by long and hard study that man slowly discovers her secrets, and only by skill and labor after many failures that he gets possession of her resources and the means of controlling her powers in his service. But this very study and labor develop and strengthen him, make him many-sided, capable of higher attainments and joys, and promote his civilization.

Physical evil is also a discipline purifying and developing moral

and spiritual character. The natural wants of the family, the helplessness of infancy, the presence of sickness and suffering draw out our compassion and sympathy. Disappointment and loss, adversity and sorrow draw out our moral and spiritual aspirations and strengthen our moral purpose.

“ Who never ate his bread in sorrow,
Who never spent the darksome hours
Weeping and watching for the morrow,
He knows you not, ye higher Powers.”¹

It follows that an imperfect world is adapted to the training and development of imperfect beings, and a progressive world to the training and development of progressive beings.

It must be added that a considerable part of the suffering of man is the result of violation of the moral law. Such are the bodily infirmity and disease caused by drunkenness, gluttony and licentiousness, the want and distress consequent on improvidence and idleness. Evils thus caused are no proofs that God is not good, but are penalties for vice and deterrents from its commission.

“ Pain in man
Bears the high mission of the flail and fan.”

To complete this line of thought it is important to notice that the wellbeing of man in the spiritual system is attainable only in the life of love, realized for the individual in his own personal character and life and for society in the kingdom of Christ on earth. And love in its essence involves the spirit of self-sacrifice or self-devotement in bringing men into harmony with God in his righteousness and grace, in maintaining his truth and law and thereby promoting universal wellbeing in the kingdom of Christ. But sacrificial love in a human being can reveal itself only in service to others, which involves self-privation and, it may be, positive suffering. Hence Christ as the ideal man, in whom God comes into humanity to reconcile the world unto himself, reveals the divine love, under the conditions and limitations of man, in his humiliation, suffering and death for men. Thereby in the presence of the selfishness dominant among men and in the act of redeeming men therefrom, he reveals, asserts and maintains the law of love in its unchanging and universal supremacy and inviolability. Here is the highest revelation of the subordination of privation and suffering to the highest ends of the spiritual system. And here, from a new point of view, we catch a glimpse

¹ Wilhelm Meister, bk. ii. chap. 13.

of that superiority to conditions and limitations which we have repeatedly noticed in the personality even of finite beings. For this self-sacrifice in privation and suffering for others is of the essence of love, in which the man realizes at once his own highest good and the highest good of all in the kingdom of Christ. We can only allude to this here. Its full elucidation must be postponed till we study the revelation of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. In the light of that revelation we may apprehend the significance of that central fact in human history that it is only he who was preëminently the man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, in whom God comes to man and reveals the nature of his divine love, and who brings men to God and transforms human society into his kingdom of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit.

Third Answer: Notwithstanding physical evil, we find on examining the physical system that it is promotive not only of development but also of happiness.

Here the first thought to be considered is, that the perfection of a being and its harmony with the constitution and laws of the universe, that is, with its environment, constitute its wellbeing or true good. In proportion as, under the discipline of life, however painful and trying for the time, a man is developed toward the perfection of his being, he becomes capable of purer, greater and more varied enjoyment. The lower joy lost is replaced by joy of a higher character. As Paul describes his experience, the loss is gain.

Besides this there is a keen strong joy in work and achievement, in conflict and conquest, in surmounting difficulties and resisting evil. There is joy in the assertion of one's personality against adverse circumstances, in standing strong and unsubdued in the endurance of pain, in the consciousness of rectitude in a firm and vigorous doing of duty and accomplishing of work under obloquy, poverty and suffering. There is joy in suffering itself when incurred in prosecuting a worthy work. There is joy in the self-sacrifice of love to God and man, even though leading to a martyr's stake; joy which may mount to exultation and triumph. Here is a strong, manly joy, stronger and purer and nobler than any which a life of indulgence, luxurious ease and self-gratification can give. No history presents more numerous or more noble examples of this sublime joy, of men and women rejoicing that they are counted worthy to suffer in support of truth and righteousness, than the history of Christianity.

This is not mere theory ; it is fact attested in the common life of man. It is in these acts of energy and mastery that a man feels his life to the utmost, that he feels its highest capacity and intensity, and is exhilarated in the highest consciousness of power. In vacation men find recreation in athletic achievements, in risking life and limb in climbing mountains, in yachting to the arctic seas, in tramping through forests, sleeping on the ground, hunting and fishing, putting off the comforts of civilization and enduring the discomforts of savage life ; and all for the exhilaration and enjoyment of it. Men propose the attainment of release from labor and care, and the enjoyment of unbroken peace and luxurious ease ; they hope for a time when they can live not to minister but to be ministered unto. At last they get riches ; the end toiled for through long years is attained ; but it only disappoints them. They are oppressed with ennui ; for the first time life becomes tasteless, monotonous, wearisome. Hence it is that men, after getting riches, continue hard at work in business and risk their gains in new enterprises ; it is not necessarily through covetousness, but rather through the radical impulse to exert their powers, through the necessity of action and achievement to the highest consciousness of life. So Carlyle truly says : “ It is a calumny to say that men are roused to heroic actions by ease, hope of pleasure, recompense — sugar-plums of any kind in this world or the next. In the meanest mortal there lies something nobler. . . . It is not to taste sweet things, but to do noble and true things and vindicate himself under God’s heaven as a God-made man, that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs. Show him the way to do that, the dullest day-drudge kindles into a hero. They wrong man greatly who say he is seduced by ease. Difficulty, abnegation, martyrdom, death, are the allurements that act on the heart of man. Kindle the inner genial life of him, you have a flame that burns up all lower considerations.”¹

The theory that the universe exists to pour enjoyment into the passive capacity of the soul, to make men happy by the gratification of appetites and selfish desires, issues logically in pessimism. The gratification of a selfish desire like covetousness or ambition, is but fuel to the flame. The desire grows by what it feeds on. In that way it is impossible for man to attain a satisfying life ; the heart becomes but a nest of insatiate and stinging reptiles, and life is not worth living. It is only in love to God and man, in the “ noble deeds and daring high ” of self-devoting service,

¹ Hero-Worship, p. 237, ed. 1858.

that man finds the true worth and imperishable blessedness of life, the fountain of living water opened within him, not flowing in, but flowing forth unto everlasting life.

This aspect of life and its enjoyment is commonly overlooked both by those who urge and those who answer the objection founded on physical evil. When this is taken into account the force of the objection is broken. If the world were so constituted that happiness came only in a life of indolence and ease, of self-indulgence and being ministered unto, pessimism would have been the only true theory of the universe. On the contrary we live in a rugged world and must work to subdue and possess it. But theism makes the significance of it plain. Our lot in the world is in harmony with our largest receptive capacities, our grandest powers and our best impulses; it is fitted to unfold all that is best in us, and to inspire us to seek and to enable us to attain all that makes life worth living. God has endowed us with reason and free will, with conscience, energy and courage, with spiritual capacities, aspirations and possibilities; he has given us free access to him for inspiration, invigoration and support. And he puts us in conditions which incessantly demand from us the exertion of spiritual power rising above and controlling the fleshly in us and the earthly about us; which demand love, faith, hope, courage, and ever renewed approach to the Spirit of God for fresh inspiration, guidance and spiritual power. Thus the very conditions which limit us are the means of arousing and concentrating our energies, developing our capacities and powers, directing our action wisely to right ends, forming in us godlike characters, and realizing the highest possibilities of our being.

A second consideration in this answer to the objection is, that the laws and arrangements of nature are good. The evil comes from disregarding them. And certainly the design of the Author of nature must be inferred from its laws and arrangements, not from evil incidental to the disregard of them. For the very reason that the laws are good, the disregard of them must bring evil. Because the laws are good, it is wise and right in the Author of nature to sustain them. If any one disregards them it would not be wise or right to suspend the law to prevent injury to one who disregards it. Hence it is the same arrangement of nature which occasions evil to him who disregards the law and good to him whose action is in harmony with it. The nervous system, which is the source of all the physical enjoyment of health, is the same which, disordered by drunkenness, occasions

all the horrors of delirium-tremens. The laws which insure health to the community that conforms with them, occasion disease and pestilence to the community that disregards them by neglecting drainage, cleanliness, ventilation and other requisites to healthy life. Nature itself reveals the immutability and inviolability of law and the dependence thereon of the universal wellbeing.

A third point to be noticed in this answer is the adaptation of the several species to their environment, and the approach of individuals to the ideal of their species as perfect in its kind; so that the constitution of a creature with all its limitation is best for it in the circumstances of its existence. It would be no blessing to an oyster, in its environment, to have the keen senses of a dog. This would follow from the theory of evolution; because the modification and origination of species are supposed to be effected by the environment; and so far as they are so, they must be adapted to it. Evolution does not destroy the force of our reply to the objection. It only reveals a plan, receiving accomplishment through all time, to secure the adaptation of the species to its environment, and thus to secure the widest range of life and the highest attainable good for the several species in the circumstances in which they live. It must be added that no brute is aware of its limitations and discontented with its nature and environment, because, not being endowed with reason, it cannot look over its own limits into any higher condition and compare itself with beings of a higher order.

It is objected that with the progressive modification of their environment species become extinct. But this merely refers us back to the finiteness of the universe and its consequent imperfection and progressiveness. In any stage of its evolution after it has become capable of sustaining sentient life, it is filled with living beings adapted to it and of as high an order as could live under the conditions then existing. As the world passes to a higher stage, these, whose organisms are not adapted to the new conditions, disappear and beings of a higher order succeed. The gradual extinction of a species in this way is no more incompatible with the goodness of God than their death in any other way. It is simply incidental to the limitation and imperfection inseparable from the finite, and to the necessary progressiveness of the physical system. And it is certainly no injustice to the myriads of supposable plesiosaurs, megalosaurus, pentacrinites, and the like, that they have never been brought into existence. Certainly no

one will urge that, if the earth had remained till now inhabited only by creatures of this low order, it would prove the wisdom and goodness of God more than it does advanced to what it now is. In the future, when man's selection shall have superseded natural selection, noxious animals, insects and plants will disappear. But that disappearance will be incidental to the progress of the cosmos as a whole, in which the inferior and imperfect must give place to that which is superior and better.

A fourth point to be noticed is the evident design in nature to multiply life and its joys. The evidence of intelligent and benevolent direction in nature does not require us to show that everything exists for the welfare of man. In the bounty of the universal Father there is provision both for man and beast. "He giveth to the beast his food and to the young ravens when they cry. He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle and herb for the service of man." The design is evident to fill the world as full as it can hold with life and enjoyment. While it is a sphere for the action of rational beings and opens to them the possibility of attaining their true and highest good in the realizing of spiritual ends, there is infused into every lower condition of matter, not yet fitted to be the vehicle of rational intelligence, every grade of sensitive life of which it is capable. As in a pile of cannon-balls the interstices may be filled with smaller balls, and again with musket bullets, and again with shot, and again with sand, so all the interstices of the world are filled with successively lower and lower forms of life so that its utmost capacity for life and its joys may be filled.

It has already been said that the evidence of directive intelligence, and especially of love, found in nature alone, is incomplete. But in nature we find evidence of directive intelligence. And the evidence of subordination to spiritual ends, of progressive realization of results of higher and higher order, and of multiplied adjustments and arrangements productive of happiness at least precludes the belief that the directing power is malignant. And a rational being, who knows moral distinctions and feels moral obligation in his own conscience, must find in nature preponderant evidence that the power directive in it is righteous and benevolent.

This is confirmed by the fact that from the observation of the world men in all ages of civilization and of diverse philosophical opinions have agreed in the conclusion, that the law of love is supreme and universal; "that the real nature of the universe is

such that it warrants on our part unlimited love, and absolute trust that the highest moral nature is nearest in accord with the truth of things.”¹ Thus not merely from the intuitions of our rational and moral constitution, but also from the observation of nature, we are justified in the faith that physical evils which we cannot explain are, in some way not yet perceived by us, in harmony with the righteousness and benevolence of God.

VIII. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE VALIDITY OF THE INFERENCE.—First to be noticed is the objection that order and law prove the absence of will. Comte often appeals to this as a sort of axiom; and it is commonly urged as an objection entirely refuting the theistic inference from law and order in nature. The objection is founded on a gross misrepresentation of theism. It falsely assumes that according to theistic teaching the ultimate ground of the universe is the almightiness of arbitrary and capricious will; that God is merely a power that arbitrarily breaks in on the course of nature and is entirely exempt from all law. Hence it infers that so far as the reign of law and order is found in nature, God is excluded. So Leon Dumont says: “If the existence of a superior intelligence in the world can be demonstrated by physical proofs, it is not by the spectacle of order and regularity, which indicate on the contrary the absence of any disposing force, but really by abnormal and contradictory facts, in a word by miracles.” And A. Elley Finch in a Discourse on the Inductive Philosophy before the Sunday Lecture Society, says: “The scientific sense of the term Law is entirely opposite to that of will. . . . Will, in the only intelligible sense, or of which we can have any knowledge, namely, human will, is vengeful, arbitrary, variable and capricious.” Professor Tyndall in his Belfast Address said: “Science demands the radical extirpation of caprice, and the absolute reliance upon law in nature.” Immediately before he had said: “The state of things to be displaced may be gathered from a passage of Euripides quoted by Hume, ‘There is nothing in the world; no glory, no prosperity. The gods toss all into confusion, mix everything with its reverse, that all of us, from our ignorance and uncertainty, may pay them the more worship and reverence.’” And J. S. Mill says of God: “If it was his will that men should know that they themselves and the world are his work, he, being omnipotent, had only to will that they should be aware of it.”² That is, he could will knowledge into

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 212–224.

² Three Essays on Religion, p. 179.

men's minds without any action of their minds; and equally, it would seem, without their having any minds. He could as well will knowledge into a stone. If not, he is not almighty. From the same misapprehension arises the alleged dilemma: "Either the world is a machine left by God to run of itself, or else it is a machine so clumsily constructed that its maker must stand by and move its wheels." Hence the impression that so soon as we know the laws according to which nature goes on we have no more need to believe in God; so soon as we know how a thing is made we can no longer believe that it had any maker. Hence "Copernicus is represented as the man who has withdrawn the seat from under the ancient Hebrew and Christian deity," and we are told that "Newton robbed the heavens of their gods and disenchanting the world."¹

But the objection, being founded on a total misapprehension, is of no force against theism rightly understood. This teaches that the ultimate ground of the universe is not will alone, but reason; that God is Reason energizing; that his will is a rational will, not acting capriciously but in the light of reason and in harmony with its truths, laws, ideals and ends. Here is the basis of order and law. The action of a will in conformity with the unchanging principles of reason must in its very nature be orderly and accordant with law. This is exemplified in human life. The action of a man of fixed integrity is uniform in uprightness. The action of a man devoted to a great cause, like Wilberforce, Clarkson, Luther, Paul, is uniform and persistent against all obstacles. Comte himself in his persistent devotion to the development of his system of thought is a striking example. In fact the ultimate basis of the unity of a system orderly under law is this, that it is pervaded and controlled by thought which it reveals in principles and laws to the studious observer. The objection on the contrary insists that order and law reveal the absence of a pervading intelligence and a guiding mind. Applied to ordinary life it would insist that while soldiers march keeping time with the music there is no thought guiding their movements; if they break into disorderly movements that would prove the presence and guidance of mind. If the railroad train comes in every day at the same minute, that proves that no mind regulated it. Only when it runs off the track and is delayed is the guidance of an engineer revealed. If a merchant goes to his counting-room and returns to his dinner at the same hours every day, he acts irra-

¹ Strauss, *Old Faith and New*, Trans. p. 123; Jacobi, *Werke*, vol. ii. p. 52.

tionally ; it is only when he acts at hap-hazard that he reveals intelligence.

Theism affirms that absolute and perfect reason is the ultimate ground of the universe and consequently of its order and law and its unity in a system. The objection is not against theism, but against the objector's own unworthy conception of God. It must be acknowledged, however, that some theologians have taught that the universe is grounded in arbitrary will above all law, and so have invited the objection.

It may be replied further to the objector, that while denying the personal God, he ascribes to law and order the functions of an intelligent person.

The objector surreptitiously brings into the idea of law the extraneous idea of power. For example, Darwin says of Lamarck : " He first did the eminent service of arousing attention to the probability of all change in the organic as well as in the inorganic world being the result of law, and not of miraculous interposition." Here law is conceived as exerting both directive and efficient power and thus as exercising the functions of a personal being. And this is a single example of a confusion of thought common among skeptics. But a law of nature is merely the statement of a uniform sequence of events in nature as a fact. Mr. Darwin thinks he explains the fact by saying it is the " result " of a law which itself is merely a statement of the fact. Did ever mediæval schoolman more completely lose himself in words ?

On the other hand, in speaking of power, the objector surreptitiously brings in the idea of law. For example, it is announced as a sort of axiom in science that every body must act according to the law of its being. Physical science thus declares that the action of every body is regulated by law. But the objector in appealing to this maxim silently assumes that the power exerted by the being contains in itself law. But power and law are totally distinct and cannot be identified. If, as science declares, the power in acting is regulated by law, the law must either be external to the power, and then it is necessary to refer it to a directing mind above the power ; or else the power has its law within itself and so regulates and directs itself, and then it is itself a rational free will.

In fact the idea of power or force does not contain the idea either of rational law or of uniform sequence. There is nothing in force which explains why in any case the force is so much and no more, why it acts now and not then, why it causes motion in this

direction rather than that, or why it acts in any uniform sequence. The conception of power acting under the regulation of law can be realized only in a rational free agent that is either the power itself or else another that is above the power and directs it. Accordingly J. S. Mill affirms in his review of Comte: "The laws of nature cannot account for their own origin."

The same confusion of thought is exemplified in appealing to the laws of natural selection and of the survival of the fittest. In fact these phrases do not properly denote either the power which acts or the uniform sequence in which it acts, but rather the effect or result of the power acting thus uniformly. And, as Canon Mozley has said, it is a negative or privative result. The survivor "does not owe to it its existence, but only its sole existence, as distinguished from the fate of a rival that perishes. . . . Natural selection only weeds and does not plant; it is the drain of nature, carrying off the irregularities, the monstrosities, the abortions; it comes in after and upon the active developments of nature to prune and thin them; but it does not create a species; it does not possess one productive or generative function."¹

The objection therefore is refuted; our inference is legitimate that the order and law of nature reveal in it a directing mind. Mr. Martineau has well said: "What have we found by moving out along all radii into the infinite? That the whole is woven together in one sublime tissue of intellectual relations, geometrical and physical — the realized original, of which all our science is but a partial copy. That science is the crowning product and supreme expression of human reason. . . . Unless therefore it takes more mental faculty to construe a universe than to cause it, to read the book of nature than to write it, we must more than ever look upon its sublime face as the living appeal of thought to thought." And we may fitly conclude this discussion in the words of Professor Asa Gray in closing his address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1872: "Let us hope and confidently expect that . . . in the future even more than in the past, faith in an order, which is the basis of science, will not (as it cannot reasonably) be dissevered from faith in an Ordainer, which is the basis of religion."

A second objection is, that the inference from the evidence of final causes in nature is not scientific.

Lord Bacon objected to the inference from final causes in the

¹ *Essays*, vol. ii. pp. 387, 396, 399, 402, 406.

empirical study of nature, as misleading by turning attention away from efficient causes and so hindering the progress of science. He affirmed its validity in philosophical and theological investigations, which he recognized as legitimate spheres of true and scientific knowledge. Some years ago, when Comte's Positive Philosophy was regarded more than it is now as an authority in the speculations of physical science, it was said, with an air of triumph, that Bacon had excluded final causes from the sphere of human knowledge and that Comte, in excluding efficient causes, had only carried out the progress of scientific thought to its legitimate result. But with the rejection of efficient causes science found very soon that it had no ground to stand on, and now in the law of the persistence of force recognizes them more conspicuously than ever. But final causes are still spoken against as illegitimate for purposes of physical science.

As to this, the students of physical science are the proper judges what methods are most available in its advancement. If they find the evidence of final causes of little or no value in their investigations, the theologian has nothing to say against it. But empirical science is but one grade of human knowledge. If final causes are of little value in this, they may be effectively used in the profounder inquiries of philosophy and theology, as to the reasonableness of things, their ultimate ground, law and end, and their unity in the all-comprehending system of the universe.

It must also be noticed that this objection and those which are to follow are directed solely against the evidence from final causes, which is but one of the five lines of evidence of the direction of mind in nature. The objector will hardly affirm that science excludes the others; that it takes no recognition of the facts that nature has scientific significance in thought, that it is orderly under law, that it is progressively realizing higher and higher orders of beings, and that it, with all that is in the universe, is in the unity of a system under the law of continuity.

In the first place, we reply to the objection that scientists find in nature arrangements and adjustments which they describe in language implying final causes and the direction of mind; and probably it would be impossible to describe them correctly otherwise. No other language would fairly and fully express the facts observed. For, as Professor Agassiz said in the last year of his life in a letter to the Duke of Argyll: "The truth is that life has all the wealth of endowment of the most comprehensive mental manifestations and none of the simplicity of physical phenom-

ena." Mr. Darwin, in treating of the Fertilization of Orchids, describes many and marvelous adaptations in plants. Describing an arrangement to bring the insects into contact with the pollen, he says: "Thus we have the rostellum partially closing the mouth of the nectary, like a trap set in a run for game, and the trap so complex and perfect." And in all his descriptions of these arrangements he uses the language of final causes. They are "contrivances" "in order that" the effect may be produced; "the nectar is purposely so lodged that it can be sucked only slowly." In treating of natural selection he uses language of the same kind. It "effects improvement," "checks deviation," "develops structure," "acts for the good of each creature," is "always trying to economize." He says: "It may be metaphorically said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing throughout the world every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and adding up that which is good, silently and incessantly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of every organic being." Professor Tyndall says: "The continued effort of animated nature is to improve its condition and raise itself to a loftier level." Professor Haeckel writes of the cells in an organized body as of intelligent individuals in a community. He speaks of the cell as at first satisfied with solitude; then of many cells "gathered into communities;" "devoting themselves" to special services, divided into "castes," making progress through "the division of labor," "working together for the common end," becoming "more perfect or civilized."¹ Mr. Spencer defines life as "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." But "adjustment" implies mental direction and arrangement. Hume says: "One great foundation of the Copernican system is the maxim that nature acts by the simplest methods and chooses the most proper means to any end." This is "the principle of least action," often appealed to in physical science; and it seems to have no meaning except as implying intelligent direction. As Hume himself says: "Thus all the sciences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author, and their authority is often so much the greater as they do not directly profess that intention."²

A second reply to the objection is that inferences from final causes are common in physical science, and that many accepted

¹ Evolution of Man, Trans., vol. i. pp. 152, 153, 161.

² Natural Religion, part xii.; Phil. Works, vol. ii. p. 523.

conclusions rest on them. Fifty years ago there were theologians living who contended that the fossil plants and animals were created as they are and were not remains of once living organized bodies. They were ridiculed without mercy. Yet the only possible refutation of them was the argument from final causes. The eye of the trilobite was appealed to again and again as proving that it must be the fossil of a once living eye made to see with. On the same argument Cuvier built the science of comparative anatomy, and by it Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood. From stone-implements science infers the existence and habits of prehistoric men, an inference solely from final causes. If the inference from the evidence of final causes is not scientifically legitimate, we have no proof that men, brutes or vegetables existed before the beginning of human history.

A third answer is that all science recognizes nature in the unity of a system, the cosmos. But it is involved in the idea of a system that it is the realization of a plan and thus exists for an end. The cosmos carries us back to the archetypal thought which it expresses, and so to the absolute reason in which the archetypal thought is eternal. But if there is in the universe a rational order or plan apprehensible and formulated in science, there must be in it also a final cause or an end to be accomplished. This end is the realization of the archetypal plan. And all particular individuals and processes must be directed according to the archetypal plan and subordinated to its realization as an end. Wherever there is action according to a plan, it must be action for a final cause or end, which is the realization of the plan. Evolution brings this out in bold relief. The universe is no longer regarded as a finished system in the unity of merely static relations in space, but as a system in the unity of dynamic relations, progressive in time toward the realization of an ideal. In an organism the parts are in unity by subordination to the development of the whole. It is in the sphere of organic life that final causes are most conspicuous; and objectors say that physical science has already shut them up within that sphere, and that Mr. Darwin's discovery of the survival of the fittest and of natural selection will thrust them out from that and so from the universe altogether. But now Mr. Spencer tells us that the growth of a living organism is the type of the evolution of the universe. Then everything in the universe is subordinate to its development as a whole. Then just the contrary of what objectors have so loudly claimed is true, and evolution has taken the subordination of the parts to the development

of the whole in an organism and made it the type of the entire development of the universe. It has thus established the principle of final causes in the very constitution of the universe.

History gives no account of the origin of the idea of the universe, of all nature included in the unity of a system. Primitive men must very early have derived an idea of the uniform course of nature in some rude form from the regular course of the sun, moon and stars, from the alternation of day and night, the course of the seasons, the leafing, flowering and fruiting of plants. And the idea in some rude or legendary form has usually been found among uncultivated tribes. It has survived the convulsions of all the ages, and, after the labors of many generations, is brought before us in all the complex unity and grandeur in which modern science apprehends it. The fact that the universe is known in the unity of a system implies that it is the expression of an archetypal plan. There can be no system without a plan. This plan is set before us in the sciences, which are the *mundus intelligibilis*, the universe translated into its intellectual equivalent in the mind of man. But the existence of a plan implies the realization of an end. The plan at once directs the action and sets forth the end to be realized by it. An architect plans a building and writes all the specifications. That plan sets forth the end to be realized in the building; and every timber and stone and nail, every decoration, every stroke of hammer, saw and chisel, is accordant with the plan and subordinate to its realization. So the fact that science apprehends the universe in the unity of a system reveals the plan according to which it is constituted and the end for which it is designed. This end is not external to it, but is the realization of its plan; in other words, it is the perfecting of the universe according to the archetypal plan of the absolute Reason. Therefore every being and process in it exists and acts in subordination to the ends of the whole. Nothing exists in isolation. Nothing exists by and for itself. Everywhere interaction, intercommunication — all things in thousands of relations and gradations acting together to evolve the universe toward the realization of its ideal. No individual is separated from the system so as to be without any agency in its evolution. Everything has significance, not for itself only, but also for others and for the whole.

If we pass from the physical system to the spiritual, we see that no person lives in isolation by and for himself; all persons are subordinate to the ends of the system in the interaction and

intercommunication of reciprocal service according to the law of love, the deepest law in the constitution of things.

Thus the very fact that the universe is a system implies that it and all in it exist for an end; and this end is in the fundamental plan and ideal of the universe, for the realization of which it is from age to age evolving and all things in it ceaselessly acting. The mere mechanical interpretation of nature assumes the interaction of the primitive elements for the development of the universe to the systematic unity which science sets forth in its formulas and systems. The ultimate atoms work together for this end; not one of them exists in isolation by and for itself. And thus at the basis even of the mechanical interpretation of nature the scientist tacitly and unconsciously lays the principle of the final cause. In fact no finite whole can have its ultimate ground, law and end within itself. It always carries the thought beyond it; it always reveals the background of the absolute on which it rests. And when the finite whole is found to be a reasonable system, the background beyond itself which it reveals to the thought is the absolute Reason.

A third objection is that the argument from final causes presupposes a knowledge of the purposes of God which it is presumptuous in man to assume. Descartes says: "We shall totally reject from our philosophy all investigation of final causes; for we ought not to be so presumptuous as to think that God would make us participants in his counsels." The objection is still insisted on. Descartes probably had reference to the design of the cosmos as a whole. But we have seen that even with reference to that, through our knowledge of the spiritual system and the relation of the physical system to it, we can say without presumption that the cosmos as a whole exists for and is subordinated to the higher ends of the spiritual system and of personal beings. But even if we had not knowledge of the design of the cosmos as a whole, this would not prevent our observing the adjustments and uses of particular objects and subordinate systems. Though one is not taken into the counsels of God, he can know him through the actions and works in which he reveals himself. One may admire the skill revealed in the workmanship of a telescope and its adaptation to disclose distant objects without being an astronomer and knowing all its scientific uses. One may admire the skill in the machinery of a watch and infer that it was made according to an intelligible plan and for a reasonable end without having been taken into the counsels of the

watch-maker. So when the world is found to be the expression of thought and the realization of a plan, so that it can be set forth in exact science which is its intellectual equivalent, when it is found to be ordered under law and progressively realizing ideals, we may infer that it is the expression of intelligence; and when it is found to be crowded with adaptations and adjustments fitted to effect and actually effecting specific results, we may infer that they were designed for these ends, whatever other ends unknown to us they also accomplish. This is only inferring the character of a cause from the observed character of an effect. And if this is not possible, it is impossible for God, if he exists, to reveal himself in any way to man; because, whatever he might do to reveal himself, the man cannot infer from it any intelligence or purpose whatsoever. So it is put in the Savoyard vicar's profession of faith: "I judge the world by its order, though I am ignorant of its design; because it is sufficient to compare the parts and note their concurrence, relations and concert of action. . . . I am like a man who sees for the first time an open watch, who cannot refrain from admiring the workmanship, though he does not know the use of the machine and has not seen the dial-face. I do not know, he would say, what all this is good for; but I see that each piece is made for the others; I admire the workman in the details of his work; and I am sure that these wheels move in concert only for some common end which I cannot perceive."¹ We find final causes in nature, even when we cannot "scan the ultimate purpose of the whole." It is not necessary to be taken into the counsels of the designer and to find out all about him before we discover evidence of design; for the evidence of design lies immediately in the observed facts.

A fourth objection is that the evidence from final causes is set aside as soon as the efficient cause and the law of its uniform action are discovered. Or, as Laplace puts it, final causes disappear as soon as we obtain the data requisite for resolving problems scientifically. This means, as soon as we discover the efficient cause and the law of its acting. So Mr. Fiske says: "The teleological hypothesis derives its apparent confirmation, never from the phenomena which were explained yesterday, but always from phenomena which are awaiting explanation tomorrow."² This objection is as old as Lucretius, who protests against the belief that eyes were made to see with, "since noth-

¹ J. J. Rousseau, *Émile*, chap. iv. p. 324.

² *Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 385.

ing is born in the body in order that we may use it, but that which is born in the body creates its use." It has been urged more strenuously than ever in respect to the theory of evolution. Mr. Fiske says that from the dawn of philosophic discussion appeal has been made to the evidence of final causes. "Until the establishment of the doctrine of evolution, the glove thus thrown down age after age into the arena of philosophical controversy was never triumphantly taken up. It was Mr. Darwin who first, by his discovery of natural selection, supplied the champions of science with the resistless weapon by which to vanquish in this their chief stronghold the champions of theology."¹ We may ask in passing what peculiar interest the champions of science, as such, have in vanquishing the champions of theology, that they seize with such a shout of triumph a supposedly effective weapon which generation after generation of them have been looking for in vain. Professor Haeckel says: "We discover therein the definite death of all teleological and vitalistic judgments of organisms."² And Noiré quotes Geiger: "Nature appears to be wise; it surprises us by a reason surpassing ours, that pervades it. Nature harmonizes with our reason, not because Nature is rational or subject to reason, but because reason itself is natural, developed from nature and in accordance with it."³ This, it will be noticed, asserts an effect transcending its cause. And it is said, "the earth is suited to its inhabitants because it has produced them, and only such as suit it live." There is however nothing in the appeal to evolution more than in the first statement of the objection. It is merely a supposed more full exposition of efficient causes and their law.

We may reply, in the first place, that there is nothing in the idea of a law of nature incompatible with final causes in nature: for the law is merely the statement of a fact that certain physical phenomena occur in a uniform sequence. So Lord Bacon, after saying that too exclusive attention to final causes in the investigations of physical science had tended to a neglect of the search for the physical causes, adds: "Not because those final causes are not true and worthy to be investigated, being kept within their own province. . . . For, keeping their precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived if they think there is any en-

¹ *Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. pp. 396, 397. Mr. Fiske now finds teleology in evolution: *The Idea of God*, pp. 158-163.

² *Generelle Morphologie der Organismen*, vol. i. p. 160.

³ *Die Welt als Entwicklung des Geistes*, p. 105.

mity or repugnancy at all between them. For the cause rendered that the hairs about the eyelids are for the safeguard of the sight, doth not impugn the cause rendered that pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture.”¹ If this law of pilosity had been established as an invariable sequence or law of nature, it is impossible to see in it any conflict with the inference that, in accordance with this invariable sequence in nature, the eyelid has been intelligently adjusted to the eye for its protection.

In like manner, there is also nothing in the efficient cause of any effect inconsistent with the observed evidence of a final cause. The argument of the objector, stripped of all disguises, is that whatever is the effect of a known power, for that reason cannot be an expression of intelligence. But a purpose is not the less a purpose after the agencies used in accomplishing it are known. The discovery of all the action of the muscles and nerves by which the arm of a man is moved does not disprove the intelligent direction of them in the motion. The discovery of all the muscles and nerves in the wing of a bird does not prove that the wing was not made to fly with. So far from conflicting with the inference of final causes, the knowledge of the efficient cause and its law of action is always presupposed in the argument from them. Physical causes account for the motion of matter, but not for the revelation therein of rational truths, laws, ideals and ends. The principle on which the argument rests is not merely that every beginning or change must have a cause, but also that the cause must be adequate to the effect. The question is not merely, is there a cause, but also what sort of a cause must it be to be adequate to the effect. The gist of the argument is that when a force acting according to a known law is so adjusted to other forces acting in other invariable sequences that their action in concert effects a result, that adjustment is evidence of intelligence, either in the causal agents themselves or in some agency directing them. The physical causes account for the motion. What accounts for the adjustments and adaptations, and for the concerted action of many agents, continued it may be for years and centuries, to effect a complicated result? When you have described every piece of material used in building a house and given the exact dimensions of each, and have set forth in foot-pounds the exact expenditure of force in every exertion of the workmen, you have not accounted for the concert and direction of all the energies to the

¹ Advancement of Learning, bk. ii.

construction of the house. Much less have you done anything which contradicts and annuls the inference that it was built under the guidance of intelligence, according to an intelligible plan and for a reasonable end. Dr. Beattie sowed flower-seeds so that on coming up they revealed the initials of his little boy's name. And the astonished boy laughed him to scorn when his father asked him if they did not come so by chance. The physical forces in the plants and their environment acting according to their laws could not account for the arrangement of the plants in letters. So these physical forces in each plant do not account for the concert of action of the innumerable molecules and cells for weeks together in building the plant according to its type; and in successive plants in successive generations on the same type through many thousands of years. Geoffroy St. Hilaire insists that in making out the evidence of final causes we look first at the function and then at the organ. But we see that this is not true; for the evidence of final causes presupposes a knowledge of the efficient cause and of its laws of acting. It has been said of this author that he "carried the art of shutting the eyes to a high point of philosophical perfection." This seems well established when we find him saying of the argument from final causes that "in reasoning in this way you would say of a man who uses crutches, that he was originally designed to lose a leg" in order that he might use crutches.¹

The appeal of the objector to evolution presents no new principle; for evolution is only a disclosure of the efficient cause and its law on a larger scale. It has already been shown that evolution, instead of nullifying the evidence of final causes, discloses it in the universe as a whole and attaches it to the cosmic development throughout all time and space. It sets it before us in a grand cosmic panorama in which we see the universe moving through all time toward the realization of an ideal. And thus it only makes more conspicuous the fact that the cause which through unmeasurable time has been progressively evolving higher and higher orders of being and conditions of existence, is a cause adequate to the effect; and therefore is not merely a force but a force intellectually and wisely directed either by itself or by a rational power above it. And to all who, with Spencer and the agnostics and with scientists generally, admit that the absolute is revealed in all the efficiency of the universe as Power, the inference is legitimate and necessary, not merely that physical

¹ *Principes de Philosophie Zoologique*, p. 66.

force measurable by foot-pounds reveals everywhere the absolute as Power, but also that the everywhere accompanying order and law, progressiveness toward ideals, adaptation and adjustment to ends, and intelligibility to thought in the unity of a scientific system, reveal the absolute as Reason.

This objection, then, when we come to examine it, is found to be only the reiteration under scientific phraseology of the old and obvious error that when we find out how a thing is done, we can no longer believe that any intelligence directed in the doing of it; that as soon as we understand the construction of a steam-engine we know that no mind directed its construction or guides its action; that in the universe, whatever the number of agencies combined in interaction, whatever the intricacy of the combination and the delicacy of the adjustment, however perfect the order and harmony of all in the unity of a system, these very facts, because they show us how the universe goes on, make it impossible to believe that any intelligence directed in its constitution or guides in its ongoing.

The foolishness and abortiveness of this objection is declared by Kant: "To exclude the teleological principle on account of the mechanical and, when the adaptation to an end shows itself undeniably as a relation to a cause of another kind, still always to insist on following the mechanism only, must be seen by the reason to be a fantastic wandering under the lead of those chimeras of the brain, the powers of nature, which are entirely unthinkable, as really as an exclusively teleological explanation, which takes no notice of the mechanism of nature, is regarded by the reason as fanatical."¹

Recognizing the abortiveness of the objection from another point of view, Mr. Huxley says: "The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement, of which all the phenomena of the universe are the consequences; and the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to prove that this primordial arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe. On the other hand, if the teleologist asserts that this, that or the other result of the working of any part of the mechanism of the universe is its purpose and final cause, the

¹ Kritik der Urtheilskraft (Ausz. von Hartenstein), § 78, Werke, vol. vii. p. 290.

mechanist can always inquire how he knows that it is more than an unessential incident, the mere ticking of the clock, which he mistakes for its function.”¹ He seems to mean that teleology in its broader application to the universe is confirmed by evolution and cannot be disproved; and that all which remains possible for its opponent to do is to criticise its application to details and inquire whether the teleologist does not sometimes mistake an incidental result, like the ticking of a clock, for the essential design or end of the arrangement. And to this the teleologist will not object. As has already been said, teleology has been brought into discredit by errors of this sort in applying it to trivial details. But occasional mistakes in applying the teleological argument to details do not invalidate the principle on which it rests nor make all applications of it worthless. Mr. Darwin himself says: “To suppose that the eye, with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for admitting different amounts of light and for the correction of spherical and achromatic aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest possible degree.” Why then does he not recognize in the evolution a directing intelligence? By so doing he would remove what he himself sees to be absurd, supply to the evolution that superior power and intelligence which at every stage in its progress it imperatively demands in order to escape absurdity, and so would make the theory of evolution richer and more fruitful.

From still another point of view Hartmann is right in saying that the efficient cause and the final are but different aspects of the same thing, “according as thought logically reproduces the process from later to earlier or from earlier to later. The conditionedness of the later by the earlier is called causality; that of the earlier by the later is called finality. From the point of causality the teleological order of the world is the product of the order of the world by efficient causes under natural law; from that of finality, the physical causes and laws are means to the end.” The one appears to exclude the other only so long as their common genetic ground in reason energizing is overlooked. “So soon as the advocates of the mechanical view of the world are brought to the concession that the regular order of nature is the expression of an immanent reason in the world, they can as little withhold the admission that from it must result a teleological order of the world, as the latter can deny that the order of the

¹ Critiques and Addresses, p. 307.

world by natural laws is its logically required means, so soon as they are brought to see in the teleological world-order, not a mass of divine arbitrary acts, but a result of the eternal reason of God." ¹

In respect to evolution, another point to be noticed is, that, as scientists infer, through the escape of heat all the forces in our universe must eventually come into equilibrium and all life and motion will cease. Once in this equilibrium there is no power within it which can renew its action. It must remain a motionless solid mass forever. Here are two points bearing on the question now under consideration. One is that nobody can believe it. As the authors of the *Unseen Universe* say: "That this vast store of high-class energy should be doing nothing but traveling outwards in space at the rate of 188,000 miles per second is hardly conceivable, especially when the result of it is the inevitable destruction of the visible universe." ² And it is impossible to believe that all action in the visible universe is to end, and the universe so full of energy is to become a lifeless, motionless mass and remain so forever. But all which makes it impossible to believe it is the principle of final causes. We cannot think that all the energy expended in the universe has been expended only to accomplish so meaningless and unworthy an end. The other thought is that nothing can prevent this conclusion but the recognition of the presence and action in the universe of the immanent and inexhaustible power and wisdom of God.

Thus in every line of investigation science presently comes face to face with mysteries which it cannot illuminate, problems which it cannot solve and difficulties which it cannot remove. These mysteries are understood and the difficulties removed only when the absolute Reason is recognized as immanent in the universe and energizing with inexhaustible power for rational ends. Science in its difficulties, not less than faith, has occasion to lift up its hands unto God. Science, not less than faith, has occasion to cry: "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? Whither shall I flee from thy presence?"

Hume objects that, whatever the order and law, the adaptations and adjustments observed in nature, we cannot infer from them a directing mind in the author of nature, because we have had no experience in world-building. On the contrary, from the

¹ Hartmann, *Die Religion des Geistes*, part B, pp. 129, 130.

² *Unseen Universe*, p. 156.

products of human art we can infer that a man was the maker, because we know the products of human art by experience.¹

The answer is that Hume has misapprehended the real basis of the inference. He supposes the inference to be the same in kind with that of the geologist who infers the past existence of certain kinds of animals from coprolites; not from any marks of design in these fossils, but simply because he recognizes them as objects already familiar to him. So, as Hume would reason, if one thrown by shipwreck on an unknown island finds a human footprint, or a circle with radius and tangent imprinted in the sand, or a watch, he will infer that men have been there, not from the evidence of intelligence in these constructions, but solely because he is already familiar with these things as made by man. But he cannot infer an intelligent author from the contrivances and adaptations of nature, because he has not been familiar with them in his experience as made under intelligent direction. He supposes the argument to be merely an analogy.

But this is not the ground of the inference from the law, order, progressiveness and final causes in nature. The theistic inference is from the peculiarity of an observed effect to the peculiarity of the cause adequate to produce it. It is similar to the reasoning by the Newtonian induction to discover what the cause is from the observed effect. Through our familiarity with the products of intelligently directed power in ourselves and others we recognize their characteristics wherever we see them. When we see arrangements in nature having these characteristics, we legitimately infer that they are products of power directed by mind. And the inference is as legitimate as that from any induction. And it is not true even of artificial products that our inference of the intelligence of the maker is limited to constructions with which we have been familiar in experience. If the shipwrecked mariner finds on the island a music-box, a quadrant or any mechanical contrivance which he has never seen, he will know it as a product of human workmanship from the evidences of mind in it. From stone implements, the making of which we have never observed and of some of which the use can only be conjectured, we infer the existence of man, and add copious inferences as to his habits and the history of his development.

In like manner from the evidence of mind in nature, we infer intelligence in the author of nature. Accordingly J. S. Mill affirms: "The argument is not one of mere analogy. As mere

¹ Natural Religion, part ii.; Philosophical Works, vol. ii. p. 434.

analogy it has its weight, but it is more than analogy. It surpasses analogy exactly as induction surpasses it. It is an inductive argument.”¹

If the objector denies that the universe is accounted for as the revelation of absolute Reason, it devolves on him to declare how he will account for it. But by his declaration that it is not accounted for as a revelation of reason, he is shut out from professing or attempting to give any reasonable account of it. He may fall back on complete positivism, or on Spencerian agnosticism, or on pantheistic or materialistic monism. But whatever his theory may be, it explicitly excludes reason. We can but wonder that intelligent persons readily accept almost anything as the ultimate ground of the universe, provided it excludes reason; are satisfied with any explanation and earnestly defend it, provided it leaves out that which alone can make the explanation reasonable. The inadequacy of the above-mentioned theories of the universe has already been exposed. There remain two others which may receive a passing notice.

The objector may say that the universe is accounted for by the fortuitous concurrence of atoms. This was the theory of Epicurus and Lucretius. The latter, after setting forth the Epicurean theory, adds: “If you keep these things in mind, nature is seen, free immediately and rid of her haughty lords, to do all things spontaneously of herself without the gods.”² Mr. Hume says of this theory: “This is commonly, and I believe justly, esteemed the most absurd system that has yet been proposed; yet I know not whether, with a few alterations, it might not be brought to bear a faint probability.”³ In the present revival of old atomic theories this way of accounting for the universe has reappeared. It is said that chance can do any thing if you only give it chances enough; and that with an infinite number of throws from a dice-box one could throw the Greek alphabet into the Iliad.

But chance is not a power and cannot do any thing. Chance and necessity are defined alike as describing the action of a power unregulated by reason. Chance is necessity to that which is effected by it. But neither chance nor necessity does any thing or accounts for any thing. In each case it is the power, supposed to act without the guidance of intelligence, which does what is done. The supposition is also absurd; for since the

¹ Three Essays on Religion, pp. 170, 168.

² De Rerum Natura, lib. ii. 1090-1093.

³ Natural Religion, part viii.; Phil. Works, vol. ii. p. 481.

throws are entirely unregulated by reason, there may be any number of repetitions of the same "throw," and any inference is just as valid as any other.

But we may dismiss these idle speculations about the infinite. The decisive answer is that the objector assumes that the universe once existed entirely unregulated by laws of nature or by principles of reason. He assumes a chaos in which there were not only no regularity or uniformity of sequence, no fixed connection between any event and any antecedent or consequent, but, in a confusion entirely unregulated by rational intelligence and entirely given up to chance, it might happen that there should be motion without any cause or any effect, two straight lines might sometimes happen to inclose a space, any absurdity might be real and one thing would be just as possible and just as probable as another. Such a chaos is contradictory to reason and altogether absurd; it destroys the foundation of all science; it is entirely unintelligible to human thought. And if the universe has come out of such a chaos into its present systematic order, the transition brings back all the evidence of the existence of God which is set forth in the physico-theological argument.

In fact the objector assumes that these atoms are numbered and adapted to one another and to the coming arrangements of the system; so that when those adapted to each other come together they cohere and abide, while those not adapted, if they come together, do not cohere. Mr. Tyndall, accepting this explanation of the universe, says: "The interaction of the atoms throughout all time made all manner of combinations possible. Of these only the fit ones persisted while the unfit ones disappeared."¹ So in throwing the letters of the Iliad, there is the presupposition of the letters of the Greek alphabet, of exactly as many of each as the poem contains, and of the persistence of the letters in combination when they happen to make a word and their separation when they do not. Here again all the evidences of adaptation, adjustment and design come back and prove a directing mind under whose guidance all the elements have been formed and adjusted for the purpose which they are to accomplish in the whole.

When challenged to account for the universe on the supposition that the evidence of mind in nature does not reveal the personal God, the objector may recur to the position of Hartmann or Schopenhauer, that the universe is grounded in spirit, but im-

¹ Address before the British Association at Belfast.

personal and unconscious. So Noiré says: "All for an end is the motto of nature, but only in unconsciousness. . . . Conscious ends begin only from the beginning of life." Similar views are held by Biedermann, Pfeiderer and some other theologians.¹

The untenableness of their position has already been exposed in the discussion of the absolute Being and Theism. It was shown that their error is in assuming that limitation and conditionateness are of the essence of personality, but not of the essence of spirit. But since they acknowledge that the absolute is Spirit and thus assume unconscious reason or will in the absolute, they cannot place the limitation of personality in these. They must therefore suppose it to be either in the person's consciousness or in his individuality and identity. It cannot be in the consciousness as distinctive of a person; for consciousness belongs to mind, will, spirit, in the same sense in which it belongs to a person. A spirit or person is intelligent. But thought, knowledge, intelligence involve consciousness. Take away the consciousness and you take away the thought, the knowledge, the intelligence. Unconscious knowledge is no knowledge. And this remains true whether you call the subject of the knowledge spirit or will or person. And a being without thought, knowledge or intelligence, a being therefore inferior to conscious personal beings which it is supposed to create, is in its essence limited, conditioned, imperfect. Consciousness therefore cannot involve limitation. The conscious is superior to the unconscious. The absolute is said to awake to consciousness in man. Man then is superior to the absolute Being.

To this it must be added that such an unconscious potentiality of intelligence does not account for the universe. Hartmann points out with remarkable clearness and force the evidences in the universe of the presence and direction of mind. All the writers of this class insist on them. But these evidences reveal intelligence directing efficient power in the ordering and ongoing of the universe, not an undeveloped, unconscious and unintelligent potentiality blindly moving in an aimless and unguided flow, and coming at last to consciousness in man. They contradict themselves, when recognizing the evidences of mind in the universe they still ascribe it to such an unconscious potentiality as its cause. They contradict themselves again when they sup-

¹ Biedermann, *Dogmatik*, §§ 715-717, pp. 638-647; Pfeiderer, *Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 418-421; Noiré, *Die Welt als Entwicklung des Geistes*, pp. 110, 111.

pose man, the highest product of the development, to be the creature of this unconscious potentiality and to revere and worship it as God. And Strauss emphasizes the contradiction by representing the spirit of man as having ordered and directed all the arrangements and systems of the universe in his previous state of existence as the unconscious potentiality of intelligence in nature ; and his scientific discovery of the same is merely his awakening remembrance of how he himself had ordered it at first. And this brings in another contradiction, that a man remembers that of which he had never had any consciousness.¹

Thus the active wisdom apparent in nature and recognized by these writers cannot be accounted for by unconscious impersonal spirit. This in reality is only the blind order of nature designated by the name of spirit and itself requires to be accounted for. It is unconscious reason only in the sense in which a circle drawn on a blackboard is so. The circle is reasonable in the sense that at every point it reveals reason and is an expression of thought. But the circle does not account for itself, nor is it accounted for by the blackboard and the chalk. It compels our thought to pass behind all these to the guiding mind that directed its construction according to a law and in the expression of an archetypal idea. So the wisdom revealed in nature carries us behind itself and the immediate agencies of nature to an intelligent and therefore conscious spirit energizing in nature. Spinoza says that thought is an attribute of the absolute substance ; but he explains that it is thought which has no likeness whatever to any thought or intelligence known to man. It is then a word without meaning. So when we are told that the Absolute is unconscious spirit or will or intellect, these assertions denote spirit, will, intellect which have no likeness to any spirit, will or intellect known to us ; they are therefore entirely indeterminate and void of meaning. Therefore it is only in the use of meaningless words that they who say that the universe is grounded in unconscious and impersonal reason make a seeming, but not real, advance beyond agnostics who say the absolute is the Unknowable, or pantheists who say it is pure being which is equal to zero, or even materialists who say that the universe is the manifestation only of eternal matter and force. The universe is grounded either in conscious personal reason or else not in reason at all, but in the irrational.

It is thus evident that consciousness would be no limitation of the absolute Reason or Spirit.

¹ Christl. Glaubenslehre, vol. i. p. 351.

It may now be urged that a person is limited by his individuality and identity; and that therefore, the absolute, if personal, would be limited. But these are equally essential in the idea of a spirit or will. A spirit or will must be an Ego, an indivisible one. And individuality, in its positive and proper meaning of indivisible, is essential in the idea of the absolute Being. The absolute Being is one and indivisible. It cannot be divided; there cannot be two. The absolute one must also be eternally identical. Any change into another, any ceasing to be the same demonstrates that it is not the absolute Being. But this is precisely what is meant by individuality and identity. Individuality means indivisibility. An individual is a one that, so long as it exists, is indivisible and the same. This is of the essence of personality, and equally of the idea of absolute being. In this respect also personality is not contradictory to the idea of the absolute.

It follows that the whole evolution of the unconscious is in necessity and not in freedom, and therefore affords no basis for morals. And because communion with the unconscious is impossible and it cannot be the object of trust, love, worship and obedience, it gives no basis for religion.

We welcome the testimony of these advocates of the unconscious that they find the universe pervaded by reason, and the multiplied evidences of it which they present; but we insist that these prove that the universe is grounded in conscious, personal reason.

God is the one only unconditioned, self-existent person. Man is in the image of God so far as he is one indivisible being persisting in identity and endowed with reason, free will and the susceptibility to rational and spiritual motives. But he is a person conditioned, limited and dependent. Neither conditionedness nor unconditionedness is of the essence of personality. In this, personality is analogous to power and being. Each of these may be conditioned or unconditioned without losing its essence as power or being. Personality in man is "but a pale copy"¹ of personality in God, only in the sense that it is finite, conditioned and dependent, not in the sense that it is different in its positive essence. As Lotze himself explains, "the finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of this personality, but a limit and hindrance of its development."

This theory of the unconscious may be resorted to in order,

¹ Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, bk. ix. chap. iv. § 5, xii.

while retaining the idea of the absolute as Reason or Spirit, to escape the difficulty that if God is conscious while immanent and energizing in nature, it implies that the fall of every rain-drop, the dashing of every wave, the motion of every molecule are each effected by an immediate and distinct volition of God. But in escaping this difficulty the theory practically abandons the rationality and personality of God and reduces him to blind unconscious nature moving in necessity.

We might further reply to the objection in this form, that we do not know the modes in which God acts and may leave the problem among the mysteries of the absolute Being which the finite mind cannot penetrate.

But theism has another answer. Theism teaches that the finite universe has real though dependent being, and that God progressively realizes his archetypal idea by energizing on and through the finite beings already existing. It recognizes real powers of nature acting in necessity according to the law of their being, and real powers of persons acting in freedom. Hence theism does not imply that every motion and change is caused by an immediate volition of God. It teaches that, though we cannot know just how the divine infuses itself continually into the universe, directing its forces and progressively developing it to higher and higher forms, yet we know that God's action on and through everything is accordant with the constitution and laws of its being; and that he respects the free will of man and secures to his personality all its rights.

There may be in man the spontaneity of genius and power, of habit and character, of enthusiasm and love, which seems to lift him above the consciousness of his actions. In such seemingly unconscious spontaneity our highest energy is put forth; in acts of seeming self-forgetfulness and self-abandonment our powers are exerted in their fullest tension and concentration. Is there here a glimpse of an analogy to what is immeasurably above it, the unobstructed spontaneity and intensity of God's energy working continuously and without effort from the fulness of his wisdom, love and power?

There are facts in our own experience sometimes spoken of as unconscious mental action. Thoughts, lines of reasoning, conclusions, determinations spring into consciousness which seem to have been elaborated in unconsciousness. There are depths and heights in our own spiritual being which our consciousness cannot fathom. How much more which we cannot comprehend

must there be in God, the eternal Spirit. No finite mind can ever fathom the full significance of those great words: By the word of the Lord were the heavens made; he spake and it was done. And in all his action immanent and energizing in the universe and acting on and in the human spirit, while he reveals himself and we know him, he also reveals himself as the unknown. It is with all his perfections as Paul says it is with his love, they are known and yet unknown; "that ye may be strong to apprehend what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge."

From this discussion of the objections the necessary conclusion is that they fail to break down the evidence in nature of a directing and intelligent power; they leave unimpaired the validity of the inference, from the scientific intelligibility of nature in the unity of a plan or system, from its order under law, the concerted and progressive action of its powers realizing ideals and its subordination to the uses and ends of sentient and preëminently of spiritual beings and a spiritual system, that it reveals the absolute Being, already known to be manifested in nature as power, as the absolute Reason energizing in the realization of its archetypal thought.

Dr. Bushnell illustrates our knowledge of God through nature by the supposition of our being inclosed in a succession of concentric hollow spheres, through which we indistinctly hear the ringing of strokes on the outmost one. Cicero has the conception of God as a sphere inclosing all the nature-gods: "Summus ipse Deus arcens et continens ceteros."

This a young poet has happily expressed:—

"The glowing map of night reveals
Its circling orbs upon their way;
The world is turning; watch and pray;
Hear music in the mighty wheels.

"Let faith, fore-dreaming of the goal
That summons all the flying years,
Hear, round the vast mysterious spheres,
The outmost one forever roll,

"The God-sphere holding each in place;
So that the song rolls, and a jar
In earth or the remotest star
Can lend no discord, but a grace.

“To Him who marks the sparrow’s fall
Nothing is great, or small, or strange;
Death has its hour and life its change,
And runs the love of God through all.

“Help us, O Lord, to bear thy love;
Thy love is great; bend thou our will
To thy own law that guides us still,
And guides the wandering lights above.” — Samuel V. Cole.

CHAPTER XIII.

GOD REVEALED AS PERSONAL SPIRIT IN THE CONSTITUTION AND HISTORY OF MAN.

WE now proceed from the physical system to the spiritual, to ascertain what additional evidence that the absolute Being is the personal God may be found in the constitution and history of man.

I. GOD REVEALED AS PERSONAL SPIRIT IN THE EXISTENCE OF PERSONAL BEINGS. — From the existence of personal beings we rightly infer that the absolute Being must be a rational and personal being, on the principle that the cause must be adequate to the effect.

Man knows himself and his fellow-men as personal beings. In discussing man's capacity to know God it was shown that personality in its essence is supernatural. If the line dividing nature from the supernatural runs between finite beings and God, as many theologians assume, then man is shut up in the physical or natural and excluded from any participation in the spiritual or supernatural, and from all knowledge of God or of any spiritual or supernatural reality. But theism does not admit any such rift between God and the universe, any such gulf which thought itself cannot pass over to find God. It is of the essence of theism that it declares the union and communion of God and man. The philosophical basis of this is the fact that the line of distinction between nature and the supernatural is the line of distinction between rational and free personal beings and the irrational and impersonal. Thus man is at once participant in nature and the supernatural and has in experience contents for the knowledge of both.¹ He is the bond of union between the natural and the supernatural. In him the law of continuity reaches unbroken from the spiritual into the physical, and they are knit together in one all-comprehending rational system. The consciousness of man is "the mirror of the universe," because in it he sees both the physical and the spiritual in unity.

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, chap. xvi. pp. 408, 411.

If personal beings exist, then the absolute Being is God, the personal Spirit. The cause must be adequate to the effect. Rational free persons cannot be accounted for as created or brought into existence by irrational and insensate physical forces. Atheism, therefore, must assume either explicitly or implicitly that no rational free agent or personal being exists. The question with the atheist is not so much, Does the personal God exist, as, Does any personal being exist? Is man a rational free agent?

But it is beyond reasonable doubt that personal beings do exist. All knowledge implies a subject knowing, an object known and the knowledge. The knowledge of myself knowing is essential to knowledge of the object known. If I do not know myself as existing, I do not know anything; all knowledge becomes impossible. All physical science rests on the immense assumption that the physical world of matter and force exists and is known. But if the scientist knows that the physical world exists, he equally knows that he himself exists as a rational being who knows it and describes it in science.

And man's knowledge of his own individuality and identity, of his own rationality and free will is as certain as his knowledge of his own existence. Man therefore in knowing himself knows the personal, the spiritual, the supernatural. He finds in man that which transcends the physical and the impersonal; while in the physical world he is also above it.

In explaining mental phenomena all proposed substitutes for the personal self or ego have failed. Mr. J. S. Mill defines the mind as a series of sensations and feelings. But he himself says that this involves the paradox that a series of feelings is aware of itself as past and future and as continuing through years in the unity and identity of a series.¹ But it is more than a paradox; it is an absurdity; or, if not, it is an agglutination of words, hiding the absence of intelligible meaning, worthy of a mediæval scholastic. And there is the additional absurdity of affirming a series of feelings with no being that is the subject of them. Mr. Spencer, inconsistently with his agnostic realism, seems to accept the same view. He defines the ego as "at each moment nothing else than the state of consciousness, simple or compound, passing at that moment."² The insufficiency of this and similar definitions, the contradictions involved in them, and the impossibility of explaining mental phenomena without the recognition of a personal mind are becoming more and more apparent.

¹ Mill on Hamilton, vol. i. pp. 253, 261.

² Psychology, vol. i. p. 501.

And physical science is more and more making it evident that physical force cannot account for the phenomena of mind. Facts and laws supposed to disprove personality and to resolve all its manifestations into physical phenomena are gradually being found to have no such import. When the law of the Persistence of Force was announced it seemed to be expected that it would resolve thought into a form of motor-force and completely explain mental phenomena by physical processes. But this has been found to be impossible. Scientists now hold that mental processes can never be resolved into motion nor explained by the molecular action of the brain. The physical action reveals an agency beyond itself.¹ In Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Philo asks: "What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must make it the model of the whole universe?"² To this question physical science now answers that thought is something other than the agitation of the brain and cannot be identified with it.

So also, when the theory of evolution was propounded, it was expected that, if proved true, it would disprove once for all the existence of personality both in man and God, and establish materialism on a scientific basis and beyond all further controversy. On the contrary it has been found that it presents new evidence of the existence of personality, and reveals more clearly than ever that the recognition of the personality both of man and God is a necessity of physical science in order to the intelligibility and the comprehension in a rational system of the facts which science discovers.

Mr. John Fiske, the ablest expounder and defender of Spencerian evolution in this country, teaches that physical evolution issues in the appearance of rational man; that it can advance no further, but gives place to a psychical progress. "When Humanity began to be evolved an entirely new chapter in the history of the universe was opened. Henceforth the life of the nascent soul came to be first in importance, and the bodily life became subordinated to it. Henceforth it appeared that, in this direction at least, the process of zoölogical change had come to an end, and a process of psychological change was to take its place. Henceforth along this supreme line of generation there was to be no further evolution of new species through physical

¹ Philosophical Basis of Theism, pp. 434-454. Also the materialistic argument founded on evolution, pp. 455-536.

² Part ii. Philosophical Works, vol. ii. p. 438.

variation, but through the accumulation of psychical variations one particular species was to be indefinitely perfected and raised to a totally different plane from that on which all life had hitherto existed. Henceforth, in short, the dominant aspect of evolution was to be not the genesis of species but the progress of civilization. As we thoroughly grasp the meaning of all this, we see that upon the Darwinian theory it is impossible that any creature zoologically distinct from Man and superior to him should ever at any future time exist upon the earth. . . . According to Darwinism, the creation of man is still the goal toward which Nature tended from the beginning. Not the production of any higher creature, but the perfecting of Humanity, is to be the glorious consummation of Nature's long and tedious work. Thus we suddenly arrive at the conclusion that Man seems now, much more clearly than ever, the chief among God's creatures. . . . In the deadly struggle for existence which has raged throughout countless æons of time, the whole creation has been groaning and travailing together in order to bring forth that last consummate specimen of God's handiwork, the Human Soul. . . . The materialistic assumption that . . . the life of the soul ends with the life of the body, is perhaps the most colossal instance of baseless assumption that is known to the history of philosophy. . . . The doctrine of evolution does not allow us to take the atheistic view of the position of man. . . . The Darwinian theory, properly understood, replaces as much teleology as it destroys. From the first dawning of life we see all things working together toward one mighty goal, the evolution of the most exalted spiritual qualities which characterize Humanity. . . . The more thoroughly we comprehend that process of evolution by which things have come to be what they are, the more we are likely to feel that to deny the everlasting persistence of the spiritual element in Man is to rob the whole process of its meaning. It goes far toward putting us to permanent intellectual confusion, and I do not see that any one has as yet alleged, or is ever likely to allege, a sufficient reason for our accepting so dire an alternative. For my own part, therefore, I believe in the immortality of the soul, not in the sense in which I accept the demonstrable truths of science, but as a supreme act of faith in the reasonableness of God's work. . . . According to Mr. Spencer, the divine energy which is manifested throughout the knowable universe is the same that wells up in the human consciousness. Speaking for myself, I can see no insuperable difficulty in the notion that at some period in the

evolution of Humanity this divine spark may have acquired sufficient concentration and steadiness to survive the wreck of material forms and endure forever. Such a crowning wonder seems to me no more than the fit climax to a creative work that has been ineffably beautiful and marvelous in all its myriad stages.”¹

But if rational and personal beings exist, the absolute Being, that is the ultimate ground of the universe, must be absolute Reason as well as absolute Power. This is a necessary inference on the principle that the cause must be adequate to produce the effect. Rational persons have powers of which matter, in any sense in which the word is legitimately used, is destitute. It therefore cannot be their cause. The evolution of matter by its own forces in purely physical processes into personal beings would be an effect without a cause. Finite rational beings can have the ultimate ground of their existence only in the absolute Reason, the personal God who knows all the rational truths, the rational laws, the rational ideals of perfection, the rational ends which are constituent in the rationality of the personal beings whom he has brought into existence. “He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know?” We have found in the physical system evidences of a directing mind guiding the power energizing in it and indicating that the universe is ultimately grounded in Reason. Still more decisive and imperative is the evidence of the same in the existence in the universe of rational beings and a rational and moral system. We may reasonably expect that the progress of thought, whether starting from the psychical or the physical facts in the universe, will issue in the decisive and agreeing belief that psychical acts and processes can be accounted for only by referring them to psychical agents; that rational beings and a rational system exist, which transcend the physical and cannot be accounted for by it, but which reveal the absolute Reason, energizing in it in the expression of archetypal truth, in accordance with eternal and rational laws, and in the progressive realization of rational ideals and good.

II. GOD REVEALED AS PERSONAL SPIRIT IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL RELIGIOUSNESS OF MAN. — God is revealed in the religiousness of man, which, with the included belief in a divinity, is a common characteristic of humanity, is spontaneous, powerful and persistent, and is thus found to have root in the common constitution of man.

1. Religion, with the belief in a divinity, is a common charac-

¹ The Destiny of Man, pp. 30, 31, 32, 110, 112, 115, 116, 117.

teristic of humanity ; it is generic, spontaneous, powerful and persistent.

Religion, with the belief in a divinity, is a common characteristic of humanity. It has already been shown that there is no religion without a divinity ; that in all religions, however rude the worshipers' conceptions of their gods, some sense of the presence of an infinite spirit is always discernible ; in their conceptions it is always possible to trace at least some rudiments of the two distinctive characteristics of a divinity, that it is spirit, and that it is absolute or infinite. In the powers energizing in nature they saw powers thinking and willing like themselves ; they also saw these mighty agencies acting beyond their reach and control, and were awed before them as superhuman and mysterious powers. In this awe their souls were already overshadowed by the mystery of the Infinite.

Modern scientific theories imply that man at his origin was neither savage nor civilized, but simply undeveloped. It is known that whatever progress man has made in his development, there have been degenerations from it. Many religions have been known to be degenerate. Such was the religion of the Roman empire as described by Paul in the opening of the Epistle to the Romans. This fact must have its due weight in investigating the characteristics of religions. But in all religions, even those which are degenerated, some sense of the divinity as an infinite spirit, as spirit above nature and above man, may always be found. There is veneration, awe or fear of a supernatural and superhuman being or beings. Therefore the belief in a divinity, being involved in all religions, is as universal as religion.

Religion with the belief in a divinity is a common and distinctive characteristic of man. Plutarch says : " If you will take the pains to travel through the world, you may find towns and cities without walls, without letters, without kings, without houses, without wealth, without money, without theatres and places of exercise ; but there was never seen by any man any city without temples and gods." ¹ Cicero says : " Among men there is no clan so wild and savage as not to know that a divinity is to be worshiped, although ignorant what the true God should be." And Homer says : " All men long for the gods." ² They are like unfledged birds, by an impulse of nature opening their bills wide for food which is to be brought from beyond the nest.

¹ Against Colotes the Epicurean, § 31 ; *Morals*, Goodwin's Trans., vol. v. pp. 379, 380.

² Cicero, *De Legibus*, lib. i. 8 ; *Odyssey*, iii. 48.

Modern science confirms what has been the common testimony from the earliest historical times, that religion has been a characteristic of all races and tribes of men. The most advanced researches in anthropology reach the conclusion that no tribe of men has ever been found without religion. Tylor says: "So far as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible evidence, we have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings appears among all low races with whom we have attained to thorough intimate acquaintance."¹ Quatrefages says: "Little by little the light has appeared, and the result has been that Australians, Melaneseans, Hottentots, Kaffirs and Bechuanas have in their turn been withdrawn from the list of atheist nations and recognized as religious. . . . We nowhere meet with atheism except in an erratic condition. In every place and at all times the mass of population have escaped it; we nowhere find either a great human race, or even a division, however unimportant, of the race, preferring atheism."² Tiele says: "The statement, that there are nations or tribes which possess no religion, rests either on inaccurate observation or on a confusion of ideas. No tribe or nation has yet been met with destitute of belief in any higher beings; and travelers who asserted their existence have been afterwards refuted by the facts. It is legitimate therefore to call religion in its most general sense a universal phenomenon of humanity."³ Accordingly, Professor Tyndall and other modern skeptics of science and culture admit the same; they recognize religion as constitutional in man, and requiring provision to be made for it; although they affirm that its object cannot be known but can only be imagined.

The common belief of mankind in a divinity is also spontaneous. It is not the result of any generalization of particulars, nor of any induction from facts, nor of reflective thought in any form. There are no "Evidences" or "Apologetics" in the ethnic religions. On the contrary this belief springs up with the spontaneity of life. Man finds himself limited, dependent, face to face with mighty and mysterious powers. He spontaneously looks beyond himself to another. He feels rather than thinks the presence of a divinity in these mighty energies. As the impression of the mountains, the sun, the sky, the lightning and the storm is borne in on his senses, so on his spirit is borne in the impression

¹ Primitive Culture, vol. i. p. 384.

² Quatrefages, *The Human Species*, pp. 475, 482, 483.

³ Tiele, *History of Religion*, Carpenter's Translation, p. 6.

of a spiritual and mysterious presence in these grandeurs of nature. In his straits he feels his need and cries to the divinity for help; like a little child astray from its mother on the street and in the sense of utter helplessness blindly crying for her return.

This common belief in a divinity is also powerful. Its influence has not been obscure and uncertain. It has been one of the most powerful forces in human history. It has also been a central agency in man's moral progress. The Christian religion, among others, and its historical influence must be accounted for. It cannot be accounted for on the supposition of the atheist. The mightiest and most beneficent agency in human progress cannot be a delusion founded only on falsehood.

It must be added that this belief is persistent. It has the characteristic of primitive belief that it persists in the face of unexplained difficulties. Tylor relates that certain African savages were asked how their divinities could partake of their offerings, since the meats which they had set forth for them at night were found unconsumed and unchanged in the morning. They were not in the least shaken in their belief, but replied without hesitation that the spirits licked them.¹ It persists also in spite of the speculations and opposition of atheism. It has the characteristic of a primitive belief that it persists in the feelings and spontaneous beliefs and actions, even when by intellectual questionings the man has brought himself to speculative doubt or unbelief. So the idealist practically treats outward things as objectively real. So Madame De Staël said of ghosts, I do not believe in them, but I fear them; her spontaneous and true belief in spiritual and supernatural beings persisting in the feelings and asserting itself in consciousness at the very thought of supernatural manifestations even in forms admitted to be unreal.

Atheism has never been able to establish itself except within very narrow limits. We find individual atheists, but not atheistic races, tribes or peoples. And at no period has mankind ever been atheistic. Quatrefages says: "Obliged as I am to pass in review all races of men, I have sought for atheism in the lowest and the highest, but nowhere have I met with it except in individuals or at most in some more or less limited schools, such as those which existed in Europe in the last century, or which may be seen at the present day."²

In this sporadic existence atheism is manifestly a departure

¹ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. ii. p. 351.

² *The Human Species*, p. 482.

from a primitive religiousness. It is the product of speculative thought which has led some away from their primitive religious belief, just as it has also led some to deny all knowledge of the existence of the outward world. And where atheistic schools and parties have appeared, as in the first French revolution and among the Nihilists now, it has been brought about through some revolutionary craze in which belief in God has been falsely identified with injustice and oppression, or through some other extraneous influence falsifying the significance and influence of religious belief; or through moral corruption, or anarchical fury, which must first break down all belief in God in order to accomplish its evil designs. And even thus the number of atheists has always been comparatively very small. The number of persons who have come to a speculative disbelief of the existence of a divinity and have avowed themselves atheists is probably not greater than the number who have come to a speculative disbelief of the existence of the outward world and have avowed themselves idealists or phenomenologists. The latter half of the last century was a period noted for the prevalence of atheism. But when David Hume was in Paris doing the duties of secretary to the embassy, it happened one evening at the table of Baron d'Holbach that the conversation turned on natural religion, and Mr. Hume declared that in all his life he had never met an atheist. The baron replied, You now encounter seventeen all in a bunch. Hume did not ask to be counted as the eighteenth. He had never seen an atheist in Great Britain. But at that time atheism was spreading in France; and it is a common impression that a few years later, in the revolution, all France was atheistic. Yet probably in the highest frenzy of the revolution the atheists were a small minority of the population of that country. Some years before this incident Mr. Hume's mother died. His friend Boyle, finding him in the deepest affliction and in a flood of tears, expressed regret that he had not the consolations of the Christian faith. Mr. Hume replied: "Ah, my friend, I throw out my speculations to entertain the learned and metaphysical world; yet, in other things, I do not think so differently from the rest of the world as you imagine."¹

Atheism is short-lived as well as circumscribed. No scheme of thought, so earnestly advocated as atheism at times has been, ever makes so few converts or lasts so short a time. In the

¹ *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1856, vol. vi. pp. 118, 119; *Burton's Life of Hume*, vol. i. pp. 293, 294.

French revolution the festival of Reason in Notre Dame, November 7, 1793, was followed in less than eight months by Robespierre's scenic restoration of the Supreme Being in a festival in the Tuileries and the Champ de Mars. When atheism has burned over a community and seemingly has consumed the very roots and seeds of religion, presently religious belief reappears, as vegetation springs up on burned land. And it springs up again, not by force of argument but spontaneously; because man cannot get on without it; because man's spirit asserts anew its essential relation to God and dependence on him. It is the renewal of the ancient cry, which utters the inmost need of the human heart in every age: "As the hart panteth after the water-brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God. My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God; when shall I come and appear before God?"

The same is true in the history of agnostic and monistic speculations, which, with intellectual assent to the existence of an absolute Being, deny that it can be known as a personal Spirit with whom it is possible for man to commune in acts of trust and service. The objection is urged that hundreds of millions of Asiatics are satisfied with the abstractions of Buddhism and Brahmanism, without the worship of a personal divinity. Just the contrary is the fact. The abstract speculations of Buddhism and Brahmanism never satisfied the religious wants of the people; but they are the worshipers of many gods. "Buddha (the Enlightened), which was at first only a title given to the founder of the religion, became in course of time the real substitute for God in the minds of hundreds of millions of men; and Buddha, or Lama in Thibet, was any one who succeeded in making people believe that he was a real incarnation of a previous Buddha; and for the mass of the people there was and there is yet no other God."¹ Instead of recognizing no God accessible to worship and communion the Buddhists seem to be universal believers in prayer; one of their forms of prayer is probably repeated more times every day than the Lord's Prayer or any other form of prayer known to man. And not satisfied with the abundance of prayer from their own lips, they are the only people that ever resorted also to prayer-mills that they might be sure that their petitions were being always presented before God. It is not true therefore that four hundred millions of Asiatics are atheists or at least pantheists believing in no personal God with whom man can

¹ Gentilism, by Thébaud, pp. 157, 158.

commune in acts of trust and service. On the contrary, it is a striking exemplification of the common historical fact that when atheistic speculation has prevailed with a few and for a time, it is speedily swept away among the people by the return of belief in a divinity that can be the object of religious trust and service. In view of such facts we may say with Kuenen: "The religious faith that has once struck root in the heart of a people never dies."¹

It is also a significant fact that when the higher classes of society in any country are sliding into skepticism and abandoning religion, fantastic or fanatical superstitions break out among the less educated, and even get control of the skeptics themselves. The decline of religious belief in the Roman Empire was accompanied by a remarkable prevalence of magic arts and of belief in them. The materialism and agnosticism of the present time are accompanied by a wide-spread belief in spirit-rappings.

In individuals who have become skeptical or atheistic the susceptibility to religious sentiment survives and frequently reasserts itself and brings back belief in a God, sometimes in very remarkable ways. Many agnostics, positivists and materialists of the present day acknowledge that religion belongs to the constitution of man and must have some object provided for it. Various objects have been proposed, among which are the Unknowable, the Great Human Being or Generic Humanity, the Universe itself, and even Physical Science. None of these can satisfy man's spiritual needs, but the proposals are so many testimonies to the universality of religious sentiments and wants and to the necessity of some object of religious reverence and homage adequate to satisfy them. The religious sentiment often asserts itself also in persons who have long lived in apparent unconsciousness of it. Comte, until after he published the Positive Philosophy, appears not to have recognized religion as having any legitimate place in the further development of individuals or of society. It had played its part, had passed through all its necessary stages and now must pass away. But when he was nearly fifty years old, in his acquaintance with Madame Clotilde de Vaux and his grief at her death soon after, sentiment and feeling burst through the rocky strata of intellectuality which had repressed and concealed them and flamed up in language expressing nothing less than adoration of her. In this crisis of his life his religious consciousness was awakened and he proposed Humanity itself as the Great

¹ National Religions and Universal Religions, p. 40.

Being to be the object of religious worship and service. Another example of the same is found in the life of John Stuart Mill. He says explicitly that he was of the few who have never thrown off religion because they had never had it. "I looked upon the modern exactly as I did upon the ancient religion, as something which no way concerned me." His education was chilling to all sentiment and his life was preëminently a life of the intellect. In his love for Mrs. Taylor, who became his wife, the emotional forces of his being broke their long repression and asserted themselves with might. And in this and his grief at her death, which, like Comte, he utters in language of adoration, he seems to have become aware of religious sentiments and wants. In the case of each of these men the woman seems to have exerted an influence on his religiously benumbed and undeveloped soul analogous to that exerted in the middle ages by the Virgin Mary.

These cases exemplify the fact that frequently what awakens the unbeliever to the consciousness of the spiritual and the divine is not argument nor clear and convincing presentation of truth to the intellect. The human spirit is in its constitution adapted to the spiritual system of which it is a member. In every soul is a secret chord responsive to the touch of the spiritual and the divine, as the strings of a violin respond to the touch of the bow in the hand of a musician. Hence the slumbering religious susceptibility may be awakened by a vivid picturing of spiritual realities to the imagination, or of the love of God in Christ to the heart. It may be awakened by new emergencies, by bereavement, by danger, as Volney at a time of expected shipwreck was found praying. And, though according to my observation men usually die in the belief and character in which they have lived, yet sometimes the religious susceptibilities are awakened and previous unbelief is swept away at the approach of death. That which awakens these sensibilities and leads from unbelief to belief may be something which judged by the logical understanding seems trivial. Dr. George B. Cheever relates that a pastor had long labored with a man to convince him of God's righteous government and judgment of the world, but in vain. But this man felled a tree and as it came crashing down and lay motionless where it fell, the words came to his mind, "Where the tree falleth there it shall be," with a force which carried away all his unbelief, let in the flood of the divine argument upon his soul, and brought him at length to Christian faith and repentance.¹

¹ The Powers of the World to Come, p. 64.

A most unreasoning and unreasonable change, it will be said. Most reasonable, I answer, though unreasoning. It matters not what awakens the spiritual susceptibilities of the soul; once awakened it must turn to God, its only satisfaction and rest, or it must sink back into spiritual insensibility, fainting through lack of the air by which alone the spiritual life can be sustained. Hence comes such unexpected and seemingly inexplicable breaking down of unbelief in the great crises of life. And therefore it is not strange, when the awful form of death is drawing near and the shadow of his coming glooms upon the soul, that the spiritual in the man awakes, as the body is sinking to its last sleep, and finds itself, as the spirit when it awakes must always find itself, face to face with God.

The present is commonly said to be a time of the suspense and even of the decay of faith. On the other hand Mr. Lewes says: "Ours is no longer the age described by Carlyle 'destitute of faith yet terrified at skepticism.' It is an age clamorous for faith, and dissatisfied with skepticism only when skepticism is a resting place instead of a starting point, a result instead of a preliminary caution. The purely negative attitude of unbelief, once regarded as philosophical, is now generally understood to be laudable only in the face of the demonstratively incredible."¹ The history of religion justifies the expectation that the present time will prove rather to be a period of transition, and that beneath the earnest thinking which doubt and questioning have called forth, the germs are already sprouting of a faith purer, stronger and more comprehensive of all that is distinctively Christian. And however science may emphasize the physical origin and nature of man, it only presents in clearer light by the contrast his spiritual being. As Dr. Thomson, Archbishop of York, says: "You may lower the position of man by comparing him to the apes and by chemical analysis of his brain; all the more wonderful is it that a creature in such sorry case should pretend to hold communion with the divine. His feet are in the earthy clay, but his head is lifted up toward heaven. Heir to a hundred maladies, the sport of a hundred passions, holding on this life, so checkered in its complexion, but for a few days, this creature cries out of his trouble: 'God exists; and he can see and hear me.'"²

2. From the foregoing evidence of the universality, spontane-

¹ Problems of Life and Mind, First Series, vol. i. pp. 1, 2.

² Modern Skepticism, p. 18.

ity, power and persistence of religious belief, the inference is legitimate and necessary that religion with the belief in a divinity involved in it has root in the constitution of man and is an essential and distinctive trait of humanity.¹ In other words, the inference is that man is so constituted that when normally developed he finds himself in the presence of a divinity and conscious of religiousness. And this is inferred, not merely from the prevalence of belief in a divinity in all tribes of men, but also from its spontaneity, power and persistence. Men pray to a divinity before they attempt to prove its existence. They are religious before they are scientific either in empirical, philosophical or theological science. And their spontaneous belief in a God is the basis of their theological knowledge; as their spontaneous belief in the existence of the earth, the sun, moon and stars is the basis of physics and astronomy. A belief thus pervasive, spontaneous, powerful and persistent can be satisfactorily explained only as resulting from the normal development of the constitution of man. When man's constitution is normally developed the idea of a divinity and the sentiments of religion will reveal themselves in his consciousness.

On the contrary, atheism is not spontaneous; it arises only from reflective thought, after skepticism in its better meaning has made its appearance and man has begun to investigate the grounds of religious belief. In this respect man is found in three stages. In the outset the child is destitute of religious feelings and ideas; it knows no divinity. This is not atheism, but is simply infancy, in which all the powers are undeveloped. The second stage is that of spontaneous religious sentiment and belief. The third is that of reflective thought on religion and its object. This commonly confirms and purifies from error the spontaneous religion and its beliefs, and develops them into thoughtful conviction that a divinity exists and is to be worshiped, and into some definite apprehension of what the divinity is and what service is acceptable to him. In some cases, however, though comparatively few, the questioning and thinking issue in some form of atheism. But in the second stage, that of spontaneous belief, man is always religious and atheism is never found.

Not merely is the belief in a divinity the spontaneous result

¹ "It will not do to say, we have no 'organ' for procuring us such and such experiences; we must first inquire what experiences we actually have, and then will follow the question, what 'organs' are those by which they are procured." — *Philosophy and Science*, Mind, vol. i. p. 234.

of man's normal development; the idea of a divinity when once attained is one with which the mind has affinity as congenial with itself, and in which it finds its own powers and susceptibilities unfolded and revealed in consciousness. The knowledge of God is a revelation of the human spirit to itself.

Here it is sometimes objected that the idea of God is transmitted by tradition; children are taught the faith of their parents. This is true; and when religious belief has once pervaded a community, the transmission of it from parents to children is inevitable. It is also true that it is according to the constitution of man that children are born of parents and in their early years must breathe the atmosphere of parental influence. Moreover this very fact implies in the child a constitutional capacity for religion. A child cannot be taught any thing which it has no constitutional faculty to know or susceptibility to feel. It is impossible to teach a dog the multiplication table or the binomial theorem, or a person blind from birth what is the sensation of light and color. It is impossible to influence a person to action by motives which he has no capacity to feel. Education can do no more than to draw out or develop what is already in the person who is educated. Plato in the *Meno* represents Socrates as questioning a boy who answers wrong, but after repeated questions he sees the truth and gives the right answer. Then Socrates says: "You see I have told him nothing, and yet he answers right now. The idea was in his mind and all I had to do was to draw it out." He then proceeds to illustrate education as a drawing out of the mind. And, though the idea was not literally in the boy's mind, the capacity of knowing it was there, by which, under the stimulus of the questions, he discovered it himself. Even when information is directly imparted the pupil must apprehend it by the action of his own faculties or not at all. Equally impossible is it to impart to a child any idea of a God or to awaken any religious sentiments, if the child is not constituted with powers and susceptibilities for them. And we find the minds of very young children active in laying hold of the religious ideas communicated to them and trying to frame to themselves the ideas of God and spiritual realities; pondering not merely God's love and the personal attributes revealed in the life of Christ, but also the idea of the absolute, and wondering over an existence without beginning or end, space without bounds, power that is almighty, and knowledge of all things from which nothing can be hid. The child's ideas are childlike. But they

are ideas in the sphere of the divine and reveal a capacity to know God. And in this activity of a child's mind we can see some image of the action of the primitive men in the childhood of the race trying to define to themselves, without a human teacher, the idea of a god.

Seneca says: "Do you wonder that men go to the gods? God comes to men; indeed, more exactly, God comes into men; no heart is good without God. Seeds of the divine are scattered in human bodies, which, if well cultivated, spring up and grow in the likeness of their original."¹ The earlier Stoics taught man's self-sufficiency and denied the need of faith in a God in moral action and character; but the later acknowledged man's dependence for right character and life on the indwelling God. Their ideal wise man was a Godman, in whom the Logos or absolute Reason dwelt. In this and other passages in Seneca's writings this change is noticeable. But the divinity cannot find entrance to the soul of man and influence it for good unless man is constituted with capacity for communing with God and receiving his influence. This Seneca recognizes. The seeds of the divine must be in the man or no culture can cause any thing in him to grow in the likeness of the divine. And this must be acknowledged unless we fall into pantheism, as the Stoics did, and recognize in man no personality of his own, but only the absolute Reason itself shining in the human being as the sunshine reveals itself temporarily on some angle of a diamond as a single point of light.

All this is illustrated in the education of the deaf and dumb. The testimony of their most successful teachers has been that they are less developed than pupils of the same age who hear; and that the absence of the idea of God is not atheism, but is merely an incident of the undeveloped mind. One of them writes: "Our readers may be interested to learn the first steps of the method pursued in imparting to the deaf and dumb a knowledge of the soul, and of God and his attributes. . . . We have not to construct an argument to which the mind of an inveterate skeptic, if there, could bring no objection, but rather to trace the path, along which a mind anxious to know the truth might reach a satisfactory conclusion. It is not so much, even to the deaf mute, an introduction of new facts, as pointing out the relations of those he already knows, although they have never excited his attention, and leading him to draw the plain and obvious inference. . . . In order to introduce the idea of God to the mind of the deaf and

¹ Seneca, Epist. 73 : 14.

dumb, you have only to educate or develop the reflective power to a certain point. . . . As we should expect, in most cases the idea of God would enter gradually. . . . With some individuals however it has happened that in following a course of thought like that above suggested, the sublime idea of God has seemed to burst at once upon the mind with overwhelming power. The temple that before was tenantless and lonely is filled with glory and the soul shrinks with awe and amazement before the presence of its Maker, till now unknown. Similar to this was the experience of Massieu, the celebrated pupil of the Abbé Sicard." The Abbé relates that, when, after preparing his mind in the way already adverted to, he announced to him God, the author of the beings that he saw and the object of our worship, Massieu, awed and trembling, "prostrated himself and thus offered to this great Being the first homage of his worship and adoration. When recovered from this sort of ecstasy he said to me by signs these beautiful words, which I shall not forget while I have life: 'Ah, let me go to my father, to my mother, to my brothers to tell them there is a God; they know it not.'" ¹

But we are concerned not merely with the origin and development of the idea of a divinity. It is a fact that man has the idea of God in all its fulness and majesty as held in Christian theism. It is also a fact that from the ruder conceptions of a divinity held in man's savage state, men have advanced till they have attained the grand conception of God which Christianity presents. Men have actually come to believe that God is the absolute Being, self-existent, eternal, omnipresent, almighty, the absolute and universal Reason, the eternal Spirit perfect in wisdom and love. Mr. Tyndall says man has no faculty and no rudiment of a faculty by which he can know that a divinity exists. How then has he come by the idea of God? Why is the belief in the existence of a God the common characteristic of humanity? Why has it been so spontaneous, powerful and persistent? How comes man by the ideas of eternity, immensity, unconditionedness? Some say that they come from his knowledge of his own limitations. But how can I have the ideas of finiteness, conditionedness and imperfection except as I contrast them with the ideas of the unlimited, the unconditioned, the perfect? And if it is said that these ideas and the idea of the all-perfect God have been communicated by tradition, this only pushes us back on the question, How did it

¹ American Annals of the Deaf and Dumb, vol. vi. No. iii., April, 1854, pp. 139, 140.

originate, so that man's ancestors had it to transmit? Certainly, if the belief in a divinity has no root in the constitution of man, if man has no rudiment of a faculty for knowing God, then this grand idea of the absolute Spirit, infinite in power and perfect in wisdom and love, could not have been originated by man nor even communicated to him by instruction or revelation from without. The idea would simply be impossible to him.

It is sometimes objected that the idea of God is a figment of the imagination. The impossibility of this is now evident. The imagination cannot create a new element of thought; it can only combine elements already given. The idea of a divinity contains elements of thought which imagination could never have invented.

The belief in a divinity rises spontaneously in the religious consciousness of man. In attempting to define and develop in thought the idea of God involved in this belief, man makes mistakes. Here the imagination comes in and combines the elements presented in the religious consciousness into various and sometimes fantastic forms. This is very different from the thorough-going imagination supposed by the objector, which creates the idea itself and all the elements entering into it. And yet in all the varied forms in which the divinity has been imagined essential elements of the true idea are always found. The divinity is always conceived as at least a supernatural and superhuman power, transcending the thought that would define it. Schelling speaks of the ethnic mythologies as religion growing wild. But wild plants are living plants, and when developed under cultivation to greater beauty of flower and richness of fruit are still the same plants developed. As Professor Pfleiderer says: "The imagination, in as it were instinctive rationality, anticipates the highest truth of reason, to which philosophical thought always comes back at last, that the world is the manifestation of the same Spirit which in the Ego gives us immediate knowledge of itself as our own essence;"¹ or, as I should put it, as spirit in essence like ourselves. And in studying the ethnic religions we find their true significance only as we recognize in them attempts more or less successful to define the idea of God as he reveals himself in the universe and in the spirit of man, and the attainment, with the progressive development of man, of ideas of God more worthy of the approval of reason and more satisfying to the needs of the unfolding spiritual capacities and life. Even polytheism is not wholly unlike monotheism. The numerical

¹ Religionsphil. p. 277.

distinction does not tell all the facts. Professor Max Müller has shown that in some polytheistic religions, each god becomes to the worshiper the representative for the time being of the supreme God. "Each god is felt at the time as supreme and absolute, in spite of the necessary limitation which to our minds a plurality of gods must entail on every single god."¹ And in the most distinctive polytheism each god, presiding over some department or power of nature, stands in the mind of the worshiper for one aspect of the divine. And when in the later religion of the Roman Empire every condition and act of life had its separate divinity, that seeming extreme of polytheism was really an approximation to theism in recognizing the dependence of everything on God and the presence and action of God everywhere. Polytheism confronted with the necessity of an infinite number of gods was already demonstrating its own incapacity and falsity and pointing to the one supreme and everywhere present God.

Here the objection is urged that historically religion does not begin with the worship of a personal Spirit, but of physical objects and powers. This theory of the origin of religion has recently been presented with learning and ability by Mr. Keary.² He argues that, as physical things and motions are supposed to have been designated by words before the mind and mental processes were thus designated, so religion must have begun with the worship of material things and physical powers. He supposes that religion began as fetich-worship, and that the great fetich-gods of the early world were three, and three only, the tree, the mountain, and the river. His explanation of tree-worship is this: Primeval men lived on roots and berries or on the smaller animals and the vermin which they gathered from the soil, and so habitually kept their eyes fixed on the ground. In their half glances upward they had not leisure to observe that the tree-top was not really close against the sky. "They may well have deemed that the upper branches hid themselves in infinitely remote ethereal regions." It appears, it may be remarked in passing, that these primitive men, who had never learned that a tree does not touch the sky, had the idea of "infinitely remote ethereal regions." Fetichism, beginning with the worship of an individual tree, "passed on to the worship of many trees, of the grove of trees, and it soon proceeded thence to a

¹ Hibbert Lectures, p. 285.

² Outlines of Primitive Beliefs, by Charles F. Keary, of the British Museum, pp. 37, 58, 59, 30, 31.

worship of some invisible belonging of the grove. This might be the sacred silence which seems to reign in the wood, or the storm which rushes through it, or any of the dim, mysterious forest sounds. From the visible and tangible things of earth religion looked farther away to the heavenly bodies or to the sky itself. And then at last it emerged from the nature-worshiping stage, and the voice of God, which was heard once in the whirlwind, was now heard only in the still small voice within." Others have taught that man derived his idea of a spirit and ultimately of a divinity from his own shadow. These are examples of theories in various forms which agree in teaching that physical things and powers are the primary objects of religious worship and that from these man at last derives the idea of a personal spirit and a personal divinity.

This theory of the origin of religion is philosophically improbable. Man knows himself as exerting power in moving outward objects and knows them as resisting his exertion. In this his idea of power and cause begins. He knows also that he can produce effects with an instrument external to his body, as when he knocks off a nut with a stick or stone. He knows also that there is in him in all these acts a power of unseen thought and will. When he sees movements of bodies beyond the reach and control of himself or any known living being, he naturally refers the effect to some agent that thinks and wills like himself. Thus the idea of a personal spirit, however imperfectly apprehended, must have been one of the first instead of the last. It is going far round-about to imagine that man gets his idea of spirit from physical things after many generations of nature-worship, when all the time he has the idea implicitly in his consciousness of himself, and in this, after whatever delay, must find all the elements of the idea.

The theory is also contrary to facts, so far as known. The rudest fetich-worshiper believes that the fetich is the shrine of an unseen divinity. In all nature-worship it is found that man worships in nature an unseen power, resembling yet transcending the intelligent and voluntary power of man, and while above visible nature, directing and controlling it. This Mr. Keary unwittingly recognizes when he says that the nature-worshiper "hears the voice of God in the whirlwind." Religion begins as nature-worship, because the objects of nature, the sun, the heavens, the dawn, the ocean and rivers, revealing powers beyond man's reach and control, are the revealers to him of a

power that is above nature and above man, a power that is divine. And this power he conceives of as a power that thinks and wills, that he can call on for help, that he can please or displease. In all religions man recognizes in nature an intelligent, spiritual power like his own. As Pfeleiderer says: "The imagination of the childlike man ensouls all nature; that is, treats it, especially the phenomena of motion, after the analogy of the human or animal life, between which he does not discriminate; thus he sees in every process the effect of a conscious and voluntarily acting soul."¹ So Ulrici puts it: "The manifold nature-religions (so called) from Shamanism and Fetichism up to the most developed mythical systems, in the last ground do not rest, as has commonly been supposed, on a deification of mere objects and powers of nature, but have gone forth from a perception of the Divine, though dim and undefined; of a Power working behind the phenomena of nature. Not till afterwards do they come to regard certain phenomena of nature as representatives of this nameless, divine, original Power, or to identify them with it."²

It must be added that the theory in question assumes what is impossible. The idea of spirit cannot originate otherwise than in man's knowledge of it in himself and in his fellow-men. If man sees the spiritual revealed in nature it presupposes the knowledge of the spiritual in himself. No lengthening of the process of observing nature, as described by Mr. Keary, brings him any nearer to the idea of spirit, unless he carries with him the idea already derived from his knowledge of himself. Of a theory of this class Burnouf says: "It still remains to ask how mankind have effected this transformation of a metaphor or a dream into a god, and what mysterious force has pushed them into making the transition. . . . In order to change any sensuous impression into a god, there must have previously existed the idea of a god."

With this the latest established conclusions of anthropological investigations agree. The earliest form of religious sentiment springs from the belief that in the activities and powers of physical things, at least in those which no agent is perceived to cause, is a power intelligent and voluntary like man directing and controlling them. The position of Comte, that religion begins in fetichism, is no longer tenable. Facts abundantly prove that the religions of the Greeks and Romans, the religions of India with

¹ Religionsphil. pp. 277, 278.

² Gott und der Mensch, vol. i. p. 697.

their innumerable incarnations, the religion of Persia, recognize personal divinities in and above the nature-powers in which they reveal themselves. And the best established conclusion of anthropology is that in fetichism and in all so called nature-worship, a divinity that man can commune with, that he can please and displease, is recognized in and above the phenomena and powers of nature.

For every interest of science and religion we may willingly see the intellectual rabies passing away which discovered profound myths of nature-worship not only in the ethnic stories about the gods, but also in folk-stories and nursery-rhymes, like those of the Milkmaid and of Jack and Gill; which discovered in the Odyssey the adventures of the soul after death in seeking the abode of the blessed, and in the Iliad the sun-myth, or, as it has also been interpreted, a profound exposition in Helen of the nature and power of Greek art. It supposes that the primitive peoples could not tell a story or perpetuate a tradition which was not saturated with the most profound religious and philosophical significance. They who can believe all this cannot consistently regard it impossible that the imaginings of primitive men respecting the divinity carried in them anticipations and germs of rational truth and presentiments of the true knowledge of the spiritual and the divine.

Mr. Spencer rejects the theory that religion originates in the immediate worship of natural objects and powers, and maintains that it begins in the worship of the ghosts of the dead. Aside from the impossibility, already alluded to, of accounting by this theory for the worship of the divinity in the sun, the mountains, the sky and other natural objects, the fatal objection is that man cannot have the idea of ghosts of dead ancestors until he has first the idea of the spirit in the living man. And it is going a very roundabout way through this absurdity to suppose that man gets the idea of a spirit from belief in the survival of the spirit of the dead, instead of getting the idea of spirit and of its survival from his implicit consciousness of the spiritual in himself.

It is objected by some that the knowledge of God originated from a primitive revelation. This is true only in the sense that the primitive knowledge of any object implies that the object has revealed itself in some action on the man whereby he perceives it. The same is true of the primitive revelation of God. But this fact, instead of being an objection, is itself decisive proof that man is constituted with capacity to know God. No object can reveal itself to a being not constituted with capacity to know

it. The rose cannot reveal its sweetness to one destitute of smell, nor its color and beauty to one who cannot see. God cannot reveal himself to a dog by any action upon him, nor to any being destitute of the spiritual capacity for religion and the knowledge of God. Not even by any miracle or any Christ can he reveal himself to such a being.

Müller says that if you ask an Ashanti priest how he knows that his fetich is not a common stone, he replies that the fetich told him so.¹ And this is primitive revelation, as the objector conceives it; man knows that the object of his worship is a god because the god told him so. But this revelation by words presupposes the idea of a god already known to the recipient of it. Just as, if a scientist tells me that a cat is a vertebrate animal, the communication presupposes my knowledge of a vertebrate animal. The revelation is thus nullified. This comes from the supposition that a primitive revelation must be made in words. But it can be made only by the action of the object on the man through which he apprehends the object, forms an idea of it and then gives it a name. The object must be revealed before it can be named. Hence a primitive revelation in words is impossible, for it necessarily presupposes the knowledge of the object and of the meaning of the words.

But primitive revelation in its true significance stands in no contradiction to man's constitutional capacity to know God, but is a concurrent factor with it in the knowledge. Revelation to a being without capacity to know the object to be revealed would impart no knowledge; and equally man's capacity to know God would give no knowledge of him, if God never revealed himself within the consciousness of the man by any action of which the man could take cognizance. Man has capacity to know a star; but he cannot know it if it has never revealed itself to his eye or otherwise, by any effect of which the man can take cognizance. As the star reveals itself to man by acting immediately on his senses and by effects within the sphere of his observation, so God reveals himself by his action on man's spirit and by effects within the sphere of spiritual cognizance. Thus revealing himself to the spirit of man, he calls into responsive action the man's rational and moral powers and susceptibilities, his hidden sense of the mystery of the absolute and the infinite, and all his spiritual capacities. Therein begins in man the implicit consciousness of a divinity, and, at the same time, of himself as

¹ Origin and Growth of Religion, pp. 163, 164, 118.

having religious capacities, possibilities and needs. Nor does the revelation cease; it is continuous. God is always revealing himself in the constitution and course of nature and in the constitution and history of man. It is a revelation, when man in the fulness of time is prepared for it, culminating in Christ, and perpetuated in the Holy Spirit poured out on all flesh to abide with men forever.

The inference from the whole evidence which has been presented is decisive that religion and the belief in God have root in the constitution of man; that his normal development must bring him to the consciousness of God.

3. Religion and the belief in God being thus constitutional in man, the inference is legitimate and necessary that our belief in God is a real, though inadequate knowledge of him. On this point Janet says: "The only truly philosophical inquiry is, whether religion is rooted in the very nature of man, or is but a passing and ephemeral state, destined to disappear when a higher degree of civilization is attained."¹ But the evidence already presented that religion is rooted in the constitution of man is decisive and incontrovertible. God reveals himself in the constitution and consciousness of man. In man's normal development he finds himself in the presence of God. The inference is irresistible that God exists, otherwise man's constitution normally developed necessitates the belief of falsehood. The whole normal development both of the individual and of society issues in falsehood. And the falsehood is fundamental; for what is really nonentity must be believed to be the fundamental ground of the universe. Necessarily, then, knowledge is impossible to man; for the human mind is discredited as false in its constitution, and therefore untrustworthy; and since what we constitutionally believe to be the fundamental ground of all reality is non-existent, all which we believe to be reality is equally non-existent, and the whole fabric of human knowledge dissolves into illusion.

If we ask what is the origin of our belief in the external world, we cannot trace that belief historically to its beginning; but we know that the world reveals itself to man through the senses, and that this revelation must have had its beginning with the life of man because it is essential to his life on this earth; the knowledge is as real as the life. If we ask what is the origin of the bodily appetites and the natural desires, we know that they must be commensurate with the natural life which cannot go on

¹ Theory of Morals, Trans. pp. 472, 473.

without them ; they attest the laws that the waste of the body must be replenished by food, that man is made for society and the like. So religion and the belief in God are commensurate with the spiritual life and attest the reality of its laws and of the objects with which the spiritual life is correlated. From the universality, spontaneity, power and persistence of the belief in a divinity, we learn that it is a common characteristic of humanity and is rooted in the constitution of man. For the religious person it is unnecessary to go further ; because in his own experience he already knows God. The Christian believer's consciousness of God's grace permeates his whole spiritual being, as the blood-vessels permeate the body so that the prick of a pin anywhere draws blood ; to renounce the faith which has been quickened by it would be to renounce all that he esteems highest and best in his history, all that is vitalizing in his spiritual life. And now we see also that religious belief is a normal development of the constitution of man as a personal being.

Of course it is not meant that every form in which men have constructed in thought their idea of the divinity is constitutional in man and warranted as real knowledge ; but only those essential elements in the idea of a divinity already mentioned, the absolute or infinite and the spiritual or supernatural. And these are not at first apprehended as ideas and defined in thought, but they are present submerged in feelings, impulses, wishes and instincts, undiscriminated and undefined in the primitive consciousness.

It follows that religion lives in the personality and life of man. If so, then religion will persist through all human progress, will survive all convulsions and catastrophes, will revive after all degeneracy and be a power in some form in every condition of society.

III. GOD REVEALED AS PERSONAL SPIRIT IN THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN AS SHOWN BY ITS ANALYSIS.—God is revealed in the constitution of man as a personal being. The existence of the personal God is presupposed in the normal exercise of man's constitutional powers and susceptibilities, and the belief of it is a legitimate and necessary issue of the normal development of the constitution of man as a personal being.

From the fact that belief in a divinity is a common trait of humanity and is spontaneous, powerful and persistent, it has been inferred that it has root in the constitution of man, and that our belief in God is a real knowledge of him. We are now to exam-

ine the constitution of man itself to see if we find in it confirmation of this inference and evidence of the revelation of God in the constitution of man.

1. The personal God is revealed in man's intellectual or rational constitution.

The existence of the personal God, the absolute Reason, is a necessary postulate of all ratiocinated and scientific knowledge. Its presupposition, explicit or implicit, is necessary to the human intellect in order that it may complete its processes, solve its inevitable problems and properly discharge its functions; and the reality of God's existence is necessary to the reality of the knowledge thus attained.

Because nature comprises innumerable objects existing in the unity of the physical system, which extends immeasurably in space and time, physical science, which is the knowledge of nature, must postulate, consciously or unconsciously, one universal reason regnant through all time and space, with which human reason is in unison as the same in kind. If rational intelligence is not the same throughout the universe, if the rational principles on which human science rests its conclusions are not the same through all space and time, if the mathematics by which it computes are not the same everywhere and always, if the same combination of causes does not always produce the same effect, then physical science has no certainty and scientific knowledge is impossible. The spectroscope shows us that matter is the same in the sun and stars as on the earth, the all-pervading ether binds all the physical universe together in its all-penetrating action, the laws of gravitation and of the persistence of force, of mechanics and of chemistry are the same through all nature. But this is so only if the principles of human reason are universal, regulating thought and action throughout all space and time. Then if physical science is real knowledge, the universe is pervaded by Reason that is universal, that is everywhere and always the same; and this absolute Reason not only pervades the universe, but is everywhere and always regnant in it, and all things reveal its presence, direction and control. If, as we are sometimes told, mind is the last and highest product of nature, evidently its presence and direction in nature is also the first presupposition in physical science. If evolution has culminated in evolving rational man, it is evident that Reason, like man's, is revealed in the whole process of the evolution, controlling and directing it. This conclusion — and how can any one who thinks avoid it? —

is well expressed by Professor Benjamin Peirce of Harvard, at the conclusion of his *Analytic Mechanics*: "In these researches there is one lesson which cannot escape the profound observer. Every portion of the material universe is pervaded by the same laws of mechanical action, which are incorporated into the very constitution of the human mind. The solution of the problem of this universal presence of such a spiritual element is obvious and necessary. There is one God and Science is the knowledge of him."

In addition to this it may be said that man's consciousness of himself seems to rest on a basis of universality; for it is in the perception of outward objects that he is awakened to consciousness of himself. He knows the outward world as distinct from himself, and at the same time as related to and acting on himself. He thus is conscious of himself as a centre to the universe about him. It encompasses him and from every side exerts its energies upon him, while he at the centre reacts in every direction on it, apprehends it in intelligence, illuminates it with science, and effects changes in it. Man knows himself only as in the midst of the universal system, himself and it in reciprocal action and reaction. Science as knowledge is subjective within the mind of man; and as knowledge it is equally the knowledge of the universe as objective reality. The objective reality of the universe is involved in man's knowledge of himself, and the reality of of himself is involved in his knowledge of the universe. The knowledge of both is given in one and the same act; if one is real so must the other be; if one is unreal, the other must be unreal also, and all knowledge, scientific or unscientific, becomes impossible. Thus the consciousness of self rests on a basis of universality. The knowledge of the universal is involved in the knowledge of one's self. And from this point of view, as always, the mystery of objective knowledge, that a mind can apprehend outward objects which are unlike itself, points unmistakably to the fact that the universe is itself the expression of the universal Reason, which is the absolute basis of all that is and in the light of whose eternal intelligence man participates; "the true light, which lighteth every man."

It must also be noticed that the universal is always revealed in the particular. It is not merely that the multitude of particular things in nature requires the postulation of absolute reason universally the same; it is not merely that the consciousness of self involves the knowledge of the universal; but in the com-

pleted knowledge of every particular thing the universal is presupposed. The particular cannot be known apart from the universal; it must be known in its relations to the universal as well as in its particular individuality. The individual is the synthesis of the particular and the universal. In all particular qualities we find the category of substance. Each reveals in the consciousness the universal principle that all phenomena are the phenomena of being, or in other words the qualities of substance. In every change we see the effect of a cause; every change reveals in the consciousness the universal principle of reason that every beginning or change has a cause. In every mechanical adaptation the universal axioms and demonstrated conclusions of mathematics are revealed. In every conscious free act of man the universal moral law is postulated. Thus in all knowledge of the particular or the individual, universal principles are involved and the absolute and universal reason is revealed.

In previous investigations we have considered the fundamental ideas of reason, which are the norms or standards of all rational thought and action.¹ In every case in which any one of these is regulative of thought and action, the universal is revealed in the particular.

The first of these is the True, the contrary of which is the absurd. This is the norm or standard of thinking and knowing. In knowing the particular and the individual we come in sight of truths universal and necessary, which no thought can overleap and no power break down, which must be true of all reality to which they pertain through all space and all time. In the consciousness of these truths illuminating and regulating our thought and action we find ourselves face to face with the universal reason in the completed knowledge of every particular. Thus it is true of our intellectual life that God is not far from every one of us; that in him intellectually we live and move and have our being.

The second of the fundamental ideas of reason is the Right, the norm or standard of all efficient action. What is true to the reason is a law to action. The scientific knowledge of any physical reality includes the knowledge both of it and the law of its action. Every individual agency in the universe reveals to science the reign of universal law. And in every consciously free action the agent is conscious of obligation to do right, and therein is conscious of the imperative of absolute and universal

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 180-182.

law. Therein the absolute Reason speaks within the soul of the person and reveals itself in his conscience as authoritative. Every moral act has immediate relation to the law of God. It is only as we know that relation, it is only as thus the universal reveals itself in the particular that the essential significance of the act is known. There is philosophical truth in the bold personifications of the Bible, that the blood of Abel crieth unto God from the ground; and that the hire of the laborers who have reaped your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth; and the cries of them who have reaped are entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth. In the moral consciousness of every man is the revelation of God. In it appear in his consciousness the great realities of his immediate relation to the universal, the eternal and the absolute; of his membership in the universal moral system; of his having to do with God in obeying or disobeying the eternal law of divine wisdom and love which is the constitution of the universe. Man's conscience is the reflex of God's law and of the moral constitution of the universe.

The same is true of the rational idea of the Perfect. Beauty is the revelation in some concrete object of an ideal of perfection. An ideal can be realized only in the expression of rational truth and in conformity with rational law; with the norms or standards by which reason judges, as perfect or imperfect, all creations of thought and their realization whether in nature or art. Thus in every beautiful object, in every noble character, in every creation of art, the universal is essential in the significance of the particular and the absolute Reason is revealed.

Plato says that God geometrizes. He creates the universe as the expression of archetypal truth and in accordance with exact laws. For the very reason that he does so, he creates it beautiful. The beautiful is always the revelation of the ideally perfect; and this is a creation accordant with rational law and expressive of rational truth. If therefore God is a geometrician he is in a similar sense an artist. Therefore nature is not only the revelation of science but also of the ideal and the beautiful; and the science and the beauty are alike the revelation of the universal in the particular. In the universe science reads God's thoughts after him; art expresses those thoughts in human creations, as God has expressed them in the divine. In this sense there is truth in the seemingly extravagant assertion of Quinet: "The divine Spirit is the model which under one form or another poses eternally before the mind of the true artist."

True art must express the truth that is universal, in the finite, the particular and the concrete. If the artist attends solely to the universal, he creates nothing; his work is void. If he confines himself to the finite and particular, his creation reveals no ideal significance and has no beauty. The creations of true art, whether human or divine, are revelations of the universal truth of reason in the particular and the individual.

“What here as beauty has been shown,
In some hereafter will as truth be known.”¹

Man finds relations between himself and the universe which the senses do not perceive and which cannot be defined in the exact formulas of physical science. The sun, moon and stars, which the astronomer describes in the exact results of mathematical calculations, reveal to the soul a grandeur which no *Mécanique Céleste* defines, and which nevertheless without the underlying mathematical exactness would never have been revealed. The rainbow and the soft and changing tints of the clouds, which the optician analyzes in his prism, reveal to the heart a reality which prismatic analysis cannot reveal or define. And because the universe is full of beauty it is as truly apprehended in poetry as in science.

“The world is full of poetry; the air
Is living with its spirit; and the waves
Dance to the music of its melodies
And sparkle in its brightness.”

And what poetry finds in the universe is reality. It is the truths of the eternal Reason revealed in the forms of the finite. Poetry reading in the universe the ideals of the universal Reason finds reality, as truly as science does in reading its principles and laws. Each in its own way finds the truths which are universal revealed in the forms and combinations of finite individuals. The flowers which in their blended gold and purple repeat the colors of the morning sky, reveal in their beauty the ideals of the eternal mind. And when the flower “blossoming so meekly” is considered also in the light of science, when we see the wonders of wisdom in its organic structure and life, when we see it as the representative of its species in its relations to all the orders and genera of plant-life and in its place in the whole vegetable system, when we contemplate it as a product of all cosmic forces concentrated on it during its growth, building its complicated and delicate structure,

¹ “Was wir als Schönheit hier empfunden,
Wird einst als Wahrheit uns entgegen gehn.”

Schiller, *Die Künstler*, stanza 5.

painting it with harmonious colors, and infusing into it fragrance, our feelings rise above the æsthetic to the religious. Then we are ready to bow before the commonest plant, as Milton represents Eve bowing before the tree of knowledge, with

“low reverence done, as to the Power
That dwelt within, whose presence had infused
Into the plant sciential sap, derived
From nectar, drink of the gods;”

and we acknowledge that the words of Wordsworth are not extravagant:—

“To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.”

Here then is revealed a world within a world, a system within a system, the spiritual system veiled by the natural yet revealed through it; and therein revealing to the spiritual eye the true significance and worth of the natural. The heavens and the earth declare the glory of God. The revealed glory is indeed broken, obstructed and mingled with shadows and darkness, as the light of the sun is broken, obstructed and mingled with shadows and darkness by the earth and the opaque bodies on which it falls, and refracted by the media through which it passes. But the revelation, though never complete, is always progressive towards the complete expression of the archetypal thought of the absolute Reason, of the perfect wisdom and love of God.

So also as to the Good, as to all which may be acquired, used and enjoyed, reason judges by its unchanging principles what is worthy of the pursuit and enjoyment of a rational being and has true worth. In all human enterprise and acquisition it is only in the light of the truths, laws and ideals of reason that we can know what is the true good; and thus in the common pursuits of life the universal is revealed in the particular and all are in immediate connection with God, the universal Reason.

It has also been shown that the normal development of human reason issues in the necessary belief that the absolute Being exists. The existence of the absolute Being is a necessary postulate in all scientific thought and all rational knowledge. If any being exists, some eternal, unconditioned and all-conditioning Being must exist. If this is not so, rational knowledge is impossible. Thus the absolute and unconditioned is revealed in everything finite and conditioned.

Another point to be noticed is that the existence of God, the absolute Reason, is essential to the possibility of comprehending

all reality in the unity of a rational system. It is the function of thought to integrate or comprehend in a unity the objects which it apprehends and distinguishes; and it cannot rest till it comprehends all known reality in the unity of a rational system. This is possible only in the recognition of the absolute Reason as the ultimate ground of all reality and the universe as the manifestation or revelation of it. Without this, science remains incomplete, thought remains hopelessly disintegrated, and human reason, unable to solve its necessary problems, is exposed as incompetent, untrustworthy and deceiving.

A further evidence that God exists, found in the intellectual constitution of man, is the fact that theism alone gives the rational ground for the trustworthiness of the human mind and the reality of human knowledge.

All science rests on certain immense assumptions. As we have repeatedly had occasion to notice, science assumes that the universe is reasonable; that it admits of being known and accounted for by rational intelligence. The absurd cannot be real; the real cannot be absurd. Science also assumes the uniformity and continuity of nature; that the same complex of causes always produces the same effect. Nature is in this sense truthful and trustworthy; the same observed facts justify the same inference everywhere and always. Another assumption of science is that rational intelligence is the same throughout all space and time. Without these assumptions all rational knowledge of the universe is impossible, and the attempt by investigation to get a scientific knowledge of it is foolish. But how does this prove that the assumptions are valid? What warrant have we for believing that we must be capable of knowing? The answer is that the reality of knowledge is known in the act of knowing. But here again it is not pretended that we prove the reality of knowledge. Knowledge is verified only by knowledge. All we can do is to verify knowledge derived from one source, by one mental act or process, with knowledge of the same thing from other sources or by other mental acts or processes of knowing. Thus we come back to a primitive, immediate and ineradicable confidence in the trustworthiness of the human mind as rational and intelligent and in the reality of human knowledge. Whatever issues in universal skepticism must be rejected as false. Or, as Mr. Fiske expresses it: "It puts us to permanent intellectual confusion, and I do not see that any one has as yet alleged or is ever likely to allege a suffi-

cient reason for our accepting so dire an alternative.”¹ Science without God can go no farther. We cannot but accept as true what our whole mental constitution demands. We must accept that, the denial of which implies that man’s whole mental constitution is untrustworthy.

Theism gives us a reasonable ground for all these fundamental assumptions on which the possibility of science and the reality of knowledge rest. It affirms that the universe is grounded in absolute Reason, and in this rationality man as a personal being participates. Then he knows that every part of the universe open to his observation is the expression of rational intelligence like his own; that the universe is everywhere and always reasonable and intelligible; that nature as the expression of the thought of perfect reason is uniform and continuous, and that thus nature is truthful and trustworthy, its facts the data for legitimate and conclusive reasoning and its phenomena susceptible of rational explanation. Thus he finds an immovable basis for the reality of human knowledge. The conclusion is inevitable, that, if the universal Reason, which is the personal God, does not exist and man is not endowed with reason the same in kind, then we are put to permanent intellectual confusion. Thus the existence of God is necessary to the possibility of science and to the trustworthiness of the human reason and to the possibility of rational intelligence.²

The ultimate ground of the universe cannot be truth or thought abstracted from being. It must be Reason energizing, the personal Spirit, the personal God. A recent writer says: “The skeptic has always instinctively posited Being as the ground of thought. . . . Its medicine and cure is Speculative Philosophy, which, as immanent Logic, recognizes, not in Being but in Thought, the ground of all natural objects and of all conscious subjects; which sees that it is Thought from whose fulness Being is projected as an isolated radius or single moment, and that this single moment comes to actuality only in connection with all the other moments of the inclusive Totality.” But in seeming contradiction to this the writer says in the same article: “If only we were able to realize that Thought is the purest transfiguration and clearest self-explication of Being — that in it Being comes to itself by turning itself inside out and reflecting itself in itself; if we could become conscious of thought in its height and

¹ *The Destiny of Man*, p. 116.

² *Phil. Basis of Theism*, pp. 8, 82, 143–151, 182 f., 198–203.

depth and fulness, we could never question whether to this inmost thought belonged the outwardness of being. . . . He who has learned to think Thought as the coming to itself of Being can never doubt that the thinking subject belongs essentially to and is inseparable from Thought; without the thinking subject, Thought cannot be.”¹ This can be consistent with the passage first quoted only on the supposition that thought is the original and being the derivative from it. But if thought is the transfiguration and self-explication of being, then being as transfiguring and explicating itself is prior to the thought. If thought cannot be without a thinking subject, then the thought must be predicated of the thinker not the thinker predicated of the thought; it is the thinker who puts forth the thought not the thought which develops the thinker. The thought may reveal to himself the being who thinks, but it cannot create the being. The human mind must revolt from the Spinozism which postulates substance alone as the ground of the universe, or being that is indeterminate and identical with nothing. But the postulating of thought as the ground of all being is using words without intelligible meaning. It exemplifies the common error of Hegelianism in confounding real being and its energies and activities with processes of logic, and makes the ultimate ground of the universe to be a general notion or name. Thus it loses itself in a maze of logical processes and abstract words. In the present case the fallacy seems to be that because logically the definition of thinker includes and presupposes the idea of thought, therefore the thought must precede the thinker and be the ground of his being.

If thought could be the ground of the universe, we could no longer recognize a God who has any real being, but instead of God we should have only abstract thought and laws, subjective in human intelligence; for there would be no absolute Reason to which they could be referred; and this grandiose philosophy issues in dissolving the universe into a mental illusion, with no person that is the subject of the illusion.

The necessary conclusion is that the ultimate ground of the universe is not abstract substance or indeterminate being, nor is it abstract thought or intelligence; it is the two in unity, the absolute Reason, the eternal Spirit, the personal God. All finite beings are derived from him and reveal his thought and power. Material things and physical forces are products and manifestations of the eternal Spirit and reveal his power and intelligence,

¹ Goeschel in *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Jan. 1884, pp. 27, 24.

his wisdom and love. Thought is before all finite beings, but it is eternal in the absolute Being who is God. In him all truth, all law, all ideals of perfection, and all rational forms of worth which determine what is the true good, are eternal. Eternal in him are also the power which energizes and the wisdom and love which guide and characterize his energizing in the progressive realization of all archetypal truth, law, ideals and good in the finite universe and the progressive revelation thereby of himself as perfect in power, wisdom and love. So Bossuet, after speaking of mathematical and other necessary and universal truths of reason, says: "Were all which I see in nature destroyed, except myself, these principles would be preserved in my thought; and I see that they would be always true were I annihilated. If I now ask where and in what subject these eternal and immutable truths subsist, I am obliged to admit a Being in whom truth is eternal. It is from him that the truth in all the universe is derived. It is in him, in some manner incomprehensible by me, that I see these eternal verities. To see them is to turn myself to him who is immutably all truth, and to receive his light."¹

2. In the moral constitution of man as a free agent there is a revelation of God. The existence of God is necessary to any reasonable explanation of man's free will.

The evidence of the existence of God already found in man's rational constitution reappears in his constitution as free will. Man is constituted free by his rationality. By virtue of this he is able, in the light of reason and under the influence of rational motives, to determine the ends to which he will direct his energies and his exertion of them for the determined end, and thus is self-directive and self-exertive, and therein is free. Will is reason energizing, and reason is will potential. If, then, human reason and rational knowledge presuppose the existence of God, the absolute Reason, so also the will, which is free only as it is rational, must presuppose the same.

¹ *Traité de la Connaissance de Dieu et de soi même*, chap. iv. Œuvres, tome x. p. 82.

"The ultimate point on which all necessity" (must be) "rests is therefore a partnership of thought and being. What is an element of the thought must be conversely an immediate element of being. We could call this ultimate point, if the expression were not used in manifold meanings, the identity of thought and being." "Hegel calls the Ego the universal because the particular objects fall into his consciousness, and he thinks, because the man thinks the universal, that the man himself is the universal." — Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. ii. pp. 116, 122.

Further, if the universe is not ultimately grounded in freedom, it is impossible that freedom should ever come into it. If the universe is ultimately grounded in necessity, everything in it must also be under necessity. If it is grounded in the impersonal and the non-rational, rational persons could never have appeared in it. The appearance of a rational being would then be an effect without a cause.

A third evidence is found in the fact that the consciousness of free will involves the consciousness of moral responsibility and obligation. So soon as one knows that he has anything at his own free disposal, he is conscious that he is responsible for his disposal of it. When he is conscious that he is free to choose or refuse, he is conscious of responsibility for his action and of obligation to act reasonably. Here we are brought again to the full force of the ethical evidence of the existence of God. Man finds himself in a moral system under the government of God. In the sense of moral responsibility and obligation he is brought into immediate consciousness of the absolute moral law and of the presence and command of the absolute Reason. He hears within the voice of conscience : —

“As God’s most intimate Presence in the soul,
And his most perfect image in the world.”

In the consciousness of freedom man also becomes conscious of the world as hemming him in, limiting and hindering his action. As free he finds himself in conflict with necessity, imprisoned within physical limits and overpowered by physical forces, subjected to privation and evil, tempted to wrong-doing, conscious of himself as a sinner and the subject of self-condemnation. He feels the need of God, as a rescuer and helper in the free conduct of his life, to deliver him from subjection to necessity under nature, and to lift him to the higher sphere of spiritual life in which he may find harmony and peace and real freedom. In the consciousness of freedom man must assert and maintain it against restraining and constraining powers and against hindrances within himself to carrying into effect all that reason commands and the will determines to do. And this reveals to him his need of divine help and drives him to God for redemption. Religion is a necessity to bring into reconciliation man’s consciousness of himself as free and yet as dependent on nature, held down and resisted by its forces, tempted to sin and plunged into evil.

Finally, in his choice of God as the supreme object of trust and

service, the man finds himself inspired with divine influence and quickened to new and spiritual life ; in faith in God his spirit glows with universal love. As in his own reason he participates in the light of the divine reason, so in the new spiritual life he participates in the love of God, and thus knows in his own spirit what is highest in the divine. And complying with an apostle's injunction, "Keep yourselves in the love of God," he overcomes the world, he wins the victory over its opposing forces, he finds reconciliation and peace, and the freedom wherewith Christ maketh free.

3. That man is constituted for the knowledge and service of God is evident from his susceptibility to spiritual motives and emotions. God reveals himself to man through his feeling.

A boy was flying his kite at dusk, and in the gathering darkness it soared out of sight. A by-stander told him it was lost ; but the boy replied : "No, I feel it pull." And from beyond our sight the invisible things of God have hold on us and in our hearts we feel them pull.

In a former chapter we have seen that the susceptibilities to motives and emotions are the sensitive points through which what is without us can affect us and make us aware of its presence. The sunshine falling on the eye reveals itself as light ; vibrations of air falling on the ear reveal themselves as sound ; falling on any other parts of the body they cannot make these peculiar revelations of themselves in the consciousness. So the other senses and all natural appetites, desires and affections are sensitive spots through which outward objects can reveal themselves in the consciousness. God and the system of spiritual beings are man's spiritual environment. His susceptibilities to rational and spiritual motives and emotions are the points of spiritual sensitivity through which God and spiritual beings can make themselves felt and present themselves as spiritual in the consciousness. To change the figure, they are the windows and doors through which the light of the eternal Reason can shine in and the vitalizing warmth and air of heaven can quicken the spirit.

For this reason knowledge comes in and through feeling ; and in the primitive and implicit consciousness, belief, feeling and preference exist indiscriminated together. The same is true of the primitive spiritual consciousness, in which beliefs and questionings, fears and hopes, aspirations and affections, purposes and preferences lie indiscriminated together, a seed-plot full of di-

verse seeds, each of which in the process of germination will come to light in its specific character. It is this primitive spiritual consciousness which Wordsworth presents : —

“ those obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,
Fallings from us, vanishings;
Blank misgivings of a creature
Moving about in worlds not realized,
High instincts before which our mortal nature
Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised;
. . . those first affections,
Those shadowy recollections,
Which, be they what they may,
Are yet the fountain-light of all our day,
Are yet a master-light of all our seeing;
Uphold us, cherish and have power to make
Our noisy years seem moments in the being
Of the eternal Silence; truths that wake
To perish never.”

We are now to examine what are the susceptibilities to religious motives and emotions in the constitution of man, and to consider whether these give reasonable grounds for believing that man is constituted for the knowledge and service of God and that God manifests himself in human consciousness through them.

God is the absolute Spirit. The feelings which are distinctively religious are those arising in response to man's conscious relation to a divinity. They will therefore have reference to the divinity as absolute Being, and also as personal Spirit. It has already been shown that in all religions some traces of the consciousness of the divinity in both these aspects have been found.

We begin with feelings responsive to the presence of the infinite and absolute.

Man must have been far advanced before the idea of the absolute or infinite was expressed in language or apprehended in thought. But the reality denoted by the words must have impressed itself on him from the beginning. When man found himself naked, without shelter or defense, without tools or weapons amid the mighty powers of nature, he must have been conscious of the presence of beings and agencies beyond his comprehension and transcending his power. Müller in explaining the origin of the sense of the infinite supposes a man living on a high mountain, or in a vast plain, or on a coral island surrounded by the sea and sky. The supposition is unnecessary. Wherever primitive man may have dwelt, he found himself in

the midst of agencies, whose power so far as he could see was uncontrolled and unlimited; and these must have impressed him with some sense of the superhuman, the immeasurable, the infinite as the ever-present background of his life.

One sentiment awakened would be wonder. Plato says that wonder is the origin of philosophy. He thinks that he was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris, knowing all the secrets of the gods and bearing their messages, was the daughter of Thaummas (Wonder).¹ It is a feeling in which the soul responds to the presence of the absolute or infinite, and a presentiment of the idea not yet formed.² We see it still in the freshness with which life and nature present themselves to a child and in the wonder awakened by it. In the cradle-song, —

“Twinkle, twinkle, little star,
How I wonder what you are,”

the wondering child utters in view of the starry heavens one of the feelings in which religion began. And in its craving for something above its earthly life it delights in myths and fairy-stories, peopling the earth and heavens with superhuman beings, whose place no history, however interesting, not even Robinson Crusoe or other fictions of strange adventures of men can fill. J. S. Mill, with all his hard and practical views of life, intimates as occasion of alarm that in this generation the young are for the first time growing up unromantic.

So in the primitive men there must have been a sense of the infinite in the feelings before the idea was defined in thought or named in language; a sense of a presence in nature above and beyond all that was perceived through the senses, above and beyond man himself. In the progress of man there was wonder at the vastness of the world before geometry; poetry before science; the sense of obligation felt as law in the heart before the law graven on the tables of stone or in any way formulated in words; spontaneous religion before theological definition; and in numberless forms the dumb consciousness of the absolute before the idea was defined or even named. This is set forth by Schiller: “What first after thousands of years had passed the aging reason found out, from the beginning lay revealed to the

¹ Theætetus, 155.

² We need in English a word corresponding with the German “*ahnung*.” “Presentiment” refers only to what is future. The German word denotes any intimation of reality in any obscure and indefinite feeling or state of consciousness, without reference to time.

childlike understanding in the symbols of the beautiful and the grand. Its gracious form called us to love virtue, a tender feeling rose up against vice, before a Solon wrote the law which slowly urges on the languishing blossoms. Before the bold idea of eternal space presented itself to the thinker's mind, who that looked up into the starry heavens did not already feel a presentiment of it?"¹

The feeling responsive to the absolute as it is always manifesting itself in the universe is not mere wonder. In the presence of the transcendent and resistless powers of nature, the wonder must have deepened into awe.

Another feeling awakened must have been fear. Humboldt says: "It lies deep in the troubled mind of man, in his gloomy view of things, that the unexpected and extraordinary excite only fear, not hope or joy."² It is a remark of Comte that the most terrible feeling of which man is capable is consternation, the feeling arising when the uniform order of nature seems to be interrupted. Such is the peculiar feeling occasioned by an earthquake, when all which we have regarded as most stable is shaken, and the man feels himself torn from his fixed moorings and helpless in the power of unknown, unmeasured and incalculable forces. This feeling must have been common among the primitive men. Scarcely knowing a uniform course of nature, ignorant of the causes of almost all changes, everything must have been to them strange and incalculable. Surrounded by savage beasts, amid the primeval forest which they could not cut down, hemmed in on the uncultivated and intractable earth by impassable rivers, mountains and seas, suffering the extremes of heat and cold, trembling before the lightning and the thunder, smitten by the force of fierce and invisible winds and by the rain, the snow and the hail, prostrated by unseen and unaccountable powers in disease and sinking in death, they must often have felt terror and consternation at the resistless powers acting upon and about them.

¹ "Was erst, nachdem Jahrtausende verflossen,
Die alternde Vernunft erfand,
Lag im Symbol des Schönen und des Grossen,
Voraus geoffenbart dem kindischen Verstand.
Ihr holdes Bild hiess uns die Tugend lieben,
Ein zarter Sinn hat vor dem Laster sich gesträubt,
Eh noch ein Solon das Gesetz geschrieben,
Das matte Blüthen langsam treibt.
Eh vor des Denkers Geist der kühne
Begriff des ew'gen Raumes stand —
Wer sah hinauf zur sternenhöhle,
Der ihn nicht ahnend schon empfand?" — *Die Künstler.*

² *Cosmos*, vol. i. p. 111, Otté's Translation.

And the sense of the absolute is always present to man in the mystery of the universe. Mystery presses close upon the primitive man; it envelops him like a fog. As he advances towards civilization, though the mystery recedes, it never passes out of sight. If the fog lifts a little, a larger circle of it is seen. Every advance which discloses a larger area of the known, discloses also a proportionally larger horizon of the unknown. Through all his progress from savagery to the highest civilization man has always the mystery of the infinite and the absolute in full view. The more the finite universe is disclosed to his knowledge, the larger is the horizon along the circuit of which he looks on the mystery of the absolute, and the grander his appreciation of its significance. Hence Müller does not speak too strongly when he says of the perception of the infinite: "From the first flutter of human consciousness that perception underlies all the perceptions of our senses, all our imaginations, all our concepts and every argument of our reason. It may be buried for a time beneath the fragments of our finite knowledge, but it is always there, and if we dig deep enough we shall always find that buried seed, as supplying the living sap to the fibres and feeders of all true faith."¹

There is therefore no reason to expect that man in the growth of knowledge and culture will ever outgrow his religion. The religious sentiment has a perennial root in his wonder, awe and fear in the presence of the infinite and the absolute. Man wonders at first at the extraordinary and the incomprehensible. As in his progress the unknown becomes known, in all which is known he wonders at its continuity and uniformity, its order and law; and in all that is explained, he wonders at the significance disclosed in the explanation. This all-encompassing mystery, enlarging its circuit with the enlarging area opened to human knowledge, can be neither removed, nor transcended and explained by physical science. In its attempts to explain even the physical universe by empirical methods and to comprehend it by physical agents and processes and their factual sequences, physical science ultimately breaks down in contradictions, and reveals its own insufficiency, and the necessity of recognizing spiritual powers and a spiritual system transcending matter and its forces and processes, and transcending the factual sequences and the empirical methods of physical science.

Of such highers powers man is conscious in himself; for he is conscious of himself as person or spirit. As spirit he is conscious

¹ Origin and Growth of Religion, p. 48.

of himself as supernatural, as in some sort a miracle-working power. As Goethe says: "Man alone can effect the impossible." When confronted and confounded by what is impossible to sense and empirical thought and to the unconscious forces of nature, as by a dead wall which he cannot scale, he looks on himself as a rational spirit and sees himself as a power that can transcend it. In his reason he can know what it is impossible for sense and empirical thought about sensible objects to know; in his freedom he can do what it is impossible for the unconscious forces of nature to do. He is above nature, supernatural. While he has not power, even as spiritual, fully to comprehend what the absolute Being is, and can never transcend the horizon of the mysterious, yet he can know the absolute as absolute Spirit; he can recognize spiritual energies and spiritual truths, laws, ideals and ends pervading and regulating the physical system; he can comprehend the universe as the progressive expression in the finite of the archetypal thought of the inexhaustible wisdom and love of the absolute Spirit; and thus he attains a rational explanation why it is that man's knowledge of the universe must be always bounded by mystery.

We proceed to inquire what spiritual sentiments in man are responsive to the presence of the absolute Spirit. For the absolute is not an abstraction and cannot be revealed as such. It is revealed as absolute Being. Hence it is only in view of the concrete realities of the universe that the sense of the absolute and infinite is felt, as of absolute Power and Being beneath all that is known as finite. In man as himself spirit, God is revealed as absolute Spirit.

The sentiments responsive to the presence of the absolute Spirit are, first, those motives and emotions which correspond with the four fundamental ideas or norms of reason; the true, the right, the perfect and the good. *beautiful*

The first class of these is the scientific motives and emotions, the desire to know the truth and joy in its discovery, not for its uses and gains but for the truth itself. It is the yearning of the soul to know the secret of the universe, to find its origin and author, its significance and laws and end, and to comprehend it in the unity of a rational system. It is the longing of man that the mute forces of nature would break their eternal silence and tell him whence they are and for what end they work and rest not through all the ages, and to what destiny they are bearing him. It is his longing as he gazes wistfully on the firmament to see that

“All heaven bursts her starry floors,
And strews her light below,
And deepens on and up,”

till it reveals the secret of the universe. Professor Tyndall tells us that from the beginning man has been seeking the origin of things, and that the desire impelling to this search has been the great motive to intellectual activity and scientific investigation. And Mr. Tylor says: “Man’s craving to know the causes at work in each event he witnesses, the reasons why each state of things he surveys is such as it is and no other, is no product of high civilization, but a characteristic of his race down to its lowest stage. Among rude savages it is already an intellectual appetite, whose satisfaction claims many of the moments not engrossed by war, or sport or sleep.”¹

Hence the sense of intellectual suffocation under materialism and atheism, in the consciousness of the restriction of the range and freedom of the intellect and the suppression of its energy. Atheism belittles man and the sphere of his knowledge. It was a great enlargement of the range of human thought when astronomy burst the crystal firmament and opened the depths of space crowded with suns. But if science shall shut out God and all spiritual realities, then it contracts the sphere of thought more than it had enlarged it; then science itself comes down on us as a solid firmament, and shuts us closely in. A solid firmament, with God and heaven above it, his law and love and redeeming grace revealing him beneath, is a grander theatre of thought, aspiration and endeavor, in which the soul can expatiate with a larger freedom and a nobler development, than the open and sun-thronged vast of space in which no supreme reason guides, no divine love rules, no aspiration to know God and to be like him inspires the animated clods which for a little time eat, drink and propagate, enjoy and suffer, and then crumble into dust. Then man himself is, as Pindar calls him, “a dream about a shadow;”² and we must adopt as scientific truth the pathetic words of Burke after the death of his son: “What shadows we are and what shadows we pursue.” Professor Tyndall in his Belfast Address tells of a man who said to him: “Did I not believe that an Intelligence is at the heart of things, my life on earth would be intolerable.” The author of *The Keys of the Creeds* says that he has had himself, and that it is not unusual

¹ Primitive Culture, vol. i. p. 332.

² Pindar, Pyth. viii. 135.

for persons to have such intense longing to know the secrets of the universe as to feel almost irresistibly prompted to hasten the termination of life in order to penetrate, unrestrained by the limitations of sense, the world that lies beyond.¹ And ingenuous minds, when they have found their belief in God giving way, have in many instances given utterance to the deepest sadness as they have seen the shades of their prison-house closing on them and the light of all their day shut out by the dead walls in which they were finding themselves immured.

This undying and urgent desire to know the secret of the universe is inherent in the constitution of man and is one of the roots of his religiousness. Through it God reveals himself in the human soul as rational Spirit, awakening the spontaneous and ineradicable belief that the universe is rationally intelligible and explicable, and the inextinguishable desire to know its rational ground, law, unity and design; a desire which can be satisfied only in knowing God, the absolute Reason, whose wisdom and love the universe expresses.

The next class of feelings in which the spirit of man is responsive to the presence of the absolute Spirit is the moral sentiments; the sense of obligation, remorse for wrong-doing, and the peace which suffuses the soul in the consciousness of doing right. Schenkel says: "In the conscience the human spirit is conscious of itself, but of itself in its relation to God. It is the place in the human spirit in which it finds in itself the absolute Spirit, in which it is conscious of itself in that."² In the moral sentiments man feels the pressure of absolute law, the imperative of an absolute authority. As he not merely knows his connection with the physical system but also feels it in the weight of his body, in its resistance to his action, in cold and heat, so he not only knows his connection with the spiritual system and with God but he feels it in all his moral sentiments. This appears not only in the sense of obligation but also in the prevalent consciousness of sin and guilt. The prominence in the religions of the world of acts of penance and sacrifice, of expiation and propitiation, reveal a prevalent consciousness of guilt and a fearful looking for of judgment. The worshipers feel their immediate relation to the divinity as their moral lawgiver and judge. Lenormant thinks that we can also trace in these religions a consciousness of the need of redemption from guilt and sin, and a hope of it. He refers to the common mythical conception of a young god appear-

¹ Pages 4, 5.

² Quoted by Voigt, *Fundamentaldogmatik*, p. 73.

ing as savior and mediator, allying himself with man and consummating his work of salvation by passing through suffering and death. While admitting that these myths have a reference to changes in nature he adds: "One cannot but acknowledge that they also include . . . a feeble reflex of the divine promise made to man immediately after the fall. The Christian cannot afford to despise a single one of these intuitions, which are vague and incomplete, but not the less providential for that reason, and which shine out here and there amid the darkness of paganism. It is always this expectation of a redeemer, this aspiration toward a higher spiritual law, toward the reign of a juster and more merciful god, which was never completely extinguished in the souls of the nations crushed beneath the weight of bloody, materialistic and fatalistic religions."¹ Thus, in the moral motives and emotions, is a root in the human constitution of the religiousness of man.

Man's constitutional religiousness has a root also in the feelings which pertain to the idea of the Perfect.

Man admires in his fellow-man power and excellence of any kind when it approaches to his ideal of perfection. He admires courage, fortitude, energy, self-forgetfulness and self-sacrifice, magnanimity and gentleness in the use of power, the whole assemblage of qualities which constitute heroism.

In the earliest times physical strength and agility were most admired, and the strong, swift man was the hero. In all ages men admire power of intellect and achievement, irrespective of moral character. The man of power is the hero and hero-worship never ceases. The weak gravitate toward the strong; the admiration passes over into reverence and the reverence into trust and service. The powerful man has always a following. In this way the Nimrods, the mighty hunters of men, command adherents who do their bidding in their schemes of self-exaltation, and while assisting them to desolate the earth, are themselves led to destruction.

But as man advances in development, the intellect gradually

¹ *Beginnings of History*, pp. 170, 171, Trans.

Rev. Dr. W. Ashmore, a missionary in China, in a recent public address as reported, testified of his long experience as to common ground in natural religion between the Christian missionary and the heathen about him. He testified to the belief of the Chinese in divine mercy, and to some vague idea of redemption from the divine punishment of wrong-doing. He expressed the conviction that the heathen have not only the law of nature, but to a certain degree the gospel of nature.

rises above the physical strength, and the moral more and more takes precedence of both. Then wisdom and incorruptible integrity become essential elements in the hero. Man admires heroism in virtue. This indeed he has always done; but the virtue becomes more and more prominent and is coming to be demanded as essential. Man admires the martyr who values truth and righteousness more than life. He admires the good man in the beauty and nobleness, the purity and sweetness, the beneficent self-devotion and energy, the truthfulness and strong integrity of his character. In the progress of man he more and more demands these qualities in the person whom he is to admire as a hero. This admiration may easily pass over into reverence, trust and service. And he naturally ascribes in full perfection to the divinity the qualities which he admires as perfections in men. In the lower stages of development physical strength and agility are most admired and the strong man is the hero; then the god may be Thor with his hammer. As he advances heroes of all kinds may find place in his pantheon. But in the progress of man he comes to appreciate intellectual skill and moral excellence; and at last forms the idea of God as the all-perfect Spirit.

Man feels also æsthetic admiration of the beauty and grandeur of nature. In the emotion of sublimity, in which some suggestion of the infinite and absolute in its mysterious grandeur comes upon the soul, the admiration passes into awe. In the emotion of the beautiful it is an ideal of the rational spirit which is revealed. To feel the beauty of the waving wheat is to be conscious of other interest in it than that it is food for the body. The emotion of beauty does not unfold into the religious and imply a consciousness of God so obviously as do those which we have considered. Yet the religion of the Greeks was largely a religion of beauty. In beauty of form and of combinations in nature and in the human body they saw the divine. And in every age admiration of beauty is closely akin to reverence and adoration, and may lead to it. It is mistaken for it, or perhaps is really an obscure form of religious reverence, in those who

“Worship nature in the hill and valley,
Not knowing what they love.”

There is a philosophical ground for this. Beauty is the revelation of an ideal of perfection; and the ideally perfect has no meaning except as related to some standard of truth and law in the reason. And because beauty is unintelligible except as manifesting an ideal, all beauty implies the looking on us through

nature of the rational mind that pervades all nature. The emotions of the beautiful are a response in the soul of man to a revelation of God. And as all ideals of the beautiful as well as all principles of truth and laws of action are eternal and archetypal in the absolute Reason, it was with true philosophical insight as well as with true religious fervor that Augustine apostrophized God: "O Beauty, ancient yet ever new, why have I found thee so late?"

The fourth fundamental idea of reason, the Good, arises on occasion of man's experience of pleasure and pain, of joy and sorrow. Here perhaps his most remarkable characteristic is his dissatisfaction and discontent. He is always reaching out for something beyond what he has. In the life of selfish desire, however successful in his pursuit, he is never satisfied; however great his acquisitions he has never enough. Desire is an uneasiness in the sense of want. But the desire is intensified in the exertion to gain its object; its gratification is but fuel to a fire; it grows by what it feeds on. For this reason it can never be satisfied; its uneasiness can never be removed. Therefore if the man, who lives only to gratify selfish desire, is not disappointed of the objects of his pursuit, he is disappointed in them; vanity of vanities, all is vanity, is found imprinted on all his acquisitions, and pessimism becomes his legitimate theory of life. Philosophy, poetry and religion in all ages have united in declaring man's dissatisfaction and discontent, in bewailing the emptiness and transitoriness of earthly good, and in picturing man as a stranger and a pilgrim on earth. But the brutes are contented with their earthly condition and satisfied with the gratification of their sensuous wants. "Doth the wild ass bray when he hath grass? or loweth the ox over his fodder?"

In this discontent with his condition and acquisitions, this felt insufficiency of all which satisfies the natural desires, we see man's obscure consciousness that he has powers for a higher sphere of action and capacities for a higher good; that he is related to something that transcends sense and the limits of an earthly life. In the development of animal life we see the creature moved by impulses the meaning of which it does not understand, but which are necessary to the preservation and growth of the animal or the continuance of the species. Such is the uneasiness impelling a bird to build its nest, and the uneasiness which afterwards impels it to brood on the eggs; the uneasiness which impels a duck to go into the water, and the new-born

mammal to suck. Hunger is the witness in the sensorium to the law that in organic beings food is necessary to repair waste and to sustain life. So in the spirit of man uneasiness and restlessness amid the satisfaction of sensuous and physical wants are impulses to that which is essential to the spiritual life; and this can be satisfied only in communion and harmony with God. Religion has root in the contradiction between the insufficiency of earthly and sensuous good and the aspirations of the spirit for what is untransitory, spiritual and divine. It has root in man's discontent, and is inherent in his personality; it is a necessary result of his being a spirit or person who distinguishes himself from nature and knows himself above it.

An example of this spiritual instinct is the aspiration for existence after death and the spontaneous belief in it. The senses show that all that have organic life, from man to the lowest fungus, die. Yet man longs and hopes and expects to live beyond the grave. He may try hard to convince himself that no such existence awaits him; but the belief of it or at least the hope or the fear of it persists. He thinks himself convinced that there is no existence and no righteous retribution for sin after death; he persuades himself that it is only

“The giant-shadow of our awful fear
Upon the mirror of our conscience thrown.”¹

But before he is aware his thought is again struggling to penetrate the dimness of the hereafter and his soul is gloomed with the shadow of eternity.

“Who forged that other influence,
That heat of inward evidence,
By which he doubts against the sense?”

“Here sits he shaping wings to fly;
His heart forbodes a mystery;
He names the name Eternity.”

Connected with the idea of the Good are the feelings of self-respect, of honor and shame, of the worthy and unworthy. Even the desire of happiness must be estimated in the light of reason, and enjoyment and its sources judged as worthy or unworthy of the pursuit of a rational being. In the light of reason man is ashamed of himself for seeking unworthy objects and finding enjoyment in them. He rejects with scorn the greatest pleasures,

¹ “Der Riesenschatten unsrer eignen Schrecken
Im hohlen Spiegel der Gewissensangst.”
Schiller, *Resignation*.

if they are derived from unworthy sources or are obtained by unworthy actions or on unworthy conditions. Tertullian, replying to slanders commonly reported among the heathen that the Christians mingled the blood of infants with their sacramental bread and committed incest at their solemnities, and that they believed that for so doing they would be rewarded with eternal bliss, said with noble scorn, that the eternal blessedness of heaven is not worth having at the price of committing these crimes.¹ In this sense of nobleness and worth is the consciousness of spiritual being above nature and of relationship with the divine.

Humor seems to carry in it some consciousness of man's spiritual superiority alike to the joys and sorrows of his merely natural and earthly life. In the light of reason and the consciousness of spiritual capacities and powers he can lift himself above himself; he condemns himself for wrong-doing, he despises himself for meanness, he laughs at himself for folly. Humor is that which, always with tender sympathy for man, sees something to smile at in human life; it sees the comedy mingling with tragedy in all conditions. When we contrast man's spiritual being, his divine relations, his immortal destiny with the emptiness of the joys of sense and the transitoriness of his earthly life, we see that his eagerness in pursuing these transitory things, his anxiety lest he fail to attain them, his triumph when dazzled with the shimmer and glamour of success, his anguish at disappointment and loss are out of all proportion to the importance of the objects. And in wrong-doing there is also folly along with the wickedness. It is in some consciousness of man's spiritual superiority to the life of sense that man sees the humorous side of life. As a mother, from the height of her superior knowledge and with all a mother's tenderness, looks down on her little child and sees something to smile at, not only in its childish pleasures but also in its perplexities and its sorrows and even in its faulty deeds, so the spirit of man in its humor, conscious of spiritual powers, relations and destiny, looks down from that height on the eager life of man with smiles which are not far from tears.

It must be added that in all the emotions pertaining to the true, the right, the perfect and the good, there is a revelation within the human consciousness, not only of rational spirit, but also of spirit that is absolute as well as rational. This appears in the strength and boundlessness of the aspirations and the intensity of the emotions. In science man is impelled to explore

¹ Apologeticus, § 8.

the height

the universe to its outmost bounds and its inmost constitution, outward through all space and backward and forward through all time, and with an intensity which fears not arctic cold nor torrid heat nor pestilential climates; which risks and sometimes sacrifices life in pursuit of knowledge. In the moral emotions are fears and aspirations reaching into eternity, intensity of shame and remorse driving to despair, and blessedness in doing right which fills the soul as the sunshine fills the concave of the firmament with solid light. And as to the perfect and the good, man aspires to nothing less than to be like God and to be blessed eternally with him. Pflaiderer says: "Mosaism has an absolute principle of morals: 'Be ye holy for I am holy.' The basis of the Old Testament morality is the belief in a holy God. In the holiness of God lies his exaltation above the finite and the natural, above all beginning, changing and passing away; in it lies the absolute."¹ And Kant holds that in the practical reason man has immediate consciousness of God revealing himself in the moral law within him. In the moral feelings the imperative of the absolute Reason is revealed and felt within the consciousness of man. The same is equally true of each of the other fundamental ideas of reason. In the scientific motives and emotions connected with the rational intuition of the necessary and universal principles regulative of all thinking, man finds revealed in his own consciousness the absoluteness and unchangeableness and universality of the eternal Reason. In the ideals of the perfect the soul thrills with æsthetic joy in the presence of beauty, is awed before the sublime, aspires to a perfection above all that is seen on earth, and thus is conscious of a perfection and a glory that is divine. And in our sense of honor and worth we measure what is good by standards above the mere quantity of enjoyment, above all empirical measurements; we find within us standards of unchanging reason in which we are conscious of the presence of the Reason which is absolute and divine.

The absolute Spirit reveals himself in the feelings, not only as absolute Reason, the eternal seat of all truth, law, perfection and good, but also as Reason energizing, as the almighty Will that creates and sustains the universe and reveals in it his power. Responsive to this is man's feeling of dependence, his consciousness of weakness, limitation, insufficiency, of need of one wiser and mightier than himself, a Father in Heaven. Heinrich Heine said: "I am no child; I do not want a heavenly Father any

¹ Moral und Religion, § 19, p. 32.

more." Yet in the last days of his out-door life, in the sad sense of dependence and need, he falls at the feet of the Venus of Milo, his loved ideal of beauty, sees her looking on him with divine pity, and seems to hear her response: "Dost thou not see that I have no arms and therefore cannot help thee?"¹ Comical indeed, and yet the deepest tragedy; a soul awakening from its self-sufficiency to the sense of dependence and need, and, with the revelation of the God of love lying like the sunlight all about him, crying for help to an illusion, "a false creation proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain."

Schleiermacher gives the sense of dependence as the one root of religion; as in fact being religion. But this is impossible. One may have the most urgent sense of complete dependence without any religious feeling towards the object on which he depends; as a shipwrecked sailor clinging to a floating spar. Religion implies not merely the sense of dependence, but of dependence on some power beyond nature and man. And so far as even this is the sense of dependence on power only, it is but one among many religious feelings. Religion is the response of the soul to the presence of the absolute Spirit; to the spiritual and the personal in the absolute, and not merely to the power. It is consciousness of needing the guidance of wisdom and the upholding of love, and not merely the support of power. The latter, when alone, is the consciousness only of being helpless in the grasp of unintelligent and resistless fate; it therefore lacks elements essential in the religious consciousness and is not properly called religion.

Another feeling in which religion has root is the peculiar impression under which the soul thrills at the contact or the imagination of contact with spirits from the world unseen. The imagined appearance of a visitant from the spiritual world fills the mind with awe. "In thoughts from the visions of the night, when deep sleep falleth on men, fear came upon me and trembling, which made all my bones to shake. Then a spirit passed before my face; the hair of my flesh stood up."² It is not the dread of danger. The same man might march to the cannon's mouth without trembling. It is a peculiar awe under which the man quivers at the approach of the spiritual world. Warriors, who never feared in battle, quake at their own fancies when they fancy they see a spirit.

One cannot even hear of such apparitions without a peculiar

¹ Stedman, *Victorian Poets*, pp. 18, 19.

² Job iv. 13.

terror, such as no other cause excites. That keen observer of human nature, Sir Walter Scott, remarked that when any company are in an evening listening to stories of ghosts, however convinced that the stories are false, they instinctively draw their chairs nearer together and exhibit signs of awe. The idea of the unseen world, entering the mind through the imagination, makes the soul quiver at its coming. So in Tennyson's Harold, when the kingdom has been put under an interdict by the Pope, Harold is represented as saying : —

“ Fool and wise I fear
This curse and scorn it.”

The very thought of a spiritual presence, when vivid, produces a similar impression. Experiences in thoughts and visions of the night analogous to those recorded ages ago in the book of Job, are not uncommon now. One wakes from deep sleep; in the darkness, the loneliness, the silence, he thinks of the world of spirits, its reality, its nearness, his own inevitable approach to it; he thinks of the great God looking on him out of the dark; he imagines spirits of the dead near him. Who has not felt at such hours the peculiar and thrilling awe of the unseen and spiritual world?

This is why proximity to the dead inspires men with fear, and a corpse, silent and still, daunts the soul that never feared the living. Hugh Miller in his boyhood was one night shut up by the rising tide in a cave. He says: “The corpse of a drowned man had been found on the beach about a month previous, some forty yards from where we lay. I had examined the body, as young people are apt to do, a great deal too curiously for my peace; and though I had never done the poor nameless seaman any harm, I could not have suffered more from him during that melancholy night, had I been his murderer. Sleeping or waking he was constantly before me. The near neighborhood of a score of living bandits would have inspired less horror than the recollection of that one seaman.”¹

There is often power in a single word, striking the soul's sensitiveness to spiritual realities, to rouse to intense emotion. Hannah More relates that a lady just returned from a ball saw the word Eternity on an open page on her toilet-table; its significance rushed upon her mind, awakening her spiritual susceptibilities, and this was the beginning of an earnest spiritual life.

This power on the spiritual susceptibilities exerted by the very

¹ My Schools and Schoolmasters, p. 77.

thought, the imagination even, of spiritual realities is the reason why superstition finds currency among the ignorant and those who are wrongly taught. This is no argument against the reality of God and the spiritual world, but is a decisive argument for it. It is only the deepest sentiments of the heart which can be aroused by a fancy. The bare suspicion that her absent child is in danger, even a dream of it, may rob the mother of peace. It simply shows how strong and true the instinct is, although, on hurrying home, she may find that, in the particular case, the danger fancied or dreamed of was unreal. So the ease with which superstition is propagated and the power which even through the imagination it exerts, are proof that the spiritual sensibilities are strong and true in revealing God and the spiritual world, though man err in his judgments in the interpretation of them in detail.

4. The foregoing analysis proves that the spontaneous belief in God has root in the constitution of man; that therefore it gives a real and rational knowledge of God; and if not, then falsehood is ingrained in the whole personal constitution of man, and knowledge is impossible.

It was ascertained in the outset that belief in a divinity is a common characteristic of humanity, and is spontaneous, powerful and persistent. From this it was inferred that it is rooted in the constitution of man.

We have now analyzed the human constitution and have found that this spontaneous belief has root in the personality of man and in all its capacities and powers. It has root in the reason and is involved in all its fundamental ideas; it has root in the free will; and roots ramified through the sensibilities. The belief springs not from a single tap-root, but from roots complicated and ramifying through man's entire personality. In unfolding man's consciousness of personality, from whatever side, this hidden element of belief in God comes to light, and reveals that its presence is indispensable to the completed consciousness. So Julius Müller says: "In the depths of our own self-consciousness, as its concealed background, the God-consciousness reveals itself in us; the descent into our own inmost spirit is at the same time an ascent to God. Every deep reflection on ourselves breaks through the crust of the mere world-consciousness, which separates us from the inmost truth of our being, and brings us face to face with him in whom we live and move and have our being."¹ Tertullian seems to have had the same thought in his

¹ Christian Doctrine of Sin, bk. i. part i. chap. ii.

mind when he said: "This is the crowning guilt of men, that they will not recognize One of whom they cannot possibly be ignorant. Would you have the proof from the works of his hand, so numerous and so great? . . . Or would you rather have it from the testimony of the soul itself? Though under the oppressive bondage of the body, led astray by bad teaching, weakened by lusts and passions, in slavery to false gods; yet whenever the soul comes to itself as out of a surfeit or a sleep or a sickness and attains something of its natural soundness, it speaks of God; using no other word because this is the peculiar name of the true God. 'Great God!' 'Good God!' 'May God grant it;' are the words on every lip. The soul also calls on God as Judge: 'God sees,' 'To God I commend it,' 'God will repay.' O noble witness of the soul, Christian by nature."¹ That belief in God and a divine law wells up spontaneously from the depths of the human spirit seems to be taught in Deuteronomy; "For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go for us to heaven and bring it to us, that we may hear it and do it? Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea for us and bring it to us, that we may hear it and do it? But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it."²

To our senses the earth does not seem to be one of the heavenly bodies belonging to the solar system; yet when we know it as it really is, we know it as one of them, moving among them, and like them drawn by the sun's attraction and shining with its light. So in the life of sense man does not see himself as belonging to the spiritual world; yet when he knows himself as he really is, he knows himself in the spiritual system, one among the many there, luminous with the light of the universal Reason, moving amid the grandeurs and glories of eternity, and touched at every point of his personality by the drawing of God.

We see therefore the mistake of those divines who with Schleiermacher maintain that this spontaneous belief in a God has its origin in the single feeling of dependence. For some implicit consciousness of God is involved not only in this feeling but also in all the rational motives and emotions; and also in the practical side of man's personality, as free will acting under moral responsibility. They also err who find the consciousness

¹ Apologeticus, § 17.

² Chap. xxx. 11-14.

of God in the emotional and practical sides of personality, but exclude it from the intellectual. For reason scrutinizes man's belief in God and affirms it to be a rational and reasonable belief, in fact the attestation of reason itself to the existence of God. Reason finds that in all its acts its own trustworthiness depends on the reality of the absolute Reason, and its assent to this reality is implied. And the mistake of resting this belief on feeling and the practical side of man's personality to the exclusion of reason is fatal. If religious faith has no root in intelligence, if it is not an outcome of reason, grounded in its principles and confirmed by its scrutiny, it is powerless in the face of skepticism and of too little value to be worth contending for. "The entire surrender of the soul which is the very essence of religion, can only be distinguished from superstition when regarded as in the highest sense a rational act. On any other supposition religion must be viewed as a form of mental disease."¹ A prominent preacher says in a published sermon: "The ordinary functions of thought require to be replaced by a revelation that is from above. . . . When once it has been allowed by the advocates of the gospel that reason is an incompetent authority in matters of the soul and immortality, the less they have to do with reason, either as witness or judge, the more will it comport with the dignity of the proceeding and the validity of the judging. Having discarded reason as umpire in the premises (and along with reason of course the other lower intellectual agencies) what have we left on which to rely for persuasion in the matter? . . . I know of no way that is completely satisfactory except through a conviction that is supernaturally bestowed." Here then we have "validity of judging" and "conviction" without reason or intellectual agencies. It seems not to have occurred to the writer that it requires reason to receive and interpret a revelation of God not less than to give it. Christian divines who thus flee from the assaults of skepticism to a faith founded on feeling only and divorced from reason and intelligence, concede all which the skeptic asks. They acknowledge that theistic belief is neither rational nor reasonable, and cannot stand in the light of reason.

On the other hand, this belief is not the speculative creation of reason alone apart from the emotional and practical side of man's personality. Reason finds in the feelings evidence of the existence of God. They are evidence of the existence of God on

¹ Professor Diman, *The Theistic Argument*, pp. 73, 74.

the principle on which evolution rests, that a being must be in harmony with its environment or perish. The instincts of animals point to a corresponding reality in their environment. But here we find a common characteristic of humanity to be religiousness, with its spontaneous belief, its impulses and aspirations, its varied emotions pointing to a divinity. Why must not it also reveal a corresponding reality in man's spiritual environment? A rabbit's fearfulness indicates the reality of its defenselessness and danger. So "the fear of the wicked it shall come upon him." The thirst of the deer corresponds to the existence of water to quench it. And "as the hart panteth after the water-brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, my God. . . My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God." A nestling feels the impulse to fly. Could it reason it might remember that it had always had the solid support of the nest and conclude that if it threw itself out it would fall. But when it spreads its wings it finds the atmosphere in which it can fly. So following its spiritual impulse, the soul throws itself upon the unseen in prayer and finds itself borne upward in communion with God. Thus reason finds evidence of the existence and presence of God in the spiritual instincts; in those motives and emotions which lift it above itself and have no significance except as revealing the presence of a spiritual environment; in the spiritual experience and consciousness expressed by the Psalmist: "Thou compasses my path and my lying down and art acquainted with all my ways. Thou hast beset me behind and before and laid thine hand upon me."

Religious feeling also confirms the insight of reason and the speculative conclusion of thought. As the spontaneous belief in God springing up with and in the religious feelings is found also to be implied in the principles of reason and is vindicated and verified by the scrutiny of thought, so the insight of reason and the conclusions of thought are filled with significance and confirmed by the religious feelings. The belief in God which springs up spontaneously in the feelings, the belief which is implicit in the principles of reason regulating all thought, and the belief infolded in the ratiocinated conclusions of thought are one same belief issuing from all these several processes which sustain and confirm each other. We see all the powers and susceptibilities of the human personality consenting and concurring in the belief that God exists and in this consilience of evidence establishing it firmly. In whatever operations and states the person-

ality of man reveals itself in the consciousness, it reveals itself as related to and dependent on the personal God.

In the feelings and the practical side of human personality contents are given to the idea of God in the speculative reason. Kant has shown that the idea of God is a necessary idea of pure reason. Without it the mind cannot comprehend all things in the unity of a universe, nor solve its own necessary problems, nor bring its thinking to a conclusion in knowledge. Without it thinking is but weaving a Penelope's web; with however fine a texture woven it immediately unravels. It is indeed legitimate to hold for true whatever reason sees to be a necessary truth. Kahnis truly says: "Reason renounces itself if it does not hold for real what it demands with inward necessity." But Kant objects that though the idea of God is necessary to the speculative reason, we cannot know that it has objective reality unless it has contents in consciousness. These contents he finds only in the consciousness of moral law. But it is now evident that contents in consciousness for the idea of God are found in all the rational emotions and motives, in all the spiritual instincts and impulses, and in all the activities of our personal susceptibilities and powers. Thus alike in reflective thought, in the rational intuitions and the religious experience we know God. And this accords with the ancient maxim: "Philosophy seeks for the truth, theology finds it, religion takes it into possession."¹

It follows that the belief in God does not rest on a special faculty weak in isolation from the intuitive and reflective powers through which other objects are known. The belief in God rests on and is interwoven with the entire personality of man. The knowledge of God, like all knowledge, begins in experience and is elaborated in thought. If this were not so no arguments could prove his existence. Thus the belief in God, rooted in the whole personality of man, is real knowledge. And if it is not, the rational and personal constitution of man is deceitful and untrustworthy and all knowledge is impossible.²

5. Religion with the spontaneous belief in a God involved in it exists antecedent to and independent of scientific thought, empirical, philosophical and theological. This is a necessary inference from the constitutional religiousness of man which has now been established.

¹ "Philosophia quærit, theologia invenit, religio possidet veritatem."

² "Wer Gott nicht fühlt in sich und allen Lebenskreisen,
Dem werdet ihr nicht Ihn beweisen mit Beweisen." — Rückert.

The outward world reveals itself through impressions on the sensorium and through them we perceive it and believe that it exists. This belief is not originated by scientific thought, is not dependent on it and cannot be disproved by it. On the contrary all physical science assumes the unproved belief to be real knowledge and depends on it for its own reality as knowledge. As Lotze says : "Something like what we here experience under the influence of physical excitements we may experience under the immediate working of the divine power within the soul. Religious belief would thus be an intuition of the supersensuous power revealed to us by this inworking."¹ And as we have seen, there is a wealth of spiritual experience in the human soul in which the belief in a God spontaneously arises. And, like the belief in the external world, this belief in God does not originate in scientific thought nor depend on it, nor can it be disproved by it. All philosophical and theological thought assumes that the belief in God is real knowledge and depends on it as such, just as physical science assumes that the belief in the outward world is real knowledge and depends on it as such.

As the soul of a musician has susceptibility which thrills responsive to the sounds of a musical instrument and perceives and feels the music, so man has spiritual susceptibilities which thrill responsive to the touch of spiritual realities. A child puts its ear to a sea-shell and thinks it hears the roaring of the sea whence the shell was taken ; but in the soul of the child whispers the vast and far eternity, to which the child belongs.

You see a sun-picture forming on a prepared plate, and you know that it is a picture of some real object touched by the light of the sun. The religious consciousness is a picture of the reality of the spiritual and the unseen forming within the soul by the light which shines from beyond the range of sense and lighteth every man, revealing God.

Jacobi, recognizing in man a power of knowing God and spiritual realities, analogous to his power of perceiving outward things through sense, insists that it is the reason in its highest significance. It "is the spiritual eye for spiritual objects, and we call it reason. Some who are called philosophers have sought to dispense with this organ, thinking they could see their one truth clearer with one eye. So they put out the eye for the supersensible, insisting that it is only a delusive eye, a seeing double. It should be noticed how the one eye, after this operation, gets

¹ Mikrokosmos, vol. iii. bk. ix. chap. iv. § 1.

into the middle of the forehead and no trace of the second eye remains. These Polyphemuses find credence among too many. . . . Socrates, and Plato after him, oppose this one-eyed wisdom, and prove in many ways that if a man is ever to attain the truth, he needs to have both eyes and to keep them both wide open."¹ And from a point of view at the extreme opposite to Jacobi we find Professor Le Conte affirming the same conclusion: "As there must be objective reality in the things which constitute the material of knowledge, so there must be objective realities corresponding to fundamental and universal religious beliefs. It is impossible to avoid this conclusion except by an agnosticism which destroys science as well as religion."² And does not Paul also, with equal decisiveness, recognize in man an eye which sees the invisible, when he says: "The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen"? And the same is recognized by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, when he says of Moses that "he endured as seeing him who is invisible."

It follows that the spontaneous belief in God thus inwrought into the personality of man is a reasonable ground of religious service and life, even though the man has not as yet defined and verified it in scientific thought. It is reasonable for a person to act on the belief that the sun exists, though he has never proved it and has never studied astronomy. It is reasonable for him to believe in the reality of music, though he knows nothing of the undulations of the air and the mathematics of the musical scale by which science explains it. So it is reasonable for a person to believe in God and to serve him religiously, though he has never attempted scientifically to defend or formulate his belief. The same is true of belief in Christ and Christianity as set forth in the Bible. Christ, his life and spiritual power, are the great demonstration of Christianity. When God as revealed in Christ touches and rouses to action the spiritual susceptibilities and capacities of a man, when he meets and satisfies his spiritual aspirations and needs, when in his religious consciousness the man finds him quickening, renovating, nourishing and purifying his soul, then he believes in him. And this belief, springing from his very constitution as a personal being and living in the inmost life of his spirit, is a reasonable and trustworthy belief.

And if this is not so, then the great majority of human beings can never attain a reasonable belief in God and a trustworthy

¹ Jacobi, Werke, vol. ii. pp. 74, 75; David Hume über den Glauben.

² Princeton Rev., April, 1881, p. 172.

ground of religion. It is true the heavens declare the glory of God, all nature is crowded with the evidence of his existence, physical science is daily revealing new wonders of his wisdom, and the constitution and history of man proclaim his moral law and reveal his perfect love. But in this day skepticism is equally all-pervading, putting its interrogation-point after every declaration of God's glory. It calls to us with its questions and doubts from the misty heights of pantheistic speculation and from the shining path of physical science through all space and time. In studying the evidences of Christianity we have to trace out the labyrinths of history, to dig up ancient and buried cities, to decipher hieroglyphics and cuneiform inscriptions, and to master a Babel of strange languages. The mass of men cannot do this. What then? Are they shut out from the possibility of knowing God? or must they receive their belief on the authority of learned men? Neither the one nor the other. They are to find him touching their own hearts and revealing himself in their own lives. They may say with a true meaning:—

“ Away, haunt thou not me,
 Thou vain philosophy.
 Little hast thou bestead
 Save to perplex the head
 And leave the spirit dead.
 Unto thy broken cisterns wherefore go,
 While from the secret treasure, depths below,
 Fed by the skyey shower
 And clouds that sink and rest on hill-tops high,
 Wisdom at once and power
 Are welling, bubbling forth, unseen, incessantly. . . .

“ Why labor at the dull mechanic oar,
 When the fresh breeze is blowing
 And the strong current flowing
 Right onward to the eternal shore? ”

It is evident, therefore, that the faith of an unlettered Christian is a reasonable faith. In a time of persecution a young woman was assailed by her persecutors with arguments to unsettle her faith. She heard them patiently and replied, I am unlearned and cannot argue for Christ, but I can die for him.

And in the perplexities and difficulties of thought and the objections and doubts incident to its investigations, it is reasonable to keep fast hold on this spontaneous belief, which comes from the depths of our personal and spiritual being. This hope “ we have, as an anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast and

entering into that within the veil." Also in the gathering shadows of death it is reasonable that men hold fast upon this living faith, above all theological formulas. Jean Paul Richter says: "When in your last hour all faculty in the broken spirit shall fade away and die into inanity—imagination, thought, effort, enjoyment—then will the night-flower of belief alone continue blooming and refresh with its perfume in the closing darkness." This living faith is the fountain of living water springing up within the soul and flowing forth unto everlasting life.

Because belief in a divinity springs spontaneously out of the inmost personality of man, it must be persistent in human history, and its suppression by speculative skepticism can be only local and temporary. For this belief exists before physical science, philosophical investigation or theological thought; and though it can be verified by these and shown to be a reasonable belief, yet it exists spontaneously independent of them. In fact it is the beliefs, welling up spontaneously in our very constitution and living in the feelings and will as well as in the intellect, which call forth in their defense the devotedness of self-sacrificing love. An opinion held merely as a result of argument or a balancing of evidence is not secure. A new fact, a new argument, a suggestion of doubt from one whose opinion has weight, may shake it and cause it to fall. If religious belief is to rule our lives, if it is to be the motive that impels and the standard by which we judge our actions, if it is to demand self-devotedness and self-sacrifice and the martyr-spirit in allegiance to it, it must be more than an opinion founded on a balance of arguments and evidence, it must spring from our constitution as personal, it must live as a real communion with God, a real experience of his presence and his love. But when thus rooted in the personality and living in the spirit's life, it persists in the face of scientific and philosophical speculation, and if temporarily suppressed returns with power.

"One day they will return in shining forms,
 These fair ambassadors of the Infinite;
 And when they come, the rosy-fingered dawn
 Will show the nothingness of churlish Science
 Feigning void heavens above a lawless world."

And these principles must guide us in teaching men the knowledge of God. If the belief in God is not already germinal in the personality, if there has been no experience of God's influence in the soul, no spontaneous belief welling up from it, there is nothing for education to draw out nor for culture to enrich and cause to grow.

And this is the source of many errors in teaching men to know God. We attempt to put the belief in God into the mind, but we should rather draw it out. We try to teach men that there is a God by argument addressed to the intellect, but we should rather teach it by awakening and inspiring the dormant susceptibilities already in the spirit. We teach religion didactically; but we must first teach, as our Lord did, presenting spiritual realities to the spirit in the expectation that it will spiritually respond. As Boethius says, if there were not already tinder in the soul the spark of divine truth would not kindle.¹ As Mr. James Martineau says, our Lord was accustomed to “draw forth into consciousness those divine and primitive truths which have been set from the beginning in the firmament of the soul, but, for want of an interpreter, have been taken for sparkles instead of suns.”²

IV. GOD REVEALED IN THE PRACTICAL POWER OF FAITH IN HIM. — The knowledge of God is necessary to the progress of man, whether as an individual or in society, toward the realization of the highest possibilities of his being. God is revealed in the practical needs of man which God alone can meet.

1. In the first place, the knowledge of God is necessary to religion. Belief in God springs from the constitution of man. From the depths of his personality and from all its powers and capacities the spirit of man cries out for God. If there is no God, then man is endowed with powers for the exercise of which the universe presents no sphere, and susceptibilities for the satisfaction of which the universe presents no object. Then the constitution of man as personal is in direct contradiction to itself and to the constitution of the universe. He is constituted spiritual with no spiritual environment. Therefore he can never realize his complete development. He lives in but one side of his being; the other is smitten with paralysis, yet always reveals its presence by its painfulness.

All the richness and strength of character which come distinctively from religion would then be lost. The tenderness and depth of repentance for sin as against God, the faith in God by which in the consciousness of weakness and dependence man lifts himself above himself, becomes strong in God and is able to

¹ “Hæret profecto semen introsum veri,
Quod excitatur ventilante doctrina.
Nam cur rogati sponte recta censetis,
Ni mersus alto viveret fomes corde?”

Boethius, *De Consolatione Philos.* lib. iii. metrum xi.

² *Hours of Thought on Sacred Things*, p. 270.

stand, in the panoply of purity and truth, of faith and love, even to death against all unrighteousness, would give place to the spirit of self-sufficiency which is the basis of all selfishness. The spirit of reverence toward God and humility before him would disappear. We should lose the ennobling conception of man as in the likeness of God, subject to his law and the object of his loving care; the inspiration of communing with God and working with him for the advancement of a kingdom of God on earth; and the conceptions of the worth and dignity of man, of the sacredness of his rights, of the brotherhood and equality of men before God, the common Father of all. We should lose the conception of the universe as the manifestation of God in the progressive realization of the ideals of his wisdom and love, and of man as in the spiritual system, in which God is progressively advancing his reign of righteousness and grace and transforming human society into a kingdom of God, always with a promise of a future better than the past. And the great hope and inspiration of the life immortal would fade away from human life and death.

But this is not all. Man finds himself dependent on the resistless forces of nature; and thus, without God, subject to a blind fate. The consciousness of helpless subjection either to blind or to arbitrary and capricious power is debasing; it is a consciousness of slavery. And it is a source of continual unrest and dissatisfaction. In his subjection to these resistless forces, in the consequent restriction, disappointment, suffering and death which they bring on him, he begins to ask, Is life worth living? he falls into pessimism; he is driven it may be to suicide; or, if not, he begins to justify it as the only relief from the ills of life. He can be raised into freedom from the galling of this conscious dependence on the forces of nature only by his conscious dependence on God, and the knowledge that nature with all its forces is dependent on God and controlled by him in perfect wisdom and love. In this he finds peace. So Mrs. Browning puts it:—

“ Oh, the little birds sang east and the little birds sang west ;
And I said in underbreath, All our life is mixed with death,
And who knoweth which is best ?

“ Oh, the little birds sang east and the little birds sang west ;
And I smiled to think God’s greatness flows around our incompleteness ;
Round our restlessness his rest.”

Physicus, the author of *A Candid Examination of Theism*, concludes his volume with this testimony to the truth of what I

have said: "Whether I regard the problem of Theism on the lower plane of strict relative probability, or on the higher plane of purely formal considerations, it equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all belief of the kind which I conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my intellect with regard to this matter into an attitude of the purest skepticism. And forasmuch as I am far from being able to agree with those who affirm that the twilight doctrine of the 'new faith' is a desirable substitute for the waning splendor of 'the old,' I am not ashamed to confess that with this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost the soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to 'work while it is day,' will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terribly intensified meaning of the words that 'the night cometh in which no man can work,' yet when at times I think, as at times I must, of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it, — at such times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence not being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or whether it be due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me at least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that for me and those who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in those words of Hamilton, — Philosophy having become a meditation, not merely of death, but of annihilation, the precept, *Know thyself*, has become transformed into the terrific oracle to *Œdipus*: —

'Mayest thou never know the truth of what thou art.'"

And the late Professor Clifford, of England, said: "It cannot be doubted that the theistic belief is a comfort to those who hold it, and that the loss of it is a very painful loss. It cannot be doubted, at least by many of us in this generation, who either profess it now or have received it in our childhood, and have parted from it since with such searching trouble as only cradle-faiths can cause. We have seen the spring sun shine out of an empty heaven to light up a soulless earth; we have felt with utter loneliness that the Great Companion is dead." And M. Renan is reported to have said: "We are living on the perfume of an empty vase." Such confessions — and they are numerous — are testimony from the best witnesses that science without God cannot help men over the contradiction which, if there is no God, exists between man's spiritual aspirations and his animal nature, be-

tween man's personal constitution and his environment, nor deliver him from the consequent unrest and dissatisfaction. They give pungency to Mr. Arnold's demand : —

“ For the world cries, Your faith is now
But a dead time's exploded dream;
My melancholy, sciolists say,
Is a passed mode, an outworn theme. . . .

“ Ah if it be passed, take away,
At least the restlessness, the pain ;
Be men henceforth no more a prey
To these outdated stings again.
The nobleness of grief is gone ;
Ah, leave us not the fret alone.”

2. The power of faith in God appears in its practical influence penetrating every sphere of human activity and development.

Mr. Frederic Harrison, Professor Royce and others have given grand descriptions of what religion, if it is to exist, must be. It must harmonize with and support our largest knowledge and our deepest convictions. It must give the philosophy of human life on which to believe, to feel, to hope, to act, in a word to live and to die. It must quicken us to our most unselfish and noblest action. It must be the vitalizing principle of the purification and progress of society.

The theist accepts the description and the challenge which it carries in it. He affirms that faith in God, the eternal Spirit, the God of love in his highest revelation of himself in Christ, is necessary to the realization of these noble ends. He affirms that, in the power of faith in God progressively realizing these ends, God is always revealing himself to man. The change from belief in God to atheism will not merely set aside what is distinctively religious, but will exert a disastrous influence in every sphere of man's activity and development. If all which is distinctively religious is to be swept away, if all the powers and susceptibilities of the personality of man in which religion has root and which must have God for their development and satisfaction are abortive, having no object on which to act and no reason for their existence, if all consciousness of spiritual relations and destiny, all hope of immortality are delusions, it will be the most fundamental change possible in our conception of the universe, and of man, his history and destiny. If there is a God known to man, this must be the fundamental fact from which all which pertains to human action and interest must take its coloring and

direction. If that knowledge is annulled, the change must be radical and immense in every sphere of man's personal action. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in a recent article, shows with much force that a religion must have a supernatural basis, and that theology, that is, a doctrine of God, is essential to religion; religion will die, if the belief in a divinity ceases. If human life is what atheistic science describes it, there is no object or material for religion. He also takes the bold position that there would be no need of it. "We can get on very well without one, for though the view of life which science is opening to us gives us nothing to worship, it gives us an infinite number of things to enjoy. . . . We should have to live on different principles from those which have usually been professed; but I think that, for people who took a just view of their position and were moderately fortunate, life would still be extremely pleasant."¹ So we may say that a dog, though incapable of religion, has a multitude of things to enjoy. Without doubt man might enjoy much without religion. But the question is, Could he enjoy all which his constitution shows him capable of enjoying? Could he realize the highest possibilities of his being and attain what his constitution shows must be the ideal of man? When Mr. Stephen says that we should have to live on different principles, his words have a terrific significance which he seems not to be aware of. If, as we have seen, belief in God springs spontaneously from the constitution of man, then satisfaction in a life without a God would imply that man is unmanned; that he is reduced to a plane of life below the personal and human. For God is the centre of all the radii of the spiritual sphere.

✓ We proceed to consider some exemplifications of the practical influence of the denial of God in spheres of the indirect and remoter action of the power of faith in him.

It would tend to hinder the investigation of truth.

Mr. Stephen thinks that man might still enjoy scientific studies. But it must be remembered that the fact that a man denies God does not change his constitution as a personal being, and he can still use and enjoy his personal and spiritual powers and susceptibilities in spheres of action which are not religious. Therefore one who denies God may be interested in science. But, as we have already seen, the denial of God narrows the range of scientific thought and lessens the grandeur of its results; it annuls powerful motives to scientific investigation; by deny-

¹ The Unknowable and the Unknown; Nineteenth Century, June, 1884.

ing that the universe is ultimately grounded in reason it makes it impossible to comprehend all things in the unity of a rational system or to find for it rational significance and design ; and by denying that the universe is pervaded and regulated by one universal reason, in the light of which man's reason, as the same in kind, participates, it makes all the conclusions of science untrustworthy and all scientific knowledge impossible.

If there is no God there must be also a fundamental change in ethics and morals. Man's constitution remaining the same would indeed as now spontaneously awaken the sense of obligation, of duty and of moral law. But this constitution itself would have no rational justification or explanation. And the law would no longer be of absolute authority. As each person would be autonomic, the law could never be known as universal and supreme, but only as subjective in an individual. There would be nothing above man by which he could erect himself above himself. Moral freedom and responsibility would be no more. In the denial of God, the universal and everywhere energizing Reason, there would be no basis for a moral system and a moral order of the universe ; and therefore no basis for the law of love comprehending all virtues. Duties would take the place of love, and right character would be disintegrated into a doing of duties piecemeal. Moreover, in the absence of the absolute Reason and the absolute law eternal therein, what is right could only be determined empirically from the idea of the good and would be only that which most promotes happiness, and thus the very idea of the right would be lost in that of the expedient. Thus we are brought back to the old pagan conception of life, that its highest law is to follow nature, and its highest ideal is to gratify impulse ; "to warm both hands at the fire of life, but with prudence, so as not to burn one's fingers ;" or, as Cicero said, so to go through life that when the inevitable hour of departure comes we may quit it like a guest satisfied with the banquet of which he has partaken. What a strange idea it is, says Fourier, to maintain that God has given us passions in order that we may repress them ; as though a father were to develop vices in his child so that he may afterwards have the glory of overcoming them. And I see no escape from these conclusions and no way of retaining the moral law and duty with any distinctive significance, except as we recognize the moral law eternal in God, the absolute Reason, and man's membership in a rational and spiritual system under the law of God. The sense of duty, the recognition of man as a personal being,

endowed with inviolable rights, the object of service only, never to be possessed and used, these have their origin only in God and in the spiritual system in which man is under the law of God and lives in close relations to him. Into that "realm of ends," that divine and spiritual sphere, the sense of duty, living and growing wherever man is found, stretches deep its noble root, and from it draws its life and nourishment.

All the reasons for denying theism are equally reasons for denying morality. To attempt to develop an ethical philosophy without God must be as fruitless as an attempt to develop an astronomy of the solar system without the sun. It is because there is a sun that the planets exist in a system in their common relations to it; and it is because there is a God that men exist in a moral system in their common relations to him.

Accordingly we find that it is in man's highest moral feeling that the belief in God commends itself to him; it is in his highest selfishness, sensuality and vice that God and religion are repugnant to him. So Renan argues: "Were religion simply a mistake of mankind, like astrology, sorcery and other chimeras which have commanded belief, science would already have swept it away. Were religion only the fruit of a childish calculation, by which man hopes to receive beyond the grave a return for his investment in virtue here below, he would be most taken up with it in his most selfish moments. Now, it is in his best moments that the man is religious; it is when he is good that he will have virtue correspond to an eternal order; it is when he contemplates things disinterestedly that he finds death revolting and absurd. Must we not suppose that in these moments man's vision is the clearest? Which is right, the selfish and dissipated, or the good and self-possessed man? . . . Let us then stoutly say that religion is the product of the normal man, that man is most truly himself when he is most religious and the most assured of an infinite destiny."¹

Skeptical scientists think that science can dispense with God. But if it does, it must also dispense with ethics. Mr. Harrison pertinently says: "What can evolution do to give a basis for the entire man? How can it act on the moral nature and appeal to feeling, to veneration, devotion, love? The heart of man cannot love protoplasm or feel devotion to the idea of the survival of the fittest. Our moral being is not purified and transformed by con-

¹ *L'Avenir Religieux des Sociétés Modernes*. See Renan's *Studies of Religious History and Criticism*, Frothingham's Trans., pp. 392, 393.

templating dynamic potency that lies hid in matter. Was any one ever made purer, braver, tenderer by the law of perpetual differentiation? The scorn which true brains and hearts, that have the root of the matter in religion, launch against this assumption has been far from unjust or excessive. The dream that on the ruins of the Bible, creed and commandments, in the place once filled by Bossuet, Bernard and Aquinas, or by Paradise Lost, Pilgrim's Progress and the English Prayer Book, there might be erected a faith in the Indefinite Persistence of Force and the Potential Mutability of Matter, indeed deserves the ridicule it meets. Evolution will never eliminate the heart out of man so long as mankind exists; nor will the spirit of worship, devotion and self-sacrifice cease to be the deepest and most abiding forces of human society."¹ Of the same purport is the conclusion of Mr. Sidgwick in the closing paragraphs of his *Methods of Ethics*: "It is, one may say, a matter of life and death to the Practical Reason that this premiss" (the existence of God and divine sanctions of the moral law) "should be somehow obtained. . . . Nor can I fall back on the Kantian resource of thinking myself under a moral necessity to regard all my duties as if they were commandments of God, although not entitled to hold speculatively that any such Supreme Being exists 'as Real.' . . . Still it seems plain that in proportion as man has lived in the exercise of the Practical Reason, as he believed, and feels as an actual force the desire to do what is right and reasonable as such, his demand for this premiss will be intense and imperious. Thus we are not surprised to find Socrates, the type for all ages of the man in whom this desire is predominant, declaring the conviction that 'if the Rulers of the universe do not prefer the just man to the unjust, it is better to die than to live.' . . . The whole system of our beliefs as to the intrinsic reasonableness of conduct must fall, without a hypothesis unverifiable by experience reconciling the Individual with the Universal Reason, without a belief in some form or other that the moral order which we see imperfectly realized in this actual world is yet really perfect. If we reject this belief, we may perhaps still find in the non-moral universe an adequate object for the Speculative Reason, capable of being in some sense ultimately understood. But the Cosmos of Duty is thus reduced to Chaos; and the prolonged effort of the human intellect to frame a perfect ideal of rational conduct is seen to have been fore-doomed to inevitable failure."

¹ Creeds, Nineteenth Cent., Nov. 1880.

The knowledge of God is necessary, also, to the progress of man toward realizing the highest possibilities of his being. It is necessary to his culture and growth toward perfection.

If we look at man in society, it is evident that it is essential to the existence of society and still more to its wellbeing, that there must be some common standard of appeal in thought and also in character and action. There must be a universal reason and its common truths in order that men may be intelligible to one another in the intercommunication of knowledge and thought; in order that they may be able to discuss any subject, to present arguments and come to a common conclusion. Equally necessary is some common standard of moral judgment. Materialism or any other non-theistic theory of the universe, which offers itself as adequate for the guidance and improvement of human society, is bound to present some common and universal truths to which all can appeal in the determination of questions of belief, some universal law of character and conduct; it must provide common sentiments by which men may be moved and inspired to the noblest life; it must present these principles, laws and sentiments as authoritative upon all in some overarching light which shines for all, "the true light which lighteth every man." So Lange says: "Certain it is that the new epoch will not conquer unless it be under the banner of a great idea, which sweeps away egoism and sets human perfection in human fellowship as a new aim, in the place of restless toil which looks only to the personal gain."¹

This great idea, this inspiring sentiment is found in the law of love. But the law of love has not power to hold society in coherence and to inspire and direct its progress unless it is the law of the universal Reason of whose unchanging truths and laws the universe is the expression and revelation, unless this law is itself the constitution of society and of the universe, unless it can inspire men with the faith that the universe is upheld and directed in all its ongoing by an all-pervading energy of wisdom and love. All non-theistic systems fail of verification when tested by the demand that they provide the principles and constitutive power adequate for the coherence, the happy existence and the healthful progress of society. Theism is verified by the test. It presents the principle adequate for the unity of thought in the absolute and universal Reason in the light of which all men participate; it presents the principle adequate to the unity of moral sentiment

¹ History of Materialism, vol. iii. p. 361, Thomas's Trans.

in the law of love; and it imparts the inspiration to noble life in the revelation that God is love, and that all are called to the life of love in faith in him.

Here also is a practical test and verification of the belief in God. When God reveals himself to man he reveals man to himself. The approach of God to the spirit of man awakens him from the life of the flesh to the life of the spirit, makes him aware of his spiritual powers and relations and quickens him to spiritual life. This is just the power which meets Lange's demand in behalf of "the new epoch," and which under the banner of a great idea is to sweep away egoism and set men to concentrating their energies, in universal fellowship, on realizing the highest perfection of man. Lange adds: "It would indeed mitigate the impending conflict if insight into the nature of human development and historical processes were more generally to take possession of the leading minds." The great ideas and motive influences, which this insight would discover and which are necessary to secure the bloodless and peaceable progress of man, are just those which come from the revelation of man to himself by the revelation of God to man; just those which are brought into action when the Spirit of God comes near to the spirit of man, awakens him to the consciousness of his own spiritual powers and relations, and quickens him to spiritual activity to realize the highest spiritual ends for himself and for mankind. And as the revelation of God in Christ is the most complete revelation of God, so it, more than all else, has revealed the real significance and greatness of man's being and aroused him to use his highest powers for his highest ends. Before Christ came and in heathen civilization, the individual was lost in the race, he was submerged in the state, and in reference to it he had no rights but only owed duties; the idea was widely dominant that a whole family should be put to death for the crime of one of its members. But when God in Christ revealed his love, not merely to mankind as an organic unity, but to men individually and even to sinners, redeeming them from sin, when he proclaimed in Christ that a person is justified by God on his own personal faith turning away from sin, without the intervention of any priesthood or hierarchy, when he called every one by himself to enter into his closet and alone with God, "solus cum solo," to commune with him, as a child with his father, then the greatness of a man in his personality, his likeness to God, his immeasurable worth, and the sacredness of his rights were revealed. When a person stands face to

face with God, then and then only he knows his own greatness and dignity, the sacredness of his duties and rights, the significance and possibilities of his being. He who believes in God believes himself to be a spirit and not mere flesh; he who believes himself a spirit believes also in God. Here is the philosophical basis of the scriptural doctrine that man is justified by faith. It is only as he comes to the knowledge of God that he discovers the true significance of his own being. As a finite creature it is only as he sees his dependence on God and trusts him as the source and support of all being and all life, that he discovers the real and most fundamental relations of his being and conforms his life and action to the realities which encompass him, or, as we may say, to his real environment. It is only as he sees and trusts God as the absolute Reason or Spirit perfect in wisdom and love, that his own spiritual potencies are quickened into action and directed to realizing the highest possibilities of his being. This fact is established alike by Scripture, philosophy and history.

“ From God is all that soothes the life of man,
His high endeavor and his glad success,
His strength to suffer and his will to serve.”

To this practical test the belief in God lies open continuously through the whole course of human history and by this it challenges verification.

If we deny God, then the ideal of the perfect man is fundamentally changed. Comte says that Positivism requires man to give up his claim to be the lowest of the angels and to content himself with being the highest of the brutes. But if man may no longer think of himself as a personal being existing in a system of personal and spiritual beings all united by common relations to God, the eternal Spirit, if all interests and hopes, all activities, possibilities and plans of a spiritual system vanish in nothingness and man is shut up in the sphere of brute life, then certainly there must be a radical change in his idea of the range of his action and aspiration, of the possibilities of his being, of his perfection and the goal of his progress.

It will be objected that, though man denies God, he does not in fact sink to the level of mere brute life; he still has pleasure in science and art; he has moral ideas and acts in conformity with duty. This may be true. But it is because his denial of God does not change his constitution as a personal being, that he still feels these aspirations to higher ends than the animal system

presents, and directs his energies to higher spheres. In this his constitution as personal protests against his disbelief and denial. He uses his reason as if it participated in the light of the universal Reason, he obeys moral law as if it were absolute and universal law, he seeks perfection as if he were still the lowest of the angels, he feels enthusiasm for truth and right, for ideals of the reason and sentiments of the soul which have no significance in the life of sense, as if he were in the image of God and capable of spiritual perfection. He might give up his life for a sentiment as if conscious of worth transcending his earthly life, though every principle left him in his disbelief must tell him that the sacrifice would be foolish. And in every such "as if" the action reveals a spiritual reality.

It is needless to attempt to picture what the ideal and goal of life would be if there is no God; for we have a picture of it already drawn by the competent hand of Mr. Huxley in his *Physical Basis of Life*. He quotes one of Goethe's Venetian Epigrams, and says that into it "Goethe has condensed a survey of all the powers of mankind." It is this: "Why so bustle the people and cry? To get food, to rear children and nourish them as well as they can. . . . Farther than this attaineth no man, put himself however he will."¹ He then explains that all the multiplied activities of men are comprehended in these three classes, and adds: "Even those manifestations of intellect, of feeling and of will, which we rightly name the higher faculties, are not excluded from this classification, inasmuch as to every one but the subject of them they are known only as transitory changes in the relative positions of the human body." This, then, is the highest possibility of humanity, the ideal of human perfection, the goal of all human progress. "Lord Brougham, expressing perhaps extravagantly his expectation of intellectual progress, said he hoped the time would come when every man in England would read Bacon. Cobbett wittily replied that he would be contented if the time should come when every man in England would eat bacon — an answer not less pertinent than witty, if it meant merely that the removal of pauperism was a more immediate need than the diffusion of intellectual culture, but an answer well fitted to express the ultimate and highest promise of Professor Huxley. The Hebrew prophets foretell a happy future

¹ "Warum treibt sich das Volk so und schreit? Es will sich ernähren,
Kinder zeugen, und sie nähren so gut es vermag . . .
Weiter bringt es kein Mensch, stell' er sich wie er auch will."

for man when the earth shall be full of the knowledge of God; this new gospel foretells a happy future when the earth shall be full of bacon.”¹ Mr. Huxley with good reason cautions his readers: “In accepting these conclusions you are placing your feet on the first rung of a ladder which, in most people’s estimation, is the reverse of Jacob’s and leads to the antipodes of heaven.”

Here we come in sight of two types of civilization struggling for precedence—contrasted long ago by Jesus: the one that man lives by bread alone; the other that he lives by the word of God; the one which sees utility only in the multiplication of products, and sinking the man in the artisan, appoints him to moil and fatten “where wealth accumulates and men decay;” the other which, not neglecting physical attainments and comfort, subordinates these to intellectual, æsthetic, social and spiritual culture; the one which recognizes man in his highest attainments as no more than the student of nature; the other which, with Kepler, recognizes the student and interpreter of nature as also the student and interpreter of the divine mind, “reading God’s thoughts after him;” the one which explains man and all his progress as the result only of physical forces; the other which regards them as the result of spiritual energies originating in God’s love, expressing the action of his grace, establishing on earth a kingdom of righteousness and peace, renovating the earth by and for man and installing him in that lordship over nature for which he was created. It is the former of these types which arises from disbelief in God, a realistic and materialistic civilization, creeping over society like a glacier, freezing and burying all spiritual life and beauty.

In such a civilization, as it gradually works out its legitimate results, art will lose its ideals and sink to a realistic copying, the work of a draughtsman rather than of an artist; poetry will lose its inspiration, and the noble sentiments for which men and women have died as heroes will be sneered at as sentimentality; the chief end of man will be to be an artisan, and in the multitude of specialists Diogenes will again have need to light his lamp in the daytime to find a man; the artisan becomes of less value than his products, and, if it is needful, is to be sacrificed to multiply them. Under such influences the civilization which Comte has described as the result of the reign of Positivism may

¹ The Christian Doctrine of Human Progress Contrasted with the Naturalistic, by Samuel Harris, in Boston Lectures on Christianity and Skepticism, 1870, pp. 56, 57, 59.

be realized, if ever. The man is the tool of the state, having no rights as related to the state, but only duties; a hierarchy of savans determines despotically every person's business, regulates hour by hour all the minutiae of labor, food and rest, and, like the Inquisition of old, carries its dictation and espionage into the sphere of opinion and conscience, and, as no other tyranny political or ecclesiastical ever did, into all the privacy of life. Love is regulated by the state; the glow of passion and the freedom of impulse are suppressed; nobleness of character and heroism of action are made impossible. Individuality is lost in the monotony of a universal and regulated productiveness; everything is graded down to a dead level of mediocrity; all stimulus to enterprise and the development of genius and special endowments is taken away, and society is reduced to mechanism. This is the vision of the good time coming according to the gospel of the Positive Philosophy. And all communism and socialism, resting on the passionate denial of God, propose to realize a civilization of a similar type.

Indications of this materializing tendency are not wanting. In a notice of Charles Sumner, published soon after his death, we read: "All are agreed that his work was accomplished and that there was little left for him to do. He belonged to a past era in politics, in which what may be called sentimentalism played an important part." Since that time there has appeared an increasing tendency to stigmatize as sentimentalists and doctrinaires all who, looking beyond mere partisanship, would lift "practical politics" to a higher plane and purify and invigorate political action with strong moral principle, would stop the encroachment of the gambling spirit upon the domain of legitimate business, and would forestall the revolutionary violence of communists and socialists by finding the true way of applying the Christian law of love to the relations of labor and capital, and of constructing a Political Economy not founded exclusively on selfishness.

Dr. Dawson mentions an address recently delivered in a Scotch university by a man of some scientific standing, who illustrated clergymen's ignorance of science from the hymn,

"What though in solemn silence all
Roll round this dark terrestrial ball;"

and suggested that if Addison had substituted "splendid solar ball," "the hymn would have sung just as well, and would have had the advantage of being right instead of wrong, and would not have shocked our convictions of truth and tended to destroy

the respect which really educated men ought to have for religious instruction.”¹ What is most strikingly illustrated here is the thick incapacity to appreciate poetry in Gradgrinds professing to be scientific, but whose materialism is more manifest than their science. But what is most amusing is that if the suggestion of this solemn critic were adopted and the change made which would save “really educated men” from being shocked by clergymen’s ignorance of science, we should sing, not as devotional poetry, but as poetry rectified into exact science, the astounding assertion that all the fixed stars revolve around the sun once in every twenty-four hours. Kahnis says that some of the German illuminati in the last century, in the interests of geographical accuracy, actually changed a line of a hymn from “The world is all asleep” to “Half the world is asleep.”² I close the discussion of this point in the words of Lange; “We here leave entirely out of view what advantages the other systems (the theistic systems) may perhaps possess in their profoundness, in their relations with art, religion and poetry, in brilliant divination and stimulating play of mind. In such treasures materialism is poor.”³

It remains to consider the practical need of the knowledge of God in its bearing on man’s acquisition of the Good.

It must determine what his Good is. If he knows God, then he is capable of blessedness in communing with him and being like him, and in working with God in universal love to advance his kingdom of righteousness and peace on earth. But if there is no God, all the great possibilities of good for man in his relation to God and the spiritual system vanish. Then man’s highest and only good must be found in his short earthly life and in the narrow physical sphere of action and enjoyment.

Brutes are shut up within these limits and are content. There is nothing in their constitution that gives them any consciousness of their limitation as brutes, or any capacity of looking over the bounds of their nature into any higher sphere, or that awakens desire for aught beyond. But man cannot be groomed and foddered into blessedness. His constitution as personal awakens higher desires and inspires him with larger hopes. Therefore his desires outreach his earthly condition; they grow by what

¹ Nature and the Bible, pp. 16, 17.

² Internal History of German Protestantism since the Middle of the Last Century, p. 184, Meyer’s Trans.

³ Hist. of Materialism, vol. ii. p. 157, Thomas’s Trans.

they feed on ; and whatever the amount of his worldly goods, he remains unsatisfied and restless, always driven by a consuming desire for more. Hence men find that they have fed their hopes on illusions ; they begin to ask "Is life worth living?" They sink into pessimism ; they seek suicide. The growing frequency of this crime and the revival of attempts to justify it are gloomy symptoms of a decay of faith.

To help men to peace and save them from this disappointment and discontent some moralists warn us against dispelling the illusions of life ; let the rugged realities of life remain covered with pleasing illusions. But this is sadder than the unrest it would remedy — that one must be blinded to the realities of the life through which he hurries ; that he chase shadows with a zest whetted by their eluding his grasp ; that he shake the hoary locks of age with childish glee at gains whose transitoriness he does not see, and rush with growing eagerness across the narrowing handbreadth of life, till all unawares he steps off the brink into nothingness — a moment's bustle, a few inquiries, and all is ended.

And this unbelief dries up the springs of hope for mankind. It paralyzes the great motives to self-sacrifice in working for the progress of man ; it annuls the very principles of the equality and brotherhood of men and the sacredness of human rights, and justifies the sneers at them as glittering generalities. Expressed as only one writing from his own experience could express it : —

"Which to the wilderness drove out
Our life, to Alpine snow,
And palsied all our world with doubt,
And all our work with woe."

From all these considerations it is evident that the knowledge of God is not only practically necessary to religion and all its influences for the elevation and blessing of man, but also in personal action not distinctively religious it is necessary to the realizing of man's highest possibilities in the spheres of the True, the Right, the Perfect and the Good. Therefore the practical necessity of religion is not too strongly stated by Daniel Webster : "Religion is a necessary and indispensable element in any great human character. There is no living without it. Religion is the tie that connects man with his Creator and holds him to his throne. If that be all sundered, all broken, he floats away, a worthless atom in the universe ; its proper attractions all gone,

its destiny thwarted and its whole future nothing but darkness, desolation and death. A man with no sense of religious duty is he whom the Scriptures describe in such terse but terrific words as being without God in the world. Such a man is out of his proper being, out of the circle of all his duties, out of the circle of all his happiness, and away, far away from the purposes of his creation.”¹ We cannot be surprised at the heart-breaking sorrow over this crushing of man’s highest hopes and this desolation of human life. Professor Helmholtz, in his Popular Lectures on the Theory of Vision, expressing the desolation and sorrow of a far reaching skepticism which seemed to be impending from his own scientific speculations, uses these lines of Goethe:—

“Woe, woe,
Thou hast destroyed
The beautiful world
With powerful fist;
In ruin ’t is hurled,
By the blow of a demigod shattered.
The scattered
Fragments into the void we carry,
Deploring
The beauty perished beyond all restoring.”

3. The objection is made that we may have religion and all its practical benefits without a divinity, but with some other object of religious worship and service. John Stuart Mill says: “Though conscious of being in a very small minority, we venture to think that a religion may exist without belief in a God, and that a religion without a God may be even to Christians an instructive and profitable object of contemplation. . . . If a person has an ideal object, his attachment and sense of duty toward which are able to control and discipline all his other sentiments and propensities and prescribe to him a rule of life, that person has a religion. . . . If the object of this attachment and of this feeling of duty is the aggregate of our fellow-creatures, this religion of the infidel cannot in honesty and conscience be called an intrinsically bad one.”

In the first chapter I showed that the object of religious worship and service must be a divinity, and that Mr. Mill’s substitute, and various others suggested of late, are entirely inadequate as objects of religion in its distinctive meaning. This is exemplified in Mr. Mill’s own definition of religion. Any passion, desire or appetite may flame up and envelop the whole being,

¹ Eulogy on Jeremiah Mason; Works, vol. ii. p. 490.

may control the other propensities and prescribe a rule of life, and so would be a religion. But Mr. Mill says the controlling passion must have an ideal object. But even so, Charlotte Corday was religious; and at the present time, Louise Michel, and all the self-consecrating and self-sacrificing but passionately atheistic communists, nihilists and anarchists are religious, for "the object of their attachment and duty" is an "ideal" one. The proposal of such a substitute annuls the essential and distinctive meaning of religion.

In the light of our discussions of what religion distinctively is, of man's practical need of it and the great ends which it subserves, it is obvious that the objection as it recurs in its present form is entirely without force. No one of the proposed substitutes for a divinity can develop a religion in its distinctive significance, or meet man's religious needs, or subserve the great ends of religion in man's progress and wellbeing.

The proposers of these several substitutes for a divinity agree in testifying thereby that religion is constitutional in man and indispensable to his true development. They agree also in refuting each other. Mr. Spencer refutes Mr. Harrison, and shows conclusively that the worship of humanity is not a religion and cannot satisfy man's religious needs nor exert the beneficent influence of religion in society. Mr. Harrison conclusively proves the same of Mr. Spencer's religion of the Unknowable.¹ Each of them, in setting forth his own substitute for a divinity, declares and conclusively exposes the insufficiency of all the others. Thus we are returning to a sort of polytheism, and again as of old the gods of Greece fight against the gods of Troy, the gods of the hills fight against the gods of the valleys.

Mr. Spencer recognizes the absolute Being in the Unknowable as the object of religion, and says: "That the object-matter can be replaced by another object-matter, as supposed by those who think the 'Religion of Humanity' will be the religion of the future, is a belief countenanced neither by induction nor by deduction. However dominant may become the moral sentiment enlisted on behalf of Humanity, it can never exclude the sentiment, alone properly called religious, awakened by that which is behind Humanity and behind all other things."² Here he recognizes the absolute Being. But because it is unknowable he resolves religion into the sense of the mysterious only. This

¹ Nineteenth Cent., Jan., March, July, Sept., Nov., 1884.

² The Study of Sociology, p. 311.

certainly can never die away. But it is equally certain that it is only one manifestation of the religious consciousness and of itself alone can never constitute a religion. Such a religion would be immoral. We are not justified in trusting and serving at a venture the Unknowable, since, for aught we can know, it may be the contradictory of all which to us is true, right, perfect and good, of all which to us is wisdom and love. If the agnostic says that the human reason is not to be distrusted, that the Unknowable cannot be contradictory to reason, then it is no longer the Unknowable, but is the absolute Reason, and that is God. Mr. Spencer recognizes the absolute Being, and this is essential in the idea of a divinity. But in declaring it unknowable he admits that the universe may be ultimately grounded in unreason and not in reason. More than this is necessary to the idea of a divinity and the possibility of religion; the absolute Being must be recognized as the absolute Reason energizing in the universe, and its ultimate ground.

On the other hand, Mr. Harrison, the great expounder and defender of Comte's worship of Humanity, recognizes the rationality of the divinity, but denies that it is absolute Being. In fact it is not a being at all, but only an abstract idea of the wisdom and love, the beauty and nobleness of humanity, excluding all its imperfection and weakness, its ignorance and vice. But we cannot worship an abstract idea constructed by our own minds. We cannot be conscious of dependence on it, cannot commune with it, cannot trust it and serve it. The worshiper of it, as Browning says, is like a boy riding astride a stick, who himself carries the horse on which he rides. The ancient Romans personified and deified the virtues. They worshiped, as goddesses, Fides, Pudicitia and other virtues. Christianity swept away this worship and revealed to us all wisdom and love, all beauty and perfection, all truth and law, all ideals of good, archetypal, concrete, eternal in God, the absolute and universal Reason, and, as such, being the fundamental constitution of the universe. But now that skepticism denies the God of wisdom and love, the virtues, dispossessed of their habitation in the divine being, are again worshiped, but only as elements of an abstract idea. Professor Clifford, however, seems to have been able to carry this out into a sort of realism in which he parodies the Christian's "Our Father who art in Heaven" with "Our Father Man." "The dim and shadowy outlines of the superhuman deity fade slowly away from before us; and as the mist of his presence floats aside, we perceive with

greater and greater clearness a yet grander and nobler figure of him who made all gods and shall unmake them. From the dim dawn of history and from the inmost depth of every soul the face of our Father Man looks out upon us with the fire of eternal youth in his eyes, and says, Before Jehovah was I am.”¹

And if humanity, embodied as our Father Man, is to be worshiped, we may pertinently ask on what principle the worshiper selects certain qualities to be combined as the object of worship, while leaving out many others which in the actual history of humanity have been its more common characteristics.

Feuerbach teaches that God is simply man himself contemplated as objective. His doctrine issues in these definitions of God: “God is the aspiration of the human heart transformed into a fixedly blessed Is, the omnipotence of the feeling, the prayer which hears itself, the soul perceiving itself, the echo of our own cries of distress, . . . the free atmosphere of the heart, the unuttered pain of the soul. God is a tear of love shed in the deepest concealment over human misery.” Certainly such a God cannot be the object of religious trust and service, nor meet any of the practical needs of religion.

Ruge presents still another conception of a humanitarian religion: “Religion in the sense of humanity-worship (*Humanismus*) is conscientiousness, the conviction of truth which binds us to live and act in obedience to the highest and holiest law. It is ardor, inspiration for the Right and the Good and their realization on earth; consequently the noble passion for freedom and right. For the self-conscious man is as such free, he acknowledges no lord over himself; he should therefore make himself free from every outward authority, not only of positive religion and of the church, but also of the existing state, so far as it is grounded on an antithesis of the lord and the servant, of the government and the subject.”² This leaves out the essential idea of religion. It begins by identifying religion with morality and resolves itself into the loud-mouthed fervor for human freedom which issues in red republicanism and anarchy.

In like manner if religion is identified with morality or with enthusiasm for science, if the universe itself is proposed as the object of religious reverence, the proposed worship misses what is essential in religion and fails entirely to satisfy man’s need of re-

¹ Lectures and Essays, vol. ii. p. 243, London ed. 1879.

² Das Wesen und die innere Wahrheit des Christenthums, von Dr. Wilhelm Meyer, pp. 124, 125, 108, 109.

ligion and to subserve its ends. In fact they all assume an impassable gulf between man and the absolute Being. If they do not go with Strauss to bald materialism, their substitute for a divinity is either the unknowable or a non-entity; and they must join in the confession of Feuerbach: "We adore the great negation."

It is not to be expected that any considerable number of persons will accept these weak substitutes for a divinity or rest in these artificial religions. They are at best temporary expedients to break the force of the fall into atheism. They must issue either in a return to theism or in the abandonment of religion altogether and the substitution of culture in its stead. But such a culture would be meagre and superficial.

Already there is a tendency to set up a Hellenistic culture, which substitutes beauty for duty, the love of truth defecated from all interest in its practical bearings for love to man, and intellectual activity for religious faith; a breezy, open-air life, a life of enjoyment in following the impulses of nature for a life of concentrated energy, of discipline and self-devotion, of warfare against evil. Schiller in his *Gods of Greece* laments the departure of the old mythology:—

" Cold from the North has gone
Over the flowers the blast that killed the May;
And to enrich the worship of the One,
A universe of gods must pass away."

But theism is not antagonistic to culture. On the contrary it deepens and enriches it. If the gods have vanished from the trees and streams, from the hills, the seas and the stars, yet no solitude is made; for the universe is filled with God. A man is a centre to the universe. From every side it acts on him through the eye, the ear and every sense; the moon and planets, the sun and stars, the immensely distant nebulae pour their light on him; electricity, gravitation, all the powers of nature act on him; he is central to the universe and all its energies converge on him. Herein he also sees encompassing and converging on him the universal Reason pervading and regulating the universe by the same principles which he knows in his own reason. Thus he sees the universe full of God and pervaded with a divine wisdom and love. Anywhere the man entering into his closet and shutting the door finds himself shut in with God and communing with him. The gods of Greece can never return, and the culture which grew up around them in that ancient age can never be renewed. But the

universe to us has a grandeur and glory which the ancient Greeks never knew. And in the knowledge of the one God the culture of man has a depth and breadth and richness which polytheism could never produce. And any culture developed in the absence of all religion and under the withering breath of atheism must not only be incapable of being a substitute for religion, but as culture must be arid and barren.

V. GOD REVEALED IN THE COURSE OF HUMAN HISTORY. — The full development of the evidence that God reveals himself in history would require study of the entire history of man. I shall attempt only to indicate some of the lines in which the evidence may be found.

1. The existence of God is revealed in the history of man's religion; and is necessary to account for its origin, its universality, spontaneity, power and persistence, and for its progressive development.

As already shown, the universality, spontaneity, power and persistence of belief in a divinity prove that it and the religiousness accompanying it are rooted in the constitution of man, and that, if no God exists and religion is a delusion, then falsehood is incorporated into the constitution of man and all knowledge is impossible through the untrustworthiness of man's mental powers. The objection was formerly urged, and is still urged by ignorant and fanatical unbelievers, that religion was an invention of priests to keep the people in subjection. We might ask how there came to be priests in the first place, and how men came by the belief in a God and the capacities for religion and morality which made them susceptible of being controlled by these influences. But leaving this, it is evident that such universal, continuous and powerful forces in humanity as religion and morality are not inventions and contrivances. They are rooted in the whole personality of man and are the spontaneous outgrowth of the fundamental principles of his reason and of the noblest sentiments and deepest needs of his rational constitution. They can be accounted for only on the supposition that God exists and reveals himself to man.

The evidence, however, does not lie merely in the origin, universality and continuity of the belief in a divinity, but also in the progressive development of the knowledge of him, keeping pace with man's advancing knowledge of the universe.

It is often objected that the savage at first refers everything to a spirit like his own; but as fast as he finds out the causes and

order of nature, he ceases to wonder and to see a spirit in it; hence that it is only in extraordinary and startling events that the man sees a divinity. But this does not accord with the facts. The gods of the heathen are gods of the sun, of the dawn, of the powers of nature in their fixed courses, and not divinities known only in the extraordinary and violent energies of nature. So Mr. Spencer truly says: "As fast as the explanation of anomalies dissipates the wonder they excited there grows up a wonder at the uniformities; there arises the question, how came they to be uniformities? As fast as science transfers more and more things from the category of irregularities to the category of regularities, the mystery which once attached to the superstitious explanation of them becomes a mystery that attaches to the scientific explanation of them; there is a merging of many special mysteries in one general mystery."¹ And the wonder of ignorance is exceeded by the wonder of knowledge.

If the progress of man in knowledge, civilization and mental development left the idea of God behind as a figment of the childhood of the race, the objection might have some force. But in all his progress man never leaves it behind, but retains and develops it. He finds that it harmonizes with his increasing knowledge, underlies it as the ground of its reality and unity, and is enriched by all which science discovers of the universe in and through which God is revealed. When in the progress of knowledge man has attained the idea of a cosmos, then arises the necessity of referring the cosmos itself with all its order, law and beauty to one originating and perfect mind expressing its thought in it; and polytheism gives place to monotheism.

A recent writer argues that "if all religions have arisen from the needs and constitution of mankind in society, there can be no objective truth in any of them." And, he says, it is idle to attempt by any test to determine among them the true religion, for "obviously all religions are true, inasmuch as they meet the needs of their followers." That is, there is no objective reality to the divinity of any of them. To this it is sufficient to reply that this reasoning leads to the denial of the objective reality of all knowledge, because it impugns the trustworthiness of man's rational constitution. It must be added that this reasoning rests on the assumption that the different forms of religious belief are essentially antagonistic and contradictory; that they have no elements in common. On the contrary the fact is that in all religions

¹ Study of Sociology, chap. xii. p. 310.

there are common elements which are retained and more clearly and fully developed in all the progress of man. Theism in its highest forms takes up into itself all the elements of truth which the human mind has apprehended in its ruder forms of worship and its more imperfect conceptions of the divinity.

The same writer declares that Christianity is only a "venering" of paganism;¹ and other writers affirm that it is only a survival of sun-worship, and another that the "wise men of the East" were traveling Buddhist priests, who imported elements of the Buddhist belief into Christianity. Here the very fact that Christianity retains all the truths of other and less perfect religions is urged to prove that it is not a true religion and that its God has no objective reality. Just the contrary should be the inference; that man having some true idea of God from the beginning, has retained it through all his progress and developed it to a more complete idea of him. It would be just as pertinent to argue that the human mind has outgrown physical science, because it has rejected alchemy and astrology for chemistry and astronomy, because it no longer believes in the theory of Thales that water is the original of all things, nor in phlogiston, as to argue that the human mind has outgrown theism because it no longer believes in fetichism and the myths of polytheism. The conceptions which uncultivated minds form of supernatural beings may be wrong. They may believe in hobgoblins which have no existence and in myths which are not true. They may misinterpret the manifestations of God and of the unseen world. But this does not disprove the belief in the supernatural and the divine. If impressions on man's spiritual susceptibilities have led men to believe in hobgoblins, impressions on the senses have led men to believe that the moon is no bigger than a cheese and that the stars are merely glittering spangles. As such errors of sense do not destroy the credibility of physical science, so errors in interpreting spiritual impressions do not destroy the credibility of theism.

The necessary inference is that nothing but the real existence of God can account for the origin, universality, spontaneity, persistence and power of religion and the belief in a divinity, and for the progressive development of the idea of God keeping pace with the advancing knowledge and culture of man. God must have revealed himself to man or the belief in him could not have arisen and persisted, spontaneous, universal and powerful, any

¹ A. R. Grote, *The New Infidelity*, pp. 45, 46, 25.

more than a belief in the sun could have been universal, if the sun had never revealed itself to man.

Opposed to this view of the progressive development of religion and the idea of God is Comte's law of the progress of thought. This is the law that knowledge must exist in three theoretical conditions; the theological or fictitious, the metaphysical, and the positive, which is its last and highest form. Alike in every individual and in the race, knowledge must pass through the theological and metaphysical stages in order to attain its maturity in positivism. In the theological stage of thought the mind must pass through three subordinate stages. Man begins with fetichism. He thinks every physical phenomenon is a manifestation of a mind or spirit like his own; and therefore takes any object as the abode or shrine of a divinity. The next stage is polytheism. The supernatural agencies are reduced in number and only the more important natural powers are presided over by a divinity. The next stage is monotheism. In the metaphysical condition phenomena are referred to entities, substances, causes. In the latest stages of metaphysics men substitute, for the multitude of entities at first proposed, the one great entity, Nature. The theological is the infantile state of human intelligence, its necessary point of departure; the positive is its fixed and final condition; and the metaphysical is the state of transition. Comte, as the representative of positivism, rejects as unscientific all recognition of supernatural beings, of substance, cause and force, of atoms, molecules and ethers. He laments the use of "the unfortunate word attraction" by Newton. He claims for positivism exclusive control over human thought and belief; he regards it as profoundly incompatible with metaphysics and theology, and stakes its triumph on their overthrow.

The decisive refutation of this law of progress is that it is everywhere contradicted by the facts of history. Comte himself acknowledges this to be the one serious objection.¹

In the present state of anthropological knowledge there is no sufficient reason to believe that the primitive religion of man was fetichism. On the contrary, "it is a fact proved by historical evidence that fetichism represents a secondary stage in the growth of religion and that it presupposes an earlier stage in which the name and concept of something divine, the predicate of every fetich, was formed." "Wherever there has been an opportunity

¹ Cours de Phil. Positive, tome ii. p. 234; tome iv. p. 709 and leçon 51; tome v. leçons 52-55.

of ascertaining by long and patient intercourse the religious sentiments even of the lowest savage tribes, no tribe has ever been found without something beyond mere worship of so-called fetiches." "There is ample evidence that the same tribes who are represented as fetich-worshippers believe either in gods or in a supreme good God, the creator of the world, and that they possess in their dialects particular names for him." "In Africa many tribes who believe in fetiches cherish at the same time very pure, very exalted, very true sentiments of the Deity. . . . The very tribes who were represented to us as living instances of fetich-worship, possessed religious ideas of a simplicity and sometimes of a sublimity which we look for in vain even in Homer and Hesiod." ¹

Waitz says: "A more profound investigation, such as has lately been carried out by several eminent scholars, leads to the surprising result that several negro tribes, who cannot be shown to have experienced the influence of any more civilized nations, have progressed much farther in the elaboration of their religious ideas than almost all other uncivilized races; if we do not like to call them monotheists, they have come very near to the boundaries of monotheism, although their religion is mixed with a large quantity of coarse superstition." ² Of the religions of the African negroes Tiele says: "The prominent characteristic is their unlimited fetichism. . . . A theistic tendency cannot be denied to them. Almost all tribes believe in some supreme god, without always worshiping him." ³ Mr. Rae says that Schultze, in his *Fetichismus*, "is almost the only surviving representative of the theory which makes fetichism the initial form of religion." ⁴

And the three principal stages recognized in Comte's law are found not to be successive as the law requires, but coexistent; and that, not merely as Janet suggests, because different persons and peoples pass through the three stages with different rapidity, but in the same persons and peoples. ⁵ In Lord Bacon all three are conspicuous. Theological thought, a profound religious spirit and eminence in physical science coexisted in Kepler, Newton and many others. The brilliant metaphysics of Greece flourished

¹ Max Müller, *The Savage*, Nineteenth Cent., Jan. 1885, p. 125; *Origin and Growth of Religion*, pp. 101, 106, 102, 116.

² *Anthropologie*, vol. ii. pp. 167-171.

³ *Ency. Brit.*, Religions, vol. xx. p. 362.

⁴ *Recent Speculations on Primitive Religions*, *Contemporary Review*, Oct. 1880.

⁵ *Theory of Morals*, p. 475, *Trans.*

in the midst of polytheism. The brilliant era of Arabic science coexisted with the most intense monotheism. The renaissance issued in a great revival of theological thought. Modern physical science has not issued in positivism, as Comte predicted, but has left it behind; and has itself become intensely metaphysical, busying itself preëminently with forces, molecules, ethers and other metaphysical ideas, against which, as unscientific, Comte so vigorously protested. And aside from this, with all the brilliant achievements of physical science, philosophical thought is intensely and widely active; and never has there been more thinking and more earnestness of thinking on religious themes.

Comte also acknowledges that his law is not found to be true in Asia; and he entirely overlooks Russia and America. And the law is not verified in the development of children any more than in the history of the race. Multitudes have been thoughtless of God in childhood and youth who have been awakened to deep religiousness in mature life.

In anticipation of Comte, a theory of the progress of thought essentially the same with his had been propounded by Turgot.¹ It is one of many attempts to express the significance of great periods of history in a single generalization. The German idealists have proceeded on the principle that a theory of history is to be first formed in their own minds and then simply to be exemplified and illustrated from the facts of history. "According to Fichte, history is but the biography of the absolute Ego from the infancy to the maturity of reason, through the five great epochs of instinct, authority, reflection, science and philosophy. According to Schelling, it is the self-evolution of the absolute Mind, as revealed in humanity through the three periods of fate, of natural law and of providence. According to Hegel, who reduced history as well as nature to sheer logic, it is the human development of the absolute Reason, the dialectic of nations, the great argument of successive civilizations, beginning in China, continuing in India, Egypt and Greece, and issuing in Germany as a complete triumph of art, religion and philosophy. Cousin found in all history, as the only possible phases of civilization, the three ideas and epochs of the infinite, the finite and the relation between them, with their predetermining climates, the Asiatic, the Mediterranean and the European."² When history is studied for the purpose of verifying such theories, the results can-

¹ Flint's *Phil. of History in France and Germany*, p. 113.

² Prof. Shields, *The Final Philosophy*, p. 213.

not be trustworthy. The history will be shaped to the theory, not the theory to the history. Such theories perhaps attract attention as ingenious speculations for a time and then sink into oblivion. Comte's theory excited not a little discussion for a few years; but it is already sinking into the oblivion of its many analogous predecessors.

We have already seen that knowledge on any subject attains completeness only by passing through the three grades of empirical, noetic or rationalistic, and theological thought.¹ The true course of thought is the reverse of that set forth in Comte's law; for it culminates with the theological and begins with the empirical. It also differs from Comte's law in this, that the human mind is not occupied with the three stages successively, and with each for a long period of time; but always, whatever it investigates, the mind passes through the three stages of thought in order to complete its knowledge of it. Hence we do not distinguish them as respectively transitional and permanent, but man's knowledge is permanent in the continuous use of the three in connection and unity. And it is equally true that he has been always and simultaneously occupied with the three spheres of knowledge, nature, man and God. And the facts of history show that, from age to age, the progress of knowledge has been going on at the same time in each grade, empirical, rationalistic and theological, and in each sphere, nature, man and God. Comte confounds theology with superstition and charges on it errors which were due only to the prevailing ignorance of an early age. He identifies theology with ignorance, and relegates all the ignorance of an age to its theology. He represents the progress from ignorance to knowledge as the progress from theology to science. The truth is that in the earlier ages man was ignorant on all subjects. If his theology was childish, so also were his philosophy and his empirical science. Ignorance and immaturity characterized his thinking on God; they equally characterized his thinking respecting man and nature. His progress from ignorance to knowledge on all subjects has been simultaneous. The progress of science, therefore, does not expel the belief in a divinity nor remove the necessity of ultimately explaining all phenomena by it. It makes the idea of God and his relations to the universe more intelligent, but not less true or less urgent.

2. History shows that atheism, wherever it has prevailed, has been disastrous to the interests of society.

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 293-344.

The prevalence of avowed atheism in any nation or community has been of rare occurrence and of short duration. The reign of atheism in France in the first revolution, for example, was short, and probably controlled the belief of but a small minority of the population.

Where atheism has prevailed it has proved disastrous. The reign of atheism in France is known in history as the Reign of Terror. The decay of the ancient religion in the Roman empire and the attendant gradual coming in of skepticism and atheism were accompanied with general corruption of morals and an enfeebling and disintegrating of society.

Conversely, the theories and revolutionary schemes of anarchists demand the rejection of all belief in God. The nihilists and revolutionists of all types, who are now seeking to destroy government and to resolve society into anarchy, agree in declaring that the first necessity is to root out all belief in God.

The argument is of equal force, whether atheism is in these cases a cause or a consequent of the corruption, and of the anarchical violence and terrorism. If it is a cause, then it is responsible for these evils. If it is a consequent, then theism is a barrier against corruption, terrorism and anarchy, which must be broken down before they can prevail.

3. A third line of argument from history would consist in pointing out the influence of religious belief in the progress of civilization. The presentation of this evidence would require a study of the whole history of man; its scope is too wide for presentation here. But by all my study of the subject I am convinced that religious belief has been an essential factor in the progress of man and of civilization; that this progress could never have been realized in atheism; that religious belief is essential not only to progress but also to the supremacy of law, to the stability, order, intelligence and virtue of the community; that it is thus essential to preserve the results already attained and to prevent degeneracy into corruption, disorder and violence, and a return to a barbarism, which, in the use of the agencies of civilization with the spirit and recklessness of barbarism, would be the most terrific the world has ever seen.

One of the marked characteristics of modern civilization is the great industrial movement which is exalting industrial enterprise into a public function, is determining the welfare of nations, and giving scope for the genius and ambition which aforesaid found no sphere but in politics and war. It would be easy to show

that Christianity has been one of the most powerful agencies in effecting this change.

For four hundred years the great struggle in political life has been to break down despotism and elevate the people to self-government. Underlying this are the great principles of the worth of a man and the sacredness of his rights inherent in his personality as a man; the equality of men before the law; the existence of government for the good of the governed, and the like. It was Christ who made these principles powers in civilization. He taught that a man is worth more than a world; he revealed God's estimate of the worth of a man in all which he does in Christ to turn him from sin and bring him back to God. He declares the equality of all men before God; each man is justified by his own faith and admitted to free communion with God without the intervention of any priest or any human mediation. And in the Fatherhood of God he gives a real and immovable basis for the brotherhood of man. Nothing short of the God over all can be the basis for the political equality and freedom of men.

The Lutheran revival in religion preceded the Baconian revival in science. And the Lutheran revival was a breaking away from authority in the sphere of thought to original investigation, from the authority of the Aristotelian logic not less than of the church. It was an assertion of the right of private judgment, a return to dealing with concrete realities instead of abstractions and words, a subordination of speculative inquiry to the practical needs and uses of men. These were the very principles of the Baconian movement; and they were applied by Luther in theology before they were applied by Bacon in science. And in the Reformation it was religion and theology which waked the human mind, and aroused the activity of thought which has since achieved so great results in physical science.

And so in all human progress it is the spiritual which precedes and quickens the progress of discovery and invention in the physical.¹

In fact we are indebted to religion for that fixed belief in progress which is now accepted as a sort of axiom in the face of all discouragements. It is the prophecy and promise of the Hebrew and Christian religion through the ages which have incorporated into human thinking the expectation that the future is to be better than the past.

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, 330-333.

And the more elevated and true the idea of God, the more rapid and genuine has been the progress of man. Accordingly for many centuries history has shown that the only progressive nations have been the Christian nations. And now progress is beginning among the oriental peoples only as it has been stimulated and guided from Christendom.

4. There can be no satisfactory philosophy of human history without the recognition of God and of man's relation to him in a moral and spiritual system.

An examination of human history discovers a progress of man toward the realization of a higher and better condition and the appearance more and more clearly of the advancing reign of righteousness, peace and universal good-will. It discovers a plan pervading history and progressively realized by the action of man under the influence of his surroundings; but it is plainly not a plan which men have devised or by any concert agreed on, any more than the coral polyps ever agreed on the plan according to which by the labors of many generations they build a Neptune's cup. Writers on the philosophy of history refer to the various agencies which have coöperated in bringing mankind to the highest advancement which it has yet attained. They tell us what was contributed by the Greek civilization and culture, what by the Roman, what by the Hebrew. They tell us of the far-reaching influence, in promoting civilization and progress, of great wars, of scientific discoveries, of industrial inventions; of the service rendered by Charlemagne, by Napoleon; of the preparation for the coming of Christ and the spread of Christianity made by the Roman conquests and the Greek philosophy. Nothing can be more certain than that these various agents acted without concert and without conscious design of realizing a preconceived plan for the progress which humanity has made and to which in fact they were important contributors. We are driven to the inference that there is in the history of man a progressive realization of an ideal plan which cannot be referred to man himself, but must be referred to some superior and all-embracing wisdom superintending and directing his progress.¹

In fact the very conception of a philosophy of human history presupposes that it has the unity and significance of a plan carried forward through the ages. The fact that the courses of human history can be thus comprehended in a philosophy implies that

¹ "Deus ordinem seculorum tanquam pulcherrimum carmen honestaret." — *De Civitate Dei*, lib. xi. cap. 18.

the history is philosophical; that there is a philosophy in it; that therefore there must be above it some superintending and directing mind, progressively realizing a grand ideal in the development of man.

If, on the other hand, an attempt is made to find a philosophy of history without God, no such philosophy will be found; it will be impracticable to bring the facts into the unity of a philosophical system. And in addition to this, the whole history of man will be found to be without worthy significance or end.

The Bible declares that God is establishing on earth a kingdom or reign of God, which is to be a kingdom of righteousness, peace and good-will. With this conception of God and of man under God's law in a moral and spiritual system, of man's sin and God's redeeming energy working in and with man for his renovation, development and blessedness, and of the gradual transformation of human society into the kingdom of God, we find a worthy significance and design of human history.

If all men eventually become worshipers of the one only living and true God, if as the children of God, their common Father, they dwell together in righteousness, peace and good-will, then the history of man will have demonstrated the existence and reign of God. And already the progress of man and the course of his development admit no satisfactory explanation without the recognition of God and of man's relation to him in a moral system.

But this line of thought reaches too far to be even entered on here. I can merely call attention to it as a line of evidence which will richly repay investigation.

VI. ANTHROPOMORPHISM. — The objection is urged that, after all, the idea of God is anthropomorphic; it is a fiction which man creates from the attributes of his own mind. Feuerbach, for example, says: "Man — this is the mystery of religion — projects his being into objectivity; and then again he converts this projected image of himself into a subject to which he himself becomes an object. Man is an object to God. It is not indifferent to God that man is good or evil."¹ The man creates his own God by unconsciously projecting his own attributes outside of himself and illuding himself with the belief that it is a real being other than himself, and then worships it as God. Thus a man's God, like the spectre on the Brocken, is only a magnified shadow of himself. Herbert Spencer puts the objection thus: "If for a moment

¹ Wesen des Christenthums, chap. i. § 2.

we made the grotesque supposition that the ticking and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of consciousness, and that a watch possessed of such a consciousness insisted on regarding the watchmaker's action as determined, like its own, by springs and escapements, we should simply complete a parallel of which religious teachers think much. And were we to suppose that a watch not only formulated the cause of its existence in these mechanical terms, but held that watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate this cause, and even vituperated, as atheistic watches, any that did not venture so to formulate it, we should merely illustrate the presumption of theologians by carrying their own argument a step further."¹ The same objection has been often urged in various forms. Mr. Huxley uses a death-watch ticking in a clock, and a piano listening to its own music. Hume tells us of a world of spiders imagining the creator to be an infinite spider which spun the world out of its own bowels. In the earlier Greek philosophy, Xenophanes presents the objection of anthropomorphism in essentially the same form. He says that men of different races picture their gods like themselves. The Thracians picture them as fair and red-haired, the Ethiopians as black and flat-nosed. And so, he says, if lions, oxen and horses knew the art of drawing, they would depict their gods severally in their own forms. And so, it is objected, men deceive themselves, "describing the Immortals in the language of mortals."² It is only an example of "our inclination to find our own figures in the clouds, our faces in the moon, our passions and sentiments even in inanimate matter."

The first answer is that the objection makes no distinction between the attributes and character peculiar to personality in its perfection and the non-essential forms in which personality is manifested. The theologian always distinguishes between a rhetorical or poetical ascription to God of hands or eyes, of anger or repentance, of human organs and passions which are not essential to personality and its perfection, and a philosophical recognition of God as the absolute Reason energizing freely in wisdom and love, which are of the essence of personality in its perfection. This distinction the objection entirely overlooks. The objection rests on the absurdity that if a watch should become endowed with reason it would still remain a mere machine just

¹ First Principles, pp. 110, 111.

² "Immortalia mortali sermone notantes." — Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, lib. v. 121.

as it was before, and therefore would see nothing in itself but mechanism and could ascribe nothing but mechanism to its maker. But if a watch were endowed with reason it would no longer be a mere machine, but a rational person. Then contemplating its own mechanism, it would infer, precisely as a rational man does in contemplating it, that it had a maker like itself in intelligence, but not necessarily like itself in its mechanism. And should this intelligent watch ridicule all intelligent watches that believe they were made by an intelligent maker, it would be like Mr. Spencer ridiculing intelligent men for believing their creator to be an intelligent being; and thus I “merely illustrate the presumption of” Mr. Spencer “by carrying” his “argument one step further.”

And this is evident not merely from the whimsical analogies in which the objection has so often been expressed, but also in its more scientific statement. Mr. John Fiske says: “The definition of intelligence being ‘the continuous adjustment of specialized inner relations to specialized outer relations,’ it follows that to represent the Deity as intelligent is to surround him with an environment, and thus to destroy his infinity and his self-existence.”¹ Mr. Spencer says: “So too must die out the belief that a Power present in innumerable worlds throughout infinite space, and who during millions of years needed no honoring by the inhabitants of earth, should be seized with a craving for praise; and having created mankind, should be angry with them if they do not perpetually tell him how great he is. . . . Passing over the familiar difficulties that a god who repents of what he has done must be lacking either in power or in foresight; that his anger presupposes an occurrence which has been contrary to intention, and so indicates a defect of means; we come to the deeper difficulty that such emotions, in common with all emotions, can exist only in a consciousness which is limited.” This is the reasoning of which Mr. Harrison says: “As a summary of philosophical conclusions on the theological problem it seems to me frankly unanswerable. It is the last word of the agnostic philosophy in its long controversy with theology.”² Mr. Fiske makes no distinction between what is essential in rationality and personality and what is merely a particular and contingent form in which it is manifested; and infers that because man is surrounded with an environment God must be so. Mr. Spencer, with his indorser, falls into the same error; he also criticises

¹ *Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii. pp. 394, 395.

² *Nineteenth Century*, Jan. 1884, pp. 6, 7; and March, 1884, p. 494.

rhetorical and poetical anthropomorphisms as philosophical propositions; and besides this, founds his reasoning on an astounding caricature of theism of his own invention. And Mr. Harrison declares his inference from this monstrous misrepresentation to be "an unanswerable summary of philosophical conclusions."

The objector insists on ascribing to God the limitations and imperfections of man. But reason and freedom, righteousness and benevolence, wisdom and love, truth, right, perfection and worth, are not limitations and imperfections; they are eternal and universal. Man participates in them; and they are rightly ascribed to God. But no theologian ascribes to God the finiteness, the imperfection of man, nor any human characteristic which is not essential to rational personality in its perfection. The objection proves no more than that it is absurd and ridiculous to hold it as philosophical truth that God has the eyes or ears or passions of a man. But the objection is of no force whatever against attributing to him reason and freedom, righteousness and benevolence, wisdom and love, intelligence and power. When Mr. Spencer attributes Power and Being to the Unknowable Absolute, he is just as anthropomorphic as is the theist when he attributes reason to the Absolute. For man has no knowledge of power and being except through his own consciousness. So also he is as anthropomorphic as the theist in saying, in the article quoted, "that the power which manifests itself in consciousness is but a differently conditioned form of the power which manifests itself beyond consciousness."

A second answer to the objection is that all scientific knowledge of nature is anthropomorphic in the same sense in which theism is so. The postulation of the universality of reason and of man's participation in its light is at the basis of all science. If this is anthropomorphism in theology it is equally anthropomorphism in all scientific thinking.

Physical science accepts our observation of outward things, though made through impressions on our own senses, as true knowledge of objective reality. The knowledge of the beings and forces of which physical science treats is given in our own consciousness. Our knowledge of being is primarily given in our knowledge of ourselves and of the objects which impinge on our sensorium. Our knowledge of force is given in our own consciousness in exerting or resisting it. Du Bois Reymond says: "Force is nothing but a hidden out-birth from the resistless tendency to personification which is impressed on us, like the rhetor-

ical knack of our brain in using figurative terms when the representation of anything lacks clearness. In the ideas of force and matter we see the same dualism which thrusts itself forward in the representation of God and the world, soul and body. It is a more refined form of the necessity which once impelled men to people the woods and the fountains, rocks, sea and air with creations of their own imagination.”¹ The hypothesis of atoms and molecules arises from a necessity of our own minds to refer qualities to a being, action to an agent, and ultimately to a determinate, indivisible being. The scientific conception of potential force as distinguished from active energy, is derived from our own consciousness of power unexerted in free will; and the same is the source of the materialistic conception of mind as a property of matter, contained “potentially” in the original homogeneous and nebulous matter. The attraction and repulsion of physical science are nothing but our own pull and push transferred to external bodies. The mechanical theory of the universe is derived from the conception of a machine made by man. Mr. Darwin describing the fertilization of plants by insects continually speaks of arrangements made “in order that” certain results may be secured. He uses the anthropomorphic language of final causes because no other can so exactly express the observed facts. Nature, when we come to investigate it, is found to be essentially anthropomorphic. Scientists sometimes try to avoid this by using more abstract and general terms. But in proportion as they do this, they make their language colorless and rob it of distinctive meaning. For example, when Mr. Spencer defines life as “the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations,” the relations being indefinite, the definition is equally applicable to a multitude of adjustments; and “adjustments,” the only word which has a distinctive meaning, has itself no meaning except as the act of a mind.

In addition to this, the ideas and laws in which science apprehends, differentiates and comprehends material things are ideas of the human mind. Kant says: “An idea must lie as the ground of the possibility of a product of nature.”² Plato had taught before him, that in every observation made by the senses the reason disengages an element exclusively its own, which, until this disengagement, had been mingled and hidden in the complex result. He aimed to trace all that is presented to the

¹ Quoted by Ulrici, *Gott und die Natur*, p. 25.

² *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, sect. 65.

senses in the visible world, down to its root in a deeper and invisible world ; and he held that the notion of a perfect science is a delusion when it does not penetrate to this profounder reality. And modern science is practically in accord with these teachings of both ancient and modern philosophy. Observed facts and rational ideas are both indispensable to science. Facts may be observed through the senses ; but science is attained only when the observed facts are known in their significance to intelligence, in their order and harmony under law, in their progressive realization of rational ideals and ends, and thus in their unity in a rational system. Hence the physical world and its movements and changes lay open to the observation of the senses of man for ages while scientific knowledge of them was slowly and laboriously attained. But the scientific significance, order, progressiveness and unity of the facts are found only in their accordant with the ideas, principles, laws, ideals and ends of human reason and intelligence. Physical science consists in taking up the realities of the outward world into the intellectual equivalents of human intelligence ; thus it is as essentially anthropomorphic as theism. This however is no evidence that it is not true, but just the contrary, that it is true science. It finds that nature in its essential constitution is anthropomorphic ; it is constituted rationally ; it is expressive of the ideas and principles of human reason, accordant with its truths and laws, and developing progressively toward the realization of its ideals and ends.

Science also assumes that the principles of reason regulative of human thought and action are regulative of thought and action throughout the universe ; and that the conclusions resting on them respecting observed facts are valid conclusions throughout the universe. Astronomy applies these principles and conclusions to masses and systems in remotest space ; microscopy, to bodies and motions too minute to be perceived by the naked eye ; chemistry, to the action and reaction of molecules in the inmost composition of matter ; geology and paleontology, to the formation of this planet into a habitable world and to the life on it from the most ancient times ; and evolution, beyond the universe as now constituted to the primitive nebulous matter from which it has been evolved. All this rests on the assumption that the principles regulative of human thought and action are equally regulative of all thought and action throughout the universe ; that what is absurd to the human reason is absurd and impossible to be realized everywhere ; that therefore the universe is pervaded

and directed by one and the same universal Reason, the same, in its essential constituent principles, with the reason of man ; and that all rational intelligence is everywhere and always essentially the same in kind. Accordingly Mr. Fiske says: "From first to last all our speculative successes and failures have agreed in teaching us that the more general principles of action which prevail to-day and in our own corner of the universe have always prevailed throughout as much of the universe as is accessible to our research. They have taught us that for the deciphering of the past and the predicting of the future no hypotheses are admissible which are not based on the actual behavior of things at present."¹

Theism simply accepts this and declares that the universal Reason thus found pervading and directing the universe is God, and that man as rational is in the likeness of God.

A third answer to the objection is that it rests on the assumption of the relativity and consequent untrustworthiness of all human knowledge, and, if valid, makes all human knowledge impossible. It is merely a rhetorical and pictorial way of reasserting this familiar doctrine of complete agnosticism. The objection implies that if any man assumes that the mind of another is like his own, that the mathematical axioms and demonstrations which are true to him are true anywhere beyond his own subjective consciousness, or that any principle on which he reasons or any conclusion which he reaches is true beyond his subjective consciousness, his assumption is anthropomorphic, fictitious and false.

Finally, I recall attention to the fact that the belief in God has its grounds in reason. We have seen that it arises spontaneously in experience as a primitive belief ; that God is revealed both in nature and in man ; that the belief in his existence is grounded in every part of the rational constitution of man ; that it is a practical need, and is confirmed by the whole history of man ; that it is a necessary idea of reason, without which it cannot solve its necessary problems. A belief thus grounded is not to be rooted up by the mere assertion that it is anthropomorphic, especially since the assertion, if true, is equally fatal to all knowledge. No doctrine or belief can be invalidated merely by the objection that it is anthropomorphic ; that is, that man's knowledge implies truths and laws, ideals and worthy ends, which are universal ; which, therefore, are principles and laws, ideals and worthy ends, of the Reason that pervades and regulates the universe. Wher-

¹ John Fiske, *Unseen World*, p. 4.

ever and whatever in his immortal existence man may be, these principles and laws, these ideals and ends of reason, will illuminate him. They are the light which lighteth every man.

“ On a far shore my land swam from my sight ;
But I could see familiar native stars ;
My home was shut from me by ocean bars,
Yet home hung there above me in the night.
Unchanged fell down on me Orion’s light ;
As always Venus rose and fiery Mars ;
My own the Pleiads yet : and without jars
In wonted tones sang all the heavenly height.
So when in death from underneath my feet
Rolls the round world, I then shall see the sky
Of God’s truths burning yet familiarly ;
My native constellations I shall greet.
I lose the outer, not the inner, eye,
The landscape, not the soul’s stars, when I die.”

PART IV.

GOD REVEALED IN CHRIST AS THE REDEEMER OF MAN FROM SIN.

“When I come to consider his life, his works, his teaching, the marvelous mingling in him of grandeur and simplicity, of sweetness and force, that incomprehensible perfection which never for a moment fails, . . . when I contemplate this grand marvel, which the world has seen only once and which has renewed the world, I do not ask myself if Christ was Divine; I should be rather tempted to ask myself if he were human.” — Lamennais, *Essai sur l'Indifférence*, tom. iv. p. 449.

“The mightiest heart that ever beat, stirred by the Spirit of God, how it wrought in his bosom. What words of rebuke, of comfort, counsel, promise, hope, did he pour out; words that stir the soul as summer dews call up the faint and sickly grass. What profound instruction in his proverbs and discourses; what wisdom in his homely sayings, so rich with Jewish life; what deep divinity of soul in his prayers, his action, sympathy, resignation. . . . Rarely, almost never, do we see the vast divinity within that soul, which, new though it was in the flesh, at one step goes before the world whole thousands of years; judges the race; decides for us questions we dare not agitate as yet, and breathes the very breath of heavenly love.” — Theodore Parker, *Discourse of Religion*, p. 294 f.

“It is of no use to say that Christ as exhibited in the gospels is not historical. . . . Who among his followers or among their proselytes was capable of inventing the sayings ascribed to Jesus or of imagining the life and character revealed in the gospels?” — J. S. Mill, *Essays on Religion*, pp. 253, 254.

“The more strongly negative criticism asserts its position as to the person of Jesus, the more unaccountable are his teachings and the results of his work.” — Edersheim, *Life of Jesus*, vol. i. p. 639.

“To deny that Christianity in its various forms has been and still is one of the greatest powers in the world, or to deny that its leading doctrines have in fact been associated in many ways with all that we commonly recognize as virtue, is like denying the agency of the sun in the physical world.” — Mr. Justice Stephen, *Nineteenth Cent.*, June, 1884, p. 914.

“God’s word is an anvil which has worn out many a hammer.” — Beza.

The Christian religion “is an ultimate whereto humanity can and must attain. . . . And when it is once attained mankind cannot go back. And it ought to be said, that the Christian religion, having appeared, cannot disappear again; since it has embodied itself in its divine form, it cannot come to dissolution.” — Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister, Wanderjahre*, bk. ii. chap. i.

“Then souls of men were shaken with emotions new and strange,
And creeds and thoughts were tossing in an agony of change.
The world, that had grown weary of its pleasures and its gains,
Felt a tide of youth and rapture rush through its wasted veins;
And life it never knew before was stirring to its core
The proud and puissant empire that was ‘Pagan Rome’ no more.

The seed that was so small had grown a tree that flourished grand,
The leaven in the woman's cake had leavened all the land.
Where silver Jordan runneth from the Lake of Galilee,
A narrow kingdom lies between the mountains and the sea;
From its hill-sides red with vineyards, the gentle Syrian wind
Bore the only voice that answered to the sobbing of mankind.
To the cottage of the fisher, to the poor man's mean abode,
The 'Desire of Nations' came, the Incarnate Son of God.
The sign that was a sign of shame to pagan and to Jew,
Had become an image glorious, that all men flocked unto;
The martyr at the stake for this esteemed the world but loss,
The emperor victorious won his battles in the Cross.'

Mrs. Cecil Frances Alexander.

CHAPTER XIV.

ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GOD'S REVELATION OF HIMSELF IN REDEMPTION THROUGH CHRIST.

THE presentation of the "Evidences of Christianity" is not included in the plan of this book. I propose to consider only what is distinctive and essential in the revelation of God in Christ; the essential character and the possibility of the miraculous in the redemptive action; and the unity and continuity of God's revelation of himself culminating in Christ. The coming of Christ is the epoch in the continuous revelation in which redeemed humanity is lifted to the highest plane of its earthly development in the kingdom of Christ, and is to continue thereon under the dispensation of the Spirit till the epoch, still in the future, when the natural life of mankind on earth will end, redeemed humanity will be lifted to a higher plane and the kingdom of Christ will be perpetuated in the heavenly glory.¹

¹ There are three principal lines of the Christian Evidence.

I. The evidence of historical documents and tradition.

II. From the biblical history in itself and in its vital connection with the history of mankind. It admits of no reasonable explanation, except as recording God's revelation of himself in historical action among men, redeeming them from sin and establishing his reign of righteousness on earth. This evidence is found in three distinct lines: In the history of Israel before Christ and since; in the life of Jesus; in the rise of the kingdom of Christ on earth and its progress through the ages.

III. The philosophical argument: Christianity, as history, doctrine and life, is in harmony with the fundamental principles and ideals of reason. It is accordant with its fundamental truths and laws, and fitted to realize the perfection and wellbeing of man; thus it satisfies the demands of reason. It takes up into itself the spiritual truth and motives in other religions, harmonizes them with the higher revelation in Christ, thus meets all the spiritual needs of man and proves itself to be the absolute and universal religion. It reveals the true significance and highest possibilities of human life, the true law and goal of human progress, and the motives and influences for its realization in God's love in Christ redeeming man from sin by the power of the divine Spirit, and establishing on earth his kingdom of righteousness and peace. Thus it is the only basis for a true philosophy of human history; for that philosophy must recognize as fundamental the fact of human sin and the necessity of redemption from it in order to the progressive development of man to his true perfection and wellbeing.

God's revelation of himself in Christ as the Redeemer of men from sin and condemnation as recorded in the Bible is the distinctive and essential fact of Christianity and the centre of all distinctively Christian doctrine. I propose to consider in this chapter what this revelation of God in redemption is, and thus to define Christianity by its distinctive and essential characteristics.

By Redemption I mean all which God does to deliver man from sin and condemnation and to bring him back to harmony with himself in the life of faith and love. It includes the whole action of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. It includes also God's action in human history preparing man for Christ's coming; it includes the descent of the Holy Spirit after his ascension, and the subsequent development of the kingdom of Christ under the dispensation of the Spirit till the close of the history of the human race in its natural life on earth; and it includes the final consummation of the kingdom beyond man's earthly life in the blessedness of heaven.

I. God's action in redemption is historical.

That it is historical is involved in the idea of redemption, which is God's action on and within men, and therefore must be in the courses of human history. It is God's action issuing in historical results; it influences men to turn from sin to God, renovates them to new spiritual life, establishes and perpetuates among them a kingdom of righteousness and good-will, transforms society into the kingdom of God. It reveals its progress in history by its effects, like a hidden brook, which by the livelier green betrays the secret of its winding course.

Christ is an historical personage. His life, teaching and work, his death and resurrection are accepted by Christians as historical facts. God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. It is also the conception of Christianity that the descent of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost was an historical fact; that ever since then the Spirit of God has been acting on men and in the courses of human history building up the kingdom of Christ on earth, and will continue so to act until the final consummation of man's earthly history. Nor does the historical action of God in redemption begin with Christ's earthly life. The biblical representation is that when man first sinned he made no movement to return, and had no disposition to do so. Separated from God by his iniquity he loved the distance well. But God in his love would have him return to his favor. On the very day of his first sin God sought the sinner fleeing and hiding from his maker,

called him to himself, and while condemning his sin, received him again as a worshiper. This was the beginning of redemption. And the Old Testament goes on to relate that God continued to reveal himself among men as gracious to all who returned to him; he accepted their worship, declared to them his law, taught them by his prophets; he revealed himself to Israel as their covenant God; he perpetuated his kingdom and educated the people in the hope of the Messiah. Thus the whole history recorded in the Old Testament looked forward to Christ.

Therefore "Christianity, being essentially redemption, is necessarily historical. It is the promised Christ of the Old Testament, the living, suffering, dying, risen Christ of the New Testament, the Christ reigning and life-giving in the dispensation of the Spirit. Christianity therefore is not primarily doctrine but history; not philosophy or ethics but the historical manifestation of God in his love redeeming man from sin. It is history in the past, life-giving energy in the present, promise for the future."¹

II. God's action in redemption involves the miraculous. Rothe says: "Miracles and prophecy are not adjuncts appended from without to a revelation in itself independent of them, but are constitutive elements of the revelation itself."²

The possibility of miracles is involved in the idea of redemption. Redemption implies such presence and action of God in the universe, such access of God to man, such intimacy of man's communion with him, such close relations of the spiritual system to the natural, as make miracles possible and reasonable; as in fact make them, when rightly apprehended, to cease to be miracles in the sense often attached to them, and bring them into strict accord with the constitution and law of the universe.

Miracles, in their relation to redemption, may be distinguished as essential and incidental.

The acts which are essential and fundamental in redemption are miraculous. Such are the person and life of Christ, his resurrection and ascension, the whole history of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. And the redemptive action of God in its preparatory stage recorded in the Old Testament involves the miraculous. In all that period God was related to his people by covenant, in which he promised his favor and blessing on condition of their trust in him and their fidelity to him in obe-

¹ The Kingdom of Christ on Earth, by Samuel Harris, p. 66. See Lectures iii. and iv.

² Studien und Kritiken, 1858, p. 23.

dience to the law. We have the record of the making of this covenant with Abraham, and of its renewal at successive epochs in their history. They were instructed by his prophets, who communicated to them his commands, his warnings and his promises. It was by this covenant of God with them that Israel was distinguished from other peoples. Thus the history of redemption through this period of preparation for Christ's coming was marked by both miracle and prophecy.

The miraculous, therefore, belongs to the essence of redemption, and consequently to the essence of Christianity. The attempt to retain Christianity after eliminating the miraculous is futile. Such an elimination changes the conception of Christianity from historical redemption through Christ to speculative philosophy and ethics. The residuum of speculative and ethical doctrine, if it can be called a system of religious thought, is not Christianity; and those who hold it, however wise and good, at least are not Christians in any true significance of the name.

Besides those miracles which were constitutive and essential in redemption are others which were incidental; as the miracles of healing.

Thomas Aquinas distinguishes the first class as miracles that are objects of our faith; the second as miracles which are for the confirmation of our faith. All the miracles of Christ and the apostles were wrought in carrying on the work of redemption and founding and extending Christ's kingdom on the earth.

Miracles have a threefold significance. They are acts of redemption, either constitutive and essential, or incidental. They are signs or evidences; signs of the spiritual and supernatural penetrating the natural; of the presence of the kingdom of God on earth and of its agencies and influences energizing among men; of the riches of that kingdom opened in works of beneficence; of the presence and power of God's redeeming grace empowering and authorizing the worker of the miracle; and of the glory and coming exaltation of Christ and the prevalence of his kingdom. And, lastly, as wonders, they arrest attention, awaken the spiritual capacities, arouse the conscience, enforce instruction, and thus are auxiliary to the introduction of the gospel into the unbelieving world.

III. God's redemptive action centring in Christ constitutes a revelation. In Christ and in God's redemptive action centring in him as recorded in the Bible, God reveals himself as the Redeemer of men from sin. The redemptive action is the revelation.

It is a revelation of God himself by what he does, as distinguished from a revelation of ready-made doctrines and precepts communicated in words.

It was shown in a former chapter that a man cannot know any object merely by his own subjective activity. The object must first act in some way on him and so reveal itself, and then the mind reacts on the object, perceiving and apprehending it. The same is true of God. Man cannot know God by dint of mere subjective thinking. There must be some action of God in which he comes out from the secrecy of his being and reveals himself. It is essential in the idea of revelation that it must be made primarily in what God does. Accordingly God's action in redemption constitutes his revelation of himself as redeemer. It is a revelation of himself made in actually redeeming men from condemnation and sin, not a revelation of truth communicated in words.

Here is a double contrast. The object revealed is not primarily formulated truth or doctrine or precept; it is not even religion; it is God himself, the Redeemer of men. And the revelation is made not primarily by the medium of words and sentences but by deeds. It is not an absent father writing to his children to instruct them as to the nature of the family and the grounds of filial duty and informing them what he would have them do. It is rather a father living among his children revealing himself in all which he does for and with them. God reveals himself in redemption as the sun reveals itself by shining to all that see its light and feel its heat. Very different would the revelation of the sun be by a message to men in total darkness, teaching them by words the scientific theory of light.

Accordingly the word in which God communicates his fullest revelation is the living word made flesh in Christ; God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." The prophet Malachi, in messianic vision, sees this revelation as the rising of the sun: "Unto you that fear my name shall the Sun of Righteousness arise with healing in his wings." And in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said of him, under the same likeness to the sun, that he is the effulgence or outshining of God's glory and the very image of his substance. But God reveals himself in Christ by what he is and does rather than by what he says. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews begins by declaring that God has revealed himself

in his Son, and is occupied throughout the epistle expressly in explaining what the revelation is. But in the whole letter he does not quote a single saying of Christ, but unfolds the significance of the revelation made in what he is and does. The other epistles in the New Testament are full of Christ; they profess to know nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified. Yet in them all there is scarcely a quotation of any sentence which he uttered. Christ when on earth made himself the principal object of his own teaching. He proclaimed himself as the predicted Messiah; he explained the true nature of his kingdom and the character of those who should be admitted to it. But he said comparatively little of his death. How could he? His death was itself the revelation; it was itself the sacrifice of atonement. Necessarily he must let the fact reveal its significance. He did not come to preach redemption but to redeem. He did not come to preach the gospel, but to give us a gospel to be preached; to do the great work of redemption which reveals God's grace to sinners, the glad tidings of which are the gospel. The significance of his revelation of God does not consist primarily in "the words of the Master," as rationalists like to express it, but in what he is and does, the Immanuel, the God with us.

God's action centring in Christ and redeeming man from sin is, both as to that which is revealed and the method of the revelation, peculiar to itself, distinct from all other revelations, and transcends them all.

The old distinction of natural and revealed religion and natural and revealed theology is no longer available. All religion and all knowledge of God imply some action of God revealing himself to men. In this sense God reveals himself to all men. This Paul affirms in the first and second chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, and in his speeches at Athens and at Lystra. This universal revelation has been already set forth. God reveals himself as the absolute Being in the necessary principles and laws of thought which underlie all scientific knowledge and make such knowledge possible. In the universe he reveals himself as its first Cause and as the Power that maintains it and acts in it. In the constitution and course of nature and in the constitution and history of man he reveals himself as the absolute Reason, the personal God. And in man's rational and moral constitution and freedom God reveals himself as the righteous moral lawgiver and judge; and reveals man to himself not only as a rational free agent but also as a sinner against God in the trans-

gression of his righteous law. Christianity then is not distinguished from the so called natural religion and theology by the fact of revelation, but by the fact of an additional revelation peculiar to itself.

In the first place, it is distinguished by a peculiar line of historical action in which God reveals himself as the redeemer of men from sin. It is God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. From the beginning of history we trace a line of action in which God reveals himself as gracious to sinners. This action looks forward to Christ and culminates in him. From the God in Christ proceeds the divine Spirit. He illuminates the minds of men, darkened with sin, with the knowledge of God revealed in Christ as the Redeemer; he bears the influences and energies of God's redeeming grace through all the world and perpetuates them through the earthly history of mankind; thus he from age to age is gathering out of the world a community of the redeemed, a kingdom of Christ, a kingdom of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit, comprising all who under the influence of God's grace are willing to turn from sin and to trust and serve God in a new and spiritual life.

In the second place, God's revelation of himself in Christ is distinguished by the peculiar matter of the revelation. He reveals himself as the Redeemer of men from sin. When man by sin has sundered the bonds of his union with God in filial trust and service, the questions arise, can he be received again to the favor of God and restored to his normal union with him; and if God can receive him, can the sinner be influenced of his own free will to return. To these questions no answer is given in the revelation of God in the constitution and course of nature, or in the constitution of man, or in his history aside from the history of redemption in Christ. The answer from these sources, if any, would rather seem to be that sin, as man's wilful rupturing of his normal union with God, as his setting up for himself in self-sufficiency and repudiation of his condition as a creature, as a contradicting of the universal reason and of the fundamental constitution of the universe, must make it forever impossible for man to regain his normal union with God and so to realize his true perfection and wellbeing. Plainly it is impossible unless God first by his own action in some way reveals himself gracious and accessible even to sinners. It is in Christ and only in him that he makes this revelation. In him he makes atonement for sin, and opens the way for the free return of every sinful man who

will. In him he reveals himself gracious to sinners with open heart ready to receive them to his favor, when they return to him. And this is the Gospel of Christ, the glad tidings of great joy to all people. But this is not all. God not merely waits to be gracious to sinners when they return to him, but he puts forth positive influence to arouse and guide and draw to himself sinners having of themselves no disposition to come. While the minds of men are darkened with sin so that the light of the eternal wisdom and love are hidden, God in Christ, the eternal Reason which is the true light of every man, breaks through the darkening clouds and shines into their hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. And while men are yet sinners, with their wills fixed in the renunciation of God, in their self-sufficiency, self-will, self-seeking and self-glorying, while their desires and affections are perverted, their spiritual susceptibilities benumbed, and their fleshly nature exalted above the spiritual, God in Christ comes to them by the Spirit with heavenly influences and energies to quicken them to spiritual life, and to supply divine guidance and grace to help in time of need to every one willing to return to the life of filial trust and loving service and so to regain the privilege and blessedness of the sons of God. And here again is the gospel of Christ, the glad tidings to all.

This historical action of God in Christ redeeming the world from sin is the revelation of God peculiar to Christianity and distinctive of it. It is distinctive and peculiar both as to what it reveals and as to the historical action in which the revelation has been made. It is therefore also distinguished from all other revelations by its superior fulness and completeness, by its adaptedness to all the spiritual needs of man and by its power of spiritual renovation. It is God's revelation of himself in its highest and consummate form. As Dr. Dörner expresses it, 'The perfecting of the self-revelation of God is nothing other than the incarnation of God.'¹ This is the new revelation which breaks through the old circle of the natural life, to make us by a birth of the Spirit into new creatures in Christ and children of God. And if so, then God's coming into humanity in Christ to redeem man from condemnation and sin and to set up his reign of righteousness and grace, is the central and fundamental fact in human history, to which all other revelations and religions are subordinated, on which all true theology must centre, and on which

¹ System of Christian Doctrine, vol. iii. p. 141, Trans.

the true significance and philosophy of all other history must depend.

IV. The Christian revelation includes both the historical or public and the prophetic or private. Both are facts, and therefore both, in the broadest meaning of the word, are historical. But the distinction may be designated by these words in the lack of any which are more exact. The historical or public revelations are redemptive acts open to common observation, as the life, works, death and resurrection of Christ; and in the Old Testament the deliverance from Egypt and other divine interpositions in the history of Israel. The prophetic or private revelations are divine influences revealing God in the consciousness of an individual, so that he knows God in experience and is able to testify to others of what he has thus known of God. This is the essence of all prophecy. In this sense all Christians, as recipients of the witness of the Spirit and as thus themselves witnesses for God, are prophets. The prophets of the Bible were subjects of a special divine influence and inspired to testify of what God had revealed to them. So Ewald represents it: "We must recognize in the prophets one of the most wonderful primal faculties of the soul, potentially existing through the whole human race, but revealed in especial strength, truth and persistence in the history of Israel only." "The spirit of every true prophet begins with beholding the divine light, and being absorbed into the mind and will of God."

Prophecy is a knowledge and declaration, not of future events only, but of God in any revelation of himself within the consciousness of an individual. In Israel the prophets not only foretold future events, but were revealers of the truth, character and will of God, and preachers of righteousness. They "negotiated between God and man." They stood for God, his law and covenant against all wickedness, warned the people of impending judgments on their sins, declared God's promises, and strove to keep them faithful to their covenant with him.

Prophecy sustains important relations to redemption. Prophetic revelation is a part of the divine action in redemption, either essential or incidental. The revelation of God in the consciousness of an individual through the influence of the Spirit convincing of sin, renewing, illuminating and sanctifying, giving peace with God and inspiring with courage and hope, invigorating with divine energy in every good work, is essential in redeeming the person from sin and restoring him to his normal union and

communion with God, so that he is filled with all the fulness of God. Promise of blessing, both to the individual and to the community of the redeemed, is inseparable from the revelation of God's grace in redemption. The preaching of the gospel, the testifying of those in whom Christ is revealed, is essential in the idea of redemption as carried forward among men through the agency of Christians working together with God and finding therein their own education and development, in fellowship with God, into the likeness of Jesus Christ. In this sense prophecy is perpetual in the kingdom of Christ.

Prediction, also, by men specially inspired, is essential in the carrying forward of redemption. Such is the messianic prophecy which pervades the prophecies of the Old Testament. It was the declaration by inspired men of the revelation, which they had received in divers portions and divers manners, of the central idea and central fact of redemption. Other predictions of particular events, though they belong to the general course of redemptive action, are not essential but incidental. Thus the revelation of God in his redemptive action is both historical and prophetic, and the latter is always subordinate to the former. So a great general reveals the plan of his campaign in actually carrying it through, and therein also reveals himself as a great military genius. But in the execution of his plan he must take subordinate commanders into his confidence, disclose to them some general idea of his plan, and from step to step its details in various parts and in various ways. And these private revelations are acts essential or incidental to the action of the campaign.

Prediction in its fulfilment has also evidential value. The fulfilment in Jesus Christ of the messianic prophecy is evidence that in him God is redeeming the world. The history unfolds in agreement with the prophetic plan. The Old Testament contains the New as the bud contains the flower. In Christ the bud of prophecy opens into the flower of history. Redemption moves on in an atmosphere of promise, and prediction of greater things to come is but the vocalization of its vital breath. The fact that the spirit of promise and of prophecy pervades the Hebrew religion, unfolding into realization in Christianity and thence into larger promise, is evidence that this religion is from God. In the religions of Egypt, India, Persia, China, there is no prophecy and no promise. It is a characteristic of an ethnic religion that it assumes its own completeness, and is bound within its own limits. It admits no outlook to a future when it will burst its cere-

ments, rise to a new life and transcend itself. And it has no consciousness of a destiny and vital power to renovate society and to quicken and guide its progress to a future always better than the past. Such development and progress are precluded by the essence of these religions. Pantheism, in making God everything, makes him nothing. It recognizes only an unconscious indeterminate forever evolving into the universe and resolving back into the infinite. The movement is not forward and progressive, but ever in a circle. There is no consciousness, no intelligence, no freedom, no love, no wisdom. The generations of men are but the indeterminate, the unconscious evolved, all on the same level, all abreast rather than in movement forward. God is chained by fate, man by caste. In such a system what messianic hope can bud and blossom? What expectation and prophecy of a kingdom of God growing like the mustard-seed can spring up? But the very genius of the Hebrew religion was its outlook to the future. Its very life was in the expectation of a development into something transcending itself. It carried ever in its bosom the primal promise, "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." This the prophets unfolded with ever increasing clearness and fulness, until the expectation of its fulfilment saturated the life of the people and became what has been called The Hebrew Utopia. But this messianic expectation was realized in Christ, and from him the religion of promise and hope, of enthusiasm for humanity, of ever widening and deepening progress, has been prevailing in the world. And this progress is accordant with the essence of the religion. Here is the personal God acting in consciousness and freedom. He is the eternal Reason; he is the almighty Power acting freely in eternal harmony with the Reason. Here are wisdom and love, here is God with men, gracious even to the sinful when they return to him; here is God redeeming men from sin. Here that which has been ceases to be the measure of that which shall be; the miracle of free will bursts forth in the world and men are in the image of God, know him and can trust and serve him. Then a kingdom of God, a reign of righteousness and peace, appears on the earth; the old gives place to the better and more vigorous new; old institutions become effete and pass away; and in the face of all hindrances and delays, the believer in Christ believes that the ancient prophecy will surely be fulfilled, that "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea."

Prediction is also related to redemption as giving instruction

and motive, as inspiring courage and enthusiasm and directing endeavor. The Christian works for the welfare of men in advancing the kingdom of Christ, in the inspiration of expected victory; he knows that it is "a kingdom which cannot be moved."

V. It follows that God's revelation of himself is through a human medium.

The reception of it must be through the medium of the susceptibilities and powers of a human soul. As a revelation of God it must be not only apprehended by the intellect but accepted in the trustfulness of the heart. There must be a human medium and the mediation must be both intellectual and moral. All conception of revelation poured into a man in a mechanical way without his personal and free participation in it as its intelligent and trustful recipient, is destructive of its essential significance as a revelation. Even if the revelation were after the manner of the Arabian Nights, and the future, the distant, the unknown were seen in a magic mirror, the seer must apprehend for himself what the mirror reveals, must interpret its significance in its practical relations to himself and to persons and interests within the circle of his previous knowledge. And this must be true of revelation however made. If it is historical and public the observer must apprehend and interpret the event with his own mental powers, just as an astronomer must observe the heavenly bodies and their movements, and by the intelligent faculties of his own mind find out their scientific significance. And if it is a prophetic revelation within the man's own consciousness, he must in like manner apprehend and interpret its significance. And he must do this, under the continued influence of the Spirit, but with his own faculties, in the light of his previous knowledge, and in view of the bearing of the revelation on existing conditions and circumstances. And as God's revelation pertains to the moral and spiritual in man, its reception and interpretation will depend on the moral and spiritual state of the man. Hence Christ compares his word to seed, the growth of which depends on the receptivity and condition of the soil on which it falls. Revelation must find in man some soil in which it can inhere and take root. Otherwise it is abortive. This distinguishes Christianity from heathen religions. In these the alleged revelations are not given through an intelligent, moral and personal medium. The Pythia uttered her oracles only when possessed by the god and beside herself in mantic fury. Christianity, on the contrary,

insists that "the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets."

It must also be through a human medium that the revelation is communicated. Prophecy is communicated first by the prophet who has received it. And both historical revelation and prophetic are communicated, by those who have received them, to all people. The human spirit enlightened and fired by the Spirit of God is the only adequate agency for communicating God's revelation of himself in Christ to all mankind. Hence our Saviour's command is, "Go ye."

The action of God in redemption and the revelation of himself made thereby as redeemer is necessarily progressive. This is not on account of any imperfection in God, but on account of the limitation and imperfection of man to whom the revelation is made and by whom it is received, communicated and perpetuated. God's action in redemption and the revelation made by it go on in the courses of human history. For this reason a large part of the Bible is history of the ordinary actions of men and the ordinary providence of God in human affairs. The revelation is the heavenly jewel; the human history is its necessary setting. Hence along with the distinctively redemptive action go always the human agency and action through which it is connected with humanity. Hence the revelation is everywhere related to the historical exigencies of the time; it bears the marks of the age and country in which it was given, and even of the individual prophet or apostle who received it. Paul's epistles were written to meet existing conditions in the churches to which they were addressed. The inspired writings are, in various forms, biography, history, doctrines and precepts, poetry, letters, proverbs and parables. The revelation must therefore be progressive. Facts and ideas familiar to all in modern civilization could not have been communicated in the languages of ancient time. No prophet could have predicted intelligibly at the court of David, king of Israel, that on April 4, in the year of our Lord, 1885, in a battle fought that day with cannon and rifles in Egypt, a position was shelled by the English at two o'clock in the afternoon, and the news of this event was sent by electric cable and announced in New York in America on the same day before the clock struck two in that city; that it was printed the same afternoon in the newspapers, and that one of these sent by rail was read in a town seventy miles from New York at seven o'clock the same evening. Here is the necessity that God's revelation of

himself must be progressive. God can reveal himself no faster than is commensurate with the knowledge, the condition, the receptivity of the men on whom he acts and to whom and through whom he reveals himself. There must be a preparatory dispensation before Christ comes. The race must be educated to receive the larger revelation. The redemptive action must be adjusted to the existing capacity and condition of men; the light must be admitted gradually to the eye enfeebled in long darkness; a sudden excess of light would only dazzle and blind. Archbishop Whately illustrates this necessary progressiveness of revelation by a father writing letters to a son from early childhood to full manhood. A better illustration would be from a father living with his son, revealing himself as father both by what he does and by counsel and instruction; the son meanwhile from early childhood up keeping a diary or record both of his father's acts and of his counsel and teaching as received and understood by him at the time. The revelation of the father to the son as thus recorded would necessarily be progressive. The father would adapt his conduct, counsel and instruction to the unfolding capacity of the child. The child would record them with such capacity of apprehension and expression as he had at the time and in their application to the current events and the existing circumstances. And yet by the very process the father is progressively educating the son to capacity for larger and higher instruction, and to a more mature and complete understanding of the father's plan in educating him, and of his fatherly character and love.

All religions claim to rest on revelation. But not one of these alleged revelations, so far as it is the tradition of the action of a god, declares any unity of plan and continuity of beneficent action on the part of the god, aiming at the spiritual renovation of human character and the reconciliation of man with God. The Christian revelation, on the contrary, is the manifestation of God bringing a divine life into the world, the coming of a divine energy into human history progressively revealing God as the redeemer of men from sin, and issuing in the coming of Christ, in whom God is reconciling the world to himself, and the kingdom of righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit is securely founded and begins to pervade the world.

Revelation is not an end in itself. God makes the revelation by his gracious action redeeming men from sin; the revelation is not an end in itself but is subordinate to the redemption of men

from sin, and to the advancement of the kingdom of God, which in its progressive realization is the consummation of all good for mankind. What is revealed is God himself. God must be what he is before he can reveal himself as he is. His action in redemption is his revelation to man of what he is. His eternal ethical character is Love including both righteousness and goodwill. He redeems men from sin because redemption is the spontaneous and free acting out among and upon sinful men of his eternal ethical character. In this redemptive action he reveals himself as eternal Love. The revelation is incidental to his redemptive action; for if he acts towards men at all he will act out his eternal ethical character; and in acting it out he reveals himself as eternal Love. And the revelation is subordinate to the design of redemption; for the revelation of his love is made in his redemptive action in order to draw men away from their sin and misery to reconciliation with himself.

VI. The Bible is the inspired record of God's action centring in Christ, redeeming man from sin and establishing his kingdom of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit. It is not itself the revelation, but it is the inspired record of the revelation and preserves its contents.

The Bible is necessary for the preservation of the revelation. This is well expressed by Rothe: "Revelation should not be like a meteor flashing for a moment on the world, but should fix itself like the sun in the firmament to bring the full clear day over the whole circuit of the earth. It must then incorporate itself organically into the existence and life of the race, and become an historical power and thus a factor in the development of the world's history. To this end it must be written."¹ As the kingdom grows the knowledge of God's past action in establishing it and especially of his coming in Christ, must be perpetuated and extended. And this is the design of the record in the Christian Scriptures. The Bible is not the revelation itself but the record of it; it is essential to its preservation. John Wallis, one of the clerks of the Westminster Assembly, said: "The Scriptures in themselves are a lantern rather than a light."² But they who would destroy the lantern in order that the light may shine more clearly would only find the light blown out.

The Bible is the record of God's action in Christ redeeming men from sin, as distinguished from a collection of doctrines and precepts revealed in propositions to inspired men, and from a rec-

¹ Zur Dogmatik, pp. 121, 122.

² Sermons, London, 1791, p. 127.

ord of the religious sentiments and experiences of pious persons. It is the record both of the historical or public, and of the prophetic or private revelations. But the latter are presented as they were given, in their historical setting, in their place in the history and their relation to the then existing conditions and exigencies of the divine kingdom; and they are seldom elaborated into formulas of doctrine or vindicated by any argument.

The Bible is not a collection of truths formulated in propositions, which God from time to time whispered in the ear to be communicated to the world as the unchanging formulas of thought and life for all time. It records indeed the teachings of prophets and apostles; it records the teachings of Christ — Logia, as Matthew Arnold calls them, “words of the master,” in which they, who regard him as a teacher only, find the whole significance of his mission. But, while these are of inestimable worth, they are not the essence of the biblical revelation. God reveals himself by his action on and before men. The revelation recorded in the Bible is that which God made by his historic action redeeming man from sin, culminating in Christ and in the presence and power of the Holy Spirit, issuing in the continued agencies and influences of God’s redeeming grace working in humanity and transforming society into the kingdom of God. This historic redemption and the life arising from it are the essence of Christianity. The Bible therefore is not a system of philosophy, ethics or theology; it is not an “arsenal of proof-texts.” “The gospel is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek.” (Rom. i. 16.) If we get out of it a system of truth as to God and his relations to man, we must do it as an astronomer gets a system of astronomy from the heavenly bodies, as a botanist gets a system of botany from the plants, as a statesman gets a system of political administration from the history of man. The facts are in the heavens, in the plants, in the history of man; the science is found by human observation and thought. It is only in an analogous way that we get our theology, by studying the facts of God’s historical action in redemption recorded in the Bible.

The conception of the Bible as a collection of doctrines and precepts was common in the Middle Ages and has been scarcely less so in Protestant theology. Theologians have used it as an arsenal of proof-texts. Luther said: “Therefore are St. Paul’s epistles more a gospel than Matthew, Mark and Luke. For the latter record not much more than the history of Christ’s works

and miracles. But the grace which we have through Christ no one presents so bravely as St. Paul. Because now much more lies in the word than in the works and deeds of Christ, if we must dispense with one of these, it were better to be without the works and the history than the word and doctrine; so are those books to be valued most highly which treat most fully of the doctrine and word of Christ.”¹ And coming down to the most recent times, I find the following in two different numbers of one of our most widely circulated religious newspapers: “Christ was an instructor, a lecturer, a reformer, an agitator, and not a magistrate or king, or in any sense a lawgiver.” “Many Christians regard the Bible as a clear and comprehensive revelation concerning God and divine government, which contains the whole truth concerning him and his purposes, so that humbly studied and heartily received it will furnish a complete science of God and divine things. I do not so understand the Bible. It appears to me to be simply a book of practical directions for godly living in this present life.”

Professor Robertson Smith rejects the mediæval conception of the Bible as a book of ready-made doctrines and precepts; but he falls into an error of a similar kind when he says: “The Bible is a book of experimental religion. . . . In the Bible God and man meet together and hold such converse as is the abiding pattern and rule of all religious experience.” He recognizes its historical character, not as the history of the redemptive action in which God reveals himself, but “its peculiar worth” is in the record of the personal experience of individuals in communion with God. This is as erroneous and misleading a conception as that which regards it primarily as a revelation of doctrines, or “a book of practical directions for godly living.” It remains an arsenal of texts as really as it was to the dogmatist; texts which the believer appropriates as fitting his own experience, and as given primarily for this very purpose. It is “a personal message to me.” And the conception is of God primarily making a private revelation to individuals, instead of primarily working the redemption of man and setting up his kingdom of righteousness. It remains as much as ever a whispering in the ear of an individual instead of God’s majestic march through history, redeeming man from sin.²

And this historic character of the Bible, instead of implying

¹ Preface to Exposition of the Epistles of Peter and Jude.

² The Old Testament in the Jewish Church, pp. 11, 12, 13, 15, 18.

any detracting from its divine authority, greatly enhances its significance as a revelation of God.

It confirms its truth, as rooted in history. The Bible purports to be the record of a progress of God through human history reconciling man to himself and thus establishing in the hearts of men the reign of God, the divine kingdom of righteousness and good-will, of peace and joy in God; a progress involving the coming of God in Christ, the Redeemer, from whom the redeeming energy goes out through all the world and continues through all following ages, extending and perpetuating the kingdom of Christ by the agency of men and women quickened to the life of faith and Christ-like love, under the influence of the ever present Spirit of God. The making of this biblical record went on through the ages, connected with the redemptive action and inseparable from the various exigencies of its progress and the divine manifestations made in them. The biblical record is rooted in the history which it records. The truth of the Bible is the truth of a course of history. It can be rooted out from the life and history of man only when this whole history is rooted out.

The Bible itself also must be accounted for. It is a collection of small books written at different periods in the course of many centuries. The writers were of various conditions and acquirements, from kings and priests to shepherds and fishermen, some learned, some unlearned, living in widely separated ages and widely different conditions of society. The books were written in almost every variety of literary form. Their all-pervading idea of God's redemptive action and kingdom is unique, found nowhere in human literature outside of the Bible and the range of its influence. This great idea sets forth as the end to be attained, the highest life of man, the realization of the highest possibilities of his being in righteousness and good-will and reconciliation with God, and the universal extension of a spiritual kingdom of renewed men. Yet these many authors, writing each about the events and with the culture and under the influence of their nation and age, grasp and unfold this unique idea as they saw it, in the forms and coloring respectively of their own times. Such a result was possible only if God was really moving through the ages in his redemptive action and thus actually making the revelation which these books record.

Not only is the Bible rooted in the history of the past, but it challenges verification from the history of the future. It finds the true significance of history in the relation of man to the God

of righteousness and grace and in the perpetuation and advancement of his spiritual kingdom among men. And as these ends shall be more and more realized in the progressive history of man, the verification of the Bible will be continually going on.

Contrast the Bible, thus the outgrowth of the ages, with the Koran, which records no redemptive action of God in humanity through the ages, which had no roots in the past, but was the creation of a single man in a small part of a single life-time, and professes to be only the record of private communications made secretly to him.

Thus the conception of the Bible which I have presented shows the irresistible evidence of its truth as the product of God's historical action through the ages.

And this sets aside the objection of F. W. Newman, Rousseau and others, that a revelation made in a book is impossible. As Rousseau puts it, "revelation is not possible even though God should wish it; for as the first truths are cognizable to all intuitively, no other truths, as truths of religion, can rise to the same rank." Certainly reason must always be supreme in the sphere of truth. No miracles can prove that it is right to hate one's neighbor. But the objection rests wholly on the supposition that the Bible is a collection of ready-made propositions divinely revealed. It is of no force against the Bible rightly conceived. For the revelation is not "made in a book;" but made in the historical action of God in his redeeming grace, and is only recorded in the book. And this ought to have been perceived by Rousseau himself when he put into the mouth of the Savoyard vicar his much admired confession of the revelation of the divine in the life of Christ.¹

And this conception of the Bible gives it a certain independence of the results of criticism. If the Bible is a collection of propositions given directly by God, then one error throws suspicion on all. But if the revelation is made in God's historical action in Israel preparatory to Christ's coming and then in Christ himself, then a single error of fact does not invalidate the history as a whole; as the recent discovery that Pocahontas did not interpose between Captain Smith and the club of the savage does not disprove the history of Virginia nor of these persons themselves. Critical discussions of the date and authorship of Deuteronomy do not destroy the credibility of the history of Israel, nor the fact that messianic prophecy pervaded its literature, nor the

¹ *Émile*, livre iv. pp. 369, 370. F. W. Newman, *The Soul*.

fact that the distinctive service of Israel to humanity was to communicate the knowledge of the one true God and to bring Christ and his benign religion into the world. So Ewald rebukes "many inquirers of modern times, who give themselves the air of being very wise and circumspect, and not only scorn to pursue the modest traces on the ground, — preferring the mazes of their own invention, — but will surrender even such a lofty and conspicuous person as Moses, the Man of God." And if one is convinced on scientific grounds that Joshua did not cause the sun to stand still, or on critical grounds that an angel did not trouble the water in the pool of Bethesda, these conclusions do not make it necessary to disbelieve that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself or to abandon all our religious faith and hope in him. If our faith rests on the letter of the Bible, it stands unstable, like an inverted pyramid on its apex, and the disturbance of a letter by criticism overturns our faith. But if our faith rests on God as the redeemer of men revealed in his gracious action in the history recorded in the Bible, nothing can unsettle our faith which does not unsettle the whole course of the history.

It must be added that nothing can take away this faith which does not equally take its deepest significance from the life of every individual and from the history of mankind. Man bound to the world of sense and shut up within the life of selfish appetite and desire cannot realize the nobleness of life, the ideal of his being nor his true good. His desires grow by gratification, and his getting, with his most eager diligence, can never overtake his discontent. He is the Prometheus bound whose ever living heart is gnawed by ever consuming greed and insatiable desires. It is the life of insatiable longing and fruitless pursuit which Goethe has pictured over and over; in Werther, in Wilhelm Meister, in Faust, and in a peculiar form in his Tasso, the type of one living in the visions of the poet, in the sensitiveness of the artist, in the refinement of high culture, and bewildered and hurt by contact with the realities of life. In these characters Goethe pictures himself and the life of unsatisfied yearning and endless unrest in which, as he said in his later years, he himself had lived. Life can be redeemed from this fruitless activity and ever goading restlessness only as man knows himself in his relations to God and his likeness to him, and in the life of faith in God and universal love becomes a worker with God to extend his kingdom of righteousness and good-will, and thus realizes his own perfection and wellbeing and sees his earthly life and work unfolding into

the life eternal. Then life is found to be no longer a failure, a series of illusions and disappointments, vanity of vanities and vexation of spirit, but a sphere for the noblest work and the achievement of the noblest ends, rich and satisfying alike in the pursuit and the attainment, in which success is assured in the progressive realization of the highest possibilities of the being and in promoting the highest welfare of man. In a Christian life there is no place for the despairing question, Is life worth living? A great philosopher said: "I have spent my life in laboriously doing nothing." A great emperor said: "I have tried everything, and nothing is of any profit." Goethe said his life had been a continual rolling of a stone up hill, which as continually rolled back. But Paul said: "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith; henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness;" in the retrospect, fidelity, earnestness and achievement; in the future, beyond the bloody death, a continued career from glory to glory.

The same line of thought is true of the history of mankind. The highest destiny of the individual determines the highest destiny of mankind. Human history has no worthy object except as there is in the process of realization among men a kingdom of God in which all possible perfection, blessedness and worth are progressively attained on earth, and which, as the successive generations of men pass away, is unfolding into the kingdom of heaven. Pessimism is the necessary conception of the life and destiny of the individual and of the history and destiny of mankind, if we must leave out the high possibilities of man's being which are involved in his participation in the light of the divine Reason, in his likeness to God in his rational and free personality, in the fact of God's redeeming action revealing himself in human history, and in man's capacity and privilege to commune with God and to be a worker with him in the advancement of his kingdom of righteousness and good-will. So Victor Hugo says: "God is found at the end of all. Let us not forget it, but let us teach it to all; there would be no dignity in living and life would not be worth its pain, if we are to die totally. That which alleviates toil, which sanctifies work, which renders man strong, good, wise, patient, beneficent, just, at once humble and great, worthy of intelligence, worthy of liberty, is the having before him the perpetual vision of a better world shining through the darkness of this life."¹

¹ Speech on the Falloux Law, 1850.

The Bible is also the medium of fellowship with the people of God in all the ages. It reveals God in his redeeming grace, and the faith in him which has vitalized the Christian experience of his people in all the ages. Thus, while the Christian under the influence of the Spirit finds God revealed in the Bible directly to his own soul, he therein also finds himself in fellowship with all who have trusted the God of grace as he has revealed himself in ages past. Our God is the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob. As Paul declares, "We, brethren, as Isaac was, are the children of promise." We utter our devotion in the words of penitence, trust and praise in the Hebrew Psalms. In the New Testament we are brought into communion with Christ and his apostles. In the first words of the prayer which our Lord taught us we must recognize this fellowship with all men, and say, "Our father." Whatever destroys our belief of God's revelation of himself recorded in the Bible, also dissolves into illusion all which is deepest, purest and most ennobling in the fellowship of men.

With the historical conception of the Bible we shall interpret it more correctly, shall apprehend its significance in greater richness and fulness, and shall apply it practically with more wisdom and efficiency.

We shall interpret it more correctly. The Bible is the record of God's historical action redeeming men from sin and in it revealing himself as the God of righteousness and grace. As in a grand panorama it discloses to us God moving in the courses of human history, revealing both the depths and heights of his own love, and the greatness and worth, the sin and the needs, the possibilities and opportunities of man. The study of it as a mere collection of doctrines and precepts, of religious sentiments and experience, must miss much of its true meaning and lead into positive error.

Its significance also will be seen with greater richness and fulness. Dean Stanley used to speak of the Bible as "having far more in it than has ever been taken out of it."¹ The study of the Bible as the history of God's revelation of himself in redeeming the world from sin, is the study of a theme which is inexhaustible; it is "to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge." The study of the prophetic revelations in their place in the history and their relation to the exigencies of the kingdom opens in them new reality and mean-

¹ Bradley's Recollections of Stanley, p. 118.

ing. The study of any event or period of the history in its relation to the progressive development of the redemptive action, opens new and rich mines of instruction. And the life and death and resurrection of Christ, in their moral and spiritual significance, will always be in advance of the progress of man.

And the beneficent moral influence of the Bible is the greater because it records God's revelation of himself by his action in human history. God reveals himself not to scholars only but to mankind. The historical is the most effective method of reaching all minds. "History is philosophy teaching by examples." A Unitarian writer, trying to explain the superior power of the evangelical preaching, gave as the reason the fact that the evangelical conception of revelation is more dramatic. It opens with Eden and the Fall; it discloses God visiting judgments on men for sin, the flood, the storm of fire on Sodom; giving his law and entering into covenant with the people at Sinai; going before them and encamping among them, the light of his tabernacle seen every evening from the surrounding tents. Then it shows him revealed among men in Christ going about doing good, bearing men's sorrows and sins, opening the inmost heart of God in love to men even to the cross, then rising triumphant over death in man's behalf, reigning in heaven bearing them always on his heart, and yet dwelling among men everywhere and always in his Spirit, unseen, yet closer to them and more intimate with them than when his tabernacle was among them or even when in Christ he was with them on the earth. It is dramatic indeed; but it is the drama of God's real history among men seeking the lost and reconciling sinners to himself. The revelation of God in this great drama of redemption is the power of the Bible. The Bible is the glass through which we look back through the vista of the ages and see God moving among men in his righteousness and grace, educating them to capacity to know him, and to know themselves in their true dignity and capacity in their relation to him, developing them to receptivity of larger communications of his grace and to greater spiritual power in achieving great results in the service of God and man, and thereby to the development of themselves toward perfection and the realization of the highest possibilities of spiritual love, wisdom, beauty and power; and thus bringing in everlasting righteousness and so revealing himself with ever increasing glory as the Saviour of man. Here is the fullest revelation of man, opening to us in long vistas the significance of his history in the past and of his destiny in the

future. Here also God makes the fullest revelation of himself. His archetypal plan comes into view traced in the long line of his righteous and gracious action through the past and brightening onward into the glories of the future; in redemption he comes into multiplied and intimate connections with man and therein reveals himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit; his inmost being seems to unfold to sight in the fulness of his communication of himself to sinful men in saving them from sin; the depths of his love and wisdom are opened to view, as when the doors of a great palace are thrown open and we look in on its rich rooms and lengthening halls.

But notwithstanding this wide range through history, this world-wide grandeur and magnificence of God's revelation of himself and of his kingdom recorded in the Bible, or rather for these very reasons, it is the book which brings God nearest to the individual believer and closest to his own personal experience and spiritual needs. It is to every Christian a word in season, a word to the heart. And like no other book it comes to the spiritual mind with a self-revealing and self-evidencing power and convinces him of the divine authority of the revelation which it declares. As Rothe says: "What most impresses the right reader of the Bible is just this, that in it and nowhere else the Christian religious truths which he has longest confessed come to him as with supernatural light, with such original truth to nature, such fresh breathing life, such transparent purity, such majestic and commanding authority, that he finds himself immediately convinced of their reality and obliged to give himself up to them."¹

VII. After Christ's ascension the divine action in redemption is continued by the Holy Spirit.

The belief in a divine influence on men is not peculiar to Christianity. It is commonly recognized in some form in the ethnic religions. The peculiarity of Christianity in this respect is that the Spirit of God in his universal presence continues the work of redemption. The redeeming energy of God which centred in Christ, proceeds from him in the Holy Spirit, perpetuating and diffusing the offers, the influences and agencies of God's redeeming grace. Thus the Spirit is distinctively the divine witness to Christ through all the ages. God does not complete redemption in the earthly history of Christ. In him he makes atonement for sin and opens the way for the outpouring of the influences of his grace in all their fulness on all mankind in the Holy Spirit. Nor

¹ Zur Dogmatik, p. 165.

does he leave the communication of the glad tidings of his grace in Christ to the record of it in the Bible and to the faithfulness and diligence of his people. But in the Spirit he continues to dwell and act among men, testifying of God's grace in Christ and with divine influences drawing them to return to him in faith and love. Hence the testimony of God himself in the Spirit to Christ and the divine grace in him is given in the soul of men who open their hearts and minds to receive it, and this goes with the Bible and the efforts of the church to perpetuate Christian faith among men.

But here again the witness is not by communicating a truth to the intellect, but by actually continuing the work of redeeming men from sin by quickening them to the new and spiritual life, inspiring them to Christ-like love and work in drawing men away from sin and advancing Christ's kingdom on earth, and so developing them in spiritual purity, completeness and power.

The knowledge of Christ by his disciples and their communion with him were necessarily incomplete while he was with them in the flesh ; for his presence was limited to one place, and the great revelation, by his death, resurrection and ascension, and by the coming of the Spirit, was not yet made. After he was gone their knowledge of him and communion with him were more complete. Then they began, under the quickening of the Spirit, to tread with intelligence the Way of Christ and to preach him with power. So Christ himself had said, "It is expedient for you that I go away."

Therefore the influence of Jesus after his death is not merely like the posthumous influence of a great man, surviving in the remembrance of his life, in the consequences of his deeds, the record of his instructions, or even in the institutions which he founded. He is present and acting among men in the Spirit whom he sends and in whom he is administering his kingdom of grace on the earth. Thus is his own word fulfilled : "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." We must not suppose that God's work of redemption was finished in the earthly life of Christ — a transitory wonder, like the sheet let down from heaven before the astonished eyes of Peter and then drawn up again and seen no more. It continues through the history of man. And this even the symbolization of the Scriptures represents. In the theophanies the common symbol of God's manifestation was light ; the flaming sword which guarded Eden, the burning bush, the fire and cloud which guided Israel in the wilderness, which envel-

oped Sinai and filled the tabernacle and the temple, the overpowering glory before which prophets fell and became as dead men. This peculiar manifestation of God the Jews called the Shechinah. The same symbol repeatedly manifested the glory of the Christ, in the bright cloud which overshadowed him in his transfiguration, and which received him at his ascension, in the glory brighter than the sun in which he appeared to Paul, in the splendence in which he was seen by John in Patmos, his face like the sun shining in his strength and his very feet like brass heated to whiteness in a furnace. The same symbol manifested the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost, cloven tongues of fire on each disciple. It is a fit symbol; for light with its accompanying heat is the guide of all action and the nourisher of all life; it is essentially pure, incapable of taking on itself any defilement even by contact with pollution, and purifying even to burning. The Shechinah is, indeed, no longer seen; the voice of God speaking from heaven is no longer heard; "no angel's pinion gleams along the empyrean now." But the Spirit of God, silent and all-pervading, is perpetually carrying forward redemption to its consummation. And in this we have an advantage. While the ancient revelations were made to favored prophets and apostles and were by them communicated, the Spirit comes with the gospel to each and all. His divine influence is at once universal and individualizing; it pervades the whole, it concentrates on every one. It knocks at every door; it enters every opened heart and dwells within it. This universality and individualization were perhaps symbolized by the manner of his manifestation on the day of Pentecost: the Shechinah broken up into lambent flames resting severally on every one.

In his parting words to his disciples the Lord had said: "I ascend to my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God;" "all authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth;" and he had promised, after his exaltation to send to them his Spirit who should abide with them forever. The descent of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost was the present token and pledge that the Lord had triumphantly accomplished all which he had said, and that in his exaltation he remembered his disciples left on earth and had fulfilled his promise. And the influence of God's Spirit on any human heart through all time is a present token and pledge of the same. Nor is this all. By the influence of the Spirit we are brought into immediate connection with the Lord, as the rays of the sun falling on us bring us into

immediate connection with the sun. In that influence the energy of redeeming grace strikes on our souls; we are brought into contact with the heart of God and feel the throbbing of his love knocking evermore for a responsive love. Then, rejoicing in God, we rise up new witnesses from our own experience of the power of God to redeem from condemnation and sin. And through all the Christian ages every one who has had the like experience has become a witness to Christ revealed in his own consciousness by the Spirit of God. Their united testimony comes to us from all the ages, like that which John heard from the hosts of the blessed in heaven, "as the voice of many waters and as the voice of a great thunder; and as the voice of harpers harping with their harps; and they sing as it were a new song." This is the witness of the Spirit to Christ in the consciousness and the deepest experience of every Christian.

VIII. Christianity is ideal as well as historical. But the ideal Christ necessarily implies the historical Christ.

Rationalistic writers have attempted to retain an ideal Christ while neglecting or rejecting the historical. So Strauss: "The attempt to retain in combination the ideal in Christ with the historical having failed, these two elements separate themselves, the latter falls as a natural residuum to the ground, and the former rises as a pure sublimate to the ethereal world of ideas."¹ The ideal has been presented in various forms; the subjective idea of moral perfection; the objective idea of God's presence in the human race as a whole. With some, Christianity becomes nothing more than a collection of moral precepts and prohibitions. Matthew Arnold presents two virtues, kindness and pureness, charity and chastity, and says: "If any virtues could stand for the whole of Christianity, these might." Of the deeper conception of Christ and Christianity which has prevailed through the ages he says: "The immense pathos, so perpetually enlarged upon, of his (Christ's) life and death, does really culminate here: that Christians have so profoundly misunderstood him."²

The reply is that the ideal of Christianity can be found only in the historical Christ. This is exemplified in the authors just now quoted, who miss the distinctive idea of Christianity. The same must be the failure of every attempt to find the ideal Christ without the historical. Christianity assumes as already existing a knowledge of God and his law, of sin and the need of reconcili-

¹ Strauss, *Life of Jesus*, vol. ii. p. 887, Miss Evans's Trans.

² *Last Essays on the Church and Religion*, pp. xx. 53.

ation with God. These are not distinctive of Christianity. All that is peculiar and distinctive in Christianity is known only in the revelation which God makes of himself in his action in human history redeeming men from sin and centring in Christ.

So Biedermann says: "The Christian religion will be the redemption of the natural man out of his disunion from God into freedom in God through the full revelation of God's grace in Jesus Christ, the object of its faith."¹ God reveals himself in redemptive action centring in Christ. But we must interpret that action and read the idea of God and of man set forth in it. We stand before the redemptive action in Christ as the scientist stands before the physical world, reads the thought expressed in its masses and molecules and their interaction, and thus apprehends them in science. So we observe God's action in Christ redeeming men from sin, read in it the thought or idea which it expresses, and thus apprehend it in theology. It is said there is no theology in the history of Christ and no theology in the biblical history; and in the same sense it is true that there is no science in nature. The science in the one case and the theology in the other is simply the apprehension and enunciation of the idea or thought disclosed in the facts. In each it is the facts translated into thought and so apprehended, distinguished and comprehended in the mind. There can be no astronomical knowledge of the sun except what is obtained from the sun itself; and the ideal sun of science implies the existence of the real sun. So the distinctive truths of Christianity can be found only in Christ and the historical redemption in him. And necessarily if the ideal Christ is accepted as true, the historical Christ must be accepted as real.

At whatever point we find a spiritual truth or motive distinctive of Christianity, we find it inherent in the historical Christ and the historical action centring in him.

While in other religions man thinks of himself as seeking God, in Christ God reveals himself as seeking man. While in other religions men think themselves obliged to make God propitious, God reveals himself in Christ as graciously disposed towards sinners; not only willing to forgive any who return to him, but seeking men in their sins to draw them back to filial trust in him and so to reinstate them in their normal condition of union with God. His attitude toward the sinner is not merely that of the father willing to receive the prodigal son when he returns in penitence and rags, but also that of the shepherd going out on the moun-

¹ *Christliche Dogmatik*, § 113, p. 131.

tains to seek and recover the sheep that had strayed from the fold, exposing himself to the perils of the mountain's storms and cold, its slippery precipices and savage beasts, from which he seeks to save the sheep. "God so loved the world." God's good-will, his gracious disposition to save, precedes the sinner's return; if not, the sinner would return in vain. And when man by sinning has disrupted his union with God, has rushed away in his isolation and individuation, and his will is set in his self-sufficiency on himself as his supreme object of trust and service, then if left unsought and untouched by God, he would have no disposition to return. But God, "not wishing that any should perish but that all should come to repentance," follows the sinner with his love on his darkening way, as the sun follows with its attraction a comet in its remotest flight to draw it back to itself.

This is God's attitude always toward all for whom Christ died. But this doctrine is not independent of God's historical action redeeming men from sin in Christ; it merely declares one item of its significance.

In Christ God unites himself, not with a particular man already existing, but with humanity itself in all its essential attributes. In him God enters humanity with redeeming grace, and from him pours into humanity the divine Light and Life and Love to renovate man to spiritual life and draw him back into union with himself. In Christ God is revealed in his grace to man, and man is revealed in his normal condition, in union with God and in the realization of his archetypal perfection. Christ is the new Head of the human race in whom man is to be born of the Spirit and quickened to a new spiritual life, and is to realize the perfection and good which he has missed by separating himself from God in sin. Thus Christ is "the manifestation of a person in whom the eternally ideal had become the historically real."

The same dependence of the idea of Christianity on the historical Christ appears in the progress of Christianity, both in the renovation of individuals and the progress of the kingdom of Christ. A distinctive doctrine of Christianity appears in its unique idea of the kingdom of Christ on earth; the community of those who have been reunited to God through his redeeming grace, and by their common union with God in Christ are united with one another in fellowship in the Christian community. This kingdom is in the world like the leaven and the mustard-seed; and as it spreads and grows, is gradually transforming hu-

man society into the kingdom of God. We note its coming in the spiritual renovation of individuals, in the training of children for Christ, in the moral purification of society, in every overthrow of wicked institutions, usages and laws, in every reformation which is a real and permanent uplift of society. And while it is thus renovating individuals and society in this life, it is from generation to generation continuously flowing over, like a great river into the ocean, into the life eternal in heaven. And so it is to continue till the consummation of human history on earth. And this will be in the coming of the historical Christ and the awarding to all men of their destiny by him in the final judgment. But the progress of Christ's kingdom through the ages is not by the power of truth alone. But in his kingdom on earth Christ is present in his Spirit, in whom the light and energy of his redeeming grace are brought to bear on men. As Paul says, "The Lord is the Spirit." It is in and through the Spirit that Christ is in us and we in Christ, and our normal condition of union with God is attained anew. Hence "the ideal Christ" is not a subjective idea of our own minds, nor truth and precept intellectually apprehended. Rather, if we must speak of the ideal Christ, it is the living Spirit of Christ pervading humanity with the offers and influences of redeeming grace brought into the world through him, and revealing him in our own consciousness.

Therefore the spiritual doctrine, precept and motive of Christianity centre on the historical Christ and the historical action of God in redemption wrought through him. If the ideal Christ is true the historical Christ is real. For the essence of Christianity is not speculative nor ethical philosophy, but the redemption of man from sin in the person of Jesus Christ.

Christianity has its doctrine, its speculative and ethical philosophy; but they rest on the historical facts of redemption through Christ, and take up and express their significance. They grasp the true idea and greatness of man, the significance of his history, the ideal of his perfection and wellbeing, and the possibilities of his destiny, with a depth, clearness and comprehensiveness wanting in all philosophy which takes no note of the real facts of man's relation to God. It is only as man is known in his relations to God in redemption that we get the true philosophy of his history, the true conception of man himself and of the possibilities of his being, and of human society in its true progress and destiny. Man's history and destiny remain inexplicable to the reason until we know him in his relation to God in Christ redeeming

him from sin. It is evident therefore that the ideal Christ cannot be separated from the historical. The fact that we have the ideal, can be accounted for only by the historical existence of the real Christ. As Professor Hedge says: "If the Christ of the church is an ideal being, it was Jesus who made the ideal. The ideal in him is simply the result of that disengagement from the earthly vestiture which death and distance work in all who live in history."¹ And Theodore Parker says: "Shall we be told, Such a man never lived; the whole story is a lie? Suppose that Plato and Newton never lived; that their story is a lie. But who did their works and thought their thought? It takes a Newton to forge a Newton. What man could have fabricated Jesus? None but Jesus."²

Therefore in seeking the central idea of Christianity we must begin with the revelation of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. If Christ is the God in man redeeming man from condemnation and sin, if the story of that wondrous life and death and triumph over death is true, then in its full scope and ultimate intent it cannot have been designed for any nation or section of men exclusively, but is broad and deep as humanity. It cannot be limited in its influence to any partial sphere of human thought and action, but must throw its light and influence on all. Christian theology must centre on it. Philosophy cannot be complete if it takes no note of this great revelation of God in his relation to man, and of man in his relation to God. Even in relation to physical science it answers questions which the science inevitably raises but which it makes no attempt to answer because they reach beyond its province; and it declares the worthy ends for which the world exists and the glorious issues of its evolution in the future. It must be the central fact in human history; essential to disclose the true significance of historical events and periods, and the true principles and aims of human politics, civilization and progress, and to reveal in the progressive kingdom of God the highest destiny of man. It is also central in the life of the individual man, the very turning-point of his destiny, as it comes to him in the invitation and energy of God's redeeming grace, awakening him to the consciousness of spiritual relations, obligations and privileges, calling him to enter the kingdom of God which has come to him, drawing him to return to union and communion with God.

¹ Ways of the Spirit, p. 338.

² Discourse of Religion, Boston ed. 1842, p. 363.

CHAPTER XV.

MIRACLES.

I. DEFINITION. — A miracle is an effect in nature which neither physical forces acting in the uniform sequences of cause and effect nor man in the exercise of his constitutional powers are adequate to effect, and which therefore reveals the agency of some supernatural being other than man.

A miracle presupposes the system or course of nature. "Nature" as here used means the physical system. It includes the whole of impersonal being, conditioned in time and space and the subject of continuous transition through the energy of efficient causes acting as they are acted on in the uniform sequences of cause and effect. These uniform sequences are called laws of nature. A miracle is an effect in the physical system which these causes acting in these uniform sequences would never have effected.

A miracle also presupposes a supernatural system. By this I mean the moral, rational or spiritual system. Man is a supernatural being. As endowed with reason and free will and susceptible of rational motives he is a personal being and as such above nature or supernatural.¹ He thus knows what the supernatural is. By his own rational free action on nature he has knowledge of the supernatural acting on nature. A miracle therefore is not the revelation of a kind of agency foreign to his experience and so unknowable, but of a rational free agency like his own; and supernatural because it is rational, free and personal. By this knowledge in his own experience he can recognize a supernatural agency in the effects in which it manifests itself. A miracle is an effect in nature manifesting the agency of some supernatural being other than man.

¹ Professor Thomas H. Green of Oxford, says, that the self-conscious will of man "does not consist in a series of natural events . . . is not natural in the ordinary sense of that term; not natural at any rate in any sense in which naturalness would imply its determination by antecedent events or by conditions of which it is not itself the source."

Man belongs both to the physical system and to the moral; both to nature and the supernatural. As to his physical organization he is implicated in nature. The physical forces in their unvarying sequences sweep through his being as resistlessly as through a rose or crystal. But in knowing himself and his fellow-men he knows the spiritual system and his own participation in it. As participating and acting in both spheres, and as acting by his own free will on nature, he knows that the two systems are not sundered by any impassable gulf, but are in the closest communication and interaction. Thus he knows that the action on nature of personal beings other than man, if such exist, is possible without any interruption of its uniformity and continuity.

A miracle as such does not reveal the moral character of the agent. That is revealed in the character and design of the miracle, as the moral character and intent of a man are revealed by his action.

In this definition of a miracle we must notice two different meanings of law. Laws are primarily principles of reason; as, that every beginning or change has a cause, that the same complex of causes always produces the same effect, and others. These laws regulate both thought and things, and they persist unchanged through all changes and convulsions, through all production and all dissolution; and all changes must accord with them. No action of power, even though almighty, ever interrupts their operation. Every miracle is wrought in accordance with them.

In accordance with these laws there are uniform factual sequences which are also called laws of nature, but only in a secondary sense. These do not persist forever. A new force may begin to act in the complex of causes which has produced this factual sequence, and the sequence is interrupted. But this very interruption of the sequence is effected only in accordance with the unchanging principles of reason which are the laws of nature in the true and deeper sense. The rotation of the earth is a uniform factual sequence of this sort, which has been uninterrupted throughout the entire experience of mankind. But it had a beginning and science teaches that it will come to an end. But its beginning and its ending must be accordant with the true and deeper laws of nature, the principles of reason.

A miracle supposes a rational free will, which is above nature, acting as a new cause in a physical complex of causes and producing an effect which the physical causes left to themselves

would not have produced. This is the essence of a miracle. But the free will itself, though it may interrupt a uniform factual sequence, can do it only in exact accord with the principles of reason which are the true and never changing laws of nature, and regulate all thought and all energy. The action of the human free will is of the essence of a miracle. It is open to every objection which can be urged against a miracle. On the other hand the reality of human free will removes all objections from the uniformity and continuity of nature to the possibility of miracles. But since we are familiar with the action of the human will, we do not call it a miracle. We give the name, miracle, only to effects in nature transcending the power of man and revealing a supernatural agent transcending man. But the proof of the existence of free will in man is equally proof of the possibility of miracles, provided free will exists in God or in any personal free agent other than man.

It follows that the question as to the reality and possibility of miracles resolves itself into the question as to the reality and possibility of rational free will. It is the question whether any rational free will can exist either in God or man. The denial of miracles, on the ground of their impossibility in consistence with the continuity and uniformity of nature, involves the denial of free will and the assertion that all human action is necessitated by antecedent physical force in the fixed course of nature, as completely as are the running of water and the falling of stones.

II. POSSIBILITY OF MIRACLES.— All objections to miracles resolve themselves into this: A miracle is impossible because it interrupts the uniformity, continuity and unity of nature. It would be a foreign agency intruding into nature, incompatible with the unity of nature in an all-comprehending system and with the uniformity and continuity of its course of development. The objection merely unfolds the significance of M. D'Azeglio's witticism: "Ah, I do not believe in them. They are nothing but celestial *coups d'état*."

The general answer is that miracles are possible if God exists. This answer is forcibly presented by J. S. Mill: "In order that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon occurrence; but that this happened in the absence of any counteracting cause. Now in the case of an alleged miracle the assertion is the exact opposite of this. It is that the effect was de-

feated, not in the absence but in consequence of a counteracting cause, namely, a direct interposition of an act of the will of some being who has power over nature ; and in particular of a being, whose will, having originally endowed all the causes with the powers by which they produce their effects, may well be supposed able to counteract them. A miracle is no contradiction to the law of cause and effect ; it is a new effect supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause. Of the adequacy of that cause, if it exist, there can be no doubt ; and the only antecedent improbability which can be ascribed to a miracle is the improbability that any such being had existed in the case.”¹ All which Hume makes out is, that no evidence can prove a miracle to one who does not already believe in the existence of God and the moral or supernatural system. This belief is presupposed in every investigation of the occurrence of miracles. The idea of a miracle includes the idea of the supernatural. It would be idle to discuss the question of the intervention of a supernatural power in the course of nature with one who has no belief that any supernatural power exists. In the preceding investigations we have found full justification of our belief in the existence of God and the moral or supernatural system. With this attained the possibility of miracles is assured and the force of the objection is broken. The fallacy of the objector lies in his recognition of the physical system alone. As Trench represents it, he is like the earth-born giant, the Titan Antaeus. His whole strength depends on his standing on the earth. The moment you lift him into the sphere of the personal, spiritual and supernatural, to the recognition of a personal God and a moral system, his strength is gone.² For all believers in the existence of God and the moral system, this answer establishes beyond all controversy the possibility of miracles. The objection derives all its force from the assumption that the physical system is the only and all-comprehending system of the universe.

The objection now recurs in a new form. The possibility of miracles being admitted, yet if God should work a miracle or empower any finite person to do it, the act would be an interference with the course of nature, interrupting its uniformity and continuity in the unity of the physical system.

To the objection in this form there are four answers. It is founded on erroneous ideas, of what a miracle is ; of what God is ; of what nature is ; and lastly, of what the universe is.

¹ Logic, bk. iii. chap. xxv. § 2, p. 376.

² Miracles, Preliminary Essay, chap. v. 4, p. 62.

The first answer to the objection as now urged is this: The objection rests on an erroneous idea of what a miracle is. It assumes that an interruption of the uniformity and continuity of the course of nature is of the essence of a miracle. On the contrary the essence of a miracle consists in the immediate action of a rational free will on nature, directing its physical agencies to the effecting of results which, without this supernatural direction, they would not have effected. What the believer in miracles has to establish is that such supernatural direction of the forces of nature is possible without interrupting its uniformity and continuity. A rational free will, if it exists, is supernatural; it is a power above nature. It belongs to the rational and spiritual system, not to the physical. Its action on nature is from above nature.

Such action does not imply the introduction of any new physical agent or force into nature, but only the action of a spiritual power guiding in a new direction physical agents and forces already existing, so that they cause an effect different from what they would have caused without the spiritual action. A physical force acting at right angles to another is said neither to increase nor lessen the force deflected. This may help us to conceive of the possibility of directing physical forces by spiritual action.

The action of man's free will on nature is the same in essence with what we call miraculous. Hence Jacobi and others have been wont to call man a miracle-worker. If a man by an act of will should cause a physical effect a mile off without intermediate physical agency, we should call it a miracle. Such effects of human volition we are not accustomed to observe. What we observe, when man by his action modifies the action of physical forces, is itself the action of an organized body on material things. Muscular force is physical force. Such, for example, is the action of man in building a dam, putting in machinery and making the force of falling water grind his corn, or in calling forth and directing steam-power by an engine, or electricity by a battery and wires. The really miracle-working power of the human will is hidden from us in the brain and the nervous system. Physical science cannot deny that this power is there, because it declares that the motion of the molecules of the brain cannot be transformed into thought and volition, and therefore cannot cause them. It is the manifestation of a supernatural power in man, a power which cannot be defined in the formulas

of mechanical science, which physical science cannot explain or account for, which physical science leaves as a power beyond and above nature. This action of man's will continually going on is in its essence miraculous. But this action of man's will on nature does not interrupt the uniformity and continuity of nature and its unity in the physical system. It does not interrupt the action of the forces of nature in its uniform sequences of cause and effect. It only gives the physical forces a new direction and thus in the course of nature and through its forces produces a new effect. It is not an interruption of the continuity of nature, but rather a using of its powers in accordance with their laws by a higher power for higher and rational ends. The will of man can do this. Much more may the will of God act immediately on nature, and in the course of nature and through its forces accomplish the ends of his eternal love and wisdom, without interrupting its uniformity and continuity, or its unity in the physical system. A miracle, then, involves no interruption of laws of nature other than is equally involved in effects caused by the action of man's free will.

A second answer is that the objection is founded on an erroneous idea of what God is. It assumes that God is a capricious will unregulated by reason. It regards him as a mere almightiness acting in no accordance with law. Hence it concludes that his action must be without continuity and uniformity, and therefore incompatible with the unity of all things in a system. It rests on a superficial philosophy, the falsity of which has already been exposed, which accepts as an axiom that order and law prove the absence of will. But in truth the deepest ground of continuity and uniformity in the unity of a system is in the reign of reason. The highest conception of order which the human mind can attain is the order of a rational system in which a rational power is expressing the archetypal thoughts of reason, in accordance with rational law and for the progressive realization of rational ends. All action regulated by reason will have unity of plan and end, and continuity and uniformity in carrying out the plan and attaining the end. As Rothe says, the phrase "laws of nature" is continually presented as "a Medusa's head." But the so-called laws of nature are merely observed factual sequences. The name "laws" can be applied to them only in a secondary application. The word law has its primary meaning in the realm of personality as imposing obligation on free personal agents to act uniformly and continuously in accordance with the truths, laws,

ideals and ends of reason. The principles of reason regulating physical force are the laws of nature in their true and deepest meaning. The sequences have come to be called laws, because they are seen to reveal in nature this intelligent and rational regulation by a power above nature. God is not a capricious will. He is the absolute Reason. All his action is uniform and continuous in the unity of a system, progressively realizing his eternal and archetypal thought in harmony with eternal and universal laws of reason. The universe itself in its development is the progressive expression of the thought and the realization of the plan of God in his eternal love and wisdom. The uniformity and continuity of nature have their ground in the unchangeableness of the principles, laws, ideals and ends of reason. God's action therefore cannot be in contravention of the laws of nature. And this is no new idea. It is as old as Augustine. He says: "God does nothing against nature. When we say he does so, we mean that he does something against nature as we know it—in its familiar and ordinary way. But against the highest laws of nature he no more acts than he acts against himself."¹

A third answer is that the objection rests on a false idea of what nature or the physical system is. It assumes that nature is a closed circuit; that God cannot act on it without breaking it up. Nature is conceived to be like a vessel of cast-iron; a power that modifies it breaks it. It is regarded by the objector as a definite amount of matter and force, conceivable as so many tons and foot-pounds, combined into a mechanism. God cannot act on or through it without interrupting the continuity and uniformity of its action, and perhaps breaking the machinery to pieces.

At present the favorite theory of physical science is that nature is a mechanism. But a machine, when in action, implies the continuous exertion on it of a force from without, causing its motion in accordance with the law or plan of its construction. It implies a mind that directed its construction. It implies also a mind that intelligently applies the external force and directs its action to the accomplishment of previously planned results. But this intelligent application and direction of the force does not interrupt the uniformity and continuity of the action of the machine according to the law of its construction. On the contrary, this is an essential presupposition in the idea and plan of a machine; for if there were no application of external force, the machine would not act, and therefore could not have any continuity

¹ Contra Faustum, xxvi. 3.

or uniformity of action. If nature is a machine, the fact that there is an intelligent being acting on and through it from without and directing and regulating its action according to the law and design of the machine, implies no interruption of the continuity and uniformity of the action of the machine according to its law.

Nature has a closer analogy with an organism than with a machine. But an organic growth is possible only as cosmic agencies act on the organism from without and supply it with nutriment. This also may be directed and regulated by intelligence so as greatly to modify it; as a gardener modifies by culture or by grafting the flower and fruit of a plant. If therefore nature is an organism, there must be another system of agencies environing it, acting on it and making its growth and development possible. And this environment, being beyond nature, must be supernatural, and thus supplies the intelligent direction and regulation of its development. And the action of this environment on it involves no interruption of the uniformity and continuity of nature.

Therefore, in any possible conception of nature, it necessarily implies the presence and action on it of a supernatural power continuously supplying and intelligently applying and directing the energy which is working in and through it. Physical science reveals the necessity of such a power, but cannot discern what it is. Theism gives the explanation by declaring that it is the God whom all men grope after and conceive in some form as the object of worship, and whom theism presents as the absolute Reason freely energizing in nature in the expression of rational truth, in accordance with rational law, for the realization of rational ends. And this immanence of God in nature and his action on and through it no more interrupt its order and law than the action of the engineer interrupts the order and law of the engine or than that of the gardener interrupts the order and law of the growth of the plant.

The necessity of such a supernatural agency is disclosed by physical science itself.

Physical science rests on the assumption that nature is orderly and continuous under law. Without this assumption science is impossible. In discussing the physico-theological proof it was shown that science itself demands the existence of a supernatural power as the ground of the universe, and its immanent agency in it, as the only rational explanation of its own postulate of the law of continuity. It was also shown that physical science dis-

closes facts which, so far as it can discover, are contradictory to the law of continuity and can be harmonized with it only by the recognition of God immanent and energizing in nature. It was also shown that the appearance of life, sensitivity and rational personality constitute epochs in the evolution, in which new powers appear and begin to act. These new powers can be accounted for only by the recognition of God immanent and energizing in nature; otherwise they are effects without a cause. Thus physical science discovers, in the process of evolution, changes which have all the essential elements of epochal miracles.

The necessary conclusion is that nature is not a closed circuit, but open and plastic to the divine action. Since the spiritual or supernatural is immanent in the natural, since its laws underlie the laws of nature and are revealed in them, a miracle is not only possible to almighty power, but also possible to it working in wisdom and love in harmony with reason, without interrupting the continuity, uniformity and unity of the physical system. In fact we have found that there is in the course of nature continuous divine action having the essential characteristic of the miraculous; that is, the action of a supernatural will, other than man's, causing effects in nature which its physical forces without extraneous direction would never have effected. Thus, when nature is seen in its deepest significance, the miraculous is the law of nature rather than the exception to it, the ordinary rather than the extraordinary. "In God we live, and move, and have our being." And the miraculous, instead of being an interruption of the course of nature, is found to be the indispensable ground of the possibility of the continuity, uniformity and unity of the physical system.

The Bible says that God created by his word. This gives a basis for a legitimate analogy. In the universe God is progressively expressing his eternal and archetypal thought. Worlds and systems are the words in which he is expressing it. Hence men properly speak of the Book of Nature. The continuity and uniformity of nature and its unity in a system are analogous to the continuity, uniformity and unity of an author's thought in writing a book. He is progressively expressing it. The letters, words and sentences vary. But through this variation, ordering and controlling it, runs one uniform and continuous course of thought in the unity of a system or plan. So God is progressively expressing his archetypal thought in the successive words, sentences and chapters of the never completed Book of Nature.

This conclusion becomes more evident if we revert to the fact that the invariable uniformity and continuity of nature cannot be known by observation and experience; these can never compass the universal. The law of the uniformity and continuity of nature is a principle of reason, regulative of all thinking. It declares simply that the same complex of causes must always cause the same effect. It does not declare that any observed complex of causes has always existed or will always exist. A certain complex of causes effects the rotation of the earth on its axis and the alternation of day and night. But the rotation of the earth once began and sometime will cease. This principle may be as applicable to molecules as to masses. Materialists maintain that the molecules, or at least the ultimate atoms supposed to compose them, are infrangible, unchangeable and eternal. But it may be that instead of having reached in these the ultimate, matter may have existed in some previous condition entirely beyond our observation. Conjectures of such existence are familiar to science.¹ It is as reasonable that the molecules may have existed under different conditions and in different forms as that the sun and planets have so existed. The search by physical science to ascertain in what previous forms and conditions matter has formerly existed is legitimate, so long as it is confined to the investigation of facts and inferences from them. The position of the materialist, that matter, in the forms and conditions in which we know it by the senses, is eternal, has no warrant either in physical science or in philosophy.

The objection to miracles which we are now considering rests on this materialistic assumption. It supposes nature to be a closed circuit, a finished and self-moving mechanism, admitting no intervention of a power from without. This implies that nature as we know it, with all its observed factual sequences, is eternal. The objection brings us squarely to this alternative: shall we retain this rigid conception of the physical system, contradictory alike to physical science and to philosophy, and give up the possibility of the miraculous in its essential significance, or shall we modify this rigid conception of matter and of the physical system and believe in the possibility of the miraculous in its essential significance? If we accept the latter, the rational principle of the unity, continuity and uniformity of nature remains unchanged and universally regulative forever, but with variability of factual sequences in entire consistency with it. Certainly the only rea-

¹ Phil. Basis of Theism, pp. 413, 416-418, 495-497.

sonable decision is, that we must modify the rigid and narrow conception of matter and the physical system and acknowledge that the material system, as the progressive expression of the archetypal thought of the absolute Reason, is always plastic to its creator's power, and yet always unchanging in its unity, uniformity and continuity as regulated in conformity with the principles and laws of reason and for the realization of rational ends. It is unchanging in unity, uniformity and continuity as the progressive expression of unchanging wisdom and love, with variability of factual sequences, in adaptation to new developments of the archetypal plan and preparing for still higher stages in its progressive realization.

A fourth answer remains to be considered. The objection rests on a false idea of what the universe is. It assumes that the physical system is the only and all-comprehending system and that no spiritual system exists. It necessarily follows that the only laws in the universe are the mere factual sequences observed in nature. Thus the very idea of law in its true significance to the reason is lost, and the universe is known as going on necessarily and forever merely in the factual sequences of physical cause and effect. This shuts out God as really as miracles. It shuts out all rationality and freedom as really as it shuts out God.

Here again the objection is founded on a falsity. There is also a spiritual system consisting of personal beings capable of knowing God, subjects of his law and government, objects of his loving care, capable of trusting and serving him and of communing with him, capable of spiritual perfection and blessedness, and so presenting an end to be attained in the universe transcending the physical system and worthy of God. That this system exists we know in our knowledge of ourselves, of our fellow-men and of God.

The spiritual system and the physical are not in antagonism nor existing apart, but are in intimate interaction and close correspondence. The physical system is the expression of thought; and physical science consists in reading and formulating the thought which it expresses. But the thought imprinted in it comes from the rational or spiritual sphere. The factual sequences, which we call laws of nature, are revelations of the continuity and uniformity of the action of power regulated by the divine Reason in executing the plans of perfect wisdom and love. Therefore it is not physical laws which are carried over into the spiritual, but it is the spiritual laws which are carried over into the physical

and reveal themselves in the laws of nature. And the physical forces acting in their factual sequences may be held in abeyance in the presence of a spiritual power acting according to these higher laws. This would be analogous to mechanical force held in abeyance in the presence of chemical affinity, and chemical force held in abeyance in the presence of life. The physical system is also subordinate to the spiritual. It gives the theatre in which spiritual beings live and act, the media through which they reveal themselves, the agencies and instruments through which they act. The ends for which nature exists are not in itself but in the spiritual sphere beyond. Nature always points to something beyond itself, backward to a cause, above to a law, and forward to ends in the spiritual system. God is always developing nature to a capacity to be receptive of higher powers. Under the tension of the divine energy in it, it always seems to be "striving its bounds to overpass." This discloses in nature a certain reality underlying Hegel's conception, that nature is always aspiring to return to the spiritual whence it came. Nature is also full of final causes; yet these point, beyond the contrivance effecting a mechanical result, to ultimate ends in the spiritual sphere. No end for the existence of nature can even be imagined in nature itself. There can be no end in the violin for the music drawn from its strings. There can be no end in a house for the architectural skill with which it is constructed, nor in the marble for the beauty into which it is chiseled. Even what in its relation to nature alone seems faulty may be occasion of good in the spiritual sphere. We ask for what purpose the enormous store of energy in the physical universe was created. If we seek the answer in the physical sphere exclusively, one inevitable answer is: "In order that something less than a billionth part of the sun's energy might be utilized by ourselves, while the remainder is carried off into space and appears again no more." But looking at this waste in view of the spiritual system, Balfour Stewart asks: "Is it not rather meant to teach us that the things which are seen are temporal, by means of a celestial handwriting in the largest possible characters?" So intimate is the connection of the two systems, so close the correspondence, that poets find in nature the imagery in which they best reveal the creations of their genius, and Christ found in nature the parables which best disclose the realities of the spiritual world. The physical is from, by and for the spiritual.

We infer, then, not merely that miracles are possible because

there is a God, but that they are probable as meeting exigencies and accomplishing ends beyond the physical in the spiritual system. And on account of the intimacy and interaction of the two systems, miracles are possible without breaking the continuity, uniformity and unity of nature, any more than Franklin broke them when by his kite he drew the lightning from the heavens, or any electrician when he sets up his battery and evokes the electricity from the continuity of its silent and unseen course. In a miracle a spiritual power reveals itself in the physical system while in the act of effecting a higher result in the spiritual system.

We see then that nature is not the only and all-comprehending system. The vaster spiritual system encompasses and permeates the natural as the ocean encompasses and permeates its own currents. The current has its own limits, course and laws; but it is also subject to the law of the ocean in which it moves and a part of which it is. It heaves with the ocean's billows; the swell of distant storms sweeps across it; the ocean tides, raised by heavenly attraction, rise and fall in it. These effects are inexplicable and incredible to one whose knowledge is limited to the current, but simple and intelligible when considered as manifesting the power of the ocean in which the current moves. So the course of nature is a current in the ocean of God's universal action. If miracles sweep across it and tides of heavenly influence swell within it, though transcending its laws and inexplicable to one who sees only its narrow and uniform flow, yet are they results of agencies from an encompassing and permeating system acting according to broader laws, and sweeping across the narrower stream of the physical and the temporal. To higher intelligences they do not interrupt the law of nature but reveal the universal law which is "the harmony of the universe." To their insight the course of time flows in the midst of the eternal, the physical is environed and permeated by the spiritual, the natural by the supernatural, the finite and conditioned by the infinite and the absolute.

R III. MIRACLES EPOCHAL IN THE SPIRITUAL AND THE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS. — Miracles are essential at epochs both in the evolution of the physical system and in the progress of man in the spiritual system.

Here the objection recurs in another form. Admitting the existence of God and the spiritual system, still the action of God in harmony with perfect reason must be uniform and continuous,

and a miracle would be an interruption of this continuity. By working a miracle God would interrupt and contradict himself. A miracle would imply some failure of the divine action to bring to pass the intended effect, some discovery of a defect in the original plan or inefficiency of the energy exerted to carry it through. A miracle would then be an act of God to correct a mistake, to mend a break or to make up for a failure. It therefore would be incompatible with the essential idea of God, the absolute Spirit, perpetually revealing the thought of his reason in accordance with its unchanging laws in the action of perfect wisdom and love. The objection in this form is urged by Theodore Parker, F. W. Newman and others.

The general answer is that miracles are not wrought to mend breaks, correct mistakes or to make up for failures, but are epochal, or at least incidental, in the evolution of the universe and the progressive realization of its archetypal plan.

The objection, in the form now under consideration, rests on the false assumption that every miracle is an event entirely isolated. This implies that it has no unity with other events in the universal system and no intrinsic connection with its progressive development; and that it has no design but to excite the wonder of the observers and to accredit the miracle-worker as a messenger from God. This is the conception of Hobbes in his witticism in the *Leviathan*, that miracles are like pills which must be swallowed whole without chewing. The same must be the conception of Matthew Arnold who, in the chapter on miracles in *Literature and Dogma*, selects as a type of all miracles the conversion of a pen into a pen-wiper. From this conception his inference is true enough: "Suppose I could change the pen with which I write into a pen-wiper, I should not thus make what I write any the truer or more convincing." Such are not the Christian miracles; but are rather miracles of the kind which the Jews asked for and Jesus refused. It must be admitted, however, that some defenders of Christianity have had only this conception of a miracle and thus have opened their defenses to successful assault. The answer to the objection is, that miracles are not isolated events, but are included in the archetypal plan of the universe, are subordinate to its archetypal end and essential in its normal development. Hence in working a miracle God does not interrupt the continuity and uniformity of his action in progressively realizing the archetypal plan of perfect reason, and does not contradict himself.

In the first place, this form of the objection is already answered in the answers to its other forms. If the physical system is not alone, if there is a God and a spiritual system, if the spiritual environs and permeates the physical, if they are not in antagonism but in harmony, if the thought, law and order of the spiritual find expression and its ends are subserved in the physical, if the physical system is from, by and for the spiritual, then God immanent in the universe may cause in nature effects which we call miraculous without interrupting the uniformity and continuity of his own action in realizing the plan of his eternal love and wisdom.

In the second place, it is not true that miracles are occasioned by defect, mistake or failure. The truth is that they are essential in the progressive development of the plan of the absolute Reason. They mark the epochs in its progress both in the physical system and in the spiritual. The infinite cannot at any point of time be completely revealed in the finite. As the revelation of God, the universe must be endlessly progressive. Incidental to this progressiveness there must be epochs in which powers and agencies of the spiritual are manifested in the natural, higher than any that have ever appeared before. This implies no supplying of a newly discovered defect, no mending or correcting, no interruption of the uniformity and continuity of the action, no departure from the unity of the system, but only its progressive and orderly development.

This progressive development we trace through the physical system to the spiritual; thence onward in higher and higher development of the spiritual. They constitute together one all-comprehending system in which God is continuously and progressively revealing himself.

In the evolution of the physical system matter becomes fitted to be the medium for the manifestation of a higher energy. God infuses this higher energy into nature so soon as at any point it has become capable of receiving and manifesting it. Then beings of a higher order, and a higher plane of existence and action appear. The evolution is thus marked by epochs.

In this evolution of the physical system, so far as it has taken place on this earth, four great epochs are noticeable. As we do not suppose the formation of this earth was the beginning of God's revelation of himself in and through the finite, we may assume the primitive stuff, the homogeneous, the nebulous matter, the primitive fluid, or by whatever name called, as already

created. Then we find four epochs. The first is the beginning of motion. The second is the beginning of life. The third is the beginning of sensitivity. The fourth is the beginning of rational free personality in man. In the production of man the process of the physical evolution on the earth reaches its consummation. The zoölogical process is consummated and the psychological and spiritual process begins. There is not to be the genesis of a higher species but the educating, civilizing and perfecting of man. Thus the physical evolution has reached its destined goal and consummation in the appearance of rational free personality in man.¹

Where the evolution of the physical system ends the progress of the rational, moral and spiritual system begins. Nature itself has carried us upward to the supernatural. This progressive development we have traced through the physical system to the spiritual. Thence we trace it onward and upward through higher and higher developments of the spiritual system.

In the history of man as revealed in Christianity there are three great epochs: the creation of man; the coming of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself and in the Holy Spirit establishing his kingdom of righteousness on earth; and the consummation of man's earthly history in Christ's second coming, disclosing in judgment the final issues of man's spiritual history during the whole period of the existence of the race in its natural life on earth, and raising him to a higher plane of existence. As the evolution of the natural carries us up to the personal, the spiritual, the supernatural, so the progress of the spiritual carries us up to the life which is heavenly and eternal.

Besides these three, Christianity recognizes other stages of progress which constitute epochs, and are intermediate and less distinctly marked. Some of these are noticeable in the history of God's revelation of himself before Christ's coming.

It is asserted that the criticism of the Old Testament has proved that the Israelites, in all the earlier centuries of their history, knew nothing of monotheism, and that their religion was fetichism or some very low form of heathenism. Some even speak of the effrontery of Christian scholars in daring to maintain that monotheistic ideas were known in Israel. But the examination of their arguments seem to me rather to prove than to disprove the knowledge of the one God. For example, they commonly argue from Abraham's proposed sacrifice of Isaac that the re-

¹ The Destiny of Man, by John Fiske, pp. 30, 31.

ligion required human sacrifices. They coolly overlook the fact that, according to the narrative itself, the human sacrifice is forbidden. They argue from the facts that the most of the ten commandments were known in Egypt, and that some of the Mosaic usages and institutions resembled those of Egypt, that therefore Exodus is not historically credible. When it is replied that this confirms its credibility, it is quietly replied that this knowledge of Egypt may have begun centuries later, in the time of the kings. Other arguments doing equal violence to the narrative are common.

The Old Testament itself purports to be the history of the education of a people, called out of idolatry and still surrounded by it, in the knowledge of the one true God. It presents to us a people steeped in the spirit of idolatry and, in spite of all influences to the contrary, often relapsing into it. It discloses the difficulty of educating them and the slow and faltering progress which they made to the knowledge of the true God. It also discloses the presence of that higher knowledge of God from the beginning of the history and the earnest inculcation of it by the more enlightened minds. It discloses the presence and agency of a supernatural power from the beginning, and thus gives consistency to the Old Testament and is an internal evidence of its historical credibility. Mr. Spencer says it is impossible for a rude people in the earlier stages of development to receive the ideas of a later and higher civilization. This is exemplified in the slowness and difficulty of training Israel in the knowledge of God, as narrated in the Old Testament. On the other hand the facts that the higher ideas were present in the minds of some, that they were inculcated in teaching, embodied in laws, organized in ritual and institutions, however imperfectly, prove that this higher knowledge was not the result of natural development but of supernatural influence. The life of Israel is always gravitating toward idolatry. The literature of Israel is always pointing to the one God, to the moral requirements of his law, and the value of the service of the heart and the obedience of the life above all lip-service and sacrifice. And it gradually opens the outlook of prophecy and promise to the transition of the kingdom of God into a universal kingdom of righteousness and good-will in the Messianic times. The literature of a people is commonly the outgrowth and revelation of its life. Plainly the literature of Israel is not the outgrowth and revelation of its natural life and development. It is the revelation of a light and power above

that natural life, educating and directing the people to higher and spiritual ideas and ends. This gives consistency and credibility to the history recorded in the Old Testament. The arguments against its general historical credibility derive their force largely from the foregone conclusion that such supernatural influence, direction and education are impossible.

In this preparatory period we find the continuity of the kingdom of God and of his redemptive work among men advancing through successive subordinate epochs or stages to the coming of Christ.

One of these is the first distinct historical appearance of a kingdom of God on earth. They who yield to God's gracious drawing, return to him in loyal trust and service and become the willing recipients of his seeking and waiting grace, are reunited with him in the new life of faith and love and constitute a people or kingdom of God on earth. The first distinct historical appearance of this people or kingdom of God is in the call of Abraham. Worshipers of God had existed before, but we have no clear historical knowledge of a people separated and distinct as a people of God. As the state had its beginning in the family, the church had its beginning in the same. Abraham, yielding to the divine seeking and drawing, comes out from idolatry and idol-worshipers, in trust and service of the true God. In his attempted sacrifice of Isaac he is instructed that the offering of human sacrifices practised among other peoples to propitiate the divinity, is not permitted in the worship of the true God; that God himself will provide the sacrifice, and that what is required of the worshiper is loyal trust, obedience and service. It is the beginning of the teaching, more fully unfolded afterwards, that the sacrifice which man is to provide is a broken and contrite heart. Here is the first clear historical notice of the beginning of the kingdom of God on earth, consisting of a distinct people, reunited with God and recipients of his grace through their faith or trust in him and their willing obedience and service. This is the kingdom of God on earth, which abides forever, and the progress of which gives the deepest significance to human history.

Another intermediate epoch is the deliverance of the people from Egypt, and the formal institution at Sinai of their political and ecclesiastical organization under the government of Jehovah, and on the basis of loyal trust and allegiance and of righteous life as declared in the ten commandments.

Here also the gift of prophecy must be noticed. The gift of

prophecy appears in the time of the patriarchs and of Moses. More distinctly the prophetic office is recognized in Samuel's time. It existed through the whole period of the kings and constituted one of its striking characteristics. It reaches its most remarkable development in Elijah and Elisha and in the prophets whose writings appear in the Christian Scriptures. While prophecy is not epochal as marking a point of time by its origin, it is so as a divine power entering into the course of human history. In its essential meaning, as the direct communication of God with a human spirit and the testimony of one whose heart God has touched to what he knows of God through his experience of the divine influence in his own soul, it remains a power in human history through all time.

Thus we find in the history of the earth a continuous progress marked by epochs. It is first the evolution of the physical system through successive epochs to the appearance of the spiritual system. Then it is continued in the advancement of the spiritual system through successive epochs to the final consummation of man's history in "the new heavens and the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness."

In each of these epochs in the physical system, the bringing in of the higher beings and the higher plane of existence involves all which is essential in the miraculous. Otherwise the lower produces the higher; that is, there would be an effect without a cause. And each epoch is the introduction of new invariable factual sequences or secondary laws of nature, and therein of a new range and higher manifestation of the course or order of nature.

Analogous to these are the epochs in the spiritual system. They introduce higher spiritual energies and a course and order of spiritual activities which had not appeared before. And as in nature so in the spiritual sphere, the higher power of God introduced miraculously into human history in one of these epochs, remains and continuously exerts its energies in humanity to prepare for a greater epoch and a higher plane of spiritual life. The revelation to Abraham of God in covenant with a people that trust him as their God, remains a permanent possession of mankind and a permanent power of spiritual elevation and progress. The kingdom of God on earth, organized under Moses under a covenant of righteousness, continues among men in varying forms and works for righteousness to the end of the earthly history of man. The spirit of prophecy, in its broadest sense as

the communication of God's grace within the experience of the individual enabling him to testify what he has learned from God within the secrecy of his own soul, is a power in the kingdom of God forever. And all that divine, gracious and redeeming energy, which came into humanity in Christ and was made spiritual and universal in the descent of the Spirit, abides with us forever. This is analogous to the epochs in the evolution of nature. The first sensitive cell which appeared on the earth was the coming into nature of a power which was never to cease to modify and elevate it. When the first rational man appeared, it was the coming into nature of a lord of nature, who was to use its forces and its treasures, and to modify the earth itself and subdue and civilize it.

And man himself is to be educated and developed and the spiritual system to be advanced from epoch to epoch, like a growing plant. Our Lord himself compares his kingdom to the corn growing through successive epochs; first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear. As matter must be prepared to be a medium for manifesting a higher form of energy, so in the spiritual system man must be educated and developed to receptivity for the divine influence in higher forms and for the higher revelation of God therein. Such a higher manifestation of God constitutes an epoch in the development of the spiritual. The greatest is the coming of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. This coming was delayed long after man began to exist, till he could be educated and developed to receive the new incoming of God. So the coming of man himself was delayed long after the earth existed, till matter could be elaborated into a medium capable of the manifestation of a personal spirit, and the earth be fitted for his habitation. The New Testament points us forward to a future epoch corresponding in glory with that of the coming of God in Christ. It is the new heavens and the new earth, when the long conflict in the history of the earth between the natural and the spiritual will be ended, when in the spiritual body and a corresponding environment the groaning and travailing in pain of the whole creation together will cease in the revealing of the sons of God; when the apparent antagonism between man and his environment, in the prevalence of disease and death, in the devastation of flood and fire, of drought and famine, of pestilential agencies in the air, the earth and the water, will be no more; when "God shall wipe away every tear from their eyes; and death shall be no more; neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain any more."

Hume objects that a miracle is incredible because contrary to universal experience. But against miracles such as we are now considering, which constitute epochs, this objection has no force. It might be urged with equal pertinence against epochal miracles in nature. When life first appeared it was a new reality; it had never appeared on the earth before. Nothing can be more certain than that life on earth had a beginning. And it is evident that nothing has ever been found in organic matter which can account for its beginning. And there is no objection to believing that it began, in the fact that when it had begun it remained. We may say the same of the new revelation of God in Christ. Christ's coming into the world introduced a new power of spiritual life, and it has remained. It is more powerful in the world now than ever before.

The miracles which we have been considering may be called epochal miracles. Besides these there are the incidental miracles which do not constitute epochs. Such are the miracles of healing by Christ and his apostles. These are not essential in God's redemption of men in Christ. Any one of them might have been omitted, and Christianity would have remained essentially unchanged.¹ Miracles of this type are usually clustered about the great epochs of redemption or some peculiar exigency in the progress of God's kingdom. Accordingly we find in the biblical history that miracles were not continuous, but were for the most part concentrated in a few epochs. They appear at the coming of Christ and the introduction of his reign of grace in the world. They are to appear at his final coming at the end of the natural life of mankind. Another epoch of miracles is at the call of Abraham, when the reign of God in his covenant of grace with men begins to emerge into the light of history. Then much more at the deliverance from Egypt, when the theocratic kingdom is given a political and ecclesiastical organization and enters on the second period of its development. Then in the times of Elijah and Elisha, attending the fuller development of the prophetic office and the clearer outlook to the Messiah. The action of God specially manifesting himself and con-

¹ "Miracles as mere facts are, the most of them, of very little moment. Ninety-nine out of a hundred of them could be swept away with no loss to faith, but with great gain rather."—Dr. Bascom, *Natural Theology*, p. 230. This is an extravagant assertion. The only truth in it is, that no one of the "incidental" miracles is essential to Christianity. But they are all subservient to good ends in the work of redemption.

stituting these epochs is miraculous in its essence. It is so, for example, in the coming of God in Christ, in Christ's resurrection and ascension, in the descent of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost. These epochs and the miraculous action essential in them belong to the plan of the spiritual system. The accompanying non-epochal miracles are important in its progressive realization. They are in harmony with the redemptive work and have intrinsic connection with its advancement. When once we have knowledge of the reality of any miracle, all *a priori* objections founded on their impossibility or their incredibility are nullified. When once we recognize the existence of the spiritual system in which God is realizing his highest ends, and the subordination of the physical system to it, the incidental miracles no longer seem isolated. They are incidental to the great spiritual epochs around which we find them clustered, incidental manifestations of the spiritual energy working in these epochs. And each and all of them have some intrinsic connection with the great spiritual work of God in redeeming the world from sin. And on account of their intrinsic harmony with the work of redemption, it is worthy of note that, however incredible miracles seem in other records, we are never conscious of surprise in reading of them in the life of Christ and the biblical record of God's action in redemption. The central and all-pervading thought that this is the record of God's action in redeeming men from sin is so vast, the realities opened to us are so stupendous, the scenes disclosed are so sublime, every step in the progress of the narrative is so manifestly the step of the Almighty, that the miracles harmonize with the grandeur of the whole revelation. They seem to us no more surprising or incredible than the rainbow with which God adorns the retiring storm, or the stars with which he nightly gems the sky. A miracle is not a surprise to higher intelligences, who see the spiritual as it is revealed in nature and the spiritual ends subserved through it.

We see, therefore, that miracles, as included in the plan of God's wisdom and love and essential to its realization, are not isolated events. They are not mending breaks, nor patching newly discovered defects, nor correcting errors and failures. So in the physical system the appearance of life, then of sensitivity, then of rationality, are not a mending, patching or correcting, but are essential stages in the orderly and progressive development of the system.

With this view of the grandeur of the epoch-making miracles,

both in the physical system and the spiritual, and with the Christian conception of the central significance in human history of the great fact that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, we may form some estimate of the littleness of the conception of those who regard Jesus as only a man on a level with other teachers and reformers, and who, with M. Arnold, find no meaning in the narrative of his birth except that it is a mythical representation of the old asceticism that virginity is superior in purity to marriage.

A third answer to this form of the objection is, that it rests on the error that miracles are significant only as credentials of the divine mission of the man who works them. The objector here entirely overlooks the epochal miracles, which reveal in great epochs the divine and spiritual forces developing in their uniform and progressive course both the physical system and the spiritual. He thinks only of the non-epochal miracles which are incidental to peculiar conditions of the great course of the spiritual energies, as electric sparks and lightning flashes are incidental to the continuous flow of the electric currents. These miracles wrought by Christ and his apostles are indeed evidences of a divine mission. They appealed to them as such. But they were not wrought with the primary design of furnishing evidence, any more than a benevolent man does a benevolent deed with the primary design of proving his benevolence. They have intrinsic connection with the work of redemption, and are incidental to existing conditions in the progress of the work. As such they have evidential value. A supernatural effect reveals a supernatural cause. As miracles they reveal a spiritual presence and power, as electric sparks reveal the presence and power of electricity. As benignant miracles wrought in furtherance of the work of redeeming men from sin to God, they reveal the benignant character of the spiritual power, as the electric spark reveals electricity in its peculiar characteristics. Accordingly it is written of the first miracle of Jesus that in it he manifested his glory. M. Renan insists that the only adequate proof of a miracle would be to do it under the scrutiny of scientific experts and to repeat it as often as demanded. This would be reducing the miracle to an ordinary experiment in physical science. He demands that the proof of a miracle should be proof that it is not a miracle but an ordinary event in the course of nature. He thus begs the question. A miracle assumes the existence of God and a spiritual system. It is essentially an effect in nature manifesting the presence and power of spiritual agency

acting according to spiritual laws and for spiritual ends. M. Renan's demand implies that no such spiritual power and system exist; that all which exists or can manifest its existence is that which is included in the physical system and in its factual sequences as already known. It is impossible to prove a supernatural effect if no supernatural cause, order, law or end exists.

Nor may we regard miracles merely as wonders designed to call attention to the words of a divinely commissioned teacher. John Foster says that in miracles God rings the great bell of the universe to call the attention of all people, and then through Christ and his apostles and prophets preaches the sermon. But God does not reveal himself primarily by sermons, but by moving and acting among us, especially in the grand progress of redemption. As in a fog at sea, suddenly for a moment a topsail breaks through the mists on our view, revealing the great and peopled ship which is moving unseen on its destined course, so in a miracle, through the mists of sense men catch a momentary glimpse of God and powers of the spiritual world as they move unseen through the course of the ages, redeeming man from sin.

IV. MIRACLES AND LAW. — The objection now recurs in another form. Miracles, it is said, however explained, involve an unlimited and unconditioned possibility; anything may happen. Whereas nothing is possible except what accords with the determinate laws of physical science.

This assumes that God is a capricious almightiness. In reference to this new way of putting the objection, the following remarks are pertinent.

In the first place, the objection in this form assumes that the range of possibilities is determinate, and limited by scientific law. The theist insists that this very statement necessarily carries us beyond the physical system to a mind or reason prescribing to it laws, and energizing in it and regulating its development within those scientific laws. Blind force cannot regulate itself by laws. The very recognition of scientific law assumes a scientific mind which is regulating nature in accordance with scientific law. If, then, in that scientific mind there is any truth or law not yet revealed in the factual sequences of nature known to us, or any rational end not yet attained in nature, the possibility of miracle in its essential significance is established. Thus the very statement of the objection assumes the possibility of miracles. They do not set aside law, but reveal it in a new and higher significance and application.

The energy of the absolute Reason will be uniformly accordant with reason in two respects. It can never effect an absurdity, for this would be to annul the constituent elements of reason itself. No power, not even almightiness, can do this. Here, then, is an absolute limit of possibility in the fact that Reason is absolute, ultimate and supreme. No power can effect what is absurd. This is the rational order.

There is another respect in which the power or will of God will be in harmony with reason. In his own free choice he will act in eternal accord with all the principles of reason, with all its laws, and for the realization of all its ideals and ends. This is the moral order. God always acts in perfect love and wisdom.

Here, then, is the twofold order of the universe, the rational and the moral. It is not true that there is an unlimited possibility, that anything may happen. The absolute Reason in energizing does nothing but what is accordant with reason. The objection of Professor Royce, that if a single moth is singed the system is proved to be unreasonable, rests only on a superficial view of the case.¹ It assumes that creation must be complete at a stroke. But a finite system cannot be complete, but must be progressively developed. If, as Professor Royce says, the universal Reason is always at the goal, yet he can never bring the finite being to that goal, for that would involve the absurdity of making the finite equal to the infinite. Almighty cannot create a person with a moral character, for moral character can be formed only by the free acts of the moral agent himself. To create a person with a moral character would be as absurd as to create a person a hundred years old. According to this writer, since moths are actually singed in this world, this is a world not regulated by rational law; therefore it is a world of unlimited possibilities, in which anything may happen, even miracles; but miracles only in their false meaning as actions exempt from all law.

In the existing system sin is not only possible but we know it in our own experience and observation to be actual and real. Then God meets it not only by law but also in redemption. He seeks men who have separated themselves from him in sin and draws them, with all the resources of moral influence, to return to himself. Here then is necessary, not merely education of in-

¹ "The first starving family, or singed moth, or broken troth, or wasted effort, or wounded bird, is an indictment of the universal Reason that, always at the goal, has wrought this irrational wrong." — *The Religious Aspects of Philosophy*, p. 263.

nocent but undeveloped beings, but also the redemption of men who have sinned, with their discipline, purification and development to a right spiritual character and life. Here also is a new explanation of pain, as having place in a reasonable system. How is discipline possible or sin punishable without liability to pain? Here also is a new occasion for the miraculous intervention of the spiritual powers in the course of nature and of human history. But this is with no unlimited and unconditional possibility. Man must be redeemed by methods accordant with the eternal law of reason, and by redemption must be brought back to willing and complete conformity with that law. And this fixedness of law in redemption is explicitly recognized in the Christian doctrine of the Atonement.

While there is here no unlimited and unconditioned possibility, there is a possibility of development and progress within the lines of law, leading to epochs both in the physical and the spiritual systems far in advance of the factual sequences hitherto known in human experience.

Physical science itself leads on to positions which suggest the possibility of miraculous effects in nature by the intervention of spiritual powers. At every advance in its brilliant career of discovery it reveals anew its inadequacy to answer the questions which the discovery suggests, and forces attention on God and the spiritual system for the answer. It has been said that it is only the extraordinary which led men to think of the supernatural. But science has revealed the unity of the cosmos and the uniformity and continuity of all its complicated action under the reign of law. And by disclosing this it forces us on God and the spiritual system for explanation of it. For science is showing itself to be nothing but the discovery of reason in nature and the interpretation of its physical processes in the forms of reason which they reveal.

On the other hand by its discoveries and inventions science has prepared men's minds to expect the unexpected and to regard the extraordinary as the ordinary. It has taught us that the two-foot rule of our own experience is inadequate to measure the possibilities of the universe through all time. It has been common to appeal to the evidence of the senses as giving the highest certainty. But physical science has almost established the opposite conclusion; the farther from sense and the more completely ideal our view of nature, the nearer to reality. The earth which seems to the senses to be flat, is shown by science to be spherical; the

seeming firmament is dissolved and opens out into boundless space; the reality of sound is undulations which cannot be heard; the reality of light is vibrations which cannot be seen. Appearances to sense have to be corrected by ideas of reason. Mathematical forms and formulas which are pure creations of the mind remain unchanged. Men have been wont to regard matter as solid and real, spirit as shadowy and unreal; but science indicates the contrary. Matter is never inert but always energizing, never at rest but always in motion, never stable but always in flux. Science suspects it may be nothing but force occupying space; it conjectures that it was a fluid imperceptible to sense until it began to move; it finds the mightiest of energies in the ether, imperceptible to sense, with the tension of adamant and so ethereal that it penetrates all bodies and is not known to obstruct motion. Here again science points beyond the material and the physical to the spiritual, the supernatural and the divine, as the deepest reality and the true seat of order and law.

Familiarized as we are with the discoveries by science of wonders which but lately would have been regarded as impossibilities, what shall hinder our believing that in the interest of the spiritual system and for its ends God may sometimes reveal himself in nature in ways transcending its factual sequences which we call laws? And if so, that it would be not without laws, not interrupting the continuity and uniformity of the system? It would be, on the contrary, an effect in nature in accordance with the higher laws of the rational and moral system holding the lower laws in abeyance. Human knowledge can never rid itself of its one-sidedness and become full-orbed and harmonious with itself, till it recognizes both the physical and the spiritual and their unity in one great system of the universe. And when we see that the physical system and its laws are a revelation of the spiritual system and its laws, and that the former is subordinate and tributary to the ends of the latter, certainly we may not make man's present experience of the factual sequences of nature the bound of all that is ever to be known. Professor Jevons says: "We can imagine reasoning creatures dwelling in a world where the atmosphere was a mixture of oxygen and inflammable gas like the fire-damp of coal-mines. If devoid of fire, they might have lived through long ages unconscious of the tremendous forces which a single spark would call into play. In the twinkling of an eye new laws might come into action, and the poor reasoning creatures, so confident about their knowledge of

the reign of law in their world, would have no time to speculate on the overthrow of all their theories.”¹

From this point of view miracles are not only possible but probable. Nature exists for the ends of the spiritual system. Here is the one all-dominating final cause, which discloses the significance of nature and the unity of the universe. It is probable that for the great ends of the spiritual system God may reveal himself in the physical system in effects transcending the factual course of nature and the constitutional power of man. Nor can we assign a limit to the progress of this development of the universe in accordance with rational law and for the accomplishment of rational ends.

And this, also, physical science itself seems to indicate. According to Mr. Fiske, man is the end to which the whole evolution of the physical system on earth tends. When rational man appears, there is to be no evolution of a higher species but the education and civilization of the man. Rational and moral culture take the place of physical evolution. Here is a being who is an end in himself, and not a mere medium for the evolution of another and higher species. Here the energies of the physical and spiritual systems are concentrated on this being to educate and develop him to higher and higher character and powers. Here is a new order and sphere of existence. And who shall say how far this progressive development of man may proceed? If here is a being who is an end in himself, if, so soon as he appears, the physical evolution gives place, as to him, to spiritual culture, and the energies both of the physical and spiritual systems serve him to promote his progress, who shall say that the progress may not be endless; that man's life may not issue in immortality? For if he is not immortal, then the whole conception becomes self-contradictory. If man ceases to exist he ceases to be an end in himself. He becomes a mere physical creature dissolved again into the physical system. Evolution reached its utmost in him and dismissed him into the sphere of the rational and the spiritual, as an end to be served and not as means and material for physical uses. All nature and all spiritual agencies begin to educate and develop him. But it was all a mistake. Nature takes him back into itself and grinds him up for its own uses. Nor can we say that it is the race which nature serves and all spiritual powers educate and develop. For at some time in the future, if materialism is true and no spiritual system exists, the whole

¹ Principles of Science, p. 745.

process of evolution will be ended, the world will become motionless and silent and all life will cease. It is only as nature goes back to the supernatural as its cause, and leads up to and issues in the supernatural as its end, that the universe can go on forever. The only ends worthy of so great a process are the ends which may be realized in man immortal. In accomplishing these ends it cannot be incredible that God should reveal himself in ways transcending the factual sequences of nature, yet without interrupting the continuity of the system.

V. WHAT THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MIRACLES SIGNIFIES. — We infer that philosophically and logically there is no middle ground between admitting the possibility of miracles and denying the existence of a personal God, of the spiritual and moral system, and of free will. To deny miracles on the ground of their impossibility involves the denial of the personal God. Strauss sank gradually down to this denial. Others have passed through the same descent. History seems to exemplify the truth that there is logically and philosophically no stopping place between denying that God can reveal himself miraculously and some form of atheism. Therefore the controversy of the rationalistic and skeptical criticism is not with Christianity but with theism. The real question is, Is there a personal God and is there a system of rational free agents under his government?

It is true, as already shown, that any incidental miracle of healing and the like is not of the essence of the redemption through Christ. It is conceivable, though not probable, that God might have come in Christ as he did, without working any miracle of this kind, and the redemptive action and the revelation of God in it remain in their essential significance the same. But when miracles are denied on the ground that they are impossible, the denial rests on a conception of the universe which excludes the immanence of God in nature and the connection of the physical system with the spiritual as manifesting or expressing its truths and laws and subordinate to its higher ends. Thus it denies that conception of the universe in its relation to God, and of the physical in its relation to the spiritual and supernatural, on which the essential significance of redemption by God in Christ and of Christianity rests. It is incompatible with any action of God in the epochs either of physical evolution or of spiritual development and progress; and in fact with any intervention of the supernatural in the natural, directing it by spiritual and supernatural laws to spiritual and supernatural ends, and thus reveal-

ing in the universe God and his kingdom, and in nature that which is above nature.

This denial excludes personal immortality. The transition of man at death into the spiritual sphere and a higher and immortal existence involves every supposition respecting God and the supernatural in relation to the physical which miracles involve. Strauss rejected personal immortality; and in the dedication of his second and modified *Life of Jesus* to a deceased brother he boastfully declares his disbelief. The pathetic lines of George Eliot are familiar, in which renouncing all belief in personal existence after death, she recognizes immortality as possible only in the survival of our good influence: —

“ O may I join the choir invisible
Of those immortal dead who live again
In minds made better by their presence . . .
So to live is heaven.”

And Matthew Arnold reaches the same conclusion. “What really is Christmas? The birth-day of Jesus. What is the miracle of the Incarnation? A homage to the virtue of pureness and to the manifestation of this virtue in Jesus. What is Lent and the miracle of the temptation? A homage to the virtue of self-control and to the manifestation of this virtue in Jesus. What does Easter celebrate? Jesus victorious over death by dying. By dying how? Dying to re-live. To re-live in Paradise, in another world? No, in this. What then is the kingdom of God? The ideal society of the future. Then what is immortality? To live in the eternal order which never dies. What is salvation by Christ? The attainment of this immortality. Through what means? Through means of the method and the secret and the temper of Jesus.”¹ Here is the denial of immortality veiled under high sounding words.

In like manner the denial of the possibility of miracles is equally a denial of the possibility of communion with God in prayer, of the forgiveness of sin, of a people redeemed from sin by the immediate action of God's grace, and of the establishment and progress of the kingdom of God on earth. For the possibility of these and of miracles rests ultimately on the same fundamental conception of the universe in its relation to God and as comprising the two systems, the physical or natural and the spiritual or moral, which is the supernatural.

In this deeper sense the possibility of the miraculous is of the

¹ A Comment on Christmas, *Contemporary Review*, April, 1885.

essence of Christianity and the denial of its possibility involves the denial of that which is distinctive and essential in Christianity. Christianity implies primarily a supernatural, divine action in the redemption of sinful man ; and secondarily, a supernatural revelation of God in that action. The whole conception involves the miraculous.

In conclusion, it is evident that the question with the objector is not merely as to the possibility of any or all of the incidental miracles, like the healing of a sick man by a word. It is the fundamental question whether God can be active in the universe, evolving nature to higher planes ; and in the spiritual system, educating and developing free personal beings and redeeming sinners from their sin. In fact the question goes deeper even than this. For if miracles are shown to be impossible, the same arguments equally prove that there is no God, no spiritual system, no free will of man. That is, they equally prove that the physical system comprehends all and that rational free will does not exist either in God or man or any personal being.

CHAPTER XVI.

UNITY AND CONTINUITY OF THE REVELATION OF GOD IN NATURE, MAN AND CHRIST.

NATURE and the supernatural are commonly regarded as reciprocally repugnant. They have been distinguished as the orderly and the anomalous; as the realm of law and the realm of caprice. The Christian revelation, as involving the supernatural, has been regarded as outside of nature and acting in it only by irruption and interference.

Their unity and continuity are sought in vain by pulling the supernatural down into the natural and submerging it therein. This simply annuls the supernatural. It would be to make a desert and call it peace. And because the supernatural cannot be banished from human thought, presently within the all-embracing nature the dualism reappears, and the problem of finding the unity and continuity of the physical and the spiritual, the natural and the supernatural, forces itself on us anew.

And their unity and continuity cannot be found in any theory of monism, pantheistic or materialistic. These seek the ultimate ground of the universe in some form of the unconscious and impersonal and exclude conscious rational and personal free will.

The course of thought in this volume presents a solution of this problem, which preserves the distinction between the natural and the supernatural and at the same time discloses their unity and continuity as progressively expressing the archetypal thought and realizing the archetypal ideal and end of the absolute Reason immanent and energizing in them.

It remains to consider more particularly the significance of this unity and continuity.

I. UNITY AND CONTINUITY OF GOD'S REVELATION IN NATURE AND MAN. — Nature and the supernatural are in unity and continuity as the continuous and progressive revelation of God, the eternal and universal Reason.

The attempt of some writers to find this unity by supposing the uniform sequences, called laws of nature, to be extended over

the spiritual system can be only abortive. The laws of nature which declare mere uniform factual sequences are laws only in a secondary sense. In the lapse of time these sequences may change and give place to new arrangements. On the contrary it is the principles and laws of reason which extend over nature, and its ideals and ends which are progressively realized in the ceaseless course of nature. It is these principles and laws which persist in all physical sequences, survive all their changes, reappear and persist in every new arrangement. Such, for example, persisting unchanged through all changes, are the law of causation, the law of uniformity and continuity, that the same complex of causes must everywhere and always produce the same effect, the law of the correlation and conservation of motor-force, the principles of mathematics, the laws of falling bodies, of gravitation, of the dispersion of force, and all laws of mechanics founded on mathematical principles. These are the true laws of nature. It has been shown that the fundamental axiom of physical science that the sum of all force, potential and energetic, is always the same, can be true only if there is a God; that all science depends on the assumption of the universal Reason in harmony with human reason; that it is only in the recognition of this absolute Reason, which we call God, that the *rationale* and significance of the laws of nature are found. Thus it is the principles and laws of the supernatural which are regulative in the natural and are revealed in the factual sequences which are called the laws of nature. The factual sequences and arrangements themselves, though they may last as long as the rotation and revolution of the earth, begin, are subject to change and pass away. It is the same in the spiritual or supernatural system. Men are born and die. Nations arise, flourish and decay. Literatures, forms of government, civilizations have their periods and the old gives place to the new. But the principles of truth, the law of love and the standards of perfection, beauty and worth are the same forever.

The most pregnant words ever written are the first four words of Genesis: "In the beginning God." Godless theories conceive of the universe as the less developing itself into the greater, the lower lifting itself to the higher. Thus the evolution becomes the continued production of effects without a cause. Theism says: "In the beginning God." In the evolution God is always immanent, directing and energizing, preparing what is to be the medium for the manifestation of something new and higher; and

at successive epochs bringing in the higher, as soon as a fitting sphere for its action and a fitting medium for its manifestation are prepared. The evolution is God's continually greatening revelation of himself.

Thus God's revelation of himself is not limited to a few transcendent but isolated facts of the supernatural, which we call miracles. The universe itself in its whole progressive development is the revelation of God. In the evolution of the physical system and in the education, redemption and development of man, God's revelation of himself goes on through all time. From the lowest form of primitive matter to the highest form of finite spirit the universe is the continuous and progressive revelation of God. And the natural and the supernatural are in unity and continuity as the continued revelation of the thought and realization of the ideal and end which are archetypal in God, the eternal and ever energizing Reason.

God's expression of his thought in the finite begins in the natural or physical, evolving in it successively higher and higher stages of existence. The supernatural appears at length in man. But here is no break in the continuity of the divine action. So soon as matter in its evolution has become susceptible of being quickened into organic life and the world has become fitted to sustain it, the ever energizing Reason quickens it into life. And when the world has become fitted to be the habitation of man and a living organism has become capable of being the medium for the manifestation of spiritual life, God breathes into it a living spirit. Thus in man a being appears in whom the physical and the spiritual, the natural and the supernatural are united. The cosmic physical forces sweep through man's organism as they do through the trees. But man is conscious of the powers acting on him, he apprehends, defines and comprehends them in thought, enunciates them in their intellectual equivalents in systems of science, and appropriates the forces and resources of nature to his own use and to the accomplishment of his own plans and chosen ends. He is above nature because he knows it and intelligently directs and uses it. On the other hand he finds underlying his science and revealed in it the principles and laws, the ideals and ends of reason, which, if the science is real, must be the Reason that is universal. In nature, when scientifically known, he finds the principles and laws, the ideals and ends of his own reason revealed, and therein knows his own reason as the likeness of the Reason that is universal and supreme. Thus

man is the being in whom nature and the supernatural meet, and in whom the light of the absolute Reason shines. In him the physical system and the spiritual meet and are in unity as the revelation of God.

Physiology itself brings us face to face with this great fact. It discloses the fact that every thought, volition and feeling is accompanied by molecular motion of the brain. It forces on us the question, What is the relation of the molecular motion to the conscious mental action? In answer to this question the following positions have been taken.

Comte denies that consciousness is a legitimate source of psychological knowledge and ignores mental phenomena as outside of the legitimate sphere of science. But this position is itself unscientific. It assumes a scientific knowledge of man while taking no notice of a whole class of indisputable facts. In fact it implies that science itself, being a mental phenomenon, is not scientific, but is excluded from the sphere of scientific knowledge.

Materialists answer that the conscious mental phenomena are caused by the molecular action. Mr. Huxley has said: "We have as much reason for regarding the mode of motion of the nervous system as the cause of the state of consciousness, as we have for regarding any event as the cause of another." But this is a physical impossibility, and as such is denied by science. Motion proceeds only from motion, and in all its transformations cannot produce any thing but motion. If it were transformed into thought it would disappear as motion. This would be contrary to the law of the correlation and conservation of force. It would be a miracle in the extreme of its false meaning, as an event contrary to all law. Mr. Huxley himself, though he has declared motion to be the cause of the phenomena of consciousness and thus claims to give a scientific account of them, does really exclude them from scientific recognition. He calls men "conscious automata." He insists that thought and feeling are merely "indices of changes which are going on in the brain." Thus he teaches that conscious mental action is not a force or energy; it does no work; every demand of physical science is met without it. Consciousness is a mere register which somehow has become attached to some machines. The machine would be just as perfect and efficient without it. Hence if every thing were going on in the world as now, but without consciousness, every formula of science would be met and every

demand of science satisfied as completely as with consciousness. Thus all these known facts of consciousness are arbitrarily excluded from the sphere of legitimate scientific investigation.

A third answer is that the molecular motion of the brain is caused by the action of the mind. This answer may be accepted by those who believe in the existence of rational personal beings. It is denied as unscientific by all who do not believe this. The reason given is that if the mind is a cause of motion the effect will be a miracle. This is plainly a begging of the question. It is asked: Is this an effect of a cause other than matter and motor-force? The answer is, No; because the supposed cause would be other than matter and motor-force. Here it is assumed as a universal postulate that there is no causative energy in the universe except that of matter manifested in motor-force; or rather that of motion. We are told that "all the forms of energy have now been proved to be but modes of motion." When mental phenomena are known which confessedly are not modes of motion, they are arbitrarily ignored as beyond the pale of science. But that is not science which refuses to seek a scientific explanation of known facts.

It should be noticed, however, that the reason given for this denial is a recognition of the fact that a miracle in its essence is no more than a causative action of a rational power or mind on nature. It does not consist essentially in the interrupting of the order and laws of nature.

A fourth answer is that consciousness and the molecular motion may be two aspects of the same reality, dual as it appears to us, but one as it is in fact. Both mind and motion are simultaneously concerned in the one causal energy. "Motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion; mind-changes produce nothing but mind-changes; both producing both simultaneously, neither could be what it is without the other, because without the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is." In the absence of mind the molecular action of the brain could no more be what it is; in the absence of brain the conscious mental action could no more be what it is. This is illustrated by the vibrations of the chords of a harp and the music which we hear. These are two different ways of viewing the same reality. If either the vibrations or the mental act were wanting there would be no music.

Such a theory was proposed by the late Professor Clifford.¹

¹ Lectures and Essays, vol. ii. pp. 31-70, *Body and Mind*; vol. i. pp. 223-253, *The Unseen Universe*.

It declares that mental phenomena are not a form of motion and cannot be accounted for by motion. On the contrary, it declares that mental phenomena are a causative energy acting on nature; that mind is a cause other than motor-force, though acting jointly with it. It thus recognizes mental phenomena as within the pale of science and as legitimate objects of scientific investigation. And the conception of this universe going on automatically just as it does now, but without consciousness, becomes impossible. This theory also, while distinguishing the physical and the spiritual, declares their real unity and coöperation.

In these respects this theory is a real advance. But it does not give the full significance of the union of the physical and the spiritual in man. According to Professor Clifford mind is merely a series of subjective impressions. He says this is all which he finds in his own consciousness. He thinks there is no room in the universe for ghosts, or superior intelligences or bogies of any kind. But this contradicts the obvious fact of the unity of consciousness. A series of impressions cannot in each separate impression be conscious of itself in the unity of a series. This is mere nonsense. The theory also contradicts the common consciousness of men. Professor Clifford says "if the mind were a force we should be able to perceive it." The fact is that, with the exception of the professor and a few theorists, men are conscious that they do perceive it. When a man thinks or wills or exerts his energy, he is conscious that it is himself who thinks and wills and acts. He cannot utter his consciousness without declaring this belief; I think, I will, I act. In fact man's knowledge of force or energy originates in his consciousness of himself exerting or resisting it.

The theory contradicts not only consciousness and common sense, but reason also. It is a constituent element of reason regulating all thought, that there can be no thought without a thinker, no action without an agent, no motion without something which moves and something which causes the motion, no quality without a being, no phenomenon without something which appears and something to which it appears. No chemistry of thought can dissolve this unity, no ingenuity of skepticism can annul the principle of reason which compels us thus to think. It underlies all rational thought and knowledge. Men may speculate as to the nature of the being. They may call it thought or they may call it force. But all the same the thought or the force is hypostasized as objectively real and the hypostasized thought

or force is distinguished from the subjective consciousness of it. Whatever is presented in consciousness is known also in the forms of reason as a phenomenon of being.

We must then advance beyond this theory to find the significance of the unity of mental phenomena and molecular motion. When once it is admitted that the molecular motion of the brain is not the cause of conscious mental acts, then physiology and biology disclose an effect for which within their sphere no cause can be found. And when they further admit that mental phenomena are a causal energy acting on nature, they point up to the only reasonable position remaining, that conscious mental acts are acts of a rational personal being. In man as a personal being his power is enlightened by reason and is thus self-directing and self-exertive. But he is in nature while above it, a personal spirit in and acting through a physical organization. And in this personal spirit, conscious of itself and revealing itself through an organized body, is the synthesis and the only synthesis of motion and thought, of physical force and rational will, of matter and spirit. Physiology and biology have brought us forward to a point of view from which we must see man as at once natural and supernatural, as a personal being, in nature yet above it, and acting in and on it from above.

In this union of the natural and the supernatural in man we have a point of view from which we see the possibility and probability that there may be a conscious mind acting as causal energy along the lines of physical force and directing them. And we see both the possibility and the probability that the absolute Being, that is the ultimate ground of the universe, is the absolute Reason; and that the energy acting in the universe goes back for its origin to the absolute Power that is inseparable from the absolute Reason, that is one and the same with it, Reason energizing; and this is God. Professor Clifford denies this. He argues that we know conscious mental phenomena only as connected with the action of a brain; and there can be no God that acts in conscious rationality, because we know of no great brain through which his consciousness would be possible. But the professor's experience is too limited to justify this inference. To argue that because human intelligence is connected with a brain therefore God cannot be intelligent except through an infinite brain is anthropomorphism in its grossest form. We return upon him the question of the skeptic to the theist:—

“ Think you this mold of hopes and fears
 Could find no statelier than his peers
 In yonder hundred million spheres? ”

If we are to reason from experience, the legitimate inference is that because mind, as we know it, is conscious therefore all other mind in the universe must be conscious. And since Professor Clifford recognizes mind as a causative energy distinct from motor-force and finds it necessary to suppose some element of mind in every motion in nature, the inference seems to be inevitable, even from his own position, that that which is ultimate in the universe must be mind. And since the highest order of power known to us is mind-power, we must infer that the ultimate and absolute cause of the universe must be mind-power; for it cannot be of an order inferior to beings actually existing in the universe. Still more when we see that man, as a rational person, is supernatural and spiritual, we must recognize the supernatural and spiritual in God. Thus physiology and biology bring us to the door which opens from the darkness of the impersonal and physical into the realm of the spiritual and the presence of God.

The fact that man's mind acts through a physical organization does not justify the inference that it must perish when the physical organization dies and is dissolved. Behind the world perceptible to sense is a world of molecules and ethers entirely imperceptible. Behind this imperceptible world, science is finding itself obliged to assume atoms of a secondary order, some frictionless fluid, some homogeneous, still more remote from sense. Evolution assumes that the imperceptible universe existed before the perceptible, and that the latter is evolved from the former. But behind this imperceptible world, and beyond and above it, we find mind revealing itself. If now it is admitted that mind in man is a causative energy, in the consciousness of which man knows himself as a personal being, and in this consciousness his knowledge of being in its deepest reality originates, it is entirely supposable that this personal spirit may have in itself energy to survive the catastrophe of death, taking with it or finding for itself in the extra-sensible sphere a finer medium through which to act in consciousness. And this is the more reasonable because God is ever energizing in the progressive evolution of nature and the progressive development of the spiritual system. And as in a great epoch of evolution he breathed the human spirit into this mortal body, it is in analogy with the whole course of the evolution that death should be another epoch in which man is lifted to

a higher plane of being. Thus physiology and biology open to us an outlook of hope and probability to immortal life.

In following scientific thought into the extra-sensible world and tracing its venturesome speculations respecting different orders of atomic existence therein, the thought may naturally suggest itself that a still finer mind-stuff may underlie the most refined of the extra-sensible matter and manifest itself by acting therein. But this implies that the mind-stuff is merely a finer form of matter, therefore only the medium through which a mind or spirit may reveal itself. It is not the mind or spirit itself. The ultimate unit of the spiritual system is a conscious rational person. The spiritual system can be conceived only as consisting of rational persons, in unity by participating in the light of a common rationality and acting in free will under one and the same moral law. It is a system, which, as it is observed to exist on earth, began at the great epoch when rational man appeared. It is not impossible nor incredible that a spiritual sphere may exist in the visible world, but imperceptible by the human senses; that as through the natural eye we see the physical world, so with the spiritual eye, were it opened, we should see a spiritual world. Milton says:—

“Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth
Unseen, both when we wake and when we sleep.”

This is a poetical conception. But poetical conceptions sometimes picture the deepest truths. This, however, is widely different from the conception of an underlying and impersonal mind-stuff.

That which underlies the finite universe, which is the deepest reality both in the physical and the spiritual systems, which is in fact the constitution of the universe, is the archetypal thought eternal in the absolute Reason. And science, as it passes from perceptible matter to the ether, from molecules to atoms, and thence to atoms of a second order, has entered on a course of thought which can stop nowhere but in the absolute Reason, which is God. The only ultimate ground on which the finite mind in its inquiries can rest is the Reason that is universal, unconditioned and eternal; it is the truths, the laws, the ideals of perfection and good, eternal and archetypal in God, the eternal Reason, and the eternal wisdom and love of God by which they are progressively expressed and realized in the finite. The truths, laws and ideals, the wisdom and love are eternal and unchange-

able. The finite forms, arrangements and sequences in which they are progressively expressed and realized are variable. It is in these variable arrangements and sequences that man's free will finds scope for action and that miracles are possible.

Hence in the progressive expression of the divine thought there are epochal miracles, in which a new and higher expression of the eternal truths, laws and ideals is attained and a higher order of being and action appears.

And in connection with this progressive realization of the archetypal thought, incidental miracles wrought by men are possible. We have seen that the natural and the supernatural are united in man, and that the action of his rational free will on nature is essentially the same in kind with miraculous action. We call the effect of an action of this kind a miracle only when it reveals a power transcending that of man as known in common experience. But man in his progress advances beyond himself. If Newton when two years old had written the Principia, it would have been a miracle. It was no miracle to write it in his mature years. Is there potential in man a power of mind over matter, which, in an analogous way, may be developed with the progressive development of man, so as to be capable of doing works which done in his present immaturity would rightly be called miracles? As in the progress of Christ's kingdom on earth all man's powers become more fully and harmoniously developed, as he comes into closer union with God in the life of faith and love and more receptive of the divine gifts, as thus his thought and will are brought more into harmony with the constitution and powers of the universe, it is conceivable that he may find himself in the exercise of a power over nature which we should now regard as miraculous. It would only be the essentially miracle-working power in every free will developed in unison with God's will and revealing itself in mightier works. The miracles of prophets and apostles would still be wonders and signs as well as mighty works, because so far in advance of the spiritual development of man within the kingdom of Christ in their time. They would be signs of the presence and gifts of God and a prophecy and promise of the more complete development to come; "solitary early flowers" revealing the power of the returning sun already quickening the earth and giving promise of summer. And our Lord said, in reference to some of his miracles: "Greater works than these shall ye do." And if this conception should be realized it would prove that miracles cause no break in the continuity of nature, that the

supernatural is ever present and directive in the natural, and that Jesus is the ideal man more completely than we have been wont to suppose.

II. UNITY AND CONTINUITY OF GOD'S REVELATION IN NATURE, MAN AND CHRIST. — The unity and continuity of nature and the supernatural, the unity of the human and the divine, are further disclosed in the revelation of God in Christ. As in man the spiritual and supernatural appears in the physical, so in Christ the divine appears in the human. And in this higher stage of the revelation its unity and continuity are not interrupted.

I. Christ's coming constitutes a new epoch in the progressive development of the world and in the revelation of God therein. The universe, so far as we know it in the history of this earth, is in continual development and progress from the lower to the higher. The progress is marked by epochs in which successively higher orders of being and spheres of action appear and the ever immanent God makes new revelations of his archetypal thought. Such epochs are the beginning of motion, the introduction of organic life, the introduction of sensitivity, the introduction of rational personal beings. In the last the great transition is made from the natural to the supernatural, and the moral and spiritual system appears. Then, after due preparation in the education and development of man, in the fulness of time, is the great epoch in which God comes in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, and therein making the consummate revelation of what he is in his relation to man and of what man is in his relation to God, disclosing to human view the archetypal principles and laws which guide God's action, and the archetypal ideals and good to be realized in the history and destiny of man. This is the great revelation of God. Whatever may be said of the previous epochs, he would be a bold skeptic who should venture to affirm that the Christ was merely a natural product of a physical and godless evolution. In this epoch Christ comes, as the Head of a new humanity, bringing the divine into the human to establish the kingdom of heaven on the earth, to quicken men by a new birth of the Spirit, to lift them from their submergence in the life of nature to spiritual life in union with God in faith and love, and to diffuse and perpetuate among them the Spirit of God with all heavenly influences to draw them into Christ's kingdom of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit. And we look forward to another epoch, when Christ will come again at

the consummation of the work of redemption and the close of the natural life and earthly history of man, when the kingdom of Christ on earth will be completed and will exist with all who have been gathered into it in a higher order of life and in a new and celestial environment, where it will go on forever in ways of glory beyond the power of man to conceive.

Thus the coming of the Christ is the central epoch, and the Word made flesh and dwelling among us is the central power in the continuous and progressive development of this world from its primitive homogeneous matter to the glory of the new heavens and the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness.

As in man the natural and the supernatural or spiritual are in unity, so in Christ is the unity of the human and the divine. And since man unites the natural and the spiritual, in Christ is consummated the unity of the natural, the spiritual and the divine. From him goes forth the divine Spirit, invisible but bearing the divine light and life and love, to touch all hearts and to unite himself in perpetual indwelling with every man who opens his heart in faith to receive him. . . So in the new era introduced at this great epoch of the coming of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, men one by one are touched by the Spirit bearing the heavenly influences, and with victorious allurements, with most loving and sweet force of persuasion, drawn into the kingdom of Christ.¹ And in the consummation of this progressive revelation, Christ's earthly kingdom is itself glorified in the heavenly.

2. Christ brings the divine into the human as an abiding power of illumination, renovation and reconciliation. The divine abides in the human in the Spirit of Christ. So in previous epochs the personal, after it appears, abides and works in organic nature, and the organic life abides and works in the inorganic.

Christ brings the divine into the human as a power of illumination. In the Bible, Wisdom is personified as present in the formation of the world, directing it "as a master-workman."² The evidence of the presence and direction of this master-workman are found in nature by science. It is the declaration of this

¹ "Victrix delectatio." — Augustine. "Amabili et suavissima persuasionis necessitate. . . . Ut nulla vis major amore, nec fortior necessitas charitate, quæ et instar olei effusa in nobis, suavissima delectatione nos perfundit, et instar catenæ fortissimæ nos constringit." (II. Cor. v. 14.) — Turretine, *Inst.* Loc. 15, Quæst. 4, xviii., xxi.

² Prov. chap. viii. 30.

wisdom in nature which constitutes science. Science rests on the assumption that the reason whose master-workmanship is revealed in nature is the same in kind as the reason in man that discovers it in nature; that man participates in the light of the Reason that is universal. When God comes into humanity in Christ, the eternal Reason reveals itself in him; the light, which lighteth every man, comes into the world in Jesus, who himself is man. And Paul says that the spiritual light which shines on us from God is through Christ: "Seeing it is God, who said, Light shall shine out of darkness, who shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ."

Christ brings the divine into the human not merely to illuminate, but also to renovate and reconcile. From him proceeds the Spirit as the quickener of spiritual life. Thus, from Christ, the light, the life and the love of God penetrate and transform humanity.

This is strikingly set forth in the First Epistle of John. He announces as his theme the eternal Logos that came into the world in Christ. He says that he presents this to them, that all to whom he writes may be, like himself, in fellowship with this divine being. He says, "Our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ." We are brought back to our normal condition of union with God through Christ by participating in the influence of the divine Spirit carrying the energy of redeeming grace through the world. John proceeds to declare that in Christ the divine Light, the divine Life and the divine Love are penetrating and pervading humanity to bring man into fellowship with God by participating in these. The eternal Reason that lighteth every man is come into the world in Christ, and through him every mind darkened by sin may participate in the divine Light and see all things as they are related to God and illuminated by the light of the eternal Reason. "God is light and in him is no darkness at all. If we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another and the blood of Jesus his Son cleanseth us from all sin." Christ is also "the eternal life, which was with the Father and was manifested unto us." And from him this Life goes out into the world, a life-giving energy in which also we participate: "This is the promise which he promised us, even the life eternal." In him also the divine Love is energizing in the world to bring all men to participate in it and so to be animated with a love like the love of God revealed in Christ. And thus partaking in the divine

Light and Life and Love, men become children of God by a spiritual and divine birth, and constitute a new humanity as children of God under the Headship of Christ. And so the separation from God is ended, and in union with him men have sure hope that they shall realize in themselves the ideal of humanity set before them in Christ. "Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us that we should be called children of God; and such we are. . . . Beloved, now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. But we know that when he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him even as he is." In Christ are the eternal Light, Life and Love of God, entering and penetrating humanity to seek and to save the lost.

3. Christ, thus bringing the divine into the human, in illuminating and renovating man, takes up and vitalizes all spiritual truth and motives of other religions and of the ethnic philosophies.

The line of divine revelation which issued directly in his coming was in the history of Israel. The religion of Israel looked forward to the epoch of his coming with ever brightening prophecy and promise. It was the same course of God's redemptive action in its earlier stage preparing for the epoch when the Christ should come.

God does not reveal himself only in the history recorded in the Bible. He reveals himself also in the consciousness of men, in the constitution and course of nature, and in the constitution and history of man. His work of preparing men for Christ's coming was not in the history of Israel alone, but in the history of all nations, and in their philosophies and their religions. This is assumed in all the numerous essays and discourses on the preparation of the world at the Christian era for the introduction of Christianity. And in fact the Gentiles were found to be at least as ready to receive Christ as were the Jews.

In polytheism the minds of men were opening more and more to the recognition of a divinity in the course of nature and of human life and history to the minutest details. So Kant said that even in the blindest polytheism a spark of monotheism shimmers through, to the full recognition of which, not primarily reflection and deep speculation, but only the gradual progress of the common intelligence of man, conducts.¹ If science is to comprehend all things in the unity of a scientific system, monotheism is its

¹ Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 455.

necessary basis. Polytheism was a preparation for it. When the sun and stars, the mountains, the ocean and the air, when every part and power of nature had its god, the polytheism revealed the monotheistic belief that all nature is pervaded by the divine and under divine control. When polytheism regarded its deities as deified men, when in its latest periods in the Roman Empire it had a several deity to preside over every quality, condition and act of men, every stage in organic growth, every form and manifestation of physical force, this was a more full recognition of the monotheistic principle and could not be far from recognizing the one omnipresent God. When the Hindu says that he acknowledges 300,000,000 gods, it is the expression, in polytheistic form, of the monotheistic principle that God is everywhere, and has all wisdom, all virtue, all power. As all nature and all mankind began to be comprehended in the unity of a scientific and reasonable system, the divinity that rules in the universe could no longer be regarded as many, but as one, as the universal Reason endowed with all wisdom and all moral perfection and all might. In India and the East, and through Stoicism in Greece and Rome, philosophy, groping for this unity and universality of the divine, had thought it might be found in pantheism. But this gave only a dead unity without conscious personality or free spiritual life in God or man. The unity was found in the one living God, already known in Israel, and brought into humanity in Christ, the source of spiritual life for all men.

Thus all that is true in polytheism is comprehended by Christianity, into which it faded like the many stars into the one light of the rising sun. Monotheism was the legitimate issue of the progress of the human mind through the many-starred night of polytheism. But in fact the morning dawned on the world only when, in the coming of Christ, "The Sun of Righteousness" arose.

Mr. Buckle anticipates a millennial issue of human progress, when population will be more and more concentrated in cities, and thus be shut out from the hills and valleys, the rivers, the forests and the fields, and even from the broad sky, and occupied solely in business; and that then all superstition, that is, all belief in God and the supernatural, will be extirpated, and man will be blessed in a wholly artificial life. This implies that the works of man will shut out the works of God, and Gradgrind will reign unmolested and supreme. This would be progress reversed. It would be night swallowing both sun and stars in total darkness.

The insufficiency of the ethnic religions and philosophies to meet man's spiritual wants awakened the thoughtful to a consciousness of their need of further revelation of God—a consciousness pathetically set forth by Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Seneca and others. The truths respecting God and his relations to man, recognized in the ethnic religions and philosophies and taken up in Christianity, are some of them of fundamental importance and none are insignificant. In these religions and connected with them men have learned the existence of supernatural beings, of man's relation to a divinity, of moral law, of sin, and of the need of redemption. If all ideas and influences of this kind had been erased from the minds of men and their minds left an entire blank respecting them, then they would have become a second time children or savages, and would need anew a long education and development before they could understand and receive the significance of God's revelation in Christ.

The different nations of antiquity contributed severally to the education and progress of the race: as Greece gave men art, poetry, philosophy; Rome gave political law and organization; Phœnicia letters; Egypt, Babylon, Persia and other nations helped in the development of civilization. This being the fact, we may properly suppose that God was working in and through these in preparing for the revelation in Christ and the development of his kingdom to a spiritual and universal kingdom. And whatever of truth and spiritual motive was in their religions and philosophies was taken up and vitalized in Christianity. The Christian Fathers declare that God was preparing mankind for Christ by the ethnic philosophy and culture as really, if not as directly, as by Israel and its prophets. Justin Martyr says: "The whole race of men had part in the Logos and those who lived in harmony with reason are Christians, even though they have been regarded as atheists; as, among the Greeks, Socrates, Herakleitus, and men like them." "Whatever things have been rightly said among all men are the property of us Christians."¹

Clement of Alexandria saw in the Greek philosophy an education of mankind running parallel with the Hebrew prophecy, and consequently in Christianity the growth of the seeds of truth contained in each. "Philosophy was a schoolmaster to bring the Hellenic mind to Christ as the law was to the Hebrews." "Let a man milk the sheep's milk if he need sustenance; let him shear

¹ First Apology, chap. xlvi.; Second Apology, chap. xiii. "In harmony with reason" is in the original *μετὰ λόγου*.

the wool if he need clothing. And in this way let me produce the fruit of Greek erudition. . . . Philosophy, a divine gift to the Greeks. . . . Before the advent of our Lord philosophy was necessary to the Greeks for righteousness. And now it becomes conducive to piety; being a kind of preparatory training to those who attain faith through demonstration. God is the cause of all good things; but of some primarily, as of the Old and the New Testament; of others by consequence, as of philosophy. Perchance philosophy was given to the Greeks directly and primarily till the Lord should call the Greeks. . . . But all (these philosophies) are, in my opinion, illuminated by the dawn of the Light (of the Logos). . . . There is then in philosophy, though stolen as the fire by Prometheus, a slender spark capable of being fanned into a flame, a trace of wisdom, and an impulse from God."¹ And Augustine held that the religion then called the Christian had in its substance been previously with the ancients and had not been wanting from the beginning of human history. He says: "Moreover if those who are called philosophers, and especially the Platonists, have said aught that is true and in harmony with our faith, we are not only not to shrink from it, but to claim it for our own use from those who have unlawful possession of it. . . . These truths are, so to speak, their gold and silver, which they did not create themselves, but dug out of the mines of God's providence which are everywhere scattered abroad."² And Basil compares Christians to bees which gather the honey of all flowers. And here is the truth in Bishop Butler's words: "Christianity is a republication of natural religion."³

Adolf Harnack says: "Christianity has throughout sucked the marrow of the ancient world and assimilated it. . . . The strength and greatness of the gospel has consisted in this, that it could ever attract to itself and preserve everything worthy of life which the ages possessed. Just through this power of assimilation and expansion the Gospel has established its right to be the universal religion, and has proved itself the most conservative of all forces, because securing endurance to everything worthy to endure."⁴ If Christianity adopted festival days of the heathen, it was only to divest them of their heathenism and to consecrate them to Christ. Through human imperfection it has

¹ Stromata, bk. i. chaps. 1, 2, 5, 13, 17.

² Christian Doctrine, bk. ii. chap. 40.

³ Analogy, part ii. chap. i.

⁴ Contemporary Review, Aug. 1886, p. 237.

sometimes taken up temporarily elements foreign and enfeebling. But its power to absorb, assimilate and consecrate to Christ whatever of truth and excellence was in the ethnic religion, philosophy and life, is one great evidence that it is divine.

And equally Christ takes up and vitalizes all those great ideas which the skepticism of our day would substitute for God as the objects of religious worship.

Mr. Spencer thinks that religion can never pass away because man must always be confronted with the mystery of things. But the merely mysterious and unknowable can never be the object of religious trust, worship and service. And always the larger the area of the visible and known, the larger the horizon of the invisible and unknown. Christ in his revelation of God awakens a consciousness of his mysterious and transcendent grandeur which no agnosticism can impart.

Mr. Harrison, on the contrary, insists rightly that the personal and spiritual are essential in the divine. As the object of religious worship, he proposes man, with all which is tender, noble and grand in his history. With great power he sets forth the Great Human Being, the ideal representative of all men in their unity as mankind, of all excellence in humanity which history has revealed or which is possible to man, as the object of adoration, the source of inspiration and energy, and the ideal end on the realization of which in humanity all human aspiration and energy should be concentrated. He says: "Religion in its proper full sense means the state of unity and concentration which results when our intellectual, moral and active life are all made one by the presence of some great Principle, in which we believe, whom we love and adore, and to which our acts are submitted, so that the perpetual sense of our dependence on that power goes deep down into all we think, or feel, or do. . . . To have religion in any true sense is to have peace."¹

Religion demands all this. But the Great Human Being can never satisfy the demand. It has no intelligence to hear our cries and no power to help. It has no personality, no conscious being. It is a mere abstraction, a subjective creation of our own thought. It is as far from being an object of religious worship as is the Unknowable. And in the worship of it, however elevated the admiration for all which is great and noble in human history, and however earnest the insistence on the obligation to love man and to consecrate life to his service in the endeavor

¹ The Creeds: Old and New, Nineteenth Century, Nov. 1880.

to realize in him his highest excellence, Christianity is beyond all comparison superior in these very particulars. I will not say Christianity takes up these qualities from this worship of humanity, for unquestionably all which is worthy and inspiring in this worship was derived, however unconsciously, from Christianity. God is revealed in Christ reconciling the world to himself, redeeming man from sin to the knowledge of God and to union with him, educating and developing him to the realization of his ideal as set forth in Christ, pervading the world with the influence of the divine Spirit, and progressively transforming society into the kingdom of God. This revelation of God is also the highest possible revelation of the capacities and possibilities of humanity, of the worth of man and the sacredness of his rights, of the obligation of all to live in the love and service of man, and of his capacity for wise thoughts and great deeds and noble character. It is the revelation of man to himself as really as it is the revelation of God to man. In Christ is the ideal of humanity in a human person and a human life, the law of love revealed in the concrete; in him also is the love of God embodied and revealed in a living man and a human life. Here are at once the law, the motive and inspiration to obey it, and the divine grace seeking man in his sins to inspire and quicken, to guide and strengthen him in the way of life, and the divine promise stimulating hope and courage and giving assurance, to all who seek, that they shall find the realization in themselves of the ideal of manhood presented before them in Christ. It is true that God reveals himself in humanity. But this revelation can never be complete, for the history of humanity will never be completed. In Christ, the ideal man, the whole contents of that revelation of God in humanity, are summed up in brief. He is the ideal of man in union with God and the recipient of his spirit and grace. He is the ideal of man in the perfection of his being: "When he shall appear, we shall be like him." He is the ideal man, loving all with a divine love, coming not to be ministered unto but to minister, taking the form of a servant, and spending his energies working with the Father to save man from sin, to develop him to his true manhood in the likeness of God, and to build human society into a kingdom of righteousness and good-will. He is the ideal of man in his subjection to privation, suffering and death, in his conflict with sin, his triumph over all the powers of evil, and his ascension glorified to the life immortal. In Handel's Messiah poetry and music com-

bine to give expression to the significance of this revelation of God in Christ and of this revelation in Christ of what humanity is and is to be. "He shall reign forever and ever." Neither music nor poetry, neither philosophy nor religion, neither law nor gospel can transcend this. It is the highest consummation of thought, feeling and life; it is the union of the human with the divine. In worshiping God in Christ we worship him in humanity. The Christian has in Christ and God's redemption of man real ground for reverence for humanity not to be compared with any possible reverence for the fiction which the positivists worship.

The agnostic and the positivist each presents a one-sided and erroneous view, and therefore each easily and triumphantly refutes the other. The agnostic affirms that the Unknowable is the absolute Being, but denies all qualities of personal Spirit. The positivist affirms the personal and ethical contents of the idea of God, but recognizes them only in humanity and denies the absolute Being. The one has the contents without the being; the other has the being without the contents. The synthesis of the two would give us the idea of God. Christian theism gives this synthesis, and thus in the personal God finds the substantial reality in unity for these two ideas.

Professor Seeley of England suggests enthusiasm for physical science as an adequate substitute for religion. But scientific investigation is itself incited by the necessity of seeking the causes, laws and *rationale* of things, which necessarily carries the thought to God. Interest in nature, admiration of its order and beauty, reverence for the universe as the revelation of God are stimulated and nurtured by religious faith.

Matthew Arnold conceives of religion as morality lit up with emotion. But Christ is the most complete revelation of the moral law; and by his teachings and work, his life, death and resurrection, himself more than all others has awakened the emotion and enthusiasm which light up morality.

Philosophy also claims to be the guide of life. Men have sought in it a substitute for religion. But for all man's spiritual needs it is inadequate. And whatever of spiritual truth and motive is in it Christ takes up and vitalizes in the Christian life.

Skeptics commonly write as if it was indisputable that Christianity rests only on arbitrary miraculous action to the exclusion of philosophy. They also claim that they find more consolation

and help in philosophy than in the Christian religion. Mr. Hennell, in his *Inquiry concerning the Origin of Christianity*, called Jesus "A Jewish Philosopher." Of this George Eliot says: "To say 'Jewish philosopher,' seems almost like saying a round square; yet these two words appear to me the truest description of Jesus."¹ She expresses very strongly her perception of the contrast between the Jew and the philosopher. Yet she conceives of Jesus as taking both characters into his own. Both of these writers seem entirely unaware that Paul had presented so similar a description of the wonderful comprehensiveness of Jesus, and that they were using, in opposition to what they took for Christianity, a remarkable conception of Christ which is emphatically set forth in Christianity itself.²

In the first glow of her departure from her early faith George Eliot thought she had found more than a substitute for Christ. Roused by some remark of Mr. Bray on the beneficial influence of evangelical beliefs, she said: "I say it now and I say it once for all, that I am influenced in my own conduct at the present time by far higher considerations and by a nobler idea of duty than I ever had while I held the evangelical beliefs." And about that time she was thinking of writing an essay on the superiority of the consolations of philosophy to those of Christianity. Yet philosophy without religion is necessarily one-sided, incomplete, and inadequate to the spiritual needs. While claiming to disclose to man the all-comprehending unity of the universe and

¹ Life by J. W. Cross, chap. iii. In her letters and diary as given in her *Life*, Miss Evans unconsciously reveals the fact that her religion had been exceedingly narrow and superficial. While so many, who have been constrained of late to yield to the current skepticism, have expressed deep sorrow at being obliged to give up their Christian faith, Miss Evans exults in a sense of liberation. She also says that, while evangelic, she had at one time sacrificed the cultivation of her intellect and a proper regard to her personal appearance. "I used to go about like an owl to the great disgust of my brother; and I would have denied him what I now see to have been lawful amusements." She speaks of the suffering of childhood from "colic and whooping-cough and dread of ghosts, to say nothing of hell and Satan, and an offended Deity in the sky, who was angry when I wanted too much plum-cake." She speaks of her soul "as just liberated from the giant's bed of dogmas on which it has been racked and stretched ever since it began to think." In reading her diary and letters it seems to me that what she had renounced was a restraint and constraint, a terror, gloom and asceticism, which have no place in the faith and love, the hope and joy, the genial interest in life and humanity which belong to the religion of Christ; and that she failed to recognize these latter as essentially Christian.

² I. Cor. i. 22-24.

the highest ends of his being, to develop his highest capacities and powers and to give satisfaction and scope for their highest energy, it overlooks broad areas of reality and truth and has no quickening touch for man's highest spiritual capacities and powers. And presently the philosophy itself is found to be breaking down into universal skepticism. This George Eliot found out in her own experience. Speaking of "the first impulse of a young and generous mind" when liberated from the "giant's bed" of evangelical "dogmas," she says: "But a year or two of reflection and the experience of our own miserable weakness, which will ill afford to part even with the crutch of superstition, must I think effect a change. Speculative truth begins to appear but a shadow of individual minds."¹

Her experience that even the crutch of so-called superstition is more helpful than the self-sufficiency of a godless philosophy has been a common experience in the history of unbelief from age to age.

Thus Christ takes up the spiritual truths and motives in all the religions and philosophies of mankind and assimilates and vitalizes them in the divine and spiritual power with which he is renovating men in the new spiritual birth and life, and thus bringing upon the natural life of man the new humanity in which the spiritual predominates over the natural, of which he is the head, and of which he is constituting his kingdom of righteousness and peace.

This comprehensiveness of Christianity was well expressed by Henry More, in the seventeenth century: —

"The true religion sprung from God above,
Is, like her fountain, full of charity;
Embracing all things with a tender love,
Full of good-will and meek expectancy;
Full of true justice and sure verity
In voice and heart; free, large, even infinite;
Not wedged in straight particularity,
But grasping all in her vast active sprite.
Bright lamp of God, oh, that all could joy
In thy pure light."

4. In thus bringing the divine into the human as an abiding power of illumination and renovation and appropriating and vitalizing all spiritual truth and motive in redeeming men from sin, Christ reveals the true significance and dignity of human life, the worth of man and his highest destiny, otherwise but dimly known;

¹ Life, chaps. ii. and iii.

and he is also the central source of the spiritual influence which is quickening men to seek the realization of this high destiny for themselves and for all men.

If the life of nature in man is shut up within itself, if his good is to be found only in getting and self-indulgence, in the gratification of desires, then, as has already been shown, pessimism is inevitably the true theory of human life. For the desires are in their essence unrest and uneasiness in the sense of want, and they grow by what they feed on; and man has spiritual ideas and aspirations which stretch beyond the life of nature and seek their objects in the spiritual and the divine. Atheism shuts man into the life of nature and shuts him away from the spiritual and the divine. It can show no end, which reason can judge worthy, for the existence of humanity. Physicus has recorded an appalling description of the darkness and desolation it brings on human hopes. After speaking of his own former faith in God, now lost, he says: "But now, how changed! Never in the history of man has so terrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may now behold advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless in might, uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulfing our most precious creed and burying our highest life in mindless desolation. . . . The flood-gates of infidelity are open and Atheism overwhelming is upon us."¹ In its coming it has brought with it a remarkable development of pessimism, not only as a sentiment or as poetry, but in the form of philosophy. The two religions which by common consent stand highest on the scale after Christianity are Mohammedism and Buddhism. The latter sinks us in the slough of pantheism, and its necessary practical issue is pessimism. The former is monotheistic. But its God approximates closely to a fate; it knows little of the high spiritual significance of the life of faith and love; and even in the future world its heaven is scarcely of a higher order than a life of selfish and sensuous indulgence, not the realm of perfect and universal love.

It is the Christ alone who reveals the true significance of humanity and its highest possibilities and noblest destiny. And through him come the spiritual agencies and motives which quicken men to the new spiritual life and bring them to concentrate their energies on the service of God and man in the life of universal love.

He meets all man's spiritual needs by bringing him to union

¹ A Candid Examination of Theism, by Physicus, p. 51.

with God in the life of faith and love, and to reconciliation, communion and peace with God. He reveals to man his true well-being and highest destiny as renewed in a spiritual birth and life and as capable of spiritual growth and achievement on earth and in the life immortal. He reveals the kingdom of God on earth and in heaven as the realization of the perfect unity and community of men and of the highest possibilities of humanity.

And in this he reveals the true worth and dignity of man, the sacredness of both his obligations and his rights, the brotherhood of men as the children of God and redeemed through Christ, the common Saviour, and all those great ideas which have guided and inspired the true political and social progress of man in modern times. Christianity, and it alone, takes up the whole man, spiritual and natural, and the whole sphere of his action, individual and social, all his interests and possibilities, science and industrial invention, literature and æsthetic art, work and play, politics and business, morality and economics; it takes them up with spiritual light and love and life and power adequate to quicken, inspire and guide the progress of the individual and of society toward the realization of the ideal perfection of humanity.

Thus the historical action of God in Christ is the basis of the only true and complete philosophy of human history. Man and his history and destiny can never be understood without recognizing his relation to God, the fact of sin and God's gracious action in redemption, and the existence and growth of God's kingdom on earth. Christ is central in human history. On him all the lines of divine action and influence before his coming converge; and from him all divine action and influence in redemption go forth into the subsequent life and history of man. Thus God's action in redemption is found to be the deepest power in human history. The history of man in its true and most profound significance is the history of redemption. Christianity lives in the history of man, its roots struck down into the depths of the past, and in prophecy and promise its branches lifting its verdure and blossoms and fruit to all the heights of the future — the veritable tree Ygdrasil around which the moral world is built and on which its stability depends.

And because the religion of Christ is comprehensive of all spiritual light and life and power, and is to satisfy the spiritual needs of man in all ages, it is tested by the progress of thought and civilization through all time. In presenting himself as the king of God's kingdom on earth and the Mediator through whom God

comes to save men from sin, Christ challenges this test. A god of the Scandinavian mythology was once tested in various ways to prove his power. Among other trials he was challenged to a race and was outrun. He afterwards learned that his competitor in the race had been Human Thought. In all which pertains to man's moral and spiritual life Christ has been tested in the race with human thought for 1800 years and has been always in advance. In fact it is much more than this. He has kept the lead while, by his spiritual quickening of men, it is he himself who has given to human thought its power and speed.

5. Christianity is the one absolute and universal religion for all men in all ages.

This is essential in the idea of redemption through God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. It is God's historical action redeeming men from sin. It is the culmination of all preceding revelations. Christ is the king of God's kingdom on the earth. He is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world; he tasted death for every man; from him the Spirit of God is poured on all flesh, and whosoever will may take the water of life freely; in him God is our Saviour, "who willeth that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth."¹ The aim of Christianity is as broad as humanity and as far-reaching as the continued history of mankind in this world and the next. Its aim in respect to the individual is his spiritual renovation and perfection, begun on earth and completed in his glorification in heaven; and in respect to society, it is to transform it into the kingdom of God existing on earth and in all generations issuing, like a river into the sea, into the kingdom of the blessed in heaven; and after the succession of human generations on earth shall have ended, going on forever in the heavenly glory in ways dimly known to us. In this kingdom all possible human perfection and good are to be realized. From its beginning on earth through its everlasting duration "all that life is love."

Hence the outlook of Christianity is to an ever-progressive education and development of man, through his faith and God's gracious dwelling in him through the Holy Spirit, to the realization in him of all that is true, right, perfect and good, in a life in which all his energies are exerted to the utmost in the service of man, loving his neighbor as himself. Christianity is the religion of promise, the future ever to be better than the past. It is thus the religion for all ages, brightening and expanding as the ages

¹ I. Tim. chap. ii. 4.

roll on. And as it is the religion for all ages, so it is also the one only religion for all nations, under the prevalence of which all men may dwell together in love as the children of their common Father in heaven, redeemed by the same Saviour, and animated by the same trust in God and love to God and man.

Christianity is fitted to be the universal religion, also, by its power of adaptation to new conditions without change of its principles, its life, character or power. We have seen that, both in the physical system and the spiritual, the principles and laws of reason are unchangeable and eternal, but the arrangements and uniform sequences which manifest or express them are variable and transient. So it is in the Christian religion.

This results from the fact that the Christian revelation was primarily a revelation of God through his historical action in redemption, and not primarily of doctrine in formulas addressed to the intellect. Men in all ages study the great facts of God's action and his communications to men in reconciling the world to himself, to learn from them the Way, the Truth and the Life. So they study the ongoinings of the physical system to learn the science and laws of nature. Thus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day and forever. His historic life, death, resurrection and ascension remain unchanged. The Way, the Truth and the Life are the same to all generations. But the significance of Christ to humanity is apprehended progressively; new applications of Christianity to new conditions and civilizations may be discovered, past errors may be corrected, and practical applications of it suited to former conditions may become effete and pass away. It is remarkable that in the Christian Scriptures there is very little of formulated doctrine, very little of argument in defense of doctrine, scarcely any systemization of either doctrine or ethics. There are in the New Testament no prescribed liturgy or forms of worship; but two sacraments, and those of the simplest form; no prescribed form of church organization and administration; very little as to church officers. It is at the farthest remove from being a system of thought, organization, worship and life completed and worked out in details, a closed circuit of doctrine, precept and ecclesiastical rubrics to which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be taken away. Therefore in Christianity is place for building on unchanging truth in Christ, who is the Logos that lighteth every man, an ever grander structure of religious knowledge and life, and adapting it to the varying development and conditions of man, from the child to the philoso-

pher, from the savage to the most learned of civilized men. This is the truth which Rothe meant to express when he said, "Christianity is the most mutable of all things. That is its special glory." And the same characteristic of the Bible is the ground of Dean Stanley's recognition of "the endless vigor and vitality of the words of Scripture;" and of the conviction expressed in his Inaugural Lecture at Oxford, in 1858, that "in that virgin mine, the insufficiently explored original records of Christianity, there are still materials for a new epoch; that another and a different estimate of the points on which Scripture lays the most stress warrants the hope that the existing materials, principles, doctrines of the Christian religion are far greater than have ever yet been employed, and that the Christian church, if it ever be permitted or enabled to use them, has a long lease of new life and new hope before it."

The evils resulting, if Christ and the apostles had presented us a completed and closed circuit of doctrinal formulas, practical rules and ecclesiastical rubrics, have been glaringly manifest in the Papal church with its doctrine of infallibility. Catholic divines at this day are seriously discussing whether the proceedings of the papacy against Galileo forbid good Catholics now to teach the Copernican astronomy. St. George Mivart tells us that a much esteemed priest, who often teaches from a London pulpit, lately avowed his belief that the sun and the whole sidereal heavens do actually revolve round the earth every twenty-four hours; adding that it was his belief because he considered that the church was committed to that belief by its decision respecting Galileo. On the other hand Mivart says he has often heard it said: "How providential was that divine influence which guarded the Pope from addressing to the universal church any decree formally excommunicating all adherents of Copernicanism thenceforth for all time."¹ And another very excellent priest exclaimed to him: "How glorious it would be if it should turn out after all that the sun did move round the earth, and that therefore the church had been all this time in the right about the matter."

It is the essence of Christianity that it is the glad tidings of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself; that the power of God in Christ is ever in it through the divine Spirit; that it is the living and ever present power of God unto salvation; that therefore its principles are not lifeless crystals, formed

¹ Nineteenth Century, July, 1885, pp. 35, 36, 38.

with mathematical exactness, but germs of life; that its divine light and life and power, forever unchanged, adapt themselves to men in all conditions, are in advance of all moral and spiritual progress, and take up, vitalize and apply all truth respecting God and his relations to men which the religions and religious philosophies of men have brought to light. And as thus competent to be the universal religion, the course of the ages has been the continuous verification of Christianity. As to the individual Christianity is its own attestation in the life of every one who trusts and serves Christ, so to the human race Christianity is its own attestation through the ages in the progress of the kingdom of God. And we are justified in expecting that it will continue thus to verify itself in all the progress of man in the future until the kingdom of Christ is established over all the earth; and in the realization of practical Christianity in all human life and institutions the demonstration of its divine character and origin will be complete. Renan says at the close of *The Life of Jesus*: "This sublime man, who still presides each day over the history of the world, it is allowed to call divine, not in the sense that Jesus has absorbed all divinity, but that he has caused his race to make the greatest advance toward the divine. From the common level of mankind there rise pillars toward heaven, which attest a nobler destiny. Jesus is the highest of these pillars. In him is centred all that is good and exalted in our nature. Whatever may be the unlooked for phenomena of the future, Jesus will never be surpassed. His worship will grow young forever. All ages will say that among the sons of men none has ever been greater than Jesus."

III. UNITY OF LAW IN THE SPIRITUAL AND THE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS.—Does the continuity of God's action in the universe imply that the laws of the spiritual system and of the physical are the same?

1. In seeking an answer to this question we must have regard to the following principles.

The factual arrangements and order of nature and the uniform sequences commonly called its laws are in their essence variable and transient, and cannot be universal laws extending over the spiritual system. It is only the principles and laws of reason which are every where and always the same.

Of these unchanging principles and laws some are in the nature of things applicable only to the physical system, others only to the spiritual or personal system. The mechanical law of

the accelerated motion of falling bodies is a mathematical law universally true of bodies falling to the earth. But it has no application to mental phenomena and is not a principle of the moral law. The law of gravitation is not a law to the free choices of the human will. Thought and volition cannot be weighed. Mr. Spencer's attempt to develop the moral law from the physical principle of the survival of the fittest is an example of this misapplication of natural law to the moral system. On the other hand the law of love is not a law to stones and trees and snakes, nor to the physical energies of impersonal being. The identity of all their laws is not essential to the unity and continuity of the two systems in the universe.

As personal and impersonal beings are both finite, some principles of reason pertaining to the existence and interaction of finite beings must be laws to both systems. These we may legitimately attempt to trace.

Another guiding principle is that in the order of dependence the spiritual precedes the physical; "in the beginning God." It is the rational and spiritual that is revealed through the physical, not the physical which is revealed through the spiritual. The factual sequences called laws of nature are not carried over upon the spiritual system, like an inundation of mud, smothering all spiritual life. And the unchanging rational principles and laws which regulate the physical system do not originate in it and thence pass over upon the rational and spiritual; but they originate in the latter and thence pass over and regulate the physical.

The physical system is an expression or manifestation of the thought not less than of the power of the absolute Reason. This may be said to be the *noumenon* of which the physical universe is the phenomenon. It is the reality which appears. Therefore the physical universe is in its essence intelligible in all its parts. It is an expression of the archetypal thought of the absolute Reason—an expression which, on account of the limitation of the finite, is always progressive and always incomplete. The subordination of the physical appears in the fact that the physical is symbolic of the rational. Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske, when at the end of their analysis they reach matter or force, call it a symbol. Their whole analysis is an analysis of symbols. Matter and force are symbols of something which is not matter nor force. The homogeneous itself is a symbol of a mysterious Power behind it. This Power cannot be the Unknowable because

it is manifested or revealed in the universe. What they really find in nature is power revealing thought. It is the thought of the universal Reason. This is the only true sense in which physical things and forces are symbols. The subordination of the physical to the spiritual system appears also in the fact that the spiritual is the *prius* of the physical, from which it proceeds and for which it exists. Even man, though implicated in nature, is a lord of nature. While the ethnic religions regarded even the gods as submerged in nature or identified with its powers, in the opening of Genesis God is the creator, man has knowledge of him, is under his law and appointed to have dominion over nature and to use it. And this lordship over nature is realized in Christ and by all men who are united with God by faith in him.

2. An example of a law of reason which extends over all finite beings, whether in the physical system or the spiritual, is the law that every beginning or change has a cause.

This law implies that the greater force must always prevail over the less when they act against each other. The simplest application of this law is to the impact of bodies in motion. The one which has the greater momentum, as the product of its mass and velocity, must prevail over one that has less. The application of this becomes less easy as the arrangements of nature become more complicated, and especially in organic and conscious life. But in all complications the law of causation remains true, and the greater power, or the power working at greater advantage, must always prevail over the less when they come into opposition. In the sphere of organic life this is the law of the survival of the fittest.

This law implies also that a power which, developing its resources to the utmost, remains inferior, cannot unaided lift itself to equality with the superior. It must be elevated, if at all, by a superior power. This is simply the law that every change must have an adequate cause; that that which is not, cannot make itself into that which is; that no being can lift itself above itself.

Let us now look at this law in its relation to the personal or moral system.

The law prevails in the moral system. It is as true of spiritual energy as it is of physical. The man who has the higher constitutional endowment and is the better disciplined, trained and educated for any line of action, other things being equal, must prevail in competition with one who is inferior. It is strength not weakness that achieves in the spiritual system not less than

in the physical. There must be power to command confidence. It is not weakness but living energy that achieves the realization of truth in the life of man.

This is not changed into moral law by the fact that it is a law in the moral or spiritual system. It remains simply a law declaring what the factual action of power must be; the cause must be adequate to the effect; the stronger must prevail over the weaker, when they encounter.

In the moral or spiritual system, therefore, there are two planes of law; law in both is law in its deepest significance as unchanging principles of reason in distinction from mere uniform factual sequence. Law in the lower plane is a principle of reason declaring what *must* be the action of power. Law in the higher plane is a law of reason declaring what *ought* to be the action of a free moral agent directing and exerting his energy in the light of reason. The law of the survival of the fittest is law in the lower plane. The law of love to God and man is the law in the higher plane.

These two laws, being in different planes, cannot be in contradiction, as two straight lines in parallel planes cannot meet. There is certainly nothing immoral in the doctrine that a cause must be adequate to its effect, or that ten pounds cannot balance twenty, or that when two forces encounter, the stronger must prevail. The law of the survival of the fittest declares merely what must result when a stronger force encounters a weaker. It is no more in conflict with the moral law than is the multiplication table. Contradiction arises only when law in the lower plane is taken for the universal and supreme law and it is attempted to evolve the moral law from it.

This law in the lower plane is also a fact important to be taken into consideration in determining in any particular case what duty is. When a person sees that the strong must prevail in collision or competition with the weak, he finds himself in a universe in which power always tells. He sees therefore that since he is capable of disciplining, training and developing himself, he ought to make the most of his opportunities and powers; to acquire force of character, skill, strength and self-command. It is the law of energetic self-development overriding and subduing the desire for a life of ease and luxurious self-indulgence. He sees also that if there is no law but the might of the strongest, the weaker must go under in the fierce competition of selfish life. Under the law of love he sees that he and every man ought to

use his strength to help the weak. The higher ought to go down to the lower to lift it up. And because the law of the survival of the fittest is inexorable and unchangeable, he sees that the only effectual way to help the weak is to help them to learn how to help themselves, to develop themselves and make the most of their powers. And when all men obey the law of love and guide their loving action with due regard to the fixed physical laws in the lower plane, then the wretchedness and debasement attendant on the inequalities of human life will pass away.

Thus the physical law itself, destructive to the weak under the action of selfishness, is helpful in effecting the best moral results under the action of universal love.

A person seeing himself in relation to his fellow-men and to God in the unity of a system, knows himself under obligation to use his strength and skill, not in the service of himself alone, but of all in their relations to himself and one another in the system. If he has superior power he is under obligation to use it, not to compel the unrequited service of inferiors, but to serve them, to help them to rise. He is not to live to be ministered unto, but to minister. The law is, Greatness for service.

In this service of love, the Christian, seemingly in spite of himself, is in the way of most effectually developing himself to realize the highest possibilities of his own being.

In this also he is securing his greatest influence among men. In every sphere of human action, especially in great emergencies, history has always shown the need of men of strength and wisdom to be leaders and commanders of the people. In a shipwreck or a railroad accident, he who retains his self-possession and knows what ought to be done, takes command of the frightened company and they do what he bids. So in the greater emergencies of history, when the man of power equal to the emergency appears, the leadership is his. The same holds true in the kingdom of Christ. Whoever by entire consecration and effective service makes himself indispensable, is a bishop, a Christian king of men by divine right.

Thus both in his own self-development and in acquiring influence over others, the law of greatness for service reveals itself to be also the law of greatness by service. And by the same law the selfish misuse of knowledge and power is precluded.

Here the law of the survival of the fittest reappears, regenerated by faith in the God in Christ and by the love of God and man. Man realizes his highest greatness and power in the life

of service in love. Love is the mightiest of powers and prevails over all. It is still the strong who prevail over the weak, not by crowding them out of existence, but by purifying them from ignorance, error and sin, bringing them into submission to the law of love and into harmony with it, and thereby developing them also and making them strong in God.

But here is something widely different from the law of the correlation and conservation of force which prevails in the physical system. The giving does not impoverish. The expenditure of spiritual energy only increases it. This is our Lord's principle: "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it."

What has been said is accordant with the historical progress of man. In the ruder ages men honored physical strength, which to them stood for all greatness and commanded honor, trust and allegiance. As society advanced, naked strength was clothed with intelligence, and intellectual prowess rose to the highest honor. By the invention of gunpowder the weakest and foolishlest at ten feet distance is on a level with the strongest and wisest and even commands him. And by innumerable inventions men are brought to a level in their power of production, and the individual superiority of physical or intellectual power is lessened. But the power which grows and strengthens in the life of love can never be lessened. The world at large has yet to learn the secret, which Christ taught, of gaining power by expending, of finding life by losing it. The high place of honor which in the earlier ages was given to muscular strength and in later times to intellectual power, must in the better future be given to the moral power of love, to moral and spiritual greatness. Then physical strength and intellectual power, under the presidency of love and quickened and guided by it, will not be less but greater. Then only in the complete harmony of his being man will attain also the highest and best physical and intellectual development. Man's true progress consists in developing spiritual power to control and direct physical force. The progress of Christian civilization is marked by increasing reliance on the power of truth, righteousness and good-will, and a proportionally lessening reliance on force and violence.

Mr. Spencer teaches that by the mere physical law of evolution, the survival of the fittest, men who most fully lead lives of righteousness and good-will must have the greater advantage and power and must survive as the fittest; and thus in the future a

race of men will be evolved who will find the same enjoyment in serving others as themselves and will be as naturally impelled to it, and there will be a universal reign of love. We welcome his testimony that love is the mightiest of powers; that the universe shows to scientific observation that it is best for every man to live as if the law of love was supreme; and that the universe is so constituted that in its actual evolution it has produced a race of rational and moral beings and hereafter must culminate in bringing in the universal reign of love. This accords with Christian ethics and theological teleology. His error is in attempting to develop altruism from egoism, a moral law and system from the mere mechanical principle of the survival of the fittest, that the stronger must prevail in conflict with the weaker. This is impossible, because the only moral law which can be derived from this principle is the law that might makes right; because the physical evolution of men amiable by nature cannot give the idea of obligation and law, of right and wrong, but only of natural impulse and enjoyment; and because experience shows that the physical law without the moral cannot give the true wellbeing of man.

The Economics, prevalent since Adam Smith wrote, rests on the principle that unlimited competition springing from self-interest is sufficient to regulate aright all industry in the production and distribution of wealth. It is in fact only a peculiar application of the law of the survival of the fittest. Accordingly Mr. Spencer has been issuing his warning against legislation regulating work in factories or elsewhere and protecting the workers. But a study of the history of the *laissez-faire* theory presents facts in abundance to prove that it fails to protect the weak, to secure just and easy relations between capital and labor, and to secure the more equal distribution of wealth; that it weakens respect for man as the ultimate end of industry and degrades him into a mere instrument of wealth, as if the man were of less worth than the product of his work and might be sacrificed to increase it; and that it develops the all-consuming greed for wealth.

Doubtless the law of love, isolated from the physical law, has led to mistaken and pernicious charity. Yet it has at least preserved the love, more precious than gold. And the righteousness and benevolence exercised in accordance with that law are indispensable to the development of a true and perfect humanity and of a strong and enduring state. In many ways society must help

the weak ; and the best wisdom of the people should be employed in devising the safest and most effective means of doing it. The higher must go down to the lower to lift it up.

We have seen that it is a fixed law, both in the physical system and the spiritual, that a being cannot lift itself above itself. In accordance with this law of all finite energy, the law of love in the moral system requires the stronger to help the weaker, the higher to go down to the lower to raise it up.

“ Unless above himself he can erect himself,
How poor a thing is man.”

God in Christ comes to him with quickening spiritual influences ; and the man laying hold of the divine grace in faith receives the quickening energy of the Spirit of God and by it lifts himself into a new and higher life.

The coming of God in Christ reconciling sinners to himself sets forth the fundamental law of the universe ; the higher is to go down to the lower to help and strengthen it to rise. This is the law of love, disclosed in Christ who came not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many, who requires of his followers greatness for service and assures them of greatness by service. He himself descended and therefore ascended.¹ And as this is the law of love, the fundamental law of the moral system, so it is accordant with the fundamental law of all finite energy, the law of causation, that no being can lift itself above itself.

In this law we see the continuity of God's action in the universe, the highest ever going down to the lowest to lift it up. God is continually in the evolution of the universe preparing the lower to be the medium for the manifestation of something higher. Thus the evolution is God's ever greatening revelation of himself. At the great epochs in the evolution he infuses into the finite, so soon as it is prepared to receive and manifest it, a new and higher power, beginning a new and higher stage of existence. At every such epoch a miracle-working power is revealed, producing what transcends all which had previously appeared. So in the spiritual sphere God comes into humanity in Christ, making an epoch in the history of man, putting into humanity a new spiritual power of redemption transcending all that had been in it before. Thus Christ, as the New Testament represents it, becomes a new head of the human race, the head of a spiritual race, born anew of the Spirit of God. This epochal action of God

¹ Eph. chap. iv. 8, 9.

in Christ is in accordance with the continuity of God's action in the universe, the higher going down to the lower and lifting it up; and, as the lower becomes fitted to receive the higher, in successive epochs revealing a higher power of God which lifts the universe to higher planes of existence; first, the physical through successive epochs; then the great epoch in which, in and from the physical, the spiritual system emerges; then the spiritual through successive epochs of education and redemption, culminating in Christ; and looking forward prophetically to the new heavens and the new earth and the heavenly glory in the final coming of Christ. And the epochs in the evolution of the physical system are as really miraculous as the coming of Christ and other epochs in the spiritual system. And the latter are the continuance in the higher spiritual system of the revelation of God beginning in the physical system. And instead of being, as miraculous, foreign to the course of human development, the coming of God in Christ and the redemption of men by him are the key to the history of humanity, revealing its source, its law, its relation to God, its true end and the way of attaining it. When Christ girded himself with a towel and washed his disciples' feet, that menial act was sublime and godlike. It was the higher stooping to the lower, the divine to the human to raise it up. It set forth the fundamental law of the universe.

Thus the law of the survival of the fittest is a principle of reason, which is law both in the spiritual and the physical systems. A being cannot lift itself above itself. Accordingly God revealing himself in the finite is always, as in his revelation in Christ, the higher going down to the lower to lift it up. And this is what the law of love requires. This higher law of love, binding on moral beings, does not annul or contradict the law of the survival of the fittest. It recognizes it as a fact in the law of greatness for service, exemplified in Christ "taking the form of a servant." It finds it also as a fact, in the law of greatness by service, set forth in the exaltation of Christ. By his self-sacrificing love for men he is exalted to reign in the hearts and to receive the loving service of all who know him. Therefore his is the name which is above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow. Thus while the law of the survival of the fittest is law both in the physical and the spiritual systems, it remains merely the law of prevailing might. As such it cannot contradict the law of love; and it is equally true that it can never be identified with the law of love nor developed into

it. On the contrary, if made the principle of moral law, it directly contradicts the law of love. The Economics, which excludes the law of love from human industry and business and constructs its theory wholly on the physical law of the survival of the fittest, is indeed "the dismal science." And so is every proposed science of the significance and destiny of humanity and of the realization of the highest wellbeing of man, without the Christ.

3. A second example of a law common to all finite beings, personal and impersonal, is the law of reception and production, or, in one word, the law of dependence. The action of a finite being must be either reception or production, and the reception must precede the production. God alone can produce without previously receiving.

This is a law of mechanics. A machine can do its work only as it receives power from without itself. It is a law of organic life. Every living organism is implanted in its environment and sustained and fed from it. Every plant is a centre on which all cosmic powers centre their service to nourish and quicken its growth and productiveness. The sun, the earth, the air, the waters minister to it. Light, heat, electricity, chemical affinities, gravitation work on it diligently every hour to develop it and perfect its fruit. It is a law of the human body. A man boasts of his strength, but a brief privation of food destroys it; and he is also receiving from the air, the sun, the earth, from electricity and other cosmic agencies. It is a law of our social life. Every one receives his life from parents; and in the earlier life of the child it is still enveloped in the life of the parents. In all things we depend on others. Our table is spread with what other hands, some of them working perhaps on other continents, have produced, brought to our doors and prepared for our use. The division of labor implies our reception from others and our faith and trust in them. All our secular life is by faith as really as our religious life. Faith is the bond of society, its cohesive attraction. Without it society would be disintegrated in anarchy and man would degenerate into something worse than savagery.

Christ recognizes the same law in the moral system. Man in his spiritual life is dependent on his spiritual environment, as in his animal life on his physical environment. His spiritual environment is, first of all, God "in whom we live and move and have our being."

In the spiritual system the law of dependence is the law that a

man can live a right spiritual life only by faith in God; that all right works must be done in faith. Faith in God is the receptive action corresponding to man's weakness, dependence and need. His active and productive energy, his works, correspond to his freedom, power and obligation. But he is productive in good works only as he is continually receptive of the divine influences.

Christianity assumes that union with God by faith is man's normal condition. As a finite creature he is always dependent on God. He is free to choose the ends to which he will direct his action and exert his energies at will; but as a finite creature his freedom does not lift him out of his dependence on God. He can live aright, he can realize the highest possibilities of his being as a man, only as he willingly trusts in God, in the recognition of his dependence on him, and thus comes into his normal condition in union with God. God acts graciously on and in him with spiritual influence; the man willingly receives the divine influence and in harmony with it follows the divine drawing, working together with God. Instead of this being incompatible with man's freedom, it is essential to the exertion of his highest power for good, to his attaining his true perfection and well-being and abiding in his normal condition. This willing trust in God is faith. All right living on the part of man must be by faith in God. This is so not merely because he is a sinner, but because he is a creature and dependent on God. Angels in heaven must live by faith as really as men. And Christianity not only assumes that this union of man with God by faith is man's normal condition, but in its peculiar revelation of God in Christ, the Redeemer, unfolds the rich significance of the fact as no other religion does.

Christ illustrates this law of faith by the union of a branch with the vine. It must abide in the vine and continuously receive nourishment from it or it withers. Man in his normal condition is implanted in God and receives continuously his life-giving influence. If by his own free act he closes the avenues of communication from God and attempts to live in self-sufficiency, his spiritual productiveness ceases and his spiritual life withers.

And this reveals the essential and deepest significance of sin. It is the soul's separating itself by its own free action from God and setting up for itself in self-sufficiency, shutting out the heavenly influences on which the right spiritual life and its productiveness depend. In sinning, man repudiates his condition as a creature, absolves himself from dependence on God and obligation to him, and in his self-sufficiency and self-will, his self-seeking and self-glorifying, undertakes to produce without receiving.

Here we see the fundamental reality recognized in the law of life and justification by faith. A created being can live and develop himself aright only by recognizing his dependence on God and trusting in him. Otherwise he acts in contradiction to the deepest reality of his being. Much more, if a sinner is to be saved from sin, it is possible only by his returning to God in faith, only as putting his trust in God he renounces his self-sufficiency, and in the consciousness of dependence and need opens his heart to receive not only God's gracious and free forgiveness but also his heavenly influences, and to live and grow and become fruitful and productive by receiving God's grace and love; for in a rational free moral agent the reception cannot be passive, but is possible only by man's free choice.

Only the love, which trusts God and receives spiritual quickening and nourishment from him, becomes the love which obeys and serves, strong and productive in all works of righteousness and good-will.

The choice of God as the supreme object of trust is inevitably the choice of him as the supreme object of obedience and service. Filial trust is filial love. The consciousness of dependence on God is not, as Schleiermacher would have it, consciousness merely of dependence. God is the absolute Reason, perfect in wisdom and love. Man also is reason like God. His trust is a free and rational act, trusting God as he reveals himself our righteous lawgiver and judge, our father, and—name above every name—our Redeemer. We live by being loved. We strike our roots into the hearts of our loved ones and suck into our lives their richest affections. So in trust we strike our roots into the heart of God and receive into our lives the richness of his love. But trust like this must issue in filial obedience and willing service. The act of trust or receptivity is faith; the acts of obedience, service, productivity, are works; and faith working is love. We commonly think of Paul as feeling himself debtor to all men, as living in the intensest energy of self-forgetful love. Yet we find him drawing his spiritual strength from God's love: "The life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith, the faith which is in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me."

By sin man has sundered the bond of his union with God, and it is only by being restored to this union that he can be saved from sin and condemnation. But this reunion can be consummated only as God in Christ redeems men from sin and in the

Spirit brings the influences of his grace upon men, and only as men lay hold on God in filial trust and willingly receive all the influence of his redeeming grace. Thenceforward the divine Light, Life and Love penetrate, pervade and nourish the recipient soul, as the sunshine, air and rain and all cosmic forces penetrate, pervade and nourish the growing plant, and the believer attains "unto a full-grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." He continues always to receive and assimilate the divine communications as the bread and the water of life, the pure milk of the word, and thus is nourished and strengthened for service and productivity in all Christlike work in and for the kingdom of God.

And this is the result accomplished by Christ in redeeming men. Overpowered in his earthly life and slain by the men whom he came to save, he rose again from the grave triumphing over death, man's last enemy, and opening to his redeemed perfection and blessedness in immortal life. In the completed union of the divine and the human in himself, Christ, the glorified Head of redeemed and renovated humanity, reigns at the right hand of the Majesty on high, and from him proceed unseen the divine Light and Life and Love, in the Holy Spirit, to all mankind; the kingdom of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit comes to all and opens itself to every one who is willing to receive the grace and enter his service and kingdom. It is the work of the Spirit to bring on men the influences and energies of Christ's redemption. When under these divine influences a sinful soul is quickened and guided to Christ, and in filial trust receives him as he is offered in the gospel, then the separating gulf is crossed and the sinner is restored to his normal condition in union with God and begins the new and spiritual life. This is the beginning of the new life described in the Scriptures as being born anew of the Spirit, quickened from death to life, created anew in Christ, and by many other remarkable representations of the reality of the new beginning and the greatness of the change. Thenceforward the believer, held firmly in union with God by God's grace and his own free and willing trust, continues in spiritual growth toward the complete likeness to Christ, the perfect man.

We see, then, that the doctrine of justification by faith is not an arbitrary requirement; but faith is the necessary condition of a right life for every finite person, and preëminently necessary to the justification of a sinner, who by his sin is separated from

God and cannot be restored to union with him any otherwise than by trusting God in Christ and willingly receiving his grace as it is offered in the gospel and brought to men in the Holy Spirit.

Hence the common objection, that a man must be justified before God by right character and not by faith, and that the doctrine of justification by faith implies a letting down of the authority of law and of the obligation to obedience, is groundless and without force. There is no antagonism nor even antithesis between justification by faith and justification by right character. Justification is always conditioned on right character. Christianity affirms this: "Ye must be born again." "Follow after the sanctification without which no man shall see the Lord." Reason affirms the same. God cannot justify one who persists in sin. Such justification would be immoral in itself and of immoral tendency. But in fact justification conditioned on faith is itself justification on condition of right character. Faith is the only possible beginning of right character, and must be through life the continuous and vitalizing support of all right character and of all good works. In trusting God in Christ the communication with God is reopened. The divine and spiritual influences begin to pour into the soul. And though the man is not yet delivered from all remaining corruption and evil, yet the new life is begun, and the man is accepted as born anew by his reunion with God; and by continued faith the new life will pervade his whole being and restore him to the likeness of God and make him productive in God's service. So a scion cut from a tree, as soon as it reopens communication with the tree by being grafted in again, begins to receive of the life of the tree and is reinstated at once a living branch. For a time only a leaf or two may appear, and part of it, dried and dead, may be dropped off with the continued pouring in of the life of the tree. But the connection with the life-giving tree is restored, and after a while we find it a thrifty, growing branch, rich with leaves and new branches and fruit.

Thus the very fact of justification by faith is itself a reaffirmation of the authority and immutability of God's law. It reveals that God even in his redeeming grace cannot accept and justify a sinner who is persisting in sin; that the great gulf of separation between God and the sinner must be crossed by the sinner before he can be accepted, and he can cross it only as in filial trust he lays hold of God's gracious hand extended for his rescue.

Thus the Christian doctrine of justification by faith is necessarily the doctrine of all true philosophy and of all true theology, the belief and hope of all true religion. It is grounded on the fact that a created and finite being cannot live aright except in recognition of his dependence on God and in continuous trust in him, and that a sinner cannot begin the new and right life except by trusting in God, coming to him in his redeeming grace, and opening his heart to receive his illuminating, quickening and renovating influence. And, conversely, work in the lowest calling done in humble trust in God is accepted of him and has the dignity of true Christian service.

Thus the law that faith works by love and without faith no one can be justified before God, is the application in the spiritual system of the law that reception must precede production, which is the law of all finite energy.

IV. OBJECTIONS. — Two objections remain to be considered.

1. One objection now often urged is, that it is impossible for Christian theism to bring into a synthesis with itself the immense and varied scientific knowledge, and the intense and diversified activity both speculative and practical which characterize our modern life. No one has presented this objection more forcibly than Mr. Harrison. "Theology has had periods of wonderful energy. . . . But what can monotheism do now to vitalize and discipline the intellect, absorbed as it is in its deepest struggle with science, fact, history and common sense? . . . On its own confession it is quite unable to systemize the logic of modern thought, to disentangle the accumulated masses of modern knowledge. . . . Now, since science has surrounded our lives with such a concurrent mass of correlated law, and this sense of law is so wide-spread and familiar to the daily thought of the most ignorant; now, since our social existence is so developed and has so clothed with noble colors the free resources of man's manifold powers, now it is simply impossible to find the creator in every thought, God in every act. The most mystical of theologians, the most austere of devotees does not ask us to do so. Common sense is too overwhelming to be resisted. The Pope alone holds out and discharges a syllabus now and then. But bishops, priests and deacons, for the most part, sweep theology away from the whole field of systematic thought and active life. All we ask, say they, as sensible theologians, is to reserve the idea of God and the scheme of man's salvation for the hours that are given to meditation and prayer, to the spiritual sphere

alone. . . . Where is the man who can honestly say, looking around on the vast accumulation of modern knowledge, that he coördinates all his thought around the image of God; that the idea of God gives him a rational theory of all his acquirements, that he thinks for the service of God and can see that service fulfilled in every thought? Or who can say in the whirl of our modern industrial activity, that he works and toils for God, that God is the natural object of all human labor, that each product of his hands is a new offering to his creator's wellbeing, that it is a comfort and a use to an omnipresent providence? Who can utter any one of these phrases in a literal sense, in any but a sophistical and hysterical way?"¹

In reply to this objection, it is only necessary to expose its misapprehensions of what Christian Theism is.

As to the closing questions, men in the ruder conditions of society are supposed to have believed that their sacrifices were food to their god and an "offering to his wellbeing," and their service "a comfort and use" to him. But it is surprising that an intelligent man should attribute to Christianity a belief utterly foreign to it and from which, as history, doctrine and life, it is at the farthest possible remove. We must turn on Mr. Harrison his own inquiry, Who could utter any one of these questions, "in any but a sophistical and hysterical way?"

It is also a surprising misapprehension that Christianity in its true essence is in contradiction to science and the normal development of life in modern civilization; that all theologians except the Pope acknowledge this ineradicable contradiction; and that all "sensible theologians" conceive of religion and the spiritual life as limited to the hours of meditation and prayer, and, acknowledging the contradiction between religion and man's intellectual and practical life to be real and ineradicable, hide their eyes from it by declaring the absolute separation of religion from the scientific and the actual life of men; thus reviving the opinion attributed to mediæval scholasticism, that what is true in philosophy may be false in theology. It is not denied that some theologians have made unwise concessions, and thus have unwittingly abandoned positions important to the defense of Christianity. But that there is a necessary contradiction between true Christianity and science and the real progress of man, and that this is now commonly admitted by theologians, is a surprising misapprehension of the facts.

¹ Fred. Harrison: *Creeds; Nineteenth Century*, Nov. 1880.

And as to the alleged withdrawal of religion from actual life, the contrary is true. The most distinctive characteristic of the Christianity of this age in all branches of the church is its humanitarianism, its application of Christianity to the removal of abuses, the reformation of men, the progressive improvement of society in all spheres of human action. It is thus coming nearer to the original ideal in Christ, who, earnest and frequent in worship and prayer, alone, socially and in public assemblies, yet lived among men and went about doing good.

As to the "wide-spread sense of law," it certainly is not true that Christian theologians concede that there is any contradiction between Christianity and law. The ground taken by Christian writers in defense of Christianity is, that the miraculous element in it, instead of setting aside law, is itself a revelation of law in a more profound significance than the factual uniformity of sequences, which in empirical science are often supposed to exhaust the whole significance of the word.

If to "find the creator in every thought, God in every act," means that in every thought and act God is at the moment in the consciousness, the demand is puerile and unreasonable. But so much as this at least is true that we may by thinking "find" God in every thought and act; that is, when we are seeking to explain either the course of nature or the course of human thought and action, at whatever point in either of them we begin our inquiries, we are necessarily carried back to God for its ultimate *rationale* and ground. All science, whether empirical or philosophical, rests ultimately on the truth that God, the absolute and universal Reason, exists.

Mr. Harrison holds an exceedingly narrow and erroneous view of what the Christian religion is; consequently his objection, that it cannot take up into harmony with itself the thought and life of modern civilization, has no pertinence against Christianity rightly understood. His error in its general tenor is, that according to Christianity the religious life is limited to meditation and worship; that all knowledge of the universe is found in the Bible, and that whatever science discovers, which is not taught in the Bible, cannot be brought within the pale of Christian thought and feeling, and thus is irreconcilable with Christianity; that the Christian's trust in God's providential and gracious care assumes a direct interference of God in his behalf, which is at once favoritism to him as an individual and a breach of the uniformity and continuity of the ongoing of the universe; that so long as eclipses

were supposed to be effected by the direct action of supernatural beings they properly awakened religious emotion, but now that their scientific law is known, religion has no more concern with them; and, in a word, that as one phenomenon after another is found to be accordant with physical laws, it passes away from the sphere of religion. Only when it is assumed, as it is by Mr. Harrison, that science will account for all phenomena by physical force acting according to physical laws, are God and religion excluded from the whole range of human thought, feeling and action.

This narrow conception of religion is strikingly exemplified by Mr. Hamerton: "If I had to condense . . . the reasons why we are apparently becoming less religious, I should say that it is because knowledge and feeling, embodied or expressed in the sciences and the arts, are now too fully and variously developed to remain within the limits of what is considered sacred knowledge or religious emotion. It was possible for them to remain within these limits in ancient times, and it is still possible for a mind of very limited activity and range to dwell almost entirely in what was known or felt in the time of Christ; but this is not possible for an energetic and inquiring mind; and the consequence is that the energetic mind will seem to the other to be negligent of holy things and too much occupied with merely secular interests and concerns." And after speaking of the discovery of the physical cause of an eclipse, he says: "Exactly the same process is going on in regard to thousands of other phenomena which are one by one, yet with increasing rapidity, ceasing to be regarded as special manifestations of the divine will, and beginning to be regarded as part of that order of nature with which, to quote Prof. Huxley's significant language, 'nothing interferes.' Every one of these transferences from supernatural government to natural order deprives the religious sentiment of one special cause or motive for its own peculiar kind of emotion, so that we are becoming less and less accustomed to such emotion (as the opportunities for it become less frequent), and more and more accustomed to accept events and phenomena of all kinds as in that order of nature 'with which nothing interferes.' The philosopher says: 'If you are prudent and skilful in your conformity to the laws of life you will probably secure that amount of mental and physical satisfaction which is attainable by a person of your organization.' The priest holds a very different language; the use of the one word *love* gives warmth and color to his discourse. He says: 'If you love God with all your soul and

all your strength, he will love and cherish you in return, and be your own true and tender Father.'"¹ Thus science and religion are assumed to be in their essential significance contradictory and reciprocally exclusive; and it is assumed that if the universe is orderly and continuous under law, all love and wisdom must be excluded from the power that controls it and is revealed in it.

I have dwelt at some length on these misconceptions because they exemplify the fact that, when our new *Illuminati* write against Christianity, they commonly disclose dense ignorance of what it is, both as set forth in Christ and the New Testament and as actually held in the common Christian belief.²

These misrepresentations need no further discussion; for they have been sufficiently exposed in the presentation and defense of Christian theism in this volume. On the contrary, Christianity is in harmony with all science and its practical applications in the progress of civilization, and is able to comprehend it all in a unity of thought as the ever progressive revelation of God, and in a unity of life by the consecration of all the discoveries, resources and energies of civilization to the service of God in the advancement of Christ's kingdom of truth, righteousness and good-will among men.

2. The greatness of redemption is urged as an objection against it.

It is said that since science has revealed the vastness of the universe, it is unreasonable to suppose that God would have done so great a work to redeem from sin men on this earth, when the earth itself is but a speck in the immensity of space and amid innumerable planets, suns and systems. This is now one of the common objections of unbelief.³ But formidable as it has seemed, it takes

¹ Philip Gilbert Hamerton; *Human Intercourse, Essays*, xiii. xiv. xv. pp. 213, 217, 178.

² Mr. Spence and Mr. J. S. Mill, repeatedly exemplify this in their criticisms of Christianity. The same is true of many others who criticise Christianity as contradicting modern thought and hindering the normal development of life. If their statements of fact on other subjects are no more correct than their representations of Christianity, they are blind guides in every sphere of thought.

³ Daniel Webster had been troubled with this objection. About two weeks before his death he dictated, and afterwards revised and with his own hand copied and signed, the following declaration, which he said was to be engraved on his tombstone: "Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief. Philosophical argument, especially that from the vastness of the universe as compared with the comparative insignificance of this globe, has sometimes shaken my reason for the faith that is in me; but my heart has assured and reassured me that

but little thought to show that it is entirely unreasonable and void of force.

The first answer is that here again the objection derives all its force from the false assumption that the physical system comprehends all. When a man contemplates the vastness of the physical system and considers himself as a physical organization connected only with the material system, he must be impressed with his own littleness and insignificance. But when he considers the system of rational and immortal persons, opening through successive epochs in vistas of endless progress, and when he considers himself as in this system, one of the immortals, under the care of God, communing with him and the object of his redeeming love, then he must be impressed with the greatness of man. And the grander the system is and the more glorious its destiny, the grander is the man. Man considered as belonging to the physical system only is belittled by its greatness. Man considered as belonging to the rational and spiritual system is greatened and ennobled by its greatness. The revelation of God by his action in the spiritual system must be commensurate with the grandeur of the system and of the rational ends possible in it.

A further answer is that whatever God does, be it great or little in itself, he will do it like God, not after a human measure but after the divine. The thing produced may be little, but in it will be revealed the greatness of the God who made it. Hence in everything is a door which opens into the infinite. If we study a blade of grass, or a pebble, or a ray of light, or an electric spark, we soon come to questions which science cannot answer and which bring us face to face with God. The mystery in everything is the finger-print of the infinite hand that made it. Christ says that God cares for a sparrow. If you study the sparrow, you must master the whole encyclopædia of the sciences before you can know all which is to be known about it. Do you say it is unreasonable and incredible that God should expend so much thought and care on so little a creature? But what God does must reveal God. Therefore all lines of thought and knowledge are found converging on and revealed in the little bird. Jesus says that God clothes the lily with beauty. And light, heat, electricity, chemical affinity and all the cosmic forces are concen-

the gospel of Jesus Christ must be a divine reality. The Sermon on the Mount cannot be a merely human production. The belief enters into the very depth of my conscience. The whole history of man proves it." — Curtis, *Life of Webster*, vol. ii. p. 684.

tred on the lily to make and direct its growth, the central sun energizes in its service to quicken it, and the resources of earth, air and water are laid under contribution for its nourishment. The lily as it grows is a centre to all the physical powers. Is it incredible that God should do so much for a single lily? But if he causes the lily to grow he must do it as God, and the lily must reveal the riches and resources of God.

How much more, in saving man from sin and educating and developing him to spiritual perfection, must he reveal the God. It is not wonderful that in this work all the mightiest agencies of the spiritual world should be centred on the man, and that "the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God" should be revealed.

A further answer is that it is a characteristic of God's action that giving does not impoverish him and that every one may receive of his fulness. Of this the sun is an emblem. Every individual receives its light and heat in all their fulness, while leaving the same fulness to all. Every man, every sparrow, every lily is the centre of all the cosmic energies. So in the spiritual system every person is a central recipient of all divine energies. If it is the befitting action of God that the sun should shine and the rain fall and the wind blow on every individual, each having the fulness of all, it is also befitting that the Sun of Righteousness should rise and the dew and rain of heavenly influence descend and the divine Spirit breathe on every man. If we may so say, every one has all. It is simply the revelation of the inexhaustible and unchanging fulness of God.

Other personal beings beside man exist or will hereafter come into being. In what particular way God may reveal himself among them we have no means of knowing. But we know that it will be in some way in which every one may have the opportunity to be "filled with the fulness of God." What he has done for man on earth detracts nothing from the fulness of grace with which he may come to personal beings in other worlds. And on the other hand, the existence of innumerable other worlds, peopled it may be with rational beings, constitutes no objection to the fulness of his redeeming grace to men.

INDEX.

A.

- Abraham, human sacrifices forbidden, 489, 491; historical beginning of the kingdom of God on earth, 491.
- Absolute Being, 5 f., 151-229; definition, 154; what it is not further known *a priori* but revealed in the universe, 37, 153, 165, 172 f., 181 f.; existence of, known as a necessary principle of reason and law of thought, 79 f., 151, 154 f.; its denial involves universal skepticism, 161; objection that a finite mind cannot be conscious of, 95 ff; knowledge of, inadequate but positive and progressive, 95 f., 159, 212, 216-219, 382; objection that like is known only by like, 82 f., 159 f., 186, 257; denial that it can reveal itself in creation affirms that it is limited, 91, 160, 176, 188 f., 210, 243, 302 f.; agreement of agnostics, pantheists, materialistic monists, and deists in affirming knowledge that the absolute exists, 5, 163, 170, 222 f., 241 f.; is the *a priori* argument in its true meaning, 164; gives unity to all the so-called arguments, 153 f., 164 f.; established by Plato, 162; its great place in the history of philosophy, 162-164; non-theistic theories as related to it, 166-206; false ideas of, 173 f., 210-212, 216-219; not a negative idea, 217 f.; not unknowable in itself, 173, 181 f.; the absolute of philosophy identified with the God whom we worship, 210-216; objection that the absolute is a spirit, but unconscious and impersonal, 215 f., 334-339; is the all-conditioning, 219-221; basis of apprehending the universe in science, 220; revealed in consciousness of finiteness, 160, 229; personality of, 212-216, 334-339; if unconscious and impersonal, inferior to man, 335; feelings manifesting sense or consciousness of, 17, 378-381; absolute knowledge, 48 f., 93 f., 157-160; absolute Spirit, the two elements in the idea of a divinity, 17 f., 36 f., 79 f.; absolute, hypostasizing the adjective, 218.
- Abuse, use and disuse of faculties, 112 f.
- Acosmic pantheism, 169.
- Æsthetic sentiments responsive to the presence of God, the absolute Reason, 385-387.
- Agassiz, contrast of vital and physical phenomena, 320.
- Agnosticism, Spencerian, 172-182; definition, 168; partial, not complete, 172 f.; rests on developing the absolute *a priori*, 172; rests on some false idea of the absolute, 173 f.; rests on an illegitimate application of the maxim, definition limits, 174 f.; logically involves complete agnosticism, 176; inconsistent with itself, 176-181; its principles would consistently lead to theism, 172 f., 181, 240, 249; Mansel, the absolute limited if the absence of limitation is predicated of it, 175; the absolute unknowable because it cannot be classed, 215 f.; agreement with theism, 151, 163, 169, 172, 180 f., 222-224, 240, 249, 524; religion of, 21, 419 f., 522; theistic agnosticism, 95-97, 159, 212, 216-219, 382; exaggerated statements of, 219.
- Agreement with theism of non-theistic theories, 163, 169, 222-224.
- All-conditioning, the, implied in the unconditioned or absolute, 219-221.
- Almightiness, not a capricious will unregulated by reason, 226 f., 300, 302, 306, 316-319, 366 f., 479 f., 497 f.; effects commensurate with the limitations of the beings on and through which it acts, 301.
- Analogy, physico-theological proof not an argument from, 332 f.; of the revelation of God and of the outward world, 48 f., 377 f., 398; of the development of religious knowledge and of the science of nature, 135 f., 139, 208, 458, 470.
- Anarchists find belief in God their greatest obstacle, 430.
- Anaxagoras, 65; sun as large as Peloponnesus, 208; universe grounded in reason, 165.
- Ancestors, worship of, 18, 21 f., 362.

- Animism, 18 f., 28, 42, 44, 63, 207.
- Anthropomorphism, 433-440, 511 f.; Fiske on its necessity, 180.
- Antinomies. See Contradictions.
- A priori* argument for existence of God, its true significance, 164; idea of the absolute, error of determining what the absolute is from it, 172 f., 183 f.
- Aquinas, Thomas, two classes of miracles, 446.
- Archetypal thought of God is the constitution of the universe, 79, 115, 192, 219 f., 227, 251, 256-260, 289, 292-294, 513.
- Arguments for the existence of God, their unity, 153 f., 164 f.; objection, it is not a legitimate object of proof, 61 ff.; presupposes the idea, 36-38, 61; reasons for re-statement, 1-11; objection that inferring God's existence proves his dependence, 62; that polytheists used the same, 65.
- Aristotle, 65; calls rational ideas essences, 78.
- Arnold, M., religion of morality and emotion, 22-24, 524; barren realism of the materialist, 100; impossibility of peace in unbelief, 405, 417; logia, 458; ideal Christianity, 469; miracles, 487; significance of incarnation, Easter, and immortality, 496, 503.
- Arnold, Thomas, faith is reason leaning on God, 93.
- Ashmore, religion of China, 385.
- Assimilation of truth, 115-119; of error, 104-109.
- Assumptions of science. See Postulates.
- Atheism, "bashful atheists," 166; used as equivalent to non-theistic theories, 166; types and classification, 166-169; positivism, 170 f.; Spencerian agnosticism, 172-182; pantheism, 182-201; materialism, 201-206; its different forms in conflict, 221; in each form points of agreement with theism, 222-224; theism takes all truths recognized in non-theistic theories, 224; prevalence of atheism circumscribed and sporadic, 348 f.; short-lived, 349 f.; objection from prevalence of Buddhism, 350 f.; attended with credulity and superstition, 351; followed by revivals of religious faith, 351 f.; removed without argument, 352-354; does not originate spontaneously, 354; puts us to permanent intellectual confusion, 372 f.; involves the impossibility of knowledge, 75-82, 246 f., 393, 397; belittles man and the sphere of knowledge, intellectual suffocation, 382-384, 526-529; richness and strength of character lost, 402-405; legitimately issues in pessimism, 403, 527; disastrous in every sphere of human interest, 402-418, 526-529; paralyzes motives to self-sacrificing love, and dries the springs of hope and enthusiasm, 417 f.; historical evidence of its evil influence, 429 f.
- "At Home," in nature and the supernatural, 100, 108, 134-137, 200, 260, 290.
- Atom, ultimate unit of the physical system, 184; in solid singleness suggests no beginning or cause, 191; Clerk-Maxwell on, 203, 238; theory of, incompatible with pantheism, 184 f., 201-203; proof of finiteness of the universe and transcendence of the absolute, 237-239; fortuitous concurrence of, 333; vortex atom, 266.
- Atonement, continuity of law in redemption from sin, 499.
- Attributes of God do not imply division or limitation, 226 f.
- Augustine, God found within, 101, 116; comprehensiveness of Christianity, 145; God incomprehensible, 219; *carmen seculorum*, 432; law distinguished from factual sequences, 480; Christianity and Greek philosophy, 521; *victrix delectatio*, 516.
- Automaton, spiritual, 194.
- Awakening of spiritual capacities, 103-120.

B.

- Bacon, Lord, 115; on final causes, 320, 326 f.; Baconian revival in science preceded by Luther's in religion, 431.
- Basil, Christians like bees gathering from all flowers, 521.
- Beattie, on final causes, 328.
- Beauty, reveals ideals in nature, 280 f.; reveals truth, 369-371; reveals God, 386 f.
- Becoming, absolute, the flux of Heraclitus, 189, 199.
- Belief in God, intertwined with all normal action, 94; leads to consecration and sacrifice, 95; objection that it never becomes knowledge, 97-99; spontaneous in all religions, 15 f., 90 f., 347 f.; generic, spontaneous, powerful, persistent, 345-353; is constitutional in man, 353-364; origin of (see Origin); analogy of belief in the outward world antecedent to scientific knowledge of it, 364 f., 398; rooted in every part of man's constitution as personal, 86-91, 365-397; necessary to reconcile freedom and dependence, 376; exists antecedent to science, 397-402; analogy of music, 398; spontaneous and unelaborated in the uneducated is a reasonable faith, 352 f., 399-402; practical influence in

- every sphere of activity, 402-418; arises from uniformities, and not merely anomalies, 423 f.; is evidence that God exists, 364 f.
- Bersier, encyclicals of criticism, 130.
- Bias, false idea of, 118-120.
- Bible, God revealed in it when it "finds us," 56 f.; studied with only archæological and critical interest, 108 f., 129-131; isolated from rational thought, 131 f.; what it is, 457-466; fitted to be the book of the universal religion, 530-532.
- Biedermann, pantheistic definition of revelation, 73; imperfection inseparable from the finite, 303; the absolute is spirit, but unconscious, 335; God revealed in redemption through Christ, 470.
- Biology leads to the door which opens into the presence of God, 512, 513.
- Blindness, spiritual, 83, 103-109.
- Boehme, mysticism, 123.
- Boethius, tinder in the soul, 402.
- Boole, false idea of cause, 243.
- Bossuet, immutable principles of reason, 375.
- Brain, molecular action of, and thought, various theories, 508-511; reveals the supernatural in man, 511-513.
- Browning, Mr., on humanity-worship, 420.
- Browning, Mrs., no reconciliation of man with his environment without God, 403; every common bush afire with God, 86.
- Büchner, Dr., 223.
- Buckle, extirpation of superstition by concentrating population in cities, 519.
- Bunyan, appropriating and assimilating truth, 116.
- Burnouf, idea of a God precedes the sensuous conception, 361.
- Bushnell, illustration from concentric spheres, 339.
- Butler, Bp., revelation to be judged by reason, 136; republication of natural religion, 521.
- Butler, Prof. Wm. A., all science has its root in the invisible world, 262 f.
- Buxtorf, inspiration of Hebrew vowel-points, 128.
- C.**
- Candor and impartiality, false idea of, 118 f.
- Capacity of man to receive God's revelation and to know him through it, 74-102; needs awakening, 103-120.
- Caprice not an essential characteristic of will, nor implied in almightiness, 226, 300, 305 f., 316-319, 479 f., 497 f.
- Carlyle, absentee God, 211; the supernatural in the natural, 289; man not coaxed with sugar-plums, 312.
- Carnivorous animals, objection founded on, 303.
- Carpenter, Dr., unconscious coördination of experience, 94; notion of force indispensable. 244; science points to the origination of all power in mind, 249; what science is, 261.
- Causal energy, law of both in the physical and spiritual systems, 534-541.
- Causation, principle of, existence of the absolute Being not proved by it, 154 f., 499 f.
- Cause, First, absolute Being revealed in the universe as, 233-250; objection that it implies a beginning, 240 f.; objection that it is only adequate to the effect, 241; objection that the effect is the exact equivalent of the cause, 242 f.; Hegel's objection that inferring a cause from an effect proves that the cause is conditioned by the effect, 243; that a cause is a mere antecedent, 243 f.; that belief in a cause results from mental impotence, 244; that the causal judgment results from association of ideas, as presented by Prof. Clifford, 244 f.; objection of Physicus, 245-247; of Mr. Spencer, 157.
- Cause and will; is the idea of will essential in the idea of cause? 247-250; not a particular act of the will of God in every motion, 249, 337-339. 156 f., 241 f.
- Cave-men, pictures, and implements, though rude, prove rationality, 296.
- Centre to the action of the universe, every man is, 87 f., 367, 377, 422 f., 551 f.
- Certainty, highest, not given by the senses, Champollion, science deciphers symbols in nature, 261.
- Chance, creation by, 333 f.
- Chaos assumed by objectors to theism, 334.
- Character, likeness of, necessary to mutual intelligibility, 83; how a sinner can know, God, 83.
- Charity, when pernicious, 535 f., 538 f.
- Cheever, G. B., atheism removed without argument, 352 f.
- Christ, the great evidence of Christianity, 142; characteristics of God's revelation through, 443-473; reveals by what he is and does more than by what he says, 445, 446-448, 457-459; the ideal inseparable from the historical, 469-473; Head of a new humanity, 471, 515, 539 f.; central in theology and history, 133 f., 143 f.,

- 443 f., 450, 473, 516; God's revelation in, continues and consummates the revelation in nature and man, 515-532; the eternal reason in him revealed in human reason, 516 f.; the Light, the Life and the Love, 517 f.; reveals the worth of man, and quickens to realize the highest possibilities of the individual and of society, 526-529; reveals the fundamental law of the universe, the higher going down to the lower to lift it up, 539 f.
- Christian consciousness, 33-36.
- Christianity, takes up the truths of the ethnic religions, 15, 518-526; three principal lines of evidence, 443; distinctive and essential fact of, 444, 450; teaches that God first seeks men, other religions that men first seek God, 470 f.; objection that it cannot take up and vitalize the varied knowledge and activity of the present age, 546-550; objection founded on the vastness of the universe, 550-552; tested by the progress of thought and civilization in all ages, 528 f., 531 f.; is the one universal religion, 529-532; this involved in the idea of God in Christ reconciling the world to himself, 529; its power of adaptation, 530 f.; only basis for a true philosophy of human history, 528.
- Christian pantheism, 212.
- Cicero, 65, 339, 346.
- Civilization, knowledge of God necessary to its progress, 405-418, 430-433.
- Claudius, dispersion of heat, 205.
- Clement of Alexandria, 11, 57, 73, 520 f.
- Clifford, Prof., mind-stuff in every moving molecule, 169; the world perceived is my perception, 171 f.; the causal judgment, 244 f.; effects of atheism, 404; our Father Man, 420 f.; consciousness and molecular motion, 509-514.
- Clock, its ticking mistaken for its final cause, 330.
- Cole, S. V., the God-sphere, 339 f.
- Coleridge, the Bible, 56.
- Communion with a divinity of the essence of religion, 18, 39 f., 82 f.; excluded by pantheism, 195 f., 201, 225.
- Comprehensiveness of Christianity, 145, 518-526; of theism, 224.
- Comte, theory of religion, 22, 222, 419-421, 522-524; his phenomenalism left behind by science, 161 f.; atheism of positivism, 167, 170 f.; admit any cause and God must be admitted, 177; atheists the most illogical of theologians, 231; prevision the criterion of science, 261; excludes efficient as well as final causes, 320; awakening of his religious susceptibilities, 351 f.; on consternation, 380; man not the lowest of the angels, but the highest of the brutes, 412; law of the progress of thought, 426-429.
- Concessions of theists unwarranted, 209 f., 211 f.
- Concrete thought in theology, 3, 4, 57 f., 99-102, 135-137, 140-149.
- Conscience reveals God, 376, 384 f.
- Consciousness, its different meanings, 30 f.; sense in which God is known in consciousness, 31-33; Christian consciousness, 33-36; elements of the idea of God given in consciousness, 36-38; deeper meaning in which God himself is known in consciousness, 38-47, 74; moral consciousness, 44 f.; scientific consciousness, 45; distinguished from the pantheistic use, 32, 34, 72 f., 259 f.; in what sense God is the background of self-consciousness, 47, 72 f., 151, 393 f.; subject and object of, 33, 74; of God through the spiritual feelings, 377-393; of the individual on a basis of universality, 367 f.; predicable of the absolute Spirit without limitation, 334-339; analogy of unconsciousness of genius, 338 f.
- Consecration, legitimate issue of religious belief, 95.
- Constitution of man as personal, religious belief rooted in it, 86-89, 365-402; in the reason, 86 f., 366-375; in his moral constitution as free will, 89, 375-378; in the susceptibility to motives and emotions, 87 f., 378-393; in every part of his constitution as personal, 89, 393-397; shown also by universality, spontaneity, power and persistence of religious belief, 345-365; objection that if religion is constitutional, the object of worship is wholly subjective, 424 f.
- Constitution of the universe is the archetypal thought of God expressed in it, 78 f., 115, 219 f., 227, 251, 256-260, 289, 292-294, 513; if no God, all reason and reasonableness annihilated, 227-229.
- Continuity, law of the physical system, 267-272; unity and continuity of the physical and spiritual, 287-292, 341, 505-515; the law passes from the spiritual to the physical, not from the physical to the spiritual, 289 f., 505-508.
- Contradictions in physical science without God, 205, 239 f., 269 f., 272, 292, 381, 499 f.; same true of philosophy, 272.
- Cooke, Prof. J. P., imperfection of the eye, 295.
- Copernicus withdrew the seat from the Deity, 317.

- Cork-tree, as evidence of God's goodness, 294.
- Correspondence of nature and spirit, shown in human action and language, 264 f.
- Cosmic theism, 180 f.
- Cosmical weather, 170.
- Cosmological argument, 233-250; is the argument from the contingency of the world, 234.
- Cosmos-worship, 24.
- Cousin, effect of his lectures in Paris, 163; the absolute cognizable under difference, plurality and relation, 181.
- Creation, not completed at a stroke, 54 f., 210-212; difficulty of conceiving a beginning, 240 f.
- Credentials, miracles not merely, 496 f.
- Criticism, biblical, authority, 130; isolation from experience and doctrine, 129-132.
- Culture, determines what reality is discovered in an object, 66 f.; and the extent of possible revelation, 68; assimilating and organizing truth into life and growth and power, 115-118; enlarges man's power to know, 117 f.; ineffective without God, 133 f.; poverty of atheistic culture, 406-416; theism deepens and enriches, 422; proposed as a substitute for religion, 422 f.
- D.**
- Dante, God's word never fully expressed in the universe, 300.
- Darwin, ascribes causal force to law, 318 f.; examples of final cause in plants, 283 f.; language implying final cause, 320 f., 437; final cause in the eye, 330.
- Dawson, Dr., 415 f.
- D'Azeglio, miracles, 476.
- Deaf-mutes acquiring the idea of God, 356 f.
- Death, objection founded on, 303.
- Definition or determinateness limits, misapplication of the maxim, 174-176, 186-188, 213.
- Degeneration of religions, 29, 361, 426 f.
- Deism, 140.
- Dependence, sense of, 390 f.; not the only root of religious belief, 25, 391, 394 f.
- Descartes, the infinite not a negative idea, 217; objection to evidence from final causes, 324.
- Development by action and use, enfeeblement by disuse or abuse, 112 f.
- Dimau, Prof., belief in God resting on feeling only is superstition, 395.
- Discipline, moral, from progressiveness of revelation, 208 f.
- Discontent, revealing relation to the spiritual system and to God, 387 f.
- Ditheism, 207.
- Divinity, essence of the idea, as absolute spirit, 17 f., 36 f., 64 f., 378, 389 f.; progressive development of the idea analogous with development of scientific ideas, 16, 39, 66-68, 207-209, 354, 363, 397-399.
- Dogmatism, issues in rationalism, exemplified in Protestant theology, 127-129; the reaction, 139-143; continued movement of theological thought, 143-149.
- Dorner, Dr., 13, 28.
- Dumont, Leon, order and law prove the absence of will, 316.
- Drummond, natural law in the spiritual world, his error, 289 f., 505 f.
- Dysteleology, 304.
- E.**
- Eckart, mysticism, 123.
- Economies, *laissez faire* theory, 538, 541.
- Education, in the knowledge of God, 207-209, 493; presupposes capacities and seeds of thought, 355-357, 401 f.; of Israel in monotheism, 489-491; of man in the spiritual system, 493; in preparation for Christ, 518-521.
- Ego. See Self.
- Eleatic philosophy, 192 f.
- Eliot, George, ideas often poor ghosts, 144; immortality, 503; Jesus a Jewish philosopher, 525; her experience in substituting philosophy for religion, 525 f.
- Emergencies, revealing hidden powers of a nation, 112.
- Emerson, R. W., follow nature, 196 f.
- Ends, realm of, 285; man an end in himself, and therefore immortal, 501 f.
- Environment, spiritual, 32 f., 35, 50, 54 f., 74, 85 f., 87 f., 93 f., 395 f., 481; the soul closed against it by sin, 104-109.
- Epochal miracles in the spiritual system and the physical, 486-497, 514.
- Epochs, in evolution of the physical system, 488 f.; in the history of the spiritual system, 489-492; continuity in the whole, 489, 492-494; Christ the central epoch, 493, 515 f.; why the greater epochs delayed, 493; the new power revealed in each epoch remains permanent, 492 f., 516-518.
- Equivalentents, intellectual, of objective reality, 219 f., 256-260.
- Error incidental to progress of knowledge, 60 f., 63-66.
- Ethnic religions, 16-20, 27-29, 42-45, 346-

- 348, 350, 358-364, 452 f., 454, 456; and Christianity, 15 f., 470 f., 518-522.
- Evil, sought as good, 106 f.; moral and physical, 297; physical evil an objection against theism, 297-316.
- Evolution, nature not finished, but plastic, a growth, not a casting, 54 f., 210 f., 278-280; gradation in the organic and inorganic as existing, 277 f.; process and progress toward an ideal, 278-280, 322; its type the growth of an organism, 286, 322; implies a beginning of motion, and an immanent power transcending the universe, 239 f.; teleology of, 273, 278-280, 284, 285-287, 325 f., 328-330, 331; demands the recognition of man as personal and supernatural, 343-345; points to immortality, 344 f., 501; the lower man's origin, the more his greatness reveals God, 353; demands reason in harmony with man's, regnant in the evolution, 366 f.; without God, serves no purpose of religion or ethics, 408 f.; involves epochal miracles, 486, 488 f., 492.
- Ewald, Moses the man of God, 462; prophecy, 451.
- Experience, knowledge of God in, 30-47, 136; God found within, 101 f.; human, not a measure of the possible, 499-501.
- Extra-sensible reality, points to the existence of Spirit, 513.
- Eye, as showing design, 274, 330; alleged imperfection, 295 f.
- Ezekiel, chap. i., theophany, 71.
- F.**
- Factors, in the knowledge of God, 5, 61, 122.
- Faith, condition of justification correlative to dependence, and the only basis of right character, 23 f., 105 f., 405 f., 411 f., 541-546; participation in divine love and inspiration of life, 376 f., 402-405; practical power in every sphere of life, 405-418; of uneducated believers reasonable, 352 f., 399-402; reason leaning on God, 93.
- Faith-faculty, 89-95; no new faculty imparted by God's Spirit, 114 f.; belief in God rooted in the entire personality of man, 89, 94, 393-397.
- Fanaticism, arising from mysticism, 123-126.
- Fear, in the ethnic religions, 42; religion of, 124; a constitutional religious sentiment, 380, 396.
- Feelings, divorced from reason, issue in mysticism and fanaticism, 122-127; spontaneous belief in God arising from, 347 f., 351-353, 364 f., 397-402; religious, through which God is revealed, 377-393; boundless and intense, 389 f.; relation to reason, 122-127, 132-139, 394 f.
- Fénelon, Ulysses and Grillus, 106; the idea of the finite negative, of the infinite positive, 217.
- Fetichism, recognizes an unseen divinity that can be communed with, 28, 42, 63, 167, 207, 359-363; not the primitive religion, and often associated with elevated ideas of the divinity, 361 f., 426 f.
- Feuerbach, objections, 65, 72, 157, 334; God identical with man, 73; materialism, 106; definitions of God, 421; worship of the great negation, 422; religion sacrifices man to God, 125, 198; necessity of postulating absolute Being, 162.
- Fichte, I. H., the unconditioned, 151.
- Fichte, J. G., universal Ego is the unconscious moral order of the universe, 168; persons known only as finite, 215.
- Final Cause, the objection that knowledge how a thing is done proves that it was not done intelligently, 327, 329; the incidental mistaken for it, 330; and efficient cause two aspects of the same, 330 f.; the argument from, 272-287; is but a part of the evidence from nature, 255, 320; objections, 319-331.
- Finch, A. E., will incompatible with law, 316.
- Finite, the, possibility of God's revealing himself in, essential to his illimitation or absoluteness, 91, 160, 176, 188 f., 210, 243, 302; God's revelation in, progressive and never completed, 299-306, 507, 514; finite things not mere modes of the existence of the absolute, 183, 184 f., 186; knowledge of implies knowledge of the absolute, 160, 215.
- Finiteness, not of the essence of personality, 214 f., 335, 337.
- Fiske, John, teleology, 180, 286, 325 f.; evolution issues in the rational and supernatural, 343-345; permanent intellectual confusion, 372 f.; anthropomorphism, 180, 455; science must postulate universal reason in harmony with man's, 192, 439; symbols, 180, 533 f.; cosmic theism, 180.
- Flügel, 162, 187, 209.
- Force, sum of always the same, 161, 235 f.; without God, the absurdity of perpetual motion, 237, 268 f., 480 f.; surreptitiously ascribed to law or identified with it, 318 f.; correlation and conservation of, does not account for mind, 343, 508-511; progress marked by relatively greater admiration

in recognition of spiritual influence, 385 f., 537.

Forms of reason, 76-79, 86.

Formulas, danger of stopping in the words, 128 f., 140, 148.

Foster, John, miracles, 497.

Fourier, on the passions, 407.

Freedom, Spinoza's definition, 193 f.; knowledge of free power originates in our consciousness of power, 248; of will, God revealed in man's, 89, 375-377, reconciliation of freedom and necessity by faith in God, 376, 403-405.

Freemantle, on Christian fellowship with agnostics, 146.

French revolution, atheism of, 166.

G.

Galileo, discussion of the cycloid, 262; infallibility and his condemnation, 531.

Ghost-theory of the origin of religion, 18, 21 f., 64 f., 360-362; ghosts, fear of, 348, 391-393.

God, three factors in the knowledge of, 5, 61, 122; origin and development of the idea, 16-20, 21 f., 63-69, 345-364, how mistakes originate, 18-20, 63 f.; these do not discredit the belief, 16, 64-66; knowledge of rooted in the whole constitution of man as personal, 86-89, 365-402; knowledge of, partial but positive, 80, 95-97, 159 f., 212, 216-219, 382; the absolute of philosophy and the God of religion identified, 209-216; as absolute reason, the necessary postulate of all science, 45-47, 227, 366-375; is conscious personal spirit, 212-215, 334-339; falsely conceived as will unregulated by reason, 211, 299-301, 305 f., 316-319, 479 f., 487; legitimate issue of scientific thought, 513 f., seeking man, 470.

Goeschel, thought and being, 374.

Goethe, 54, 87, 100, 161, 182, 183, 196, 231, 294 f., 310, 382, 413, 418, 463.

Good, the, 80, 371; repelled as evil, 106-109; the true, 307, 308 f., 310, 311-313; the feelings pertaining to, reveal God, 387-390, and knowledge of God, 416-418.

Gradation in the organic and the inorganic, 277 f.

Gray, Prof. Asa., science and religion, 319.

Green, Prof. T. H., aim of philosophy, 251; free will supernatural, 474.

Grote, A. R., if religion is constitutional it has no objective truth, 424; Christianity a veneration of paganism, 425.

Grove, W. R., causation implies the will of God, 249.

Guilt and sin, consciousness of, implies consciousness of God, 384 f.

Guyon, Madame, mysticism, 123.

H.

Haeckel, Prof., definition of materialism, 201; scientific and ethical materialism, 223; dysteleology, 304; evolution annuls the evidence from final causes, 326.

Hamerton, P. G., misrepresentation of Christianity, 549 f.

Hamilton, Sir Wm., unpictured notions of intelligence, 158; no partial knowledge of God, 159; great place of the absolute in the history of philosophy, 162 f.; mistakes the absolute for the mathematical sum total, 174; negative knowledge, 172, 175, 177 f., 217; inconsistency, 178-180; immorality, 179.

Harnack, Adolf, comprehensiveness of Christianity, 521.

Harrison, Fred., agnosticism, 180; religion of agnosticism, 408 f., 419; worship of humanity, 222, 419 f., 522; accepts Spencer's caricature of theism as philosophical and unanswerable, 435; they refute each other, 524; objection that Christianity cannot take up and vitalize modern thought and life, 546-550; what is demanded of religion, 405.

Hartmann, the absolute, 151; nature rests on the supernatural, 231; preference of the savage to the civilized, and of brutes to men, 107; God is spirit impersonal and unconscious, 215, 223, 334; not holy, 226; efficient and final cause, 330; the absolute the largest general notion, 187.

Harvey, final causes, 322.

Hawthorne, God known from within, 102.

Hedge, Prof., ideal Christ derived from the historical, 473.

Hedonism, founded in the nature-side of man, 103; basis of, in ethical materialism, 223.

Hegel, 13 f., 43, 75, 91, 120, 145, 187, 200, 218, 225 f., 241, 258, 259, 290, 485.

Heine H., bashful atheists, 166; personification, 265; Venus of Milo, 390 f.

Hellenism, as a substitute for Christianity, 422 f.

Heinholtz, imperfection of the eye, 295.

Hennell, Jesus "A Jewish Philosopher," 525.

Heraclitus, absolute becoming, 189.

Herbert, Geo., 67.

Herschel, Sir John, gravitation a result of conscious will, 249.

- Hilaire, G. St., final cause and crutches, 328.
- Hill, Thomas, 262.
- Historical revelation, 121, 129 f., 133, 444 f., 446-451, 457-469; and prophetic, 42, 56, 451-454.
- History, human, revelation of God in, 423-433.
- Hobbes, miracles and pills, 487.
- Hodge, Prof. C., 209.
- Holiness, pantheistic denial of compatibility with the absolute, 209, 218, 226.
- Holy of Holies, significance, 70.
- Honor and shame, sense of, implies man's relation to God, 388 f.
- Hooker, R., God incomprehensible, 219.
- Horace, purple patch, 92; the garden-god, 199; varying errors of atheism, 221.
- Humanity, worship of, 22, 222, 419-421, 522-524.
- Humboldt, the extraordinary excites fear, not hope, 380.
- Hume, not the protagonist for Spencerian agnosticism, 177; recognizes final causes, 321; no experience in world-building, 331-333; absurdity of fortuitous concurrence of atoms, 333 f.; mind an agitation of brain, 343; infinite spider, 434; miracles contrary to universal experience, 494, 499-501.
- Humor, implies man's superiority to his physical condition, 389.
- Huxley, worship of the Unknowable, 21; the name agnostic, 176; misapprehension of Hume, 177; the mechanical does not exclude the teleological, 329; materialistic civilization, 413 f.; science gives no warrant for materialism, 204; molecular motion the cause of consciousness, 508.
- Hypostasizing the adjectives absolute, infinite, finite, 218; the copula, 174.
- Hypothesis, of Newtonian induction, in proving the existence of God, 252, 332; verification, 253, 292-294.
- I.
- Ideal and historical Christ, 469-473.
- Idealistic pantheism, 168.
- Ideals, progressively realized in particular things and processes, 274-277; in the cosmos, 277-280; revealed in the beautiful, 280 f.
- Ideas, objectively real, 78, 256-259, 437-439; of reason referred to the universal Reason, 79 f.; of Plato, 78, 192, 259, 437; of Hegel, 259 f.; ghostly till embodied, 144.
- Illuminism, 81, 416, 550.
- Image of God, man in, 82-86, 337; Lotze on, 337.
- Imagination cannot create the primitive idea of God, 358; anticipates philosophical thought in shaping it, 358.
- Immanence of God in the universe, 7, 54 f., 140, 199-201, 210-212, 225, 293, 299-301, 316-318, 485; and transcendence, 190 f., 198, 211 f., 219 f.; science finds a transcendent power immanent in nature, 480-484.
- Immortality, origin of the belief, 64 f.; indicated by evolution, 343-345; longing for, reveals man's relation to God, 388; necessary if man is an end in himself, 501 f.; compatible with man's connection with the body, 512 f.
- Imperfection, metaphysical, 301 f.
- Impotence, mental, not the origin of rational intuitions, 176, 244.
- Incidental miracles, 445, 494 f.; occur at epochs, no one of them essential to redemption, 494 f., 502; possibility of, 514 f.
- Indifference, claimed as essential to scientific and unbiased investigation, 81.
- Individual being, the unit of thought and of reality, 74, 76 f., 184 f., 187.
- Individuality is indivisibility and identity, and predicable of the absolute, 337.
- Indra, prayer to, 43.
- Induction, Newtonian, in the physico-theological argument, 252, 332.
- Industrial progress, influence of Christianity on, 430.
- Infinite, sense of, 17, 378-382; series, 155 f., 237; never fully expressed in the finite, 299. See Absolute, and Progressiveness.
- Inner light, 123.
- Insensibility of the sinner to spiritual realities and motives, 103-109; capacity to know God remains, 109-114.
- Instincts indicate objective reality, 396.
- Intellectual equivalents of reality, 208, 219 f., 256-260.
- Intelligibility of all reality, 79, 236, 256 f., 258, 533.
- "In the beginning God," 506, 533.
- Intuition, rational, confirmed by all science, 260-264.
- Inventions useless till civilization grows up to them, 68; reveal symbolism in nature, 261 f.
- Israel, alleged fetichism and polytheism, 489 f.; education in monotheism, 68, 490 f.; its literature not the natural outgrowth of its life, 490 f.; formal institution of political and ecclesiastical organi-

zation, 491; its truth taken up into Christianity, 451-454, 492 f., 518.

J.

Jacobi, inference that God exists implies his dependence, 62; reason-sense, 75; reason and faith, 80; difficulty of identifying the absolute Being with the personal God, 209; analogy of sense-perception and spiritual, 398 f.

Janet, religion constitutional, 364.

Jenyns, Soame, internal evidence of Christianity, 140.

Jesuits and Canadian Indians, 64.

Jevons, mathematical equations solved by every atom, 262; experience not the limit of possibility, 500 f.

Justification by faith, founded on a universal law of finite beings, 105 f., 411 f., 541-546.

Justin Martyr, the whole race had part in the Logos, 520.

K.

Kahnis, German illuminati, 416.

Kant, consciousness, 32; fixed belief in God, 44; thing in itself, 80; results of his philosophy, 163; conception of God, 167; education by progressiveness of revelation, 209; personality known only as finite, 215; the mechanical does not exclude the teleological, 329; God revealed in the practical reason, 390; idea underlying products of nature, 437; monotheism shimmers through polytheism, 518.

Keary, origin of religion, 359 f.

Kingdom of Christ, distinctive of Christianity, 471 f.; continuity in Old and New Testaments, 491-493; grows like an organism, 493.

Knowledge, absolute, 48 f., 157; finite not self-originating, depends on revelation, 48 f.; begins as knowledge of individuals, 74, 76 f., 184, 187; intellectual equivalent of reality, 208, 219 f., 256-260; archetypal in God. See Archetypal.

Knowledge of God, three factors, 5, 61; and belief, 97-99; progressive, 66-68; positive but inadequate, 80, 95 f., 157-159, 181 f., 216-219; progressiveness analogous with physical science, 16, 39, 139, 208; processes analogous, 58, 59-61, 135 f., 148 f.; in what sense negative, 216-218; three stages, 354, 429.

Koran, lack of roots in history, 461.

Kuenen, persistence of religious belief, 351.

L.

Lange, F. A., scientific and ethical materialism, 223; test of materialism, 410; poverty of materialism as to culture, 416.

Lanier, Sidney, 118, 290.

Laplace, could not find God with his telescope, 204; final causes, 325.

Law, of ethics and physics, 267, 498, 532 f., 535; distinguished from factual uniform sequences, also called laws, 316-318, 475, 479 f., 481 f., 505 f.; force surreptitiously ascribed to, 318; nature orderly under, 267-272; objection, order and law prove the absence of will, 316-319; unity of, in the spiritual and physical systems, 532-546; law of reason extends to nature, not the sequences of nature to reason, 289 f., 484 f., 505 f., 535; exemplified in the law of causation, 534-541; in the law of reception and production, 541-546; the law of the higher descending to the lower to lift it up, 539 f.; law and miracles, 497-502, of least action, 321.

Le Conte, Prof., objective reality of physical and spiritual, 399.

Lenormant, redemption in ethnic religions, 384 f.

Lessing, rationalism, 129.

Lewes, attitude of this age as to skepticism, 353.

Life, pagan conception of, brought back by atheism, 407.

Light which lighteth every man, 45, 366, 367, 377, 516 f., 520 f., 530 f.; life and love from Christ, 517 f.

Like known only by like, 82 f., 159 f., 186, 257.

Lilly, W. S., truth known by feeling, 88; mediæval verse, 126 f.

Lily and sparrow, cosmic forces serving organic life, 281-283, 551 f.

Logical notions and processes mistaken for concrete beings, actions, and relations, 62 f., 123, 145, 174, 186-188, 198 f., 215 f., 243, 259 f., 373 f.

Lotze, finite personality, 337; analogy of knowledge of God and of the outward world, 398.

Love, relation to intelligence, 117-119; to development and power, 126, 536 f.; not contradictory to the law of the survival of the fittest, 535; kind of service required, 535 f., 538; fundamental law of the universe revealed in God in Christ, 539 f.

Lucretius, fear generates the gods, 42; atoms, 191, 333; anthropomorphism, 434.

Luthardt, 94.

Luther and rationalism, 139, 458 f.

M.

Malebranche, positive knowledge of God, 217.

Man, normally in union with God, 81, 105, 516-518, 541-546; is supernatural in the likeness of God and therefore knows him, 83-86, 91; participates in nature and the supernatural, and "at home" in each, 85, 102, 137, 200 f., 260, 288-292, 341, 474 f.; participates in universal reason, 45-47, 79-81, 86, 368, 376 f., 516 f., 520 f., 530; the mirror of the universe, 341; revealed to himself in knowing God, 72, 95, 126, 198, 225, 355, 515, 523; greatness of the physical shows his littleness, and of the spiritual system his greatness, 551; natural and spiritual man, 103 f.; highest product of evolution, 286, 343-345; his personality a proof of the existence of God, 341-345; our Father Man, 420 f.

Mansel, 159, 175, 179 f.

Martineau, James, physico-theological argument, 319.

Materialism, 201-206; definition, 169, 201; scientific and ethical, 223 f.; subjective and objective contradictory, 205 f.; is unscientific, 253; poverty as to culture, 416.

Matter and spirit, synthesis of, in God, the All-conditioning, 220 f., 288 f.

Maudsley, Dr., insane infant, 104.

Maxwell, Clerk, atoms and molecules disclose a power transcending the universe, 203, 238.

Mead, E. D., germs of rationalism in Luther, 139.

Mechanism, the universe as, distinguished from the immanence of God, 317; materialism makes it finite with perpetual self-generating motion, 237, 268 f.

Mediæval Christian verse, more joyous than the ancient pagan, 126 f.

Messianic prophecy, 142, 452 f., 490 f.

Meyer, Wilhelm, the mystery of the universe, 151; humanity worship, 421.

Mill, J. S., immorality of Hamilton's agnosticism, 179; positive knowledge of the absolute, 216, 217; law of simplest and fewest assumptions, 255; God's will as almighty caprice, 316 f.; physico-theological argument is induction, not analogy, 332 f.; mind a series of sensations, 342; awakening of his religious susceptibilities, 351; religion without a divinity, 418; miracles possible if God exists, 476 f.

Miller, Hugh, fear of a corpse, 392.

Milton, 115, 371, 513.

Mind, not a series of sensations, 213, 246, 342, 510; not accounted for by molecular motion, 343 f., 508-513; demanded by evolution, 343 f., 506 f.; mind-stuff, 169, 513.

Miracles, 474-504; objection that they are not continued, 70 f.; possibility involved in redemption, 445 f.; essential and incidental, 445 f., 494 f., 514; threefold significance, 446; definition, 474-476, 478 f.; possibility, as consistent with the continuity of nature, 476-486, 514; epochal in the spiritual system and the physical, 486-497, 514, 539; incidental miracles in epochs, 494; miracles and law, 497-502; denial of their possibility involves denial of God, 502-504; free will essentially miracle-working, 474, 475 f., 478 f.; the law rather than the exception, 482; probable, 485 f., 499-501; current in the ocean, 486; not isolated, but in the archetypal plan, 487-497, 507; evidential value, 446, 496; arouse attention, 446, 497; objection that they are contrary to universal experience, 494, 499-501.

Mivart, St. John, present obligation of the censure on Galileo, 531.

Molecular action of the brain manifests the supernatural in man, 508-513.

Monism, definition and classification, 167-169; pantheistic, 168, 182-201; materialistic, 168 f., 201-206; agreement with theism, 163, 169, 222-224.

Monotheism and theism, 207; education of Israel to, 490 f.

Moral ideas, universal, 44 f.; and religion, 22-24, 44 f., 524; incompatible with pantheism, 193-198; constitution of man, God revealed in, 369, 375-377, 384 f.

More, Hannah, 392; Henry, 526.

Mosaism, the absolute recognized in its moral law, 390.

Moses, vision of God's glory, 69 f.

Motion, perpetual and self-generating, involved in the merely mechanical conception of the universe, 237, 268 f.

Mozley, Canon, survival of the fittest, 319.

Müller, F. Max, ethnic religions, 27 f., 29; idea of the infinite not negative, 217; each god worshiped as supreme, 359; belief in revelation, 363; sense of the mysterious, 378, 381; fetichism, 426 f.

Müller, Julius, God in the background of self-consciousness, 393.

Must be and ought to be, laws of, 535.

Mystery, 205, 381; God the greatest of all and the solution of all, 188; the mystery behind all phenomena is known as a being, 151, 203-205; lies along the line of all ac-

- tion of the absolute in the finite, 212; disclosed by science, 205, 239 f., 269-272, 292, 331, 481 f.; in everything the fingerprint of the hand that made it, 551; sense of, a feeling leading to God, 381.
- Mysticism, 122-127; its truth and its error, 132 f.; pantheistic, 199.
- Myths, ethnic, contrasted with theophanies of the Old Testament, 69; conditions of their growth, 26 f.; extravagant theories of, 69, 362.
- N.**
- Natural man and spiritual, 103-105.
- Natural selection and final causes, 322 f.
- Natural theology, need of restatement, 1-11; defects, 154.
- Natural and revealed religion, distinction no longer available, 448; the real distinction, 449-451.
- Nature, symbolie, 180 f., 256-266, 293, 533 f.; orderly under law, 267-272, 316-318, 475, 479 f., 481 f., 506, 535; realizing ideals, 272-281; subserving uses, 281-292; itself revealed in revealing God, 293; false and true idea of, 480-484.
- Nature and the supernatural, line of demarcation between, 17, 50, 83-86, 108, 253-255, 341, 381 f., 474-476; the natural cannot know the supernatural, 82-84, 103 f., 106-109; not in antagonism, 85 f., 87 f., 138, 287-292, 484-486; man at home in both, 92, 100, 108, 137 f., 200, 260, 290; synthesis in God the all-conditioning, 220 f., 288 f.; correspondence recognized in human action and language, 264 f.; unity of, 287-292.
- Nature-myths, 69, 362.
- Nature-worship, false theory that it preceded spirit-worship, 359-362.
- Necessity and freedom, origin of knowledge of, 247-249; universe grounded in freedom, 375 f.; reconciliation of freedom and dependence through belief in God, 23 f., 25, 207, 376, 403-405.
- Newcomb, Prof., 274.
- Newman, F. W., a book-revelation impossible, 461.
- Newton robbed the heavens of their gods, 317.
- Niebuhr, 225.
- Nihilists, belief in God their greatest obstacle, 166, 430.
- Nirvana of the intellect, 176.
- Noiré, 326, 335.
- Non-theistic theories. See Atheism.
- Normal condition of man, in union with God, 81, 542.
- Norwich, Bishop of, Bible without theology, 132.
- Noumenon and phenomenon, 80, 533.
- O.**
- One, the absolute, coexistence with the many, 186, 192 f.; and all, 182 f.
- Ontological argument, its significance, 164 f.; pantheism, 168; knowledge is ontological in its beginning, 77, 165, 184.
- Order of the universe, rational and moral, 498; under law reveals God, 267-272; objection that order and law prove the absence of will, 316-319.
- Origin and development, of belief in God, 16-20, 38-47, 63 f., 207 f., 346-364; Spenser's theory, 18, 21 f., 362; in man's normal development he finds God, 354; of the idea of spirit, 17 f., 21 f., 64 f., 160, 260 f.
- P.**
- Paganism, conception of life renewed by modern atheism, 407, 422; Christianity a veneering of, 425, 521 f.
- Pain and suffering, objection founded, 297, 299-311, 498 f.
- Palmer, Courtlandt, supposed argument for atheism, 166 f.
- Pantheism, definition and classification, 168 f., 182-184, 198 f.; rests on no reasonable grounds, 184-188; involves contradictions, 188-190; cannot solve the necessary problems of reason, 190-193; incompatible with free will, moral responsibility, and religion, 193-198; agreement with theism, 163, 169, 222 f.; calls attention to neglected aspects of truth, 199-201; false suspicions of, and criterion, 200, 211 f.; truths misconceived as pantheistic better set forth in theism, 199-201, 211 f., 224-229; denies the real being of finite things and persons, 168, 225; implies the evolving of the absolute into the imperfect, or of the imperfect into the absolute, 189; logically issues in complete agnosticism, 190; theistic misconceptions leading to pantheism, 211 f.; no "Christian pantheism," 212; man creates God, 227; its fascination, 197.
- Parker, Theodore, the ideal Christ implies the historical, 441, 473.
- Particular, the, the universal revealed in, 367 f.
- Paul, the natural man and the spiritual, 103.
- Peiree, Prof. Benj., 258, 262, 280, 367.

- Perfect, the, rational norm of, reveals God, 369-371; sentiments responsive to, reveal God, 88, 385-387, 389 f., 412.
- Persistence of force is persistent manifestation of the absolute Being, 154 f.
- Personality, false ideas of, 212-216, 246, 334-339, 342; potential unconditionedness, 213 f., 310 f.; finiteness not its essence, 215 f., 335-337; its essential attributes may be attributes of the absolute, 214, 337; of man proves the personality of God, 341-345.
- Personality of God, essential in the idea of religion, 18, 82-86, 167; objection that, not predicable of the absolute springs from false idea of the absolute, 210 f., 213; from false idea of the God of theism, 211 f.; from false ideas of personality, 212-216, 334-337; involves denying the predication of any attribute, 174-176, 246 f.; error that God is spirit, not personal, 215 f., 334-339; revealed in the constitution and course of nature, 251-341; in man, 341-442.
- Pessimism, 103, 106-108, 312 f., 387, 403, 416 f., 462 f., 527.
- Pfleiderer, 13, 42 f., 132 f., 215, 335, 358, 361, 390.
- Phenomenalism, Comte's, 170 f., 263 f.
- Phenomenon, not separated from the being but filled with it, 77, 79, 80; and noumenon, 80, 533.
- Philo, 43 f.
- Philosophy, Prof. Green's definition, 251; taken up into Christianity, 524-526; Paul's conception of this, 525; without God, issues in mere subjectivity, 526.
- Philosophy of history, depends on theism, 423-433; and on Christianity, 526-529.
- Physical system, God revealed in, 55; revealed as power or cause, 233-250; as the personal God, 251-340; subservient to the spiritual, 285-292, 306-311; correspondence and interaction with the spiritual, 100, 138, 287-292, 484-486; unity and continuity of the physical and spiritual, 85 f., 287-292, 505-515; laws of the spiritual system regulative in the physical, not sequences of the physical in the spiritual, 289 f., 505 f., 532-546.
- Physico-theological argument, 251-340.
- Physicus, 169, 245 f., 403 f., 527.
- Physiology requires recognition of the supernatural in man, 508-513.
- Pictism, 140, 141, 145.
- Pindar, 383.
- Plato, the soul an oracle, 87, 88; on prayer, 43; God geometrizes, 369; ideas, 78, 192, 259, 437 f.; education, 355.
- Platonism, New, and Christianity, 192.
- Plutarch, universality of religion, 346; on Plato's ideas, 192.
- Poetry reveals reality as really as science, 369-371.
- Political progress, influence of Christianity, 430-432.
- Polytheism, not atheism, 167, 207 f.; agreement with and preparation for monotheism, 28, 358 f., 518 f.; alleged religion of Israel, 489 f.
- Positivism, Comte's, left behind by science, 161 f., 171, 222; logical result of denying God, 161; denies the necessity of forming a theory of the universe, 170, 222; reason declares it, 171; implies that knowledge is impossible, 170 f.; Alice in "Through the Looking-glass," 171 f.; agreement with theism, 222; religion of, 22, 222, 419-421, 522-524.
- Postulates of science, as to the sum of all force, implies that the absolute is the transcendent cause, 235 f.; as to reasonableness of the universe, implies that the absolute is reason, 236, 258, 298; reason in harmony with man's, universal, 260-263, 436-439; postulates of science rest on theism, 372-375, 517, 518 f.
- Practical knowledge and speculative, 115, 117-119.
- Practical power of faith in God, 402-423.
- Preaching, a testifying or prophesying, 41 f., 451; necessity, 455.
- Priests, religion an invention of, 423.
- Production dependent on reception, a universal law, 105 f., 541-546.
- Progress, belief in, due to Christianity, 430 f., 451-454; lacking in ethnic religions, 452 f.; of Christ's kingdom like an organic growth, 493; the spiritual precedes and quickens the physical progress, 431; man's progress in estimating and trusting spiritual power above physical force, 385 f., 537.
- Progressiveness of God's revelation and of man's knowledge of God through it, 66-69, 137-139, 207-209, 211, 299 f., 455 f., 482, 506-508; analogy to the progress of physical science, 16, 39, 66 f., 139, 208, 363; three stages, 137 f., 354, 429; Comte's three stages, 426-429; various conflicting theories, 428 f.; is a discipline and education, 208 f.
- Proof, indirect, 251-253.
- Prophecy, testifying of God as known in experience, 41 f., 451; not merely prediction, 452-454; connection with and subordination to historical revelation, 451-454; evidential value as prediction, 452 f.; an

atmosphere of promise and progress, distinguished from the assumed completeness and fixedness of ethnic religions, 452 f.; distinguished from the mantic fury of ethnic inspiration, 454 f.; prophetic or private revelation, and historical or public, 56, 121, 451-454.

Propitiation and expiation, disclose consciousness of God as moral lawgiver, 384 f.

Protestantism, lapse into dogmatism and rationalism, 128 f.; not its essential tendency, 139 f.; political tendencies, 139; this lapse in England, America and Germany, 140 f.; the reaction, 141-144; its continuance in current thought, 143-149.

Q.

Quarles, 231.

Quatrefages, universality of religion, 347, 348.

Quietism, 123.

Quinet, 13, 102, 369.

R.

Rae, on fetichism, 427.

Rational constitution of man, God revealed in, 45-47, 75-82, 86 f., 366-375.

Rationalism, what it is, 127 f., 469; lapse of Protestantism into it, 128 f., 140 f.; relation to dogmatism, 127-129; the reaction, 141-144; Schlciermacher's influence, 141, 145; influence of Strauss, 127 f., 141-143; Lessing, 129; present rationalistic tendencies, 145 f.; affirms the ideal Christ without the historical, 127 f., 146, 469-473.

Ravaisson, on the absolute, 162.

Rayleigh, Lord, contradictions and difficulties in physical science, 292.

Realism, Natural, of physical science, 76; Rational, 48 f., 59 f., 75-82, 185, 193, 227, 256-266, 263; the true basis of physical science, 76, 78, 193; contradicted by pantheism, 185; and idealism united, 75-82, 193; materialistic, 66 f., 100, 413-417.

Realm of ends, the personal and spiritual, 285, 501.

Reason, in what sense used, 7; its fundamental ideas the forms of reality, 76, 78-80; reason-sense, 75, 81; unaided, 80 f., 91, 93, 122; human, like the universal reason and participates in its light, 44, 86 f., 366, 372 f., 438 f., 517 f.; postulate of all ethics, 44; postulate of all scientific knowledge, 45-47, 155, 220, 227 f., 235 f.,

260-264, 366-368, 436-439; shown in scientific prevision, 261; in scientific discovery, 261; in invention, 261 f.; in mathematics, 262; potential^a unconditionedness, 214.

Reason absolute, is God, 7 f., 79 f.; energizing in the universe and revealed in it, 79, 208, 317 f., 479 f.; always at the goal, incompatible with suffering, 498; conception of impersonal and unconscious reason at the ground of the universe, 215, 334-339.

Reasonableness, of the universe, a postulate of science, 79, 236, 256 f., 258; of the faith of unlettered believers in God, 399-401.

Reception precedes production, a universal law of the finite, 105 f., 541-546.

Reconciliation, of consciousness of freedom and of necessity through faith in God, 25, 195 f., 207, 376, 403; of the physical and spiritual, in man, 84-86, 474 f.; also in correspondence and subordination, 484-486; not physical laws over the spiritual, but spiritual laws over the physical, 289 f., 484 f., 505 f., 533; of man and his environment, 287-292; 402-405, 493; of the human and divine in Christ, 516-518, 543 f.

Redemption from sin, traces of the idea in ethnic religions, 384 f.; definition, and what it includes, 444; is historical, 444 f.; involves the miraculous, 445 f.; is a revelation of God, 446-451; of God himself in historical action, not of truths formulated in words, 57 f., 447; distinct from and transcends all other revelations, 448-451; in the Old Testament, 444 f., 445 f., 452 f., 489-494, 518; God seeks man before man seeks God, 470.

Relation, known as objective reality, 77 f.

Relativity of knowledge, 160.

Religion, 15-29; and morals, 22-24, 44 f., 375-377; presupposes communion with God, 18, 39-44, 362; emergence of man from the life of nature to the knowledge of God, 103-105; origin and development, 16-20, 38-47, 63 f., 207 f., 345-364; arises in man's normal development, 353-364; Spencer's theory, 18, 21, 362; various theories, 358-363; is generic, 44 f., 345-347; spontaneous, 347 f.; powerful, 348; persistent, 348-351; rooted in man's entire constitution as personal, 27, 89, 353-402; acceptable in man's highest moral feeling, repugnant in his lowest, 408; can never cease, 365, 381; proposed substitutes without a divinity, 20-27, 418-423, 522-526; practical efficacy which may be demanded

- of it, 405; all claim a revelation of the divinity, 363, 456.
- Renan, 109, 408; perfume of an empty vase, 404; test of a miracle, 496; transcendence of Jesus, 532.
- Reuss, effect of criticism, when isolated, 130 f.
- Revelation, presupposed in all knowledge by experience, 3, 48 f., 80 f., 93, 122, 363 f.; what the revelation is, 48-57; what God reveals is himself as distinguished from doctrines, 4, 57 f., 148 f., 446-451; reaction of the mind in receiving it, 59-73; is by historical action of God, 71 f., 446-451, 530-532; begins with human sin, 444 f., 449; progressive (see Progressiveness); through a human medium, in its reception and communication, 454-456; not an end in itself, 456 f.; unity and continuity of, 505-546; assumed in all religions, 363, 456; analogous to the revelation of the outward world, 48 f., 377, 398; subjective verified by objective, 5, 121; public or historical, private or prophetic, 56, 121, 451-454; limit of revelation by words, 71, 362-364, 446-448.
- Reymond, Du Bois, the idea of force anthropomorphic, 436 f.
- Richter, God's immanence in nature, 293.
- Right, the idea of, 80, 368 f., 376; motives and emotions pertaining to, 88, 384 f., 389 f.; practical influence dependent on knowledge of God, 407-410.
- Robertson, F. W., principle on which he taught, 136.
- Robespierre, scenic restoration of the Supreme Being, 350.
- Rothe, religion is communion with God, 18; miracles and prophecy constitutive elements of revelation, 445; necessity of written record of the revelation, 457; self-evidencing power of the Bible, 466; Christianity the most mutable of all things, 531.
- Rousseau, Savoyard vicar, 325; impossibility of a book-revelation, 461.
- Royce, Prof., 210, 498.
- Rückert, 397.
- Ruge, humanitarian religion, 421.
- S.**
- Sacrifice, human, 28, 125, 489 f., 491; Feuerbach, that it is of the essence of religion, 125, 198; the true Christian self-sacrifice, 126; and penance, disclose consciousness of God as lawgiver, 384.
- Schelling, atheism of consciousness, 89; epochs in evolution, 184; religion growing wild, 358.
- Schenckel, God revealed in consciousness, 384.
- Schiller, the oracle within, 130; will-power guided by reason, 306; beauty reveals truth, 370; feeling before definite knowledge, 379 f.
- Schleiermacher, religion the sense of dependence, 25, 391, 394; influence in the reaction against rationalism, 141, 145; his philosophy opposed to his religion, 209.
- Schweitzer, the absolute Spirit, 65.
- Science, none formulated in nature, 58, 470; materialistic, misses the deepest reality, 100, 292, 381-384; physical, its progressiveness analogous to that of theism, 16, 39, 66 f., 139, 208, 263; its processes also analogous, 58, 59-61, 135 f., 148, 458, 470; consists in finding rational thought in nature, 257 f., 260 f.; its contradictions and insuperable difficulties without God, 19, 205, 237-240, 269-271, 292, 331, 381, 481 f.; postulates universal reason like man's, 46 f., 75-82, 366, 393, 438 f.; its immense assumptions, 372 f.; postulates ideas under all which is observed, 78-81, 256-266, 437 f.; primitive impulse to investigation, 171, 382 f.; its anthropomorphism, 436-439; assumes that the universe is intelligible, 79, 236, 256 f., 258, 533; enthusiasm for, a substitute for religion, 25 f., 46 f., 524.
- Scientific motives and emotions responsive to God, 382-384.
- Scott, Sir W., 392.
- Seeley, J. R., scientific enthusiasm a substitute for religion, 25 f., 46, 524.
- Selection, natural, 319, 321, 322, 326; evidence of mind in nature, 275; and man's, 315.
- Self, defined as a series of sensations, 213, 342; potential unconditionedness, 214, 310, f.
- Self-consciousness, God in the background of, 47, 72 f., 151, 393 f.; pantheistic conception of it, 73.
- Self-sufficiency, 105, 542.
- Seneca, 43, 356.
- Sense does not give the highest certainty, 499.
- Sense-perception a revelation, 48 f., 59 f.; and self-perception in the same act, 76; and rational intuition, 76-80.
- Sequence, uniform, and laws, 475, 479 f., 483 f., 500, 506.
- Series, infinite, 155, 237.
- Service, Christian law of, 536 f.
- Shadows, not the origin of the idea of spirit, 21 f., 360 f.

- Shechinah, the, 468.
- Shelley, human consciousness of the divine, 250.
- Shields, Prof., theories of the stages of man's historical development, 428.
- Sicard, Abbé, and Massieu, 357.
- Sidgwick, Prof., indirect proof, 252; no ethics without God, 409.
- Signs, natural, revelation through, 52.
- Sin, separates from God, 104-109, 444 f., 449 f., 542, 543 f.; repudiates dependence on God, 105; consciousness of, not ennobling, 124 f.; consciousness of God in the consciousness of sin, 124 f., 384 f.; possibility of, involved in finite free agency, 297, 498; God meets it with law and redemption, 498 f.; its deepest significance, 542 f.
- Skepticism, universal, involved in denying the absolute Being, 161 f.; insists on perpetual uncertainty and indifference, 118 f.
- Smith, R., Bible a book of religious experience, 459.
- Soerates, 43, 365.
- Speculative inquiry divorced from the practical, 115-119.
- Spencer, H., theory of religion, 18, 21, 362; existence of the absolute Being a necessary postulate, 151; implied in the persistence of force, 155; knowledge of the absolute positive, 177, 240; accepts theistic positions and methods, 177, 180 f., 240; God unknowable because included in no class, 215 f.; consciousness of cause ineradicable, 244; on symbols, 533 f.; language implying final cause, 321; definition of the ego, 342; energy in the physical system the same as in consciousness, 181, 344; religion of agnosticism, 21, 419 f., 522; uniformity reveals the Absolute, and not merely the extraordinary, 424; belief in God anthropomorphic, 433 f.; caricature of theism, 435; definition of life, 321, 437; rude people incapable of receiving the ideas of a higher civilization, 490; error of his ethics, 537 f.; misrepresentation of Christianity, 550; type of evolution is the growth of an organism, 279.
- Spinoza, his pantheism, 182-184; like known only by like, 186; definition of freedom, 193 f.; spiritual automata, 194; begs the question, 185 f.; sub specie æternitatis, 231; thought predicated of the absolute has no likeness to human intelligence, 184, 336; contradictions, 189 f.
- Spirit, origin of the idea, 17 f., 21 f., 64 f., 160, 360 f.; acting on spirit, 52 f.
- Spirit absolute, the two essential elements in the idea of a divinity, 17 f., 378, 380 f.; not impersonal and unconscious, 215, 234-339; feelings responsive to God as, 17, 378-381, 389 f.
- Spirit, of God, awakening the spiritual in man, 114 f.; witness of, 106, 119 f., 468 f.
- Spiritual, the, in it the deepest reality and the unity of knowledge, 99-102; submerged in the natural, 103-105; capacities in insensibility, dormant not extinct, 109-114; system, its greatness reveals the greatness of man, 551. See Environment, and Physical System.
- Spontaneity of religious faith, 347, 350-353; spontaneous belief in God a reasonable ground of religious service, 399-402; to be held to amid intellectual perplexities, 400 f.
- Staël, Madame de, 348.
- Stanley, Dean, vigor and vitality of the Bible, 531.
- Stephen, Leslie, depreciation of reason by theologians, 91.
- Stephen, Sir James, objection that the theist claims faculties which others have not, 110; religion not necessary, 406.
- Stewart, Balfour, waste in nature, 485.
- Stewart, Dugald, the immanence of God in nature, 140 f.
- Stoics, earlier and later, 356.
- Strauss, his rationalism, 127; influence of his life of Jesus, 141-143; discovery of law dethrones God, 317; science is man's remembrance of what himself ordered as the unconscious absolute, 336; logical issue of denying the possibility of miracles, 503.
- Strength, physical, intellectual, spiritual, progress measured by dependence on, 385 f., 537.
- Subjective, transition from, to objective, 75-80; revelation verified by objective, 5, 121.
- Substance, cannot account for the universe, 191, 201, 224, 226 f., 237; three in one, 193, 233 f.
- Suffering, objection to theism, 297-316; its significance revealed by Christ, 298, 310 f.
- Suffocation, intellectual, caused by atheism, 383.
- Sumner, C., charged with sentimental politics, 415.
- Supernatural and natural, line of demarcation between, 50, 83-86, 253-255, 341, 474-476; ignorance of the supernatural, strange and abnormal, 81; the natural cannot know it, 82 f.; antagonism disappears, 85 f., 288 f., 289-292; man at home in both, 134-137, 200, 260, 290; sense of supernatural, responsive to spiritual en-

vironment, 391-393; origin of the idea, 17 f., 21 f., 64 f., 160, 360 f.

Supreme Being, so to regard God makes him hollow, empty, poor, 225.

Survival of the fittest, the law treated as an efficient cause, 318, 319; relation to final causes, 321, 322, 326; is the law of force, that the strongest prevails over the weaker, 220, 301, 314 f., 534; law of the physical and the spiritual, declaring what must be, not what ought to be, 534 f., 535, 540; everywhere, power not weakness that achieves, 534 f.; not in conflict with the moral law, 535, 540; essential in determining what is duty to self and others, under the law of love, 535 f., 538 f.; the law regenerated by love, greatness by service, 536 f.; progress of society by developing spiritual power above physical and regulating it, 385 f., 537; error of Spencer's ethics, 537 f.; fundamental law revealed in Christ, the higher descending to the lower to help it to lift itself higher, 539, 540.

Symbolic, nature is, 256-266.

Symbols, force and other terms used as, 180, 533 f.

Synthesis, of nature, man and God, 220 f., 288 f.; natural and the spiritual, 85 f., 288f., 289-292; of the experimental, historical and rational in the knowledge of God, 121-149; of the antitheses of thought and things, spirit and matter, infinite and finite, 219-221; of the universal and particular in human reason and consciousness, 367 f.

Syrophœnician woman, 303.

T.

Talleyrand, 133 f.

Teleology, definition, 272; internal ends realizing ideals, 272-281; in particulars, 274-277; in the cosmos as a whole, 277-281; external ends, subserving uses, 272, 281-287; in particulars, 281-285; in nature as a whole, 285-287; is but a part of the evidence, 255, 320; objections, 319-331.

Tennyson, 88.

Tertullian, on the sacrifice of infants, 28; soul of man Christian by nature, 393.

Testimony to the reality of God's revelation in experience, 41 f., 111, 469.

Thébaud, Buddhism, 350.

Theism, points of agreement with non-theistic theories, 163, 169, 177-181, 222-224, 240; takes up aspects of truth attractive in pantheism, 199-201; irreconcilable with false philosophy, 210 f.; recognizes the

unity of the universe as dynamic and rational, 168, 184 f., 187 f., 202 f.; and the absolute Being, 207-229; rational ground of the reality of knowledge, 372-374.

Theologian, three requisites, thinking, praying, trying, 115 f.

Theology, systematic, 61-66, 127, 132 f.; concrete, 4, 99-102, 127-129, 140 f., 144, 147, 148 f.; its progress analogous to that of physical science, 16, 39, 66 f., 139, 208, 363; its processes analogous, 58, 59-61, 135 f., 148, 458, 470; common objections to, unreasonable, 131, 136 f., 147; key to current movement in, 139-149; Christocentric, 133, 143, 144, 450, 473, 516; no theology in the Bible as no science in nature, 4, 58, 148, 470.

Theophanies, 69-71, 467 f.

Theophilus, eyes of the soul, 102.

Thing in itself, 80.

Thomson, Rev. Dr., 353.

Thought, necessary to the knowledge of God, 59-73, 132 f., 394 f.; abstracted from being, not the ultimate ground of the universe, 373-375; not accounted for by molecular action of the brain, 343, 508-511.

Tiele, Professor, germs of all religions in the earliest, 20; on Socrates, 43; universality of religion, 347; theistic ideas in negro fetich-worship, 427.

Tradition, theory that the knowledge of God is communicated by, 355-357.

Transcendence, God's, revealed in the universe, 233-250; implied in the postulates of physical science, 235 f.; proved from the essential conditionedness of the physical system, 236 f.; from the fact that the universe, so far as observed, is an effect, 237-239; from atoms, masses and systems in nature, 239; from evolution, 239; from gaps and breaks which are inexplicable by persistence of force, 19, 205, 239, 269-271, 292, 331, 381, 481 f.

Transcendence and immanence, 190-193, 211 f. See Immanence.

Transition of knowledge from subjective to objective, 75, 82, 220, 227, 367.

Tree, Keary's theory of worship, 359 f.

Trench, R. C., miracles and Antæus, 477.

Trendelenburg, the absolute not a negative notion, 217; proof of God's personality indirect, 252; thought and being, 375.

True, the, idea of, 80, 262 f., 368; motives and emotions pertaining to, 88, 382-384, 389 f.; practical influence dependent on the knowledge of God, 406 f.

Trust in the gods in ethnic religions, 42-44.

Trustworthiness of the human mind, 372 f.

- Truth, assimilated into life, 115-118; love of, 118 f.
- Tulloch, man's intuition of the spiritual, 93.
- Turgot, author of Comte's theory of progress of thought, 428.
- Turretine, Spirit's influence in regeneration, 516.
- Tylor, universality of religious and moral consciousness, 45, 347, 348; primitive impulse to ascertain causes, 383.
- Tyndall, materialism not favored in hours of clearness and vigor, 224; primitive impulse to ascertain causes, 383; identifies will with caprice, 316; language implying final causes, 321; no rudiment of a faculty for knowing God, 357.
- TJ.
- Uhlhorn, 29.
- Ulrici, knowledge and belief, 99, 114, 202; divinity of nature-religions, a power behind nature, 361.
- Ultimate units of thought and being, 184.
- Ulysses and Grillus, 106.
- Unaided reason, 80 f., 91, 93, 119 f., 122.
- Uniformity and continuity of nature, theism alone gives the explanation, 254 f., 316-319; these and not merely the anomalous reveal God, 19 f., 424; prove a directing mind, 267-272; these facts distinguished from rational laws, 475, 479 f., 483 f., 506.
- Union with God man's normal condition, 105 f., 542-546.
- Unity of the proofs of the existence of God, 153 f., 164 f.; all things in systems and of these in one all-comprehending, 265 f., 287-292, 505-515; is dynamic, rational and moral, 168, 184 f., 191 f., 254 f.; absolute reason necessary to, 354 f., 371; of nature, man and God, 85 f., 219-221, 287-292; and continuity of law in the physical and the spiritual systems, 532-546.
- Universal revealed in the consciousness of the individual, 367; in the particular, 367-372.
- Universe, mechanical conception of, 140, 237, 268 f., 317, 480 f.; type of, an organism, 286, 481; not a finished mechanism, but plastic, 54 f., 210, 277-280; its constitution is the archetypal thought of God expressed in it, 79, 115, 192 f., 219 f., 227, 256-260, 289, 292-294, 513; revelation of God, 54; every man a centre to, 87, 367, 422 f., 551 f.
- Unlettered Christians have a reasonable faith, 399-402.
- Use, disuse and abuse of faculties, 112-114.
- Uses, nature subserves, 281-287.
- V.
- Varuna, prayer to, 42.
- Veneering of paganism, Christianity, 425.
- Venus of Milo and Heine, 390 f.
- Verification by observation not required in scientific hypothesis, 253; of the theistic hypothesis, 253, 292-294.
- Vine and branch, parable of, 105, 542.
- Virchow, materialistic dogmatism, 204.
- Vowel-points, Hebrew, inspiration of. 128.
- W.
- Wace, faith-faculty, 90, 92.
- Waitz, advanced religious ideas of negro tribes, 427.
- Wallis, Bible a lantern rather than a light, 457.
- Waste in nature, 296, 331; Goethe on, 294 f.; Prof. B. Stewart on, 485.
- Webster, D., necessity of religion, 417 f.; objection from the vastness of the universe, 550 f.
- Whately, progressiveness of revelation, 456.
- Whitman, W., 107.
- Whitney, Prof. W. D., definition of religion, 15.
- Will, free, is reason energizing, 375; is supernatural, 17, 50, 83-86, 253-255, 341, 474-476; potential unconditionedness, 214; is its idea inherent in cause? 247-250; God revealed in the sphere of, 89, 375-377; pantheism incompatible with, 193-198; is the same with miracle-working power, 474, 475 f., 478 f., 504, 514 f.; denial of the possibility of miracles is the denial of free will, 502-504.
- Will of God, regulated by reason, 199-201, 305 f., 316-319, 479 f., 497-499; objection that order and law prove the absence of will, 316-319; not a separate volition causing every motion, 249, 337-339.
- Wilson, W. D., evolution without beginning, 209 f.
- Wisdom, a master workman, 516.
- Witness, of the Spirit, 106, 119 f., 468 f.; of the believer, 41 f., 111, 468 f.
- Wonder, a feeling responsive to the absolute, 379 f.; of ignorance and of knowledge, 424; a miracle not merely a, 497.
- Words, revelation through, inadequate, 51, 71, 362 f., 446-451; the living Word and

the written, 447 f.; of the Master, 448,
458.
Wordsworth, John, law and process, 279.
Wordsworth, Wm., 371, 376, 378.
Wright, Chauncey, cosmical weather, 170.

X.

Xenophanes, anthropomorphism, 434.

Y.

Yoga, 123.

Z.

Zeller, on the Absolute, 162.

Zeno, logical puzzles, 193.

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
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